Obj. 3: Further, habits are proportioned to their powers, as perfections to what they make perfect. But the habit which perfects the will--namely, charity--is more n.o.ble than the habits which perfect the intellect: for it is written (1 Cor. 13:2): "If I should know all mysteries, and if I should have all faith, and have not charity, I am nothing." Therefore the will is a higher power than the intellect.
_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher holds the intellect to be the higher power than the intellect.
_I answer that,_ The superiority of one thing over another can be considered in two ways: "absolutely" and "relatively." Now a thing is considered to be such absolutely which is considered such in itself: but relatively as it is such with regard to something else. If therefore the intellect and will be considered with regard to themselves, then the intellect is the higher power. And this is clear if we compare their respective objects to one another. For the object of the intellect is more simple and more absolute than the object of the will; since the object of the intellect is the very idea of appetible good; and the appetible good, the idea of which is in the intellect, is the object of the will. Now the more simple and the more abstract a thing is, the n.o.bler and higher it is in itself; and therefore the object of the intellect is higher than the object of the will. Therefore, since the proper nature of a power is in its order to its object, it follows that the intellect in itself and absolutely is higher and n.o.bler than the will. But relatively and by comparison with something else, we find that the will is sometimes higher than the intellect, from the fact that the object of the will occurs in something higher than that in which occurs the object of the intellect. Thus, for instance, I might say that hearing is relatively n.o.bler than sight, inasmuch as something in which there is sound is n.o.bler than something in which there is color, though color is n.o.bler and simpler than sound. For as we have said above (Q. 16, A. 1; Q. 27, A. 4), the action of the intellect consists in this--that the idea of the thing understood is in the one who understands; while the act of the will consists in this--that the will is inclined to the thing itself as existing in itself. And therefore the Philosopher says in _Metaph._ vi (Did. v, 2) that "good and evil," which are objects of the will, "are in things," but "truth and error," which are objects of the intellect, "are in the mind."
When, therefore, the thing in which there is good is n.o.bler than the soul itself, in which is the idea understood; by comparison with such a thing, the will is higher than the intellect. But when the thing which is good is less n.o.ble than the soul, then even in comparison with that thing the intellect is higher than the will. Wherefore the love of G.o.d is better than the knowledge of G.o.d; but, on the contrary, the knowledge of corporeal things is better than the love thereof. Absolutely, however, the intellect is n.o.bler than the will.
Reply Obj. 1: The aspect of causality is perceived by comparing one thing to another, and in such a comparison the idea of good is found to be n.o.bler: but truth signifies something more absolute, and extends to the idea of good itself: wherefore even good is something true. But, again, truth is something good: forasmuch as the intellect is a thing, and truth its end. And among other ends this is the most excellent: as also is the intellect among the other powers.
Reply Obj. 2: What precedes in order of generation and time is less perfect: for in one and in the same thing potentiality precedes act, and imperfection precedes perfection. But what precedes absolutely and in the order of nature is more perfect: for thus act precedes potentiality. And in this way the intellect precedes the will, as the motive power precedes the thing movable, and as the active precedes the pa.s.sive; for good which is understood moves the will.
Reply Obj. 3: This reason is verified of the will as compared with what is above the soul. For charity is the virtue by which we love G.o.d.
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FOURTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 82, Art. 4]
Whether the Will Moves the Intellect?
Objection 1: It would seem that the will does not move the intellect.
For what moves excels and precedes what is moved, because what moves is an agent, and "the agent is n.o.bler than the patient," as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 16), and the Philosopher (De Anima iii, 5).
But the intellect excels and precedes the will, as we have said above (A. 3). Therefore the will does not move the intellect.
Obj. 2: Further, what moves is not moved by what is moved, except perhaps accidentally. But the intellect moves the will, because the good apprehended by the intellect moves without being moved; whereas the appet.i.te moves and is moved. Therefore the intellect is not moved by the will.
Obj. 3: Further, we can will nothing but what we understand. If, therefore, in order to understand, the will moves by willing to understand, that act of the will must be preceded by another act of the intellect, and this act of the intellect by another act of the will, and so on indefinitely, which is impossible. Therefore the will does not move the intellect.
_On the contrary,_ Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 26): "It is in our power to learn an art or not, as we list." But a thing is in our power by the will, and we learn art by the intellect. Therefore the will moves the intellect.
_I answer that,_ A thing is said to move in two ways: First, as an end; for instance, when we say that the end moves the agent. In this way the intellect moves the will, because the good understood is the object of the will, and moves it as an end. Secondly, a thing is said to move as an agent, as what alters moves what is altered, and what impels moves what is impelled. In this way the will moves the intellect and all the powers of the soul, as Anselm says (Eadmer, De Similitudinibus). The reason is, because wherever we have order among a number of active powers, that power which regards the universal end moves the powers which regard particular ends. And we may observe this both in nature and in things politic. For the heaven, which aims at the universal preservation of things subject to generation and corruption, moves all inferior bodies, each of which aims at the preservation of its own species or of the individual. The king also, who aims at the common good of the whole kingdom, by his rule moves all the governors of cities, each of whom rules over his own particular city. Now the object of the will is good and the end in general, and each power is directed to some suitable good proper to it, as sight is directed to the perception of color, and the intellect to the knowledge of truth. Therefore the will as agent moves all the powers of the soul to their respective acts, except the natural powers of the vegetative part, which are not subject to our will.
