Objection 1: It seems that all things are subject to fate. For Boethius says (De Consol. iv): "The chain of fate moves the heaven and the stars, tempers the elements to one another, and models them by a reciprocal transformation. By fate all things that are born into the world and perish are renewed in a uniform progression of offspring and seed." Nothing therefore seems to be excluded from the domain of fate.
Obj. 2: Further, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei v, 1) that fate is something real, as referred to the Divine will and power. But the Divine will is cause of all things that happen, as Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 1 seqq.). Therefore all things are subject to fate.
Obj. 3: Further, Boethius says (De Consol. iv) that fate "is a disposition inherent to changeable things." But all creatures are changeable, and G.o.d alone is truly unchangeable, as stated above (Q. 9, A. 2). Therefore fate is in all things.
_On the contrary,_ Boethius says (De Consol. iv) that "some things subject to Providence are above the ordering of fate."
_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 2), fate is the ordering of second causes to effects foreseen by G.o.d. Whatever, therefore, is subject to second causes, is subject also to fate. But whatever is done immediately by G.o.d, since it is not subject to second causes, neither is it subject to fate; such are creation, the glorification of spiritual substances, and the like. And this is what Boethius says (De Consol. iv): viz. that "those things which are nigh to G.o.d have a state of immobility, and exceed the changeable order of fate." Hence it is clear that "the further a thing is from the First Mind, the more it is involved in the chain of fate"; since so much the more it is bound up with second causes.
Reply Obj. 1: All the things mentioned in this pa.s.sage are done by G.o.d by means of second causes; for this reason they are contained in the order of fate. But it is not the same with everything else, as stated above.
Reply Obj. 2: Fate is to be referred to the Divine will and power, as to its first principle. Consequently it does not follow that whatever is subject to the Divine will or power, is subject also to fate, as already stated.
Reply Obj. 3: Although all creatures are in some way changeable, yet some of them do not proceed from changeable created causes. And these, therefore, are not subject to fate, as stated above.
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QUESTION 117
OF THINGS PERTAINING TO THE ACTION OF MAN (In Four Articles)
We have next to consider those things which pertain to the action of man, who is composed of a created corporeal and spiritual nature. In the first place we shall consider that action (in general) and secondly in regard to the propagation of man from man. As to the first, there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether one man can teach another, as being the cause of his knowledge?
(2) Whether man can teach an angel?
(3) Whether by the power of his soul man can change corporeal matter?
(4) Whether the separate soul of man can move bodies by local movement?
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FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 117, Art. 1]
Whether One Man Can Teach Another?
Objection 1: It would seem that one man cannot teach another. For the Lord says (Matt. 22:8): "Be not you called Rabbi": on which the gloss of Jerome says, "Lest you give to men the honor due to G.o.d."
Therefore to be a master is properly an honor due to G.o.d. But it belongs to a master to teach. Therefore man cannot teach, and this is proper to G.o.d.
Obj. 2: Further, if one man teaches another this is only inasmuch as he acts through his own knowledge, so as to cause knowledge in the other. But a quality through which anyone acts so as to produce his like, is an active quality. Therefore it follows that knowledge is an active quality just as heat is.
Obj. 3: Further, for knowledge we require intellectual light, and the species of the thing understood. But a man cannot cause either of these in another man. Therefore a man cannot by teaching cause knowledge in another man.
Obj. 4: Further, the teacher does nothing in regard to a disciple save to propose to him certain signs, so as to signify something by words or gestures. But it is not possible to teach anyone so as to cause knowledge in him, by putting signs before him. For these are signs either of things that he knows, or of things he does not know.
If of things that he knows, he to whom these signs are proposed is already in the possession of knowledge, and does not acquire it from the master. If they are signs of things that he does not know, he can learn nothing therefrom: for instance, if one were to speak Greek to a man who only knows Latin, he would learn nothing thereby. Therefore in no way can a man cause knowledge in another by teaching him.
_On the contrary,_ The Apostle says (1 Tim. 2:7): "Whereunto I am appointed a preacher and an apostle ... a doctor of the Gentiles in faith and truth."
_I answer that,_ On this question there have been various opinions.
For Averroes, commenting on _De Anima_ iii, maintains that all men have one pa.s.sive intellect in common, as stated above (Q. 76, A. 2).
