Objection 1: It would seem that Happiness can be had in this life. For it is written (Ps. 118:1): "Blessed are the undefiled in the way, who walk in the law of the Lord." But this happens in this life. Therefore one can be happy in this life.
Obj. 2: Further, imperfect partic.i.p.ation in the Sovereign Good does not destroy the nature of Happiness, otherwise one would not be happier than another. But men can partic.i.p.ate in the Sovereign Good in this life, by knowing and loving G.o.d, albeit imperfectly.
Therefore man can be happy in this life.
Obj. 3: Further, what is said by many cannot be altogether false: since what is in many, comes, apparently, from nature; and nature does not fail altogether. Now many say that Happiness can be had in this life, as appears from Ps. 143:15: "They have called the people happy that hath these things," to wit, the good things in this life.
Therefore one can be happy in this life.
_On the contrary,_ It is written (Job 14:1): "Man born of a woman, living for a short time, is filled with many miseries." But Happiness excludes misery. Therefore man cannot be happy in this life.
_I answer that,_ A certain partic.i.p.ation of Happiness can be had in this life: but perfect and true Happiness cannot be had in this life.
This may be seen from a twofold consideration.
First, from the general notion of happiness. For since happiness is a "perfect and sufficient good," it excludes every evil, and fulfils every desire. But in this life every evil cannot be excluded. For this present life is subject to many unavoidable evils; to ignorance on the part of the intellect; to inordinate affection on the part of the appet.i.te, and to many penalties on the part of the body; as Augustine sets forth in De Civ. Dei xix, 4. Likewise neither can the desire for good be satiated in this life. For man naturally desires the good, which he has, to be abiding. Now the goods of the present life pa.s.s away; since life itself pa.s.ses away, which we naturally desire to have, and would wish to hold abidingly, for man naturally shrinks from death. Wherefore it is impossible to have true Happiness in this life.
Secondly, from a consideration of the specific nature of Happiness, viz. the vision of the Divine Essence, which man cannot obtain in this life, as was shown in the First Part (Q. 12, A. 11). Hence it is evident that none can attain true and perfect Happiness in this life.
Reply Obj. 1: Some are said to be happy in this life, either on account of the hope of obtaining Happiness in the life to come, according to Rom. 8:24: "We are saved by hope"; or on account of a certain partic.i.p.ation of Happiness, by reason of a kind of enjoyment of the Sovereign Good.
Reply Obj. 2: The imperfection of partic.i.p.ated Happiness is due to one of two causes. First, on the part of the object of Happiness, which is not seen in Its Essence: and this imperfection destroys the nature of true Happiness. Secondly, the imperfection may be on the part of the partic.i.p.ator, who indeed attains the object of Happiness, in itself, namely, G.o.d: imperfectly, however, in comparison with the way in which G.o.d enjoys Himself. This imperfection does not destroy the true nature of Happiness; because, since Happiness is an operation, as stated above (Q. 3, A. 2), the true nature of Happiness is taken from the object, which specifies the act, and not from the subject.
Reply Obj. 3: Men esteem that there is some kind of happiness to be had in this life, on account of a certain likeness to true Happiness.
And thus they do not fail altogether in their estimate.
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FOURTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 5, Art. 4]
Whether Happiness Once Had Can Be Lost?
Objection 1: It would seem that Happiness can be lost. For Happiness is a perfection. But every perfection is in the thing perfected according to the mode of the latter. Since then man is, by his nature, changeable, it seems that Happiness is partic.i.p.ated by man in a changeable manner. And consequently it seems that man can lose Happiness.
Obj. 2: Further, Happiness consists in an act of the intellect; and the intellect is subject to the will. But the will can be directed to opposites. Therefore it seems that it can desist from the operation whereby man is made happy: and thus man will cease to be happy.
Obj. 3: Further, the end corresponds to the beginning. But man"s Happiness has a beginning, since man was not always happy. Therefore it seems that it has an end.
