Reply Obj. 1: As stated above (Q. 84, A. 1, ad 1; AA. 2, 3), in the sacrament of Penance, human acts take the place of matter, which is not the case in Baptism and Confirmation. Wherefore, since virtue is a principle of an act, penance is either a virtue or accompanies a virtue, rather than Baptism or Confirmation.
Reply Obj. 2: Penance, considered as a pa.s.sion, is not a virtue, as stated above, and it is thus that it is accompanied by a bodily alteration. On the other hand, it is a virtue, according as it includes a right choice on the part of the will; which, however, applies to penance rather than to shame. Because shame regards the evil deed as present, whereas penance regards the evil deed as past.
Now it is contrary to the perfection of virtue that one should have an evil deed actually present, of which one ought to be ashamed; whereas it is not contrary to the perfection of virtue that we should have previously committed evil deeds, of which it behooves us to repent, since a man from being wicked becomes virtuous.
Reply Obj. 3: It would indeed be foolish to grieve for what has already been done, with the intention of trying to make it not done.
But the penitent does not intend this: for his sorrow is displeasure or disapproval with regard to the past deed, with the intention of removing its result, viz. the anger of G.o.d and the debt of punishment: and this is not foolish.
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SECOND ARTICLE [III, Q. 85, Art. 2]
Whether Penance Is a Special Virtue?
Objection 1: It would seem that penance is not a special virtue. For it seems that to rejoice at the good one has done, and to grieve for the evil one has done are acts of the same nature. But joy for the good one has done is not a special virtue, but is a praiseworthy emotion proceeding from charity, as Augustine states (De Civ. Dei xiv, 7, 8, 9): wherefore the Apostle says (1 Cor. 13:6) that charity "rejoiceth not at iniquity, but rejoiceth with the truth." Therefore, in like manner, neither is penance, which is sorrow for past sins, a special virtue, but an emotion resulting from charity.
Obj. 2: Further, every special virtue has its special matter, because habits are distinguished by their acts, and acts by their objects.
But penance has no special matter, because its matter is past sins in any matter whatever. Therefore penance is not a special virtue.
Obj. 3: Further, nothing is removed except by its contrary. But penance removes all sins. Therefore it is contrary to all sins, and consequently is not a special virtue.
_On the contrary,_ The Law has a special precept about penance, as stated above (Q. 84, AA. 5, 7).
_I answer that,_ As stated in the Second Part (I-II, Q. 54, A. 1, ad 1, A. 2), habits are specifically distinguished according to the species of their acts, so that whenever an act has a special reason for being praiseworthy, there must needs be a special habit. Now it is evident that there is a special reason for praising the act of penance, because it aims at the destruction of past sin, considered as an offense against G.o.d, which does not apply to any other virtue.
We must therefore conclude that penance is a special virtue.
Reply Obj. 1: An act springs from charity in two ways: first as being elicited by charity, and a like virtuous act requires no other virtue than charity, e.g. to love the good, to rejoice therein, and to grieve for what is opposed to it. Secondly, an act springs from charity, being, so to speak, commanded by charity; and thus, since charity commands all the virtues, inasmuch as it directs them to its own end, an act springing from charity may belong even to another special virtue. Accordingly, if in the act of the penitent we consider the mere displeasure in the past sin, it belongs to charity immediately, in the same way as joy for past good acts; but the intention to aim at the destruction of past sin requires a special virtue subordinate to charity.
Reply Obj. 2: In point of fact, penance has indeed a general matter, inasmuch as it regards all sins; but it does so under a special aspect, inasmuch as they can be remedied by an act of man in co-operating with G.o.d for his justification.
Reply Obj. 3: Every special virtue removes formally the habit of the opposite vice, just as whiteness removes blackness from the same subject: but penance removes every sin effectively, inasmuch as it works for the destruction of sins, according as they are pardonable through the grace of G.o.d if man co-operate therewith. Wherefore it does not follow that it is a general virtue.
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THIRD ARTICLE [III, Q. 85, Art. 3]
Whether the Virtue of Penance Is a Species of Justice?
