_On the contrary,_ Qualities are divisible only accidentally, that is, by reason of the subject. But the qualities remaining in this sacrament are divided by the division of dimensive quant.i.ty, as is evident through our senses. Therefore, dimensive quant.i.ty is the subject of the accidents which remain in this sacrament.
_I answer that,_ It is necessary to say that the other accidents which remain in this sacrament are subjected in the dimensive quant.i.ty of the bread and wine that remains: first of all, because something having quant.i.ty and color and affected by other accidents is perceived by the senses; nor is sense deceived in such. Secondly, because the first disposition of matter is dimensive quant.i.ty, hence Plato also a.s.signed "great" and "small" as the first differences of matter (Aristotle, _Metaph._ iv). And because the first subject is matter, the consequence is that all other accidents are related to their subject through the medium of dimensive quant.i.ty; just as the first subject of color is said to be the surface, on which account some have maintained that dimensions are the substances of bodies, as is said in _Metaph._ iii. And since, when the subject is withdrawn, the accidents remain according to the being which they had before, it follows that all accidents remain founded upon dimensive quant.i.ty.
Thirdly, because, since the subject is the principle of individuation of the accidents, it is necessary for what is admitted as the subject of some accidents to be somehow the principle of individuation: for it is of the very notion of an individual that it cannot be in several; and this happens in two ways. First, because it is not natural to it to be in any one; and in this way immaterial separated forms, subsisting of themselves, are also individuals of themselves.
Secondly, because a form, be it substantial or accidental, is naturally in someone indeed, not in several, as this whiteness, which is in this body. As to the first, matter is the principle of individuation of all inherent forms, because, since these forms, considered in themselves, are naturally in something as in a subject, from the very fact that one of them is received in matter, which is not in another, it follows that neither can the form itself thus existing be in another. As to the second, it must be maintained that the principle of individuation is dimensive quant.i.ty. For that something is naturally in another one solely, is due to the fact that that other is undivided in itself, and distinct from all others. But it is on account of quant.i.ty that substance can be divided, as is said in _Phys._ i. And therefore dimensive quant.i.ty itself is a particular principle of individuation in forms of this kind, namely, inasmuch as forms numerically distinct are in different parts of the matter. Hence also dimensive quant.i.ty has of itself a kind of individuation, so that we can imagine several lines of the same species, differing in position, which is included in the notion of this quant.i.ty; for it belongs to dimension for it to be "quant.i.ty having position" (Aristotle, Categor. iv), and therefore dimensive quant.i.ty can be the subject of the other accidents, rather than the other way about.
Reply Obj. 1: One accident cannot of itself be the subject of another, because it does not exist of itself. But inasmuch as an accident is received in another thing, one is said to be the subject of the other, inasmuch as one is received in a subject through another, as the surface is said to be the subject of color. Hence when G.o.d makes an accident to exist of itself, it can also be of itself the subject of another.
Reply Obj. 2: The other accidents, even as they were in the substance of the bread, were individuated by means of dimensive quant.i.ty, as stated above. And therefore dimensive quant.i.ty is the subject of the other accidents remaining in this sacrament, rather than conversely.
Reply Obj. 3: Rarity and density are particular qualities accompanying bodies, by reason of their having much or little matter under dimensions; just as all other accidents likewise follow from the principles of substance. And consequently, as the accidents are preserved by Divine power when the substance is withdrawn, so, when matter is withdrawn, the qualities which go with matter, such as rarity and density, are preserved by Divine power.
Reply Obj. 4: Mathematical quant.i.ty abstracts not from intelligible matter, but from sensible matter, as is said in _Metaph._ vii. But matter is termed sensible because it underlies sensible qualities.
And therefore it is manifest that the dimensive quant.i.ty, which remains in this sacrament without a subject, is not mathematical quant.i.ty.
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THIRD ARTICLE [III, Q. 77, Art. 3]
Whether the Species Remaining in This Sacrament Can Change External Objects?