Reply Obj. 1: The intellect may be considered in two ways: as apprehensive of universal being and truth, and as a thing and a particular power having a determinate act. In like manner also the will may be considered in two ways: according to the common nature of its object--that is to say, as appet.i.tive of universal good--and as a determinate power of the soul having a determinate act. If, therefore, the intellect and the will be compared with one another according to the universality of their respective objects, then, as we have said above (A. 3), the intellect is simply higher and n.o.bler than the will. If, however, we take the intellect as regards the common nature of its object and the will as a determinate power, then again the intellect is higher and n.o.bler than the will, because under the notion of being and truth is contained both the will itself, and its act, and its object. Wherefore the intellect understands the will, and its act, and its object, just as it understands other species of things, as stone or wood, which are contained in the common notion of being and truth. But if we consider the will as regards the common nature of its object, which is good, and the intellect as a thing and a special power; then the intellect itself, and its act, and its object, which is truth, each of which is some species of good, are contained under the common notion of good. And in this way the will is higher than the intellect, and can move it. From this we can easily understand why these powers include one another in their acts, because the intellect understands that the will wills, and the will wills the intellect to understand. In the same way good is contained in truth, inasmuch as it is an understood truth, and truth in good, inasmuch as it is a desired good.
Reply Obj. 2: The intellect moves the will in one sense, and the will moves the intellect in another, as we have said above.
Reply Obj. 3: There is no need to go on indefinitely, but we must stop at the intellect as preceding all the rest. For every movement of the will must be preceded by apprehension, whereas every apprehension is not preceded by an act of the will; but the principle of counselling and understanding is an intellectual principle higher than our intellect--namely, G.o.d--as also Aristotle says (Eth.
Eudemic. vii, 14), and in this way he explains that there is no need to proceed indefinitely.
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FIFTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 82, Art. 5]
Whether We Should Distinguish Irascible and Concupiscible Parts in the Superior Appet.i.te?
Objection 1: It would seem that we ought to distinguish irascible and concupiscible parts in the superior appet.i.te, which is the will. For the concupiscible power is so called from "concupiscere" (to desire), and the irascible part from "irasci" (to be angry). But there is a concupiscence which cannot belong to the sensitive appet.i.te, but only to the intellectual, which is the will; as the concupiscence of wisdom, of which it is said (Wis. 6:21): "The concupiscence of wisdom bringeth to the eternal kingdom." There is also a certain anger which cannot belong to the sensitive appet.i.te, but only to the intellectual; as when our anger is directed against vice. Wherefore Jerome commenting on Matt. 13:33 warns us "to have the hatred of vice in the irascible part." Therefore we should distinguish irascible and concupiscible parts of the intellectual soul as well as in the sensitive.
Obj. 2: Further, as is commonly said, charity is in the concupiscible, and hope in the irascible part. But they cannot be in the sensitive appet.i.te, because their objects are not sensible, but intellectual. Therefore we must a.s.sign an irascible and concupiscible power to the intellectual part.
Obj. 3: Further, it is said (De Spiritu et Anima) that "the soul has these powers"--namely, the irascible, concupiscible, and rational--"before it is united to the body." But no power of the sensitive part belongs to the soul alone, but to the soul and body united, as we have said above (Q. 78, AA. 5, 8). Therefore the irascible and concupiscible powers are in the will, which is the intellectual appet.i.te.
_On the contrary,_ Gregory of Nyssa (Nemesius, De Nat. Hom.) says that the irrational part of the soul is divided into the desiderative and irascible, and Damascene says the same (De Fide Orth. ii, 12). And the Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 9) "that the will is in reason, while in the irrational part of the soul are concupiscence and anger," or "desire and animus."
_I answer that,_ The irascible and concupiscible are not parts of the intellectual appet.i.te, which is called the will. Because, as was said above (Q. 59, A. 4; Q. 79, A. 7), a power which is directed to an object according to some common notion is not differentiated by special differences which are contained under that common notion. For instance, because sight regards the visible thing under the common notion of something colored, the visual power is not multiplied according to the different kinds of color: but if there were a power regarding white as white, and not as something colored, it would be distinct from a power regarding black as black.
