Reply Obj. 2: Corporeal creatures according to their nature are good, though this good is not universal, but partial and limited, the consequence of which is a certain opposition of contrary qualities, though each quality is good in itself. To those, however, who estimate things, not by the nature thereof, but by the good they themselves can derive therefrom, everything which is harmful to themselves seems simply evil. For they do not reflect that what is in some way injurious to one person, to another is beneficial, and that even to themselves the same thing may be evil in some respects, but good in others. And this could not be, if bodies were essentially evil and harmful.
Reply Obj. 3: Creatures of themselves do not withdraw us from G.o.d, but lead us to Him; for "the invisible things of G.o.d are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made" (Rom. 1:20). If, then, they withdraw men from G.o.d, it is the fault of those who use them foolishly. Thus it is said (Wis. 14:11): "Creatures are turned into a snare to the feet of the unwise." And the very fact that they can thus withdraw us from G.o.d proves that they came from Him, for they cannot lead the foolish away from G.o.d except by the allurements of some good that they have from Him.
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SECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 65, Art. 2]
Whether Corporeal Things Were Made on Account of G.o.d"s Goodness?
Objection 1: It would seem that corporeal creatures were not made on account of G.o.d"s goodness. For it is said (Wis. 1:14) that G.o.d "created all things that they might be." Therefore all things were created for their own being"s sake, and not on account of G.o.d"s goodness.
Obj. 2: Further, good has the nature of an end; therefore the greater good in things is the end of the lesser good. But spiritual creatures are related to corporeal creatures, as the greater good to the lesser. Corporeal creatures, therefore, are created for the sake of spiritual creatures, and not on account of G.o.d"s goodness.
Obj. 3: Further, justice does not give unequal things except to the unequal. Now G.o.d is just: therefore inequality not created by G.o.d must precede all inequality created by Him. But an inequality not created by G.o.d can only arise from free-will, and consequently all inequality results from the different movements of free-will. Now, corporeal creatures are unequal to spiritual creatures. Therefore the former were made on account of movements of free-will, and not on account of G.o.d"s goodness.
_On the contrary,_ It is said (Prov. 16:4): "The Lord hath made all things for Himself."
_I answer that,_ Origen laid down [*Peri Archon ii.] that corporeal creatures were not made according to G.o.d"s original purpose, but in punishment of the sin of spiritual creatures. For he maintained that G.o.d in the beginning made spiritual creatures only, and all of equal nature; but that of these by the use of free-will some turned to G.o.d, and, according to the measure of their conversion, were given a higher or a lower rank, retaining their simplicity; while others turned from G.o.d, and became bound to different kinds of bodies according to the degree of their turning away. But this position is erroneous. In the first place, because it is contrary to Scripture, which, after narrating the production of each kind of corporeal creatures, subjoins, "G.o.d saw that it was good" (Gen. 1), as if to say that everything was brought into being for the reason that it was good for it to be. But according to Origen"s opinion, the corporeal creature was made, not because it was good that it should be, but that the evil in another might be punished. Secondly, because it would follow that the arrangement, which now exists, of the corporeal world would arise from mere chance. For it the sun"s body was made what it is, that it might serve for a punishment suitable to some sin of a spiritual creature, it would follow, if other spiritual creatures had sinned in the same way as the one to punish whom the sun had been created, that many suns would exist in the world; and so of other things. But such a consequence is altogether inadmissible.
Hence we must set aside this theory as false, and consider that the entire universe is const.i.tuted by all creatures, as a whole consists of its parts.
Now if we wish to a.s.sign an end to any whole, and to the parts of that whole, we shall find, first, that each and every part exists for the sake of its proper act, as the eye for the act of seeing; secondly, that less honorable parts exist for the more honorable, as the senses for the intellect, the lungs for the heart; and, thirdly, that all parts are for the perfection of the whole, as the matter for the form, since the parts are, as it were, the matter of the whole. Furthermore, the whole man is on account of an extrinsic end, that end being the fruition of G.o.d. So, therefore, in the parts of the universe also every creature exists for its own proper act and perfection, and the less n.o.ble for the n.o.bler, as those creatures that are less n.o.ble than man exist for the sake of man, whilst each and every creature exists for the perfection of the entire universe. Furthermore, the entire universe, with all its parts, is ordained towards G.o.d as its end, inasmuch as it imitates, as it were, and shows forth the Divine goodness, to the glory of G.o.d. Reasonable creatures, however, have in some special and higher manner G.o.d as their end, since they can attain to Him by their own operations, by knowing and loving Him. Thus it is plain that the Divine goodness is the end of all corporeal things.
Reply Obj. 1: In the very fact of any creature possessing being, it represents the Divine being and Its goodness. And, therefore, that G.o.d created all things, that they might have being, does not exclude that He created them for His own goodness.