Objection 1: It would seem that the virtue of penance is not a species of justice. For justice is not a theological but a moral virtue, as was shown in the Second Part (II-II, Q. 62, A. 3). But penance seems to be a theological virtue, since G.o.d is its object, for it makes satisfaction to G.o.d, to Whom, moreover, it reconciles the sinner. Therefore it seems that penance is not a species of justice.
Obj. 2: Further, since justice is a moral virtue it observes the mean. Now penance does not observe the mean, but rather goes to the extreme, according to Jer. 6:26: "Make thee mourning as for an only son, a bitter lamentation." Therefore penance is not a species of justice.
Obj. 3: Further, there are two species of justice, as stated in _Ethic._ v, 4, viz. "distributive" and "commutative." But penance does not seem to be contained under either of them. Therefore it seems that penance is not a species of justice.
Obj. 4: Further, a gloss on Luke 6:21, "Blessed are ye that weep now," says: "It is prudence that teaches us the unhappiness of earthly things and the happiness of heavenly things." But weeping is an act of penance. Therefore penance is a species of prudence rather than of justice.
_On the contrary,_ Augustine says in _De Poenitentia_ [*De vera et falsa Poenitentia, the authorship of which is unknown]: "Penance is the vengeance of the sorrowful, ever punishing in them what they are sorry for having done." But to take vengeance is an act of justice, wherefore Tully says (De Inv. Rhet. ii) that one kind of justice is called vindictive. Therefore it seems that penance is a species of justice.
_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1, ad 2) penance is a special virtue not merely because it sorrows for evil done (since charity would suffice for that), but also because the penitent grieves for the sin he has committed, inasmuch as it is an offense against G.o.d, and purposes to amend. Now amendment for an offense committed against anyone is not made by merely ceasing to offend, but it is necessary to make some kind of compensation, which obtains in offenses committed against another, just as retribution does, only that compensation is on the part of the offender, as when he makes satisfaction, whereas retribution is on the part of the person offended against. Each of these belongs to the matter of justice, because each is a kind of commutation. Wherefore it is evident that penance, as a virtue, is a part of justice.
It must be observed, however, that according to the Philosopher (Ethic. v, 6) a thing is said to be just in two ways, simply and relatively. A thing is just simply when it is between equals, since justice is a kind of equality, and he calls this the politic or civil just, because all citizens are equal, in the point of being immediately under the ruler, retaining their freedom. But a thing is just relatively when it is between parties of whom one is subject to the other, as a servant under his master, a son under his father, a wife under her husband. It is this kind of just that we consider in penance. Wherefore the penitent has recourse to G.o.d with a purpose of amendment, as a servant to his master, according to Ps. 122:2: "Behold, as the eyes of servants are on the hands of their masters ... so are our eyes unto the Lord our G.o.d, until He have mercy on us"; and as a son to his father, according to Luke 15:21: "Father, I have sinned against heaven and before thee"; and as a wife to her husband, according to Jer. 3:1: "Thou hast prost.i.tuted thyself to many lovers; nevertheless return to Me, saith the Lord."
Reply Obj. 1: As stated in _Ethic._ v, 1, justice is a virtue towards another person, and the matter of justice is not so much the person to whom justice is due as the thing which is the subject of distribution or commutation. Hence the matter of penance is not G.o.d, but human acts, whereby G.o.d is offended or appeased; whereas G.o.d is as one to whom justice is due. Wherefore it is evident that penance is not a theological virtue, because G.o.d is not its matter or object.
Reply Obj. 2: The mean of justice is the equality that is established between those between whom justice is, as stated in _Ethic._ v. But in certain cases perfect equality cannot be established, on account of the excellence of one, as between father and son, G.o.d and man, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. viii, 14), wherefore in such cases, he that falls short of the other must do whatever he can. Yet this will not be sufficient simply, but only according to the acceptance of the higher one; and this is what is meant by ascribing excess to penance.
Reply Obj. 3: As there is a kind of commutation in favors, when, to wit, a man gives thanks for a favor received, so also is there commutation in the matter of offenses, when, on account of an offense committed against another, a man is either punished against his will, which pertains to vindictive justice, or makes amends of his own accord, which belongs to penance, which regards the person of the sinner, just as vindictive justice regards the person of the judge.
Therefore it is evident that both are comprised under commutative justice.