From this it follows that the same intelligible species belong to all men. Consequently he held that one man does not cause another to have a knowledge distinct from that which he has himself; but that he communicates the identical knowledge which he has himself, by moving him to order rightly the phantasms in his soul, so that they be rightly disposed for intelligible apprehension. This opinion is true so far as knowledge is the same in disciple and master, if we consider the ident.i.ty of the thing known: for the same objective truth is known by both of them. But so far as he maintains that all men have but one pa.s.sive intellect, and the same intelligible species, differing only as to various phantasms, his opinion is false, as stated above (Q. 76, A. 2).
Besides this, there is the opinion of the Platonists, who held that our souls are possessed of knowledge from the very beginning, through the partic.i.p.ation of separate forms, as stated above (Q. 84, AA. 3, 4); but that the soul is hindered, through its union with the body, from the free consideration of those things which it knows. According to this, the disciple does not acquire fresh knowledge from his master, but is roused by him to consider what he knows; so that to learn would be nothing else than to remember. In the same way they held that natural agents only dispose (matter) to receive forms, which matter acquires by a partic.i.p.ation of separate substances. But against this we have proved above (Q. 79, A. 2; Q. 84, A. 3) that the pa.s.sive intellect of the human soul is in pure potentiality to intelligible (species), as Aristotle says (De Anima iii, 4).
We must therefore decide the question differently, by saying that the teacher causes knowledge in the learner, by reducing him from potentiality to act, as the Philosopher says (Phys. viii, 4). In order to make this clear, we must observe that of effects proceeding from an exterior principle, some proceed from the exterior principle alone; as the form of a house is caused to be in matter by art alone: whereas other effects proceed sometimes from an exterior principle, sometimes from an interior principle: thus health is caused in a sick man, sometimes by an exterior principle, namely by the medical art, sometimes by an interior principle as when a man is healed by the force of nature. In these latter effects two things must be noticed.
First, that art in its work imitates nature for just as nature heals a man by alteration, digestion, rejection of the matter that caused the sickness, so does art. Secondly, we must remark that the exterior principle, art, acts, not as princ.i.p.al agent, but as helping the princ.i.p.al agent, but as helping the princ.i.p.al agent, which is the interior principle, by strengthening it, and by furnishing it with instruments and a.s.sistance, of which the interior principle makes use in producing the effect. Thus the physician strengthens nature, and employs food and medicine, of which nature makes use for the intended end.
Now knowledge is acquired in man, both from an interior principle, as is clear in one who procures knowledge by his own research; and from an exterior principle, as is clear in one who learns (by instruction). For in every man there is a certain principle of knowledge, namely the light of the active intellect, through which certain universal principles of all the sciences are naturally understood as soon as proposed to the intellect. Now when anyone applies these universal principles to certain particular things, the memory or experience of which he acquires through the senses; then by his own research advancing from the known to the unknown, he obtains knowledge of what he knew not before. Wherefore anyone who teaches, leads the disciple from things known by the latter, to the knowledge of things previously unknown to him; according to what the Philosopher says (Poster. i, 1): "All teaching and all learning proceed from previous knowledge."
Now the master leads the disciple from things known to knowledge of the unknown, in a twofold manner. Firstly, by proposing to him certain helps or means of instruction, which his intellect can use for the acquisition of science: for instance, he may put before him certain less universal propositions, of which nevertheless the disciple is able to judge from previous knowledge: or he may propose to him some sensible examples, either by way of likeness or of opposition, or something of the sort, from which the intellect of the learner is led to the knowledge of truth previously unknown.
Secondly, by strengthening the intellect of the learner; not, indeed, by some active power as of a higher nature, as explained above (Q.
106, A. 1; Q. 111, A. 1) of the angelic enlightenment, because all human intellects are of one grade in the natural order; but inasmuch as he proposes to the disciple the order of principles to conclusions, by reason of his not having sufficient collating power to be able to draw the conclusions from the principles. Hence the Philosopher says (Poster. i, 2) that "a demonstration is a syllogism that causes knowledge." In this way a demonstrator causes his hearer to know.
Reply Obj. 1: As stated above, the teacher only brings exterior help as the physician who heals: but just as the interior nature is the princ.i.p.al cause of the healing, so the interior light of the intellect is the princ.i.p.al cause of knowledge. But both of these are from G.o.d. Therefore as of G.o.d is it written: "Who healeth all thy diseases" (Ps. 102:3); so of Him is it written: "He that teacheth man knowledge" (Ps. 93:10), inasmuch as "the light of His countenance is signed upon us" (Ps. 4:7), through which light all things are shown to us.
