Obj. 6: Further, happiness is in the happy one uninterruptedly. But human operation is often interrupted; for instance, by sleep, or some other occupation, or by cessation. Therefore happiness is not an operation.
_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 13) that "happiness is an operation according to perfect virtue."
_I answer that,_ In so far as man"s happiness is something created, existing in him, we must needs say that it is an operation. For happiness is man"s supreme perfection. Now each thing is perfect in so far as it is actual; since potentiality without act is imperfect.
Consequently happiness must consist in man"s last act. But it is evident that operation is the last act of the operator, wherefore the Philosopher calls it "second act" (De Anima ii, 1): because that which has a form can be potentially operating, just as he who knows is potentially considering. And hence it is that in other things, too, each one is said to be "for its operation" (De Coel ii, 3).
Therefore man"s happiness must of necessity consist in an operation.
Reply Obj. 1: Life is taken in two senses. First for the very being of the living. And thus happiness is not life: since it has been shown (Q. 2, A. 5) that the being of a man, no matter in what it may consist, is not that man"s happiness; for of G.o.d alone is it true that His Being is His Happiness. Secondly, life means the operation of the living, by which operation the principle of life is made actual: thus we speak of active and contemplative life, or of a life of pleasure. And in this sense eternal life is said to be the last end, as is clear from John 17:3: "This is eternal life, that they may know Thee, the only true G.o.d."
Reply Obj. 2: Boethius, in defining happiness, considered happiness in general: for considered thus it is the perfect common good; and he signified this by saying that happiness is "a state made perfect by the aggregate of all good things," thus implying that the state of a happy man consists in possessing the perfect good. But Aristotle expressed the very essence of happiness, showing by what man is established in this state, and that it is by some kind of operation.
And so it is that he proves happiness to be "the perfect good"
(Ethic. i, 7).
Reply Obj. 3: As stated in _Metaph._ ix, 7 action is twofold. One proceeds from the agent into outward matter, such as "to burn" and "to cut." And such an operation cannot be happiness: for such an operation is an action and a perfection, not of the agent, but rather of the patient, as is stated in the same pa.s.sage. The other is an action that remains in the agent, such as to feel, to understand, and to will: and such an action is a perfection and an act of the agent.
And such an operation can be happiness.
Reply Obj. 4: Since happiness signifies some final perfection; according as various things capable of happiness can attain to various degrees of perfection, so must there be various meanings applied to happiness. For in G.o.d there is happiness essentially; since His very Being is His operation, whereby He enjoys no other than Himself. In the happy angels, the final perfection is in respect of some operation, by which they are united to the Uncreated Good: and this operation of theirs is one only and everlasting. But in men, according to their present state of life, the final perfection is in respect of an operation whereby man is united to G.o.d: but this operation neither can be continual, nor, consequently, is it one only, because operation is multiplied by being discontinued. And for this reason in the present state of life, perfect happiness cannot be attained by man. Wherefore the Philosopher, in placing man"s happiness in this life (Ethic. i, 10), says that it is imperfect, and after a long discussion, concludes: "We call men happy, but only as men." But G.o.d has promised us perfect happiness, when we shall be "as the angels ... in heaven" (Matt. 22:30).
Consequently in regard to this perfect happiness, the objection fails: because in that state of happiness, man"s mind will be united to G.o.d by one, continual, everlasting operation. But in the present life, in as far as we fall short of the unity and continuity of that operation so do we fall short of perfect happiness. Nevertheless it is a partic.i.p.ation of happiness: and so much the greater, as the operation can be more continuous and more one. Consequently the active life, which is busy with many things, has less of happiness than the contemplative life, which is busied with one thing, i.e. the contemplation of truth. And if at any time man is not actually engaged in this operation, yet since he can always easily turn to it, and since he ordains the very cessation, by sleeping or occupying himself otherwise, to the aforesaid occupation, the latter seems, as it were, continuous. From these remarks the replies to Objections 5 and 6 are evident.
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THIRD ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 3, Art. 3]
Whether Happiness Is an Operation of the Sensitive Part, or of the Intellective Part Only?
Objection 1: It would seem that happiness consists in an operation of the senses also. For there is no more excellent operation in man than that of the senses, except the intellective operation. But in us the intellective operation depends on the sensitive: since "we cannot understand without a phantasm" (De Anima iii, 7). Therefore happiness consists in an operation of the senses also.