Objection 1: It seems that the species which remain in this sacrament cannot affect external objects. For it is proved in _Phys._ vii, that forms which are in matter are produced by forms that are in matter, but not from forms which are without matter, because like makes like.
But the sacramental species are species without matter, since they remain without a subject, as is evident from what was said above (A.
1). Therefore they cannot affect other matter by producing any form in it.
Obj. 2: Further, when the action of the princ.i.p.al agent ceases, then the action of the instrument must cease, as when the carpenter rests, the hammer is moved no longer. But all accidental forms act instrumentally in virtue of the substantial form as the princ.i.p.al agent. Therefore, since the substantial form of the bread and wine does not remain in this sacrament, as was shown above (Q. 75, A. 6), it seems that the accidental forms which remain cannot act so as to change external matter.
Obj. 3: Further, nothing acts outside its species, because an effect cannot surpa.s.s its cause. But all the sacramental species are accidents. Therefore they cannot change external matter, at least as to a substantial form.
_On the contrary,_ If they could not change external bodies, they could not be felt; for a thing is felt from the senses being changed by a sensible thing, as is said in _De Anima_ ii.
_I answer that,_ Because everything acts in so far as it is an actual being, the consequence is that everything stands in the same relation to action as it does to being. Therefore, because, according to what was said above (A. 1), it is an effect of the Divine power that the sacramental species continue in the being which they had when the substance of the bread and wine was present, it follows that they continue in their action. Consequently they retain every action which they had while the substance of the bread and wine remained, now that the substance of the bread and wine has pa.s.sed into the body and blood of Christ. Hence there is no doubt but that they can change external bodies.
Reply Obj. 1: The sacramental species, although they are forms existing without matter, still retain the same being which they had before in matter, and therefore as to their being they are like forms which are in matter.
Reply Obj. 2: The action of an accidental form depends upon the action of a substantial form in the same way as the being of accident depends upon the being of substance; and therefore, as it is an effect of Divine power that the sacramental species exist without substance, so is it an effect of Divine power that they can act without a substantial form, because every action of a substantial or accidental form depends upon G.o.d as the first agent.
Reply Obj. 3: The change which terminates in a substantial form is not effected by a substantial form directly, but by means of the active and pa.s.sive qualities, which act in virtue of the substantial form. But by Divine power this instrumental energy is retained in the sacramental species, just as it was before: and consequently their action can be directed to a substantial form instrumentally, just in the same way as anything can act outside its species, not as by its own power, but by the power of the chief agent.
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FOURTH ARTICLE [III, Q. 77, Art. 4]
Whether the Sacramental Species Can Be Corrupted?
Objection 1: It seems that the sacramental species cannot be corrupted, because corruption comes of the separation of the form from the matter. But the matter of the bread does not remain in this sacrament, as is clear from what was said above (Q. 75, A. 2).
Therefore these species cannot be corrupted.
Obj. 2: Further, no form is corrupted except accidentally, that is, when its subject is corrupted; hence self-subsisting forms are incorruptible, as is seen in spiritual substances. But the sacramental species are forms without a subject. Therefore they cannot be corrupted.
Obj. 3: Further, if they be corrupted, it will either be naturally or miraculously. But they cannot be corrupted naturally, because no subject of corruption can be a.s.signed as remaining after the corruption has taken place. Neither can they be corrupted miraculously, because the miracles which occur in this sacrament take place in virtue of the consecration, whereby the sacramental species are preserved: and the same thing is not the cause of preservation and of corruption. Therefore, in no way can the sacramental species be corrupted.
_On the contrary,_ We perceive by our senses that the consecrated hosts become putrefied and corrupted.
_I answer that,_ Corruption is "movement from being into non-being"
(Aristotle, _Phys._ v). Now it has been stated (A. 3) that the sacramental species retain the same being as they had before when the substance of the bread was present. Consequently, as the being of those accidents could be corrupted while the substance of the bread and wine was present, so likewise they can be corrupted now that the substance has pa.s.sed away.
