Reply Obj. 2: The morning and evening knowledge belong to the day, that is, to the enlightened angels, who are quite apart from the darkness, that is, from the evil spirits. The good angels, while knowing the creature, do not adhere to it, for that would be to turn to darkness and to night; but they refer this back to the praise of G.o.d, in Whom, as in their principle, they know all things.
Consequently after "evening" there is no night, but "morning"; so that morning is the end of the preceding day, and the beginning of the following, in so far as the angels refer to G.o.d"s praise their knowledge of the preceding work. Noonday is comprised under the name of day, as the middle between the two extremes. Or else the noon can be referred to their knowledge of G.o.d Himself, Who has neither beginning nor end.
Reply Obj. 3: The angels themselves are also creatures. Accordingly the existence of things in the angelic knowledge is comprised under evening knowledge, as also the existence of things in their own nature.
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SEVENTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 58, Art. 7]
Whether the Morning and Evening Knowledge Are One?
Objection 1: It would seem that the morning and the evening knowledge are one. For it is said (Gen. 1:5): "There was evening and morning, one day." But by the expression "day" the knowledge of the angels is to be understood, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. iv, 23). Therefore the morning and evening knowledge of the angels are one and the same.
Obj. 2: Further, it is impossible for one faculty to have two operations at the same time. But the angels are always using their morning knowledge; because they are always beholding G.o.d and things in G.o.d, according to Matt. 18:10. Therefore, if the evening knowledge were different from the morning, the angel could never exercise his evening knowledge.
Obj. 3: Further, the Apostle says (1 Cor. 13:10): "When that which is perfect is come, then that which is in part shall be done away." But, if the evening knowledge be different from the morning, it is compared to it as the less perfect to the perfect. Therefore the evening knowledge cannot exist together with the morning knowledge.
_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. iv, 24): "There is a vast difference between knowing anything as it is in the Word of G.o.d, and as it is in its own nature; so that the former belongs to the day, and the latter to the evening."
_I answer that,_ As was observed (A. 6), the evening knowledge is that by which the angels know things in their proper nature. This cannot be understood as if they drew their knowledge from the proper nature of things, so that the preposition "in" denotes the form of a principle; because, as has been already stated (Q. 55, A. 2), the angels do not draw their knowledge from things. It follows, then, that when we say "in their proper nature" we refer to the aspect of the thing known in so far as it is an object of knowledge; that is to say, that the evening knowledge is in the angels in so far as they know the being of things which those things have in their own nature.
Now they know this through a twofold medium, namely, by innate ideas, or by the forms of things existing in the Word. For by beholding the Word, they know not merely the being of things as existing in the Word, but the being as possessed by the things themselves; as G.o.d by contemplating Himself sees that being which things have in their own nature. It, therefore, it be called evening knowledge, in so far as when the angels behold the Word, they know the being which things have in their proper nature, then the morning and the evening knowledge are essentially one and the same, and only differ as to the things known.
If it be called evening knowledge, in so far as through innate ideas they know the being which things have in their own natures, then the morning and the evening knowledge differ. Thus Augustine seems to understand it when he a.s.signs one as inferior to the other.
Reply Obj. 1: The six days, as Augustine understands them, are taken as the six cla.s.ses of things known by the angels; so that the day"s unit is taken according to the unit of the thing understood; which, nevertheless, can be apprehended by various ways of knowing it.
Reply Obj. 2: There can be two operations of the same faculty at the one time, one of which is referred to the other; as is evident when the will at the same time wills the end and the means to the end; and the intellect at the same instant perceives principles and conclusions through those principles, when it has already acquired knowledge. As Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. iv, 24), the evening knowledge is referred to the morning knowledge in the angels; hence there is nothing to hinder both from being at the same time in the angels.