Obj. 2: Further, Boethius says (De Consol. iii) that happiness is "a state made perfect by the aggregate of all good things." But some goods are sensible, which we attain by the operation of the senses.
Therefore it seems that the operation of the senses is needed for happiness.
Obj. 3: Further, happiness is the perfect good, as we find proved in _Ethic._ i, 7: which would not be true, were not man perfected thereby in all his parts. But some parts of the soul are perfected by sensitive operations. Therefore sensitive operation is required for happiness.
_On the contrary,_ Irrational animals have the sensitive operation in common with us: but they have not happiness in common with us.
Therefore happiness does not consist in a sensitive operation.
_I answer that,_ A thing may belong to happiness in three ways: (1) essentially, (2) antecedently, (3) consequently. Now the operation of sense cannot belong to happiness essentially. For man"s happiness consists essentially in his being united to the Uncreated Good, Which is his last end, as shown above (A. 1): to Which man cannot be united by an operation of his senses. Again, in like manner, because, as shown above (Q. 2, A. 5), man"s happiness does not consist in goods of the body, which goods alone, however, we attain through the operation of the senses.
Nevertheless the operations of the senses can belong to happiness, both antecedently and consequently: antecedently, in respect of imperfect happiness, such as can be had in this life, since the operation of the intellect demands a previous operation of the sense; consequently, in that perfect happiness which we await in heaven; because at the resurrection, "from the very happiness of the soul,"
as Augustine says (Ep. ad Dioscor.) "the body and the bodily senses will receive a certain overflow, so as to be perfected in their operations"; a point which will be explained further on when we treat of the resurrection (Suppl. QQ. 82-85). But then the operation whereby man"s mind is united to G.o.d will not depend on the senses.
Reply Obj. 1: This objection proves that the operation of the senses is required antecedently for imperfect happiness, such as can be had in this life.
Reply Obj. 2: Perfect happiness, such as the angels have, includes the aggregate of all good things, by being united to the universal source of all good; not that it requires each individual good. But in this imperfect happiness, we need the aggregate of those goods that suffice for the most perfect operation of this life.
Reply Obj. 3: In perfect happiness the entire man is perfected, in the lower part of his nature, by an overflow from the higher. But in the imperfect happiness of this life, it is otherwise; we advance from the perfection of the lower part to the perfection of the higher part.
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FOURTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 3, Art. 4]
Whether, If Happiness Is in the Intellective Part, It Is an Operation of the Intellect or of the Will?
Objection 1: It would seem that happiness consists in an act of the will. For Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xix, 10, 11), that man"s happiness consists in peace; wherefore it is written (Ps. 147:3): "Who hath placed peace in thy end [Douay: "borders"]". But peace pertains to the will. Therefore man"s happiness is in the will.
Obj. 2: Further, happiness is the supreme good. But good is the object of the will. Therefore happiness consists in an operation of the will.
Obj. 3: Further, the last end corresponds to the first mover: thus the last end of the whole army is victory, which is the end of the general, who moves all the men. But the first mover in regard to operations is the will: because it moves the other powers, as we shall state further on (Q. 9, AA. 1, 3). Therefore happiness regards the will.
Obj. 4: Further, if happiness be an operation, it must needs be man"s most excellent operation. But the love of G.o.d, which is an act of the will, is a more excellent operation than knowledge, which is an operation of the intellect, as the Apostle declares (1 Cor. 13).
Therefore it seems that happiness consists in an act of the will.
Obj. 5: Further, Augustine says (De Trin. xiii, 5) that "happy is he who has whatever he desires, and desires nothing amiss." And a little further on (6) he adds: "He is most happy who desires well, whatever he desires: for good things make a man happy, and such a man already possesses some good--i.e. a good will." Therefore happiness consists in an act of the will.
_On the contrary,_ Our Lord said (John 17:3): "This is eternal life: that they may know Thee, the only true G.o.d." Now eternal life is the last end, as stated above (A. 2, ad 1). Therefore man"s happiness consists in the knowledge of G.o.d, which is an act of the intellect.