Reply Obj. 2: The proximate end does not exclude the ultimate end.
Therefore that corporeal creatures were, in a manner, made for the sake of the spiritual, does not prevent their being made on account of G.o.d"s goodness.
Reply Obj. 3: Equality of justice has its place in retribution, since equal rewards or punishments are due to equal merit or demerit. But this does not apply to things as at first inst.i.tuted. For just as an architect, without injustice, places stones of the same kind in different parts of a building, not on account of any antecedent difference in the stones, but with a view to securing that perfection of the entire building, which could not be obtained except by the different positions of the stones; even so, G.o.d from the beginning, to secure perfection in the universe, has set therein creatures of various and unequal natures, according to His wisdom, and without injustice, since no diversity of merit is presupposed.
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THIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 65, Art. 3]
Whether Corporeal Creatures Were Produced by G.o.d Through the Medium of the Angels?
Objection 1: It would seem that corporeal creatures were produced by G.o.d through the medium of the angels. For, as all things are governed by the Divine wisdom, so by it were all things made, according to Ps.
103:24: "Thou hast made all things in wisdom." But "it belongs to wisdom to ordain," as stated in the beginning of the _Metaphysics_ (i, 2). Hence in the government of things the lower is ruled by the higher in a certain fitting order, as Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 4). Therefore in the production of things it was ordained that the corporeal should be produced by the spiritual, as the lower by the higher.
Obj. 2: Further, diversity of effects shows diversity of causes, since like always produces like. If then all creatures, both spiritual and corporeal, were produced immediately by G.o.d, there would be no diversity in creatures, for one would not be further removed from G.o.d than another. But this is clearly false; for the Philosopher says that some things are corruptible because they are far removed from G.o.d (De Gen. et Corrup. ii, text. 59).
Obj. 3: Further, infinite power is not required to produce a finite effect. But every corporeal thing is finite. Therefore, it could be, and was, produced by the finite power of spiritual creatures: for in suchlike beings there is no distinction between what is and what is possible: especially as no dignity befitting a nature is denied to that nature, unless it be in punishment of a fault.
_On the contrary,_ It is said (Gen. 1:1): "In the beginning G.o.d created heaven and earth"; by which are understood corporeal creatures. These, therefore, were produced immediately by G.o.d.
_I answer that,_ Some have maintained that creatures proceeded from G.o.d by degrees, in such a way that the first creature proceeded from Him immediately, and in its turn produced another, and so on until the production of corporeal creatures. But this position is untenable, since the first production of corporeal creatures is by creation, by which matter itself is produced: for in the act of coming into being the imperfect must be made before the perfect: and it is impossible that anything should be created, save by G.o.d alone.
In proof whereof it must be borne in mind that the higher the cause, the more numerous the objects to which its causation extends. Now the underlying principle in things is always more universal than that which informs and restricts it; thus, being is more universal than living, living than understanding, matter than form. The more widely, then, one thing underlies others, the more directly does that thing proceed from a higher cause. Thus the thing that underlies primarily all things, belongs properly to the causality of the supreme cause.
Therefore no secondary cause can produce anything, unless there is presupposed in the thing produced something that is caused by a higher cause. But creation is the production of a thing in its entire substance, nothing being presupposed either uncreated or created.
Hence it remains that nothing can create except G.o.d alone, Who is the first cause. Therefore, in order to show that all bodies were created immediately by G.o.d, Moses said: "In the beginning G.o.d created heaven and earth."
Reply Obj. 1: In the production of things an order exists, but not such that one creature is created by another, for that is impossible; but rather such that by the Divine wisdom diverse grades are const.i.tuted in creatures.
Reply Obj. 2: G.o.d Himself, though one, has knowledge of many and different things without detriment to the simplicity of His nature, as has been shown above (Q. 15, A. 2); so that by His wisdom He is the cause of diverse things as known by Him, even as an artificer, by apprehending diverse forms, produces diverse works of art.
Reply Obj. 3: The amount of the power of an agent is measured not only by the thing made, but also by the manner of making it; for one and the same thing is made in one way by a higher power, in another by a lower. But the production of finite things, where nothing is presupposed as existing, is the work of infinite power, and, as such, can belong to no creature.
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FOURTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 65, Art. 4]
Whether the Forms of Bodies Are from the Angels?
Objection 1: It would seem that the forms of bodies come from the angels. For Boethius says (De Trin. i): "From forms that are without matter come the forms that are in matter." But forms that are without matter are spiritual substances, and forms that are in matter are the forms of bodies. Therefore, the forms of bodies are from spiritual substances.
Obj. 2: Further, all that is such by partic.i.p.ation is reduced to that which is such by its essence. But spiritual substances are forms essentially, whereas corporeal creatures have forms by partic.i.p.ation.