Reply Obj. 3: On the coming of what is perfect, the opposite imperfect is done away: just as faith, which is of the things that are not seen, is made void when vision succeeds. But the imperfection of the evening knowledge is not opposed to the perfection of the morning knowledge. For that a thing be known in itself, is not opposite to its being known in its cause. Nor, again, is there any inconsistency in knowing a thing through two mediums, one of which is more perfect and the other less perfect; just as we can have a demonstrative and a probable medium for reaching the same conclusion.
In like manner a thing can be known by the angel through the uncreated Word, and through an innate idea.
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QUESTION 59
THE WILL OF THE ANGELS (FOUR ARTICLES)
In the next place we must treat of things concerning the will of the angels. In the first place we shall treat of the will itself; secondly, of its movement, which is love. Under the first heading there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether there is will in the angels?
(2) Whether the will of the angel is his nature, or his intellect?
(3) Is there free-will in the angels?
(4) Is there an irascible and a concupiscible appet.i.te in them?
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FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 59, Art. 1]
Whether There Is Will in the Angels?
Objection 1: It would seem that there is no will in the angels. For as the Philosopher says (De Anima iii, text. 42), "The will is in the reason." But there is no reason in the angels, but something higher than reason. Therefore there is no will in the angels, but something higher than the will.
Obj. 2: Further, the will is comprised under the appet.i.te, as is evident from the Philosopher (De Anima iii, text. 42). But the appet.i.te argues something imperfect; because it is a desire of something not as yet possessed. Therefore, since there is no imperfection in the angels, especially in the blessed ones, it seems that there is no will in them.
Obj. 3: Further, the Philosopher says (De Anima ii, text. 54) that the will is a mover which is moved; for it is moved by the appetible object understood. Now the angels are immovable, since they are incorporeal. Therefore there is no will in the angels.
_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Trin. x, 11,12) that the image of the Trinity is found in the soul according to memory, understanding, and will. But G.o.d"s image is found not only in the soul of man, but also in the angelic mind, since it also is capable of knowing G.o.d. Therefore there is will in the angels.
_I answer that,_ We must necessarily place a will in the angels. In evidence thereof, it must be borne in mind that, since all things flow from the Divine will, all things in their own way are inclined by appet.i.te towards good, but in different ways. Some are inclined to good by their natural inclination, without knowledge, as plants and inanimate bodies. Such inclination towards good is called "a natural appet.i.te." Others, again, are inclined towards good, but with some knowledge; not that they know the aspect of goodness, but that they apprehend some particular good; as in the sense, which knows the sweet, the white, and so on. The inclination which follows this apprehension is called "a sensitive appet.i.te." Other things, again, have an inclination towards good, but with a knowledge whereby they perceive the aspect of goodness; this belongs to the intellect. This is most perfectly inclined towards what is good; not, indeed, as if it were merely guided by another towards some particular good only, like things devoid of knowledge, nor towards some particular good only, as things which have only sensitive knowledge, but as inclined towards good in general. Such inclination is termed "will." Accordingly, since the angels by their intellect know the universal aspect of goodness, it is manifest that there is a will in them.
Reply Obj. 1: Reason surpa.s.ses sense in a different way from that in which intellect surpa.s.ses reason. Reason surpa.s.ses sense according to the diversity of the objects known; for sense judges of particular objects, while reason judges of universals. Therefore there must be one appet.i.te tending towards good in the abstract, which appet.i.te belongs to reason; and another with a tendency towards particular good, which appet.i.te belongs to sense. But intellect and reason differ as to their manner of knowing; because the intellect knows by simple intuition, while reason knows by a process of discursion from one thing to another. Nevertheless by such discursion reason comes to know what intellect learns without it, namely, the universal.
Consequently the object presented to the appet.i.tive faculty on the part of reason and on the part of intellect is the same. Therefore in the angels, who are purely intellectual, there is no appet.i.te higher than the will.