But such accidents could have been previously corrupted in two ways: in one way, of themselves; in another way, accidentally. They could be corrupted of themselves, as by alteration of the qualities, and increase or decrease of the quant.i.ty, not in the way in which increase or decrease is found only in animated bodies, such as the substances of the bread and wine are not, but by addition or division; for, as is said in _Metaph._ iii, one dimension is dissolved by division, and two dimensions result; while on the contrary, by addition, two dimensions become one. And in this way such accidents can be corrupted manifestly after consecration, because the dimensive quant.i.ty which remains can receive division and addition; and since it is the subject of sensible qualities, as stated above (A. 1), it can likewise be the subject of their alteration, for instance, if the color or the savor of the bread or wine be altered.
An accident can be corrupted in another way, through the corruption of its subject, and in this way also they can be corrupted after consecration; for although the subject does not remain, still the being which they had in the subject does remain, which being is proper, and suited to the subject. And therefore such being can be corrupted by a contrary agent, as the substance of the bread or wine was subject to corruption, and, moreover, was not corrupted except by a preceding alteration regarding the accidents.
Nevertheless, a distinction must be made between each of the aforesaid corruptions; because, when the body and the blood of Christ succeed in this sacrament to the substance of the bread and wine, if there be such change on the part of the accidents as would not have sufficed for the corruption of the bread and wine, then the body and blood of Christ do not cease to be under this sacrament on account of such change, whether the change be on the part of the quality, as for instance, when the color or the savor of the bread or wine is slightly modified; or on the part of the quant.i.ty, as when the bread or the wine is divided into such parts as to keep in them the nature of bread or of wine. But if the change be so great that the substance of the bread or wine would have been corrupted, then Christ"s body and blood do not remain under this sacrament; and this either on the part of the qualities, as when the color, savor, and other qualities of the bread and wine are so altered as to be incompatible with the nature of bread or of wine; or else on the part of the quant.i.ty, as, for instance, if the bread be reduced to fine particles, or the wine divided into such tiny drops that the species of bread or wine no longer remain.
Reply Obj. 1: Since it belongs essentially to corruption to take away the being of a thing, in so far as the being of some form is in matter, it results that by corruption the form is separated from the matter. But if such being were not in matter, yet like such being as is in matter, it could be taken away by corruption, even where there is no matter; as takes place in this sacrament, as is evident from what was said above.
Reply Obj. 2: Although the sacramental species are forms not in matter, yet they have the being which they had in matter.
Reply Obj. 3: This corruption of species is not miraculous, but natural; nevertheless, it presupposes the miracle which is wrought in the consecration, namely, that those sacramental species retain without a subject, the same being as they had in a subject; just as a blind man, to whom sight is given miraculously, sees naturally.
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FIFTH ARTICLE [III, Q. 77, Art. 5]
Whether Anything Can Be Generated from the Sacramental Species?
Objection 1: It seems that nothing can be generated from the sacramental species: because, whatever is generated, is generated out of some matter: for nothing is generated out of nothing, although by creation something is made out of nothing. But there is no matter underlying the sacramental species except that of Christ"s body, and that body is incorruptible. Therefore it seems that nothing can be generated from the sacramental species.
Obj. 2: Further, things which are not of the same genus cannot spring from one another: thus a line is not made of whiteness. But accident and substance differ generically. Therefore, since the sacramental species are accidents, it seems that no substance can be generated from them.
Obj. 3: Further, if any corporeal substance be generated from them, such substance will not be without accident. Therefore, if any corporeal substance be generated from the sacramental species, then substance and accident would be generated from accident, namely, two things from one, which is impossible. Consequently, it is impossible for any corporeal substance to be generated out of the sacramental species.
_On the contrary,_ The senses are witness that something is generated out of the sacramental species, either ashes, if they be burned, worms if they putrefy, or dust if they be crushed.
_I answer that,_ Since "the corruption of one thing is the generation of another" (De Gener. i), something must be generated necessarily from the sacramental species if they be corrupted, as stated above (A. 4); for they are not corrupted in such a way that they disappear altogether, as if reduced to nothing; on the contrary, something sensible manifestly succeeds to them.
