From what has been said, the objections can easily be solved.
_______________________
QUESTION 115
OF THE ACTION OF THE CORPOREAL CREATURE (In Six Articles)
We have now to consider the action of the corporeal creature; and fate, which is ascribed to certain bodies. Concerning corporeal actions there are six points of inquiry:
(1) Whether a body can be active?
(2) Whether there exist in bodies certain seminal virtues?
(3) Whether the heavenly bodies are the causes of what is done here by the inferior bodies?
(4) Whether they are the cause of human acts?
(5) Whether demons are subject to their influence?
(6) Whether the heavenly bodies impose necessity on those things which are subject to their influence?
_______________________
FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 115, Art. 1]
Whether a Body Can Be Active?
Objection 1: It would seem that no bodies are active. For Augustine says (De Civ. Dei v, 9): "There are things that are acted upon, but do not act; such are bodies: there is one Who acts but is not acted upon; this is G.o.d: there are things that both act and are acted upon; these are the spiritual substances."
Obj. 2: Further, every agent except the first agent requires in its work a subject susceptible of its action. But there is not substance below the corporeal substance which can be susceptible of the latter"s action; since it belongs to the lowest degree of beings.
Therefore corporeal substance is not active.
Obj. 3: Further, every corporeal substance is limited by quant.i.ty.
But quant.i.ty hinders substance from movement and action, because it surrounds it and penetrates it: just as a cloud hinders the air from receiving light. A proof of this is that the more a body increases in quant.i.ty, the heavier it is and the more difficult to move. Therefore no corporeal substance is active.
Obj. 4: Further, the power of action in every agent is according to its propinquity to the first active cause. But bodies, being most composite, are most remote from the first active cause, which is most simple. Therefore no bodies are active.
Obj. 5: Further, if a body is an agent, the term of its action is either a substantial, or an accidental form. But it is not a substantial form; for it is not possible to find in a body any principle of action, save an active quality, which is an accident; and an accident cannot be the cause of a substantial form, since the cause is always more excellent than the effect. Likewise, neither is it an accidental form, for "an accident does not extend beyond its subject," as Augustine says (De Trin. ix, 4). Therefore no bodies are active.
_On the contrary,_ Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. xv) that among other qualities of corporeal fire, "it shows its greatness in its action and power on that of which it lays hold."
_I answer that,_ It is apparent to the senses that some bodies are active. But concerning the action of bodies there have been three errors. For some denied all action to bodies. This is the opinion of Avicebron in his book on _The Fount of Life,_ where, by the arguments mentioned above, he endeavors to prove that no bodies act, but that all the actions which seem to be the actions of bodies, are the actions of some spiritual power that penetrates all bodies: so that, according to him, it is not fire that heats, but a spiritual power which penetrates, by means of the fire. And this opinion seems to be derived from that of Plato. For Plato held that all forms existing in corporeal matter are partic.i.p.ated thereby, and determined and limited thereto; and that separate forms are absolute and as it were universal; wherefore he said that these separate forms are the causes of forms that exist in matter. Therefore inasmuch as the form which is in corporeal matter is determined to this matter individualized by quant.i.ty, Avicebron held that the corporeal form is held back and imprisoned by quant.i.ty, as the principle of individuality, so as to be unable by action to extend to any other matter: and that the spiritual and immaterial form alone, which is not hedged in by quant.i.ty, can issue forth by acting on something else.
But this does not prove that the corporeal form is not an agent, but that it is not a universal agent. For in proportion as a thing is partic.i.p.ated, so, of necessity, must that be partic.i.p.ated which is proper thereto; thus in proportion to the partic.i.p.ation of light is the partic.i.p.ation of visibility. But to act, which is nothing else than to make something to be in act, is essentially proper to an act as such; wherefore every agent produces its like. So therefore to the fact of its being a form not determined by matter subject to quant.i.ty, a thing owes its being an agent indeterminate and universal: but to the fact that it is determined to this matter, it owes its being an agent limited and particular. Wherefore if the form of fire were separate, as the Platonists supposed, it would be, in a fashion, the cause of every ignition. But this form of fire which is in this corporeal matter, is the cause of this ignition which pa.s.ses from this body to that. Hence such an action is effected by the contact of two bodies.