Reply Obj. 2: Although the name of the appet.i.tive part is derived from seeking things not yet possessed, yet the appet.i.tive part reaches out not to these things only, but also to many other things; thus the name of a stone [lapis] is derived from injuring the foot [laesione pedis], though not this alone belongs to a stone. In the same way the irascible faculty is so denominated from anger [ira]; though at the same time there are several other pa.s.sions in it, as hope, daring, and the rest.
Reply Obj. 3: The will is called a mover which is moved, according as to will and to understand are termed movements of a kind; and there is nothing to prevent movement of this kind from existing in the angels, since such movement is the act of a perfect agent, as stated in _De Anima_ iii, text. 28.
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SECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 59, Art. 2]
Whether in the Angels the Will Differs from the Intellect?
Objection 1: It would seem that in the angel the will does not differ from the intellect and from the nature. For an angel is more simple than a natural body. But a natural body is inclined through its form towards its end, which is its good. Therefore much more so is the angel. Now the angel"s form is either the nature in which he subsists, or else it is some species within his intellect. Therefore the angel inclines towards the good through his own nature, or through an intelligible species. But such inclination towards the good belongs to the will. Therefore the will of the angel does not differ from his nature or his intellect.
Obj. 2: Further, the object of the intellect is the true, while the object of the will is the good. Now the good and the true differ, not really but only logically [*Cf. Q. 16, A. 4]. Therefore will and intellect are not really different.
Obj. 3: Further, the distinction of common and proper does not differentiate the faculties; for the same power of sight perceives color and whiteness. But the good and the true seem to be mutually related as common to particular; for the true is a particular good, to wit, of the intellect. Therefore the will, whose object is the good, does not differ from the intellect, whose object is the true.
_On the contrary,_ The will in the angels regards good things only, while their intellect regards both good and bad things, for they know both. Therefore the will of the angels is distinct from their intellect.
_I answer that,_ In the angels the will is a special faculty or power, which is neither their nature nor their intellect. That it is not their nature is manifest from this, that the nature or essence of a thing is completely comprised within it: whatever, then, extends to anything beyond it, is not its essence. Hence we see in natural bodies that the inclination to being does not come from anything superadded to the essence, but from the matter which desires being before possessing it, and from the form which keeps it in such being when once it exists. But the inclination towards something extrinsic comes from something superadded to the essence; as tendency to a place comes from gravity or lightness, while the inclination to make something like itself comes from the active qualities.
Now the will has a natural tendency towards good. Consequently there alone are essence and will identified where all good is contained within the essence of him who wills; that is to say, in G.o.d, Who wills nothing beyond Himself except on account of His goodness. This cannot be said of any creature, because infinite goodness is quite foreign to the nature of any created thing. Accordingly, neither the will of the angel, nor that of any creature, can be the same thing as its essence.
In like manner neither can the will be the same thing as the intellect of angel or man. Because knowledge comes about in so far as the object known is within the knower; consequently the intellect extends itself to what is outside it, according as what, in its essence, is outside it is disposed to be somehow within it. On the other hand, the will goes out to what is beyond it, according as by a kind of inclination it tends, in a manner, to what is outside it. Now it belongs to one faculty to have within itself something which is outside it, and to another faculty to tend to what is outside it. Consequently intellect and will must necessarily be different powers in every creature. It is not so with G.o.d, for He has within Himself universal being, and the universal good. Therefore both intellect and will are His nature.
Reply Obj. 1: A natural body is moved to its own being by its substantial form: while it is inclined to something outside by something additional, as has been said.
Reply Obj. 2: Faculties are not differentiated by any material difference of their objects, but according to their formal distinction, which is taken from the nature of the object as such.
Consequently the diversity derived from the notion of good and true suffices for the difference of intellect from will.
Reply Obj. 3: Because the good and the true are really convertible, it follows that the good is apprehended by the intellect as something true; while the true is desired by the will as something good.
Nevertheless, the diversity of their aspects is sufficient for diversifying the faculties, as was said above (ad 2).
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THIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 59, Art. 3]
Whether There Is Free-Will in the Angels?