Reply Obj. 4: Although penance is directly a species of justice, yet, in a fashion, it comprises things pertaining to all the virtues; for inasmuch as there is a justice of man towards G.o.d, it must have a share in matter pertaining to the theological virtues, the object of which is G.o.d. Consequently penance comprises faith in Christ"s Pa.s.sion, whereby we are cleansed of our sins, hope for pardon, and hatred of vice, which pertains to charity. Inasmuch as it is a moral virtue, it has a share of prudence, which directs all the moral virtues: but from the very nature of justice, it has not only something belonging to justice, but also something belonging to temperance and fort.i.tude, inasmuch as those things which cause pleasure, and which pertain to temperance, and those which cause terror, which fort.i.tude moderates, are objects of commutative justice. Accordingly it belongs to justice both to abstain from pleasure, which belongs to temperance, and to bear with hardships, which belongs to fort.i.tude.
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FOURTH ARTICLE [III, Q. 85, Art. 4]
Whether the Will Is Properly the Subject of Penance?
Objection 1: It would seem that the subject of penance is not properly the will. For penance is a species of sorrow. But sorrow is in the concupiscible part, even as joy is. Therefore penance is in the concupiscible faculty.
Obj. 2: Further, penance is a kind of vengeance, as Augustine states in _De Poenitentia_ [*De vera et falsa Poenitentia, the authorship of which is unknown]. But vengeance seems to regard the irascible faculty, since anger is the desire for vengeance. Therefore it seems that penance is in the irascible part.
Obj. 3: Further, the past is the proper object of the memory, according to the Philosopher (De Memoria i). Now penance regards the past, as stated above (A. 1, ad 2, ad 3). Therefore penance is subjected in the memory.
Obj. 4: Further, nothing acts where it is not. Now penance removes sin from all the powers of the soul. Therefore penance is in every power of the soul, and not only in the will.
_On the contrary,_ Penance is a kind of sacrifice, according to Ps.
50:19: "A sacrifice to G.o.d is an afflicted spirit." But to offer a sacrifice is an act of the will, according to Ps. 53:8: "I will freely sacrifice to Thee." Therefore penance is in the will.
_I answer that,_ We can speak of penance in two ways: first, in so far as it is a pa.s.sion, and thus, since it is a kind of sorrow, it is in the concupiscible part as its subject; secondly, in so far as it is a virtue, and thus, as stated above (A. 3), it is a species of justice. Now justice, as stated in the Second Part (I-II, Q. 56, A.
6), is subjected in the rational appet.i.te which is the will.
Therefore it is evident that penance, in so far as it is a virtue, is subjected in the will, and its proper act is the purpose of amending what was committed against G.o.d.
Reply Obj. 1: This argument considers penance as a pa.s.sion.
Reply Obj. 2: To desire vengeance on another, through pa.s.sion, belongs to the irascible appet.i.te, but to desire or take vengeance on oneself or on another, through reason, belongs to the will.
Reply Obj. 3: The memory is a power that apprehends the past. But penance belongs not to the apprehensive but to the appet.i.tive power, which presupposes an act of the apprehension. Wherefore penance is not in the memory, but presupposes it.
Reply Obj. 4: The will, as stated above (I, Q. 82, A. 4; I-II, Q. 9, A. 1), moves all the other powers of the soul; so that it is not unreasonable for penance to be subjected in the will, and to produce an effect in each power of the soul.
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FIFTH ARTICLE [III, Q. 85, Art. 5]
Whether Penance Originates from Fear?
Objection 1: It would seem that penance does not originate from fear.
For penance originates in displeasure at sin. But this belongs to charity, as stated above (A. 3). Therefore penance originates from love rather than fear.
Obj. 2: Further, men are induced to do penance, through the expectation of the heavenly kingdom, according to Matt. 3:2 and Matt.
4:17: "Do penance, for the kingdom of heaven is at hand." Now the kingdom of heaven is the object of hope. Therefore penance results from hope rather than from fear.
Obj. 3: Further, fear is an internal act of man. But penance does not seem to arise in us through any work of man, but through the operation of G.o.d, according to Jer. 31:19: "After Thou didst convert me I did penance." Therefore penance does not result from fear.