Therefore the forms of corporeal things are derived from spiritual substances.
Obj. 3: Further, spiritual substances have more power of causation than the heavenly bodies. But the heavenly bodies give form to things here below, for which reason they are said to cause generation and corruption. Much more, therefore, are material forms derived from spiritual substances.
_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 8): "We must not suppose that this corporeal matter serves the angels at their nod, but rather that it obeys G.o.d thus." But corporeal matter may be said thus to serve that from which it receives its form. Corporeal forms, then, are not from the angels, but from G.o.d.
_I answer that,_ It was the opinion of some that all corporeal forms are derived from spiritual substances, which we call the angels. And there are two ways in which this has been stated. For Plato held that the forms of corporeal matter are derived from, and formed by, forms immaterially subsisting, by a kind of partic.i.p.ation. Thus he held that there exists an immaterial man, and an immaterial horse, and so forth, and that from such the individual sensible things that we see are const.i.tuted, in so far as in corporeal matter there abides the impression received from these separate forms, by a kind of a.s.similation, or as he calls it, "partic.i.p.ation" (Phaedo xlix). And, according to the Platonists, the order of forms corresponds to the order of those separate substances; for example, that there is a single separate substance, which is horse and the cause of all horses, whilst above this is separate life, or _per se_ life, as they term it, which is the cause of all life, and that above this again is that which they call being itself, which is the cause of all being.
Avicenna, however, and certain others, have maintained that the forms of corporeal things do not subsist _per se_ in matter, but in the intellect only. Thus they say that from forms existing in the intellect of spiritual creatures (called "intelligences" by them, but "angels" by us) proceed all the forms of corporeal matter, as the form of his handiwork proceeds from the forms in the mind of the craftsman. This theory seems to be the same as that of certain heretics of modern times, who say that G.o.d indeed created all things, but that the devil formed corporeal matter, and differentiated it into species.
But all these opinions seem to have a common origin; they all, in fact, sought for a cause of forms as though the form were of itself brought into being. Whereas, as Aristotle (Metaph. vii, text. 26, 27, 28), proves, what is, properly speaking, made, is the "composite."
Now, such are the forms of corruptible things that at one time they exist and at another exist not, without being themselves generated or corrupted, but by reason of the generation or corruption of the "composite"; since even forms have not being, but composites have being through forms: for, according to a thing"s mode of being, is the mode in which it is brought into being. Since, then, like is produced from like, we must not look for the cause of corporeal forms in any immaterial form, but in something that is composite, as this fire is generated by that fire. Corporeal forms, therefore, are caused, not as emanations from some immaterial form, but by matter being brought from potentiality into act by some composite agent. But since the composite agent, which is a body, is moved by a created spiritual substance, as Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 4, 5), it follows further that even corporeal forms are derived from spiritual substances, not emanating from them, but as the term of their movement. And, further still, the species of the angelic intellect, which are, as it were, the seminal types of corporeal forms, must be referred to G.o.d as the first cause. But in the first production of corporeal creatures no trans.m.u.tation from potentiality to act can have taken place, and accordingly, the corporeal forms that bodies had when first produced came immediately form G.o.d, whose bidding alone matter obeys, as its own proper cause. To signify this, Moses prefaces each work with the words, "G.o.d said, Let this thing be," or "that," to denote the formation of all things by the Word of G.o.d, from Whom, according to Augustine [*Tract. i. in Joan. and Gen. ad lit. i. 4], is "all form and fitness and concord of parts."
Reply Obj. 1: By immaterial forms Boethius understands the types of things in the mind of G.o.d. Thus the Apostle says (Heb. 11:3): "By faith we understand that the world was framed by the Word of G.o.d; that from invisible things visible things might be made." But if by immaterial forms he understands the angels, we say that from them come material forms, not by emanation, but by motion.
Reply Obj. 2: Forms received into matter are to be referred, not to self-subsisting forms of the same type, as the Platonists held, but either to intelligible forms of the angelic intellect, from which they proceed by movement, or, still higher, to the types in the Divine intellect, by which the seeds of forms are implanted in created things, that they may be able to be brought by movement into act.
Reply Obj. 3: The heavenly bodies inform earthly ones by movement, not by emanation.
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QUESTION 66
ON THE ORDER OF CREATION TOWARDS DISTINCTION (In Four Articles)
We must next consider the work of distinction; first, the ordering of creation towards distinction; secondly, the distinction itself.
Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether formlessness of created matter preceded in time its formation?
(2) Whether the matter of all corporeal things is the same?
(3) Whether the empyrean heaven was created contemporaneously with formless matter?
(4) Whether time was created simultaneously with it?
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FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 66, Art. 1]