_On the contrary,_ It is written (Matt. 25:46) of the righteous that "they shall go ... into life everlasting," which, as above stated (A. 2), is the Happiness of the saints. Now what is eternal ceases not. Therefore Happiness cannot be lost.
_I answer that,_ If we speak of imperfect happiness, such as can be had in this life, in this sense it can be lost. This is clear of contemplative happiness, which is lost either by forgetfulness, for instance, when knowledge is lost through sickness; or again by certain occupations, whereby a man is altogether withdrawn from contemplation.
This is also clear of active happiness: since man"s will can be changed so as to fall to vice from the virtue, in whose act that happiness princ.i.p.ally consists. If, however, the virtue remain unimpaired, outward changes can indeed disturb such like happiness, in so far as they hinder many acts of virtue; but they cannot take it away altogether because there still remains an act of virtue, whereby man bears these trials in a praiseworthy manner. And since the happiness of this life can be lost, a circ.u.mstance that appears to be contrary to the nature of happiness, therefore did the Philosopher state (Ethic. i, 10) that some are happy in this life, not simply, but "as men," whose nature is subject to change.
But if we speak of that perfect Happiness which we await after this life, it must be observed that Origen (Peri Archon. ii, 3), following the error of certain Platonists, held that man can become unhappy after the final Happiness.
This, however, is evidently false, for two reasons. First, from the general notion of happiness. For since happiness is the "perfect and sufficient good," it must needs set man"s desire at rest and exclude every evil. Now man naturally desires to hold to the good that he has, and to have the surety of his holding: else he must of necessity be troubled with the fear of losing it, or with the sorrow of knowing that he will lose it. Therefore it is necessary for true Happiness that man have the a.s.sured opinion of never losing the good that he possesses. If this opinion be true, it follows that he never will lose happiness: but if it be false, it is in itself an evil that he should have a false opinion: because the false is the evil of the intellect, just as the true is its good, as stated in _Ethic._ vi, 2.
Consequently he will no longer be truly happy, if evil be in him.
Secondly, it is again evident if we consider the specific nature of Happiness. For it has been shown above (Q. 3, A. 8) that man"s perfect Happiness consists in the vision of the Divine Essence. Now it is impossible for anyone seeing the Divine Essence, to wish not to see It. Because every good that one possesses and yet wishes to be without, is either insufficient, something more sufficing being desired in its stead; or else has some inconvenience attached to it, by reason of which it becomes wearisome. But the vision of the Divine Essence fills the soul with all good things, since it unites it to the source of all goodness; hence it is written (Ps. 16:15): "I shall be satisfied when Thy glory shall appear"; and (Wis. 7:11): "All good things came to me together with her," i.e. with the contemplation of wisdom. In like manner neither has it any inconvenience attached to it; because it is written of the contemplation of wisdom (Wis. 8:16): "Her conversation hath no bitterness, nor her company any tediousness." It is thus evident that the happy man cannot forsake Happiness of his own accord. Moreover, neither can he lose Happiness, through G.o.d taking it away from him. Because, since the withdrawal of Happiness is a punishment, it cannot be enforced by G.o.d, the just Judge, except for some fault; and he that sees G.o.d cannot fall into a fault, since rect.i.tude of the will, of necessity, results from that vision as was shown above (Q. 4, A. 4). Nor again can it be withdrawn by any other agent. Because the mind that is united to G.o.d is raised above all other things: and consequently no other agent can sever the mind from that union. Therefore it seems unreasonable that as time goes on, man should pa.s.s from happiness to misery, and vice versa; because such like vicissitudes of time can only be for such things as are subject to time and movement.
Reply Obj. 1: Happiness is consummate perfection, which excludes every defect from the happy. And therefore whoever has happiness has it altogether unchangeably: this is done by the Divine power, which raises man to the partic.i.p.ation of eternity which transcends all change.
Reply Obj. 2: The will can be directed to opposites, in things which are ordained to the end; but it is ordained, of natural necessity, to the last end. This is evident from the fact that man is unable not to wish to be happy.