Nevertheless, it is difficult to see how anything can be generated from them. For it is quite evident that nothing is generated out of the body and blood of Christ which are truly there, because these are incorruptible. But if the substance, or even the matter, of the bread and wine were to remain in this sacrament, then, as some have maintained, it would be easy to account for this sensible object which succeeds to them. But that supposition is false, as was stated above (Q. 75, AA. 2, 4, 8).
Hence it is that others have said that the things generated have not sprung from the sacramental species, but from the surrounding atmosphere. But this can be shown in many ways to be impossible. In the first place, because when a thing is generated from another, the latter at first appears changed and corrupted; whereas no alteration or corruption appeared previously in the adjacent atmosphere; hence the worms or ashes are not generated therefrom. Secondly, because the nature of the atmosphere is not such as to permit of such things being generated by such alterations. Thirdly, because it is possible for many consecrated hosts to be burned or putrefied; nor would it be possible for an earthen body, large enough to be generated from the atmosphere, unless a great and, in fact, exceedingly sensible condensation of the atmosphere took place. Fourthly, because the same thing can happen to the solid bodies surrounding them, such as iron or stone, which remain entire after the generation of the aforesaid things. Hence this opinion cannot stand, because it is opposed to what is manifest to our senses.
And therefore others have said that the substance of the bread and wine returns during the corruption of the species, and so from the returning substance of the bread and wine, ashes or worms or something of the kind are generated. But this explanation seems an impossible one. First of all, because if the substance of the bread and wine be converted into the body and blood of Christ, as was shown above (Q. 75, AA. 2, 4), the substance of the bread and wine cannot return, except the body and blood of Christ be again changed back into the substance of bread and wine, which is impossible: thus if air be turned into fire, the air cannot return without the fire being again changed into air. But if the substance of bread or wine be annihilated, it cannot return again, because what lapses into nothing does not return numerically the same. Unless perchance it be said that the said substance returns, because G.o.d creates anew another new substance to replace the first. Secondly, this seems to be impossible, because no time can be a.s.signed when the substance of the bread returns. For, from what was said above (A. 4; Q. 76, A. 6, ad 3), it is evident that while the species of the bread and wine remain, there remain also the body and blood of Christ, which are not present together with the substance of the bread and wine in this sacrament, according to what was stated above (Q. 75, A. 2). Hence the substance of the bread and wine cannot return while the sacramental species remain; nor, again, when these species pa.s.s away; because then the substance of the bread and wine would be without their proper accidents, which is impossible. Unless perchance it be said that in the last instant of the corruption of the species there returns (not, indeed, the substance of bread and wine, because it is in that very instant that they have the being of the substance generated from the species, but) the matter of the bread and wine; which, matter, properly speaking, would be more correctly described as created anew, than as returning. And in this sense the aforesaid position might be held.
However, since it does not seem reasonable to say that anything takes place miraculously in this sacrament, except in virtue of the consecration itself, which does not imply either creation or return of matter, it seems better to say that in the actual consecration it is miraculously bestowed on the dimensive quant.i.ty of the bread and wine to be the subject of subsequent forms. Now this is proper to matter; and therefore as a consequence everything which goes with matter is bestowed on dimensive quant.i.ty; and therefore everything which could be generated from the matter of bread or wine, if it were present, can be generated from the aforesaid dimensive quant.i.ty of the bread or wine, not, indeed, by a new miracle, but by virtue of the miracle which has already taken place.
Reply Obj. 1: Although no matter is there out of which a thing may be generated, nevertheless dimensive quant.i.ty supplies the place of matter, as stated above.
Reply Obj. 2: Those sacramental species are indeed accidents, yet they have the act and power of substance, as stated above (A. 3).
Reply Obj. 3: The dimensive quant.i.ty of the bread and wine retains its own nature, and receives miraculously the power and property of substance; and therefore it can pa.s.s to both, that is, into substance and dimension.
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SIXTH ARTICLE [III, Q. 77, Art. 6]