But this opinion of Avicebron goes further than that of Plato. For Plato held only substantial forms to be separate; while he referred accidents to the material principles which are "the great" and "the small," which he considered to be the first contraries, by others considered to the "the rare" and "the dense." Consequently both Plato and Avicenna, who follows him to a certain extent, held that corporeal agents act through their accidental forms, by disposing matter for the substantial form; but that the ultimate perfection attained by the introduction of the substantial form is due to an immaterial principle. And this is the second opinion concerning the action of bodies; of which we have spoken above when treating of the creation (Q. 45, A. 8).
The third opinion is that of Democritus, who held that action takes place through the issue of atoms from the corporeal agent, while pa.s.sion consists in the reception of the atoms in the pores of the pa.s.sive body. This opinion is disproved by Aristotle (De Gener. i, 8, 9). For it would follow that a body would not be pa.s.sive as a whole, and the quant.i.ty of the active body would be diminished through its action; which things are manifestly untrue.
We must therefore say that a body acts forasmuch as it is in act, on a body forasmuch as it is in potentiality.
Reply Obj. 1: This pa.s.sage of Augustine is to be understood of the whole corporeal nature considered as a whole, which thus has no nature inferior to it, on which it can act; as the spiritual nature acts on the corporeal, and the uncreated nature on the created.
Nevertheless one body is inferior to another, forasmuch as it is in potentiality to that which the other has in act.
From this follows the solution of the second objection. But it must be observed, when Avicebron argues thus, "There is a mover who is not moved, to wit, the first maker of all; therefore, on the other hand, there exists something moved which is purely pa.s.sive," that this is to be conceded. But this latter is primary matter, which is a pure potentiality, just as G.o.d is pure act. Now a body is composed of potentiality and act; and therefore it is both active and pa.s.sive.
Reply Obj. 3: Quant.i.ty does not entirely hinder the corporeal form from action, as stated above; but from being a universal agent, forasmuch as a form is individualized through being in matter subject to quant.i.ty. The proof taken from the weight of bodies is not to the purpose. First, because addition of quant.i.ty does not cause weight; as is proved (De Coelo et Mundo iv, 2). Secondly, it is false that weight r.e.t.a.r.ds movement; on the contrary, the heavier a thing, the greater its movement, if we consider the movement proper thereto.
Thirdly, because action is not effected by local movement, as Democritus held: but by something being reduced from potentiality to act.
Reply Obj. 4: A body is not that which is most distant from G.o.d; for it partic.i.p.ates something of a likeness to the Divine Being, forasmuch as it has a form. That which is most distant from G.o.d is primary matter; which is in no way active, since it is a pure potentiality.
Reply Obj. 5: The term of a body"s action is both an accidental form and a substantial form. For the active quality, such as heat, although itself an accident, acts nevertheless by virtue of the substantial form, as its instrument: wherefore its action can terminate in a substantial form; thus natural heat, as the instrument of the soul, has an action terminating in the generation of flesh.
But by its own virtue it produces an accident. Nor is it against the nature of an accident to surpa.s.s its subject in acting, but it is to surpa.s.s it in being; unless indeed one were to imagine that an accident transfers its identical self from the agent to the patient; thus Democritus explained action by an issue of atoms.
_______________________
SECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 115, Art. 2]
Whether There Are Any Seminal Virtues in Corporeal Matter?
Objection 1: It would seem that there are no seminal virtues in corporeal matter. For virtue (_ratio_) implies something of a spiritual order. But in corporeal matter nothing exists spiritually, but only materially, that is, according to the mode of that in which it is. Therefore there are no seminal virtues in corporeal matter.
Obj. 2: Further, Augustine (De Trin. iii, 8, 9) says that demons produce certain results by employing with a hidden movement certain seeds, which they know to exist in matter. But bodies, not virtues, can be employed with local movement. Therefore it is unreasonable to say that there are seminal virtues in corporeal matter.