_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 2, A. 6) two things are needed for happiness: one, which is the essence of happiness: the other, that is, as it were, its proper accident, i.e. the delight connected with it. I say, then, that as to the very essence of happiness, it is impossible for it to consist in an act of the will. For it is evident from what has been said (AA. 1, 2; Q. 2, A. 7) that happiness is the attainment of the last end. But the attainment of the end does not consist in the very act of the will. For the will is directed to the end, both absent, when it desires it; and present, when it is delighted by resting therein. Now it is evident that the desire itself of the end is not the attainment of the end, but is a movement towards the end: while delight comes to the will from the end being present; and not conversely, is a thing made present, by the fact that the will delights in it. Therefore, that the end be present to him who desires it, must be due to something else than an act of the will.
This is evidently the case in regard to sensible ends. For if the acquisition of money were through an act of the will, the covetous man would have it from the very moment that he wished for it. But at the moment it is far from him; and he attains it, by grasping it in his hand, or in some like manner; and then he delights in the money got. And so it is with an intelligible end. For at first we desire to attain an intelligible end; we attain it, through its being made present to us by an act of the intellect; and then the delighted will rests in the end when attained.
So, therefore, the essence of happiness consists in an act of the intellect: but the delight that results from happiness pertains to the will. In this sense Augustine says (Confess. x, 23) that happiness is "joy in truth," because, to wit, joy itself is the consummation of happiness.
Reply Obj. 1: Peace pertains to man"s last end, not as though it were the very essence of happiness; but because it is antecedent and consequent thereto: antecedent, in so far as all those things are removed which disturb and hinder man in attaining the last end: consequent inasmuch as when man has attained his last end, he remains at peace, his desire being at rest.
Reply Obj. 2: The will"s first object is not its act: just as neither is the first object of the sight, vision, but a visible thing.
Wherefore, from the very fact that happiness belongs to the will, as the will"s first object, it follows that it does not belong to it as its act.
Reply Obj. 3: The intellect apprehends the end before the will does: yet motion towards the end begins in the will. And therefore to the will belongs that which last of all follows the attainment of the end, viz. delight or enjoyment.
Reply Obj. 4: Love ranks above knowledge in moving, but knowledge precedes love in attaining: for "naught is loved save what is known,"
as Augustine says (De Trin. x, 1). Consequently we first attain an intelligible end by an act of the intellect; just as we first attain a sensible end by an act of sense.
Reply Obj. 5: He who has whatever he desires, is happy, because he has what he desires: and this indeed is by something other than the act of his will. But to desire nothing amiss is needed for happiness, as a necessary disposition thereto. And a good will is reckoned among the good things which make a man happy, forasmuch as it is an inclination of the will: just as a movement is reduced to the genus of its terminus, for instance, "alteration" to the genus "quality."
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FIFTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 3, Art. 5]
Whether Happiness Is an Operation of the Speculative, or of the Practical Intellect?
Objection 1: It would seem that happiness is an operation of the practical intellect. For the end of every creature consists in becoming like G.o.d. But man is like G.o.d, by his practical intellect, which is the cause of things understood, rather than by his speculative intellect, which derives its knowledge from things.
Therefore man"s happiness consists in an operation of the practical intellect rather than of the speculative.
Obj. 2: Further, happiness is man"s perfect good. But the practical intellect is ordained to the good rather than the speculative intellect, which is ordained to the true. Hence we are said to be good, in reference to the perfection of the practical intellect, but not in reference to the perfection of the speculative intellect, according to which we are said to be knowing or understanding.
Therefore man"s happiness consists in an act of the practical intellect rather than of the speculative.
Obj. 3: Further, happiness is a good of man himself. But the speculative intellect is more concerned with things outside man; whereas the practical intellect is concerned with things belonging to man himself, viz. his operations and pa.s.sions. Therefore man"s happiness consists in an operation of the practical intellect rather than of the speculative.
_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Trin. i, 8) that "contemplation is promised us, as being the goal of all our actions, and the everlasting perfection of our joys."
_I answer that,_ Happiness consists in an operation of the speculative rather than of the practical intellect. This is evident for three reasons. First because if man"s happiness is an operation, it must needs be man"s highest operation. Now man"s highest operation is that of his highest power in respect of its highest object: and his highest power is the intellect, whose highest object is the Divine Good, which is the object, not of the practical but of the speculative intellect. Consequently happiness consists princ.i.p.ally in such an operation, viz. in the contemplation of Divine things. And since that "seems to be each man"s self, which is best in him,"