Now the sensitive appet.i.te does not consider the common notion of good, because neither do the senses apprehend the universal. And therefore the parts of the sensitive appet.i.te are differentiated by the different notions of particular good: for the concupiscible regards as proper to it the notion of good, as something pleasant to the senses and suitable to nature: whereas the irascible regards the notion of good as something that wards off and repels what is hurtful. But the will regards good according to the common notion of good, and therefore in the will, which is the intellectual appet.i.te, there is no differentiation of appet.i.tive powers, so that there be in the intellectual appet.i.te an irascible power distinct from a concupiscible power: just as neither on the part of the intellect are the apprehensive powers multiplied, although they are on the part of the senses.
Reply Obj. 1: Love, concupiscence, and the like can be understood in two ways. Sometimes they are taken as pa.s.sions--arising, that is, with a certain commotion of the soul. And thus they are commonly understood, and in this sense they are only in the sensitive appet.i.te. They may, however, be taken in another way, as far as they are simple affections without pa.s.sion or commotion of the soul, and thus they are acts of the will. And in this sense, too, they are attributed to the angels and to G.o.d. But if taken in this sense, they do not belong to different powers, but only to one power, which is called the will.
Reply Obj. 2: The will itself may be said to [be] irascible, as far as it wills to repel evil, not from any sudden movement of a pa.s.sion, but from a judgment of the reason. And in the same way the will may be said to be concupiscible on account of its desire for good. And thus in the irascible and concupiscible are charity and hope--that is, in the will as ordered to such acts. And in this way, too, we may understand the words quoted (De Spiritu et Anima); that the irascible and concupiscible powers are in the soul before it is united to the body (as long as we understand priority of nature, and not of time), although there is no need to have faith in what that book says.
Whence the answer to the third objection is clear.
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QUESTION 83
OF FREE-WILL (In Four Articles)
We now inquire concerning free-will. Under this head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether man has free-will?
(2) What is free-will--a power, an act, or a habit?
(3) If it is a power, is it appet.i.tive or cognitive?
(4) If it is appet.i.tive, is it the same power as the will, or distinct?
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FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 83, Art. 1]
Whether Man Has Free-Will?
Objection 1: It would seem that man has not free-will. For whoever has free-will does what he wills. But man does not what he wills; for it is written (Rom. 7:19): "For the good which I will I do not, but the evil which I will not, that I do." Therefore man has not free-will.
Obj. 2: Further, whoever has free-will has in his power to will or not to will, to do or not to do. But this is not in man"s power: for it is written (Rom. 9:16): "It is not of him that willeth"--namely, to will--"nor of him that runneth"--namely, to run. Therefore man has not free-will.
Obj. 3: Further, what is "free is cause of itself," as the Philosopher says (Metaph. i, 2). Therefore what is moved by another is not free. But G.o.d moves the will, for it is written (Prov. 21:1): "The heart of the king is in the hand of the Lord; whithersoever He will He shall turn it" and (Phil. 2:13): "It is G.o.d Who worketh in you both to will and to accomplish." Therefore man has not free-will.
Obj. 4: Further, whoever has free-will is master of his own actions.
But man is not master of his own actions: for it is written (Jer.
10:23): "The way of a man is not his: neither is it in a man to walk." Therefore man has not free-will.
Obj. 5: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 5): "According as each one is, such does the end seem to him." But it is not in our power to be of one quality or another; for this comes to us from nature. Therefore it is natural to us to follow some particular end, and therefore we are not free in so doing.
_On the contrary,_ It is written (Ecclus. 15:14): "G.o.d made man from the beginning, and left him in the hand of his own counsel"; and the gloss adds: "That is of his free-will."
_I answer that,_ Man has free-will: otherwise counsels, exhortations, commands, prohibitions, rewards, and punishments would be in vain. In order to make this evident, we must observe that some things act without judgment; as a stone moves downwards; and in like manner all things which lack knowledge. And some act from judgment, but not a free judgment; as brute animals. For the sheep, seeing the wolf, judges it a thing to be shunned, from a natural and not a free judgment, because it judges, not from reason, but from natural instinct. And the same thing is to be said of any judgment of brute animals. But man acts from judgment, because by his apprehensive power he judges that something should be avoided or sought. But because this judgment, in the case of some particular act, is not from a natural instinct, but from some act of comparison in the reason, therefore he acts from free judgment and retains the power of being inclined to various things. For reason in contingent matters may follow opposite courses, as we see in dialectic syllogisms and rhetorical arguments.
Now particular operations are contingent, and therefore in such matters the judgment of reason may follow opposite courses, and is not determinate to one. And forasmuch as man is rational is it necessary that man have a free-will.
Reply Obj. 1: As we have said above (Q. 81, A. 3, ad 2), the sensitive appet.i.te, though it obeys the reason, yet in a given case can resist by desiring what the reason forbids. This is therefore the good which man does not when he wishes--namely, "not to desire against reason," as Augustine says.
Reply Obj. 2: Those words of the Apostle are not to be taken as though man does not wish or does not run of his free-will, but because the free-will is not sufficient thereto unless it be moved and helped by G.o.d.