Obj. 3: Further, seeds are active principles. But there are no active principles in corporeal matter; since, as we have said above, matter is not competent to act (A. 1, ad 2, 4). Therefore there are no seminal virtues in corporeal matter.
Obj. 4: Further, there are said to be certain "causal virtues"
(Augustine, De Gen. ad lit. v, 4) which seem to suffice for the production of things. But seminal virtues are not causal virtues: for miracles are outside the scope of seminal virtues, but not of causal virtues. Therefore it is unreasonable to say that there are seminal virtues in corporeal matter.
_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 8): "Of all the things which are generated in a corporeal and visible fashion, certain seeds lie hidden in the corporeal things of this world."
_I answer that,_ It is customary to name things after what is more perfect, as the Philosopher says (De Anima ii, 4). Now in the whole corporeal nature, living bodies are the most perfect: wherefore the word "nature" has been transferred from living things to all natural things. For the word itself, "nature," as the Philosopher says (Metaph. v, Did. iv, 4), was first applied to signify the generation of living things, which is called "nativity": and because living things are generated from a principle united to them, as fruit from a tree, and the offspring from the mother, to whom it is united, consequently the word "nature" has been applied to every principle of movement existing in that which is moved. Now it is manifest that the active and pa.s.sive principles of the generation of living things are the seeds from which living things are generated. Therefore Augustine fittingly gave the name of "seminal virtues" [seminales rationes] to all those active and pa.s.sive virtues which are the principles of natural generation and movement.
These active and pa.s.sive virtues may be considered in several orders.
For in the first place, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. vi, 10), they are princ.i.p.ally and originally in the Word of G.o.d, as _typal ideas._ Secondly, they are in the elements of the world, where they were produced altogether at the beginning, as in _universal causes._ Thirdly, they are in those things which, in the succession of time, are produced by universal causes, for instance in this plant, and in that animal, as in _particular causes._ Fourthly, they are in the _seeds_ produced from animals and plants. And these again are compared to further particular effects, as the primordial universal causes to the first effects produced.
Reply Obj. 1: These active and pa.s.sive virtues of natural things, though not called "virtues" (rationes) by reason of their being in corporeal matter, can nevertheless be so called in respect of their origin, forasmuch as they are the effect of the typal ideas [rationes ideales].
Reply Obj. 2: These active and pa.s.sive virtues are in certain parts of corporeal things: and when they are employed with local movement for the production of certain results, we speak of the demons as employing seeds.
Reply Obj. 3: The seed of the male is the active principle in the generation of an animal. But that can be called seed also which the female contributes as the pa.s.sive principle. And thus the word "seed"
covers both active and pa.s.sive principles.
Reply Obj. 4: From the words of Augustine when speaking of these seminal virtues, it is easy to gather that they are also causal virtues, just as seed is a kind of cause: for he says (De Trin. iii, 9) that, "as a mother is pregnant with the unborn offspring, so is the world itself pregnant with the causes of unborn things."
Nevertheless, the "typal ideas" can be called "causal virtues," but not, strictly speaking, "seminal virtues," because seed is not a separate principle; and because miracles are not wrought outside the scope of causal virtues. Likewise neither are miracles wrought outside the scope of the pa.s.sive virtues so implanted in the creature, that the latter can be used to any purpose that G.o.d commands. But miracles are said to be wrought outside the scope of the natural active virtues, and the pa.s.sive potentialities which are ordered to such active virtues, and this is what is meant when we say that they are wrought outside the scope of seminal virtues.
_______________________
THIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 115, Art. 3]
Whether the Heavenly Bodies Are the Cause of What Is Produced in Bodies Here Below?
Objection 1: It would seem that the heavenly bodies are not the cause of what is produced in bodies here below. For Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 7): "We say that they"--namely, the heavenly bodies--"are not the cause of generation or corruption: they are rather signs of storms and atmospheric changes."