Reply Obj. 2: As Averroes argues, the teacher does not cause knowledge in the disciple after the manner of a natural active cause.
Wherefore knowledge need not be an active quality: but is the principle by which one is directed in teaching, just as art is the principle by which one is directed in working.
Reply Obj. 3: The master does not cause the intellectual light in the disciple, nor does he cause the intelligible species directly: but he moves the disciple by teaching, so that the latter, by the power of his intellect, forms intelligible concepts, the signs of which are proposed to him from without.
Reply Obj. 4: The signs proposed by the master to the disciple are of things known in a general and confused manner; but not known in detail and distinctly. Therefore when anyone acquires knowledge by himself, he cannot be called self-taught, or be said to have his own master because perfect knowledge did not precede in him, such as is required in a master.
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SECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 117, Art. 2]
Whether Man Can Teach the Angels?
Objection 1: It would seem that men teach angels. For the Apostle says (Eph. 3:10): "That the manifold wisdom of G.o.d may be made known to the princ.i.p.alities and powers in the heavenly places through the Church."
But the Church is the union of all the faithful. Therefore some things are made known to angels through men.
Obj. 2: Further, the superior angels, who are enlightened immediately concerning Divine things by G.o.d, can instruct the inferior angels, as stated above (Q. 116, A. 1; Q. 112, A. 3). But some men are instructed immediately concerning Divine things by the Word of G.o.d; as appears princ.i.p.ally of the apostles from Heb. 1:1, 2: "Last of all, in these days (G.o.d) hath spoken to us by His Son." Therefore some men have been able to teach the angels.
Obj. 3: Further, the inferior angels are instructed by the superior.
But some men are higher than some angels; since some men are taken up to the highest angelic orders, as Gregory says in a homily (Hom.
x.x.xiv in Evang.). Therefore some of the inferior angels can be instructed by men concerning Divine things.
_On the contrary,_ Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that every Divine enlightenment is borne to men by the ministry of the angels.
Therefore angels are not instructed by men concerning Divine things.
_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 107, A. 2), the inferior angels can indeed speak to the superior angels, by making their thoughts known to them; but concerning Divine things superior angels are never enlightened by inferior angels. Now it is manifest that in the same way as inferior angels are subject to the superior, the highest men are subject even to the lowest angels. This is clear from Our Lord"s words (Matt. 11:11): "There hath not risen among them that are born of woman a greater than John the Baptist; yet he that is lesser in the kingdom of heaven is greater than he." Therefore angels are never enlightened by men concerning Divine things. But men can by means of speech make known to angels the thoughts of their hearts: because it belongs to G.o.d alone to know the heart"s secrets.
Reply Obj. 1: Augustine (Gen. ad lit. v, 19) thus explains this pa.s.sage of the Apostle, who in the preceding verses says: "To me, the least of all the saints, is given this grace ... to enlighten all men, that they may see what is the dispensation of the mystery which hath been hidden from eternity in G.o.d. Hidden, yet so that the multiform wisdom of G.o.d was made known to the princ.i.p.alities and powers in the heavenly places--that is, through the Church." As though he were to say: This mystery was hidden from men, but not from the Church in heaven, which is contained in the princ.i.p.alities and powers who knew it "from all ages, but not before all ages: because the Church was at first there, where after the resurrection this Church composed of men will be gathered together."
It can also be explained otherwise that "what is hidden, is known by the angels, not only in G.o.d, but also here where when it takes place and is made public," as Augustine says further on (Gen. ad lit. v, 19). Thus when the mysteries of Christ and the Church were fulfilled by the apostles, some things concerning these mysteries became apparent to the angels, which were hidden from them before. In this way we can understand what Jerome says (Comment. in Ep. ad Eph.)--that from the preaching of the apostles the angels learned certain mysteries; that is to say, through the preaching of the apostles, the mysteries were realized in the things themselves: thus by the preaching of Paul the Gentiles were converted, of which mystery the Apostle is speaking in the pa.s.sage quoted.
Reply Obj. 2: The apostles were instructed immediately by the Word of G.o.d, not according to His Divinity, but according as He spoke in His human nature. Hence the argument does not prove.
Reply Obj. 3: Certain men in this state of life are greater than certain angels, not actually, but virtually; forasmuch as they have such great charity that they can merit a higher degree of beat.i.tude than that possessed by certain angels. In the same way we might say that the seed of a great tree is virtually greater than a small tree, though actually it is much smaller.
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