Reply Obj. 3: Happiness has a beginning owing to the condition of the partic.i.p.ator: but it has no end by reason of the condition of the good, the partic.i.p.ation of which makes man happy. Hence the beginning of happiness is from one cause, its endlessness is from another.
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FIFTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 5, Art. 5]
Whether Man Can Attain Happiness by His Natural Powers?
Objection 1: It would seem that man can attain Happiness by his natural powers. For nature does not fail in necessary things. But nothing is so necessary to man as that by which he attains the last end. Therefore this is not lacking to human nature. Therefore man can attain Happiness by his natural powers.
Obj. 2: Further, since man is more n.o.ble than irrational creatures, it seems that he must be better equipped than they. But irrational creatures can attain their end by their natural powers. Much more therefore can man attain Happiness by his natural powers.
Obj. 3: Further, Happiness is a "perfect operation," according to the Philosopher (Ethic. vii, 13). Now the beginning of a thing belongs to the same principle as the perfecting thereof. Since, therefore, the imperfect operation, which is as the beginning in human operations, is subject to man"s natural power, whereby he is master of his own actions; it seems that he can attain to perfect operation, i.e.
Happiness, by his natural powers.
_On the contrary,_ Man is naturally the principle of his action, by his intellect and will. But final Happiness prepared for the saints, surpa.s.ses the intellect and will of man; for the Apostle says (1 Cor.
2:9) "Eye hath not seen, nor ear heard, neither hath it entered into the heart of man, what things G.o.d hath prepared for them that love Him." Therefore man cannot attain Happiness by his natural powers.
_I answer that,_ Imperfect happiness that can be had in this life, can be acquired by man by his natural powers, in the same way as virtue, in whose operation it consists: on this point we shall speak further on (Q. 63). But man"s perfect Happiness, as stated above (Q.
3, A. 8), consists in the vision of the Divine Essence. Now the vision of G.o.d"s Essence surpa.s.ses the nature not only of man, but also of every creature, as was shown in the First Part (Q. 12, A. 4).
For the natural knowledge of every creature is in keeping with the mode of his substance: thus it is said of the intelligence (De Causis; Prop. viii) that "it knows things that are above it, and things that are below it, according to the mode of its substance."
But every knowledge that is according to the mode of created substance, falls short of the vision of the Divine Essence, which infinitely surpa.s.ses all created substance. Consequently neither man, nor any creature, can attain final Happiness by his natural powers.
Reply Obj. 1: Just as nature does not fail man in necessaries, although it has not provided him with weapons and clothing, as it provided other animals, because it gave him reason and hands, with which he is able to get these things for himself; so neither did it fail man in things necessary, although it gave him not the wherewithal to attain Happiness: since this it could not do. But it did give him free-will, with which he can turn to G.o.d, that He may make him happy.
"For what we do by means of our friends, is done, in a sense, by ourselves" (Ethic. iii, 3).
Reply Obj. 2: The nature that can attain perfect good, although it needs help from without in order to attain it, is of more n.o.ble condition than a nature which cannot attain perfect good, but attains some imperfect good, although it need no help from without in order to attain it, as the Philosopher says (De Coel. ii, 12). Thus he is better disposed to health who can attain perfect health, albeit by means of medicine, than he who can attain but imperfect health, without the help of medicine. And therefore the rational creature, which can attain the perfect good of happiness, but needs the Divine a.s.sistance for the purpose, is more perfect than the irrational creature, which is not capable of attaining this good, but attains some imperfect good by its natural powers.
Reply Obj. 3: When imperfect and perfect are of the same species, they can be caused by the same power. But this does not follow of necessity, if they be of different species: for not everything, that can cause the disposition of matter, can produce the final perfection. Now the imperfect operation, which is subject to man"s natural power, is not of the same species as that perfect operation which is man"s happiness: since operation takes its species from its object. Consequently the argument does not prove.
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SIXTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 5, Art. 6]
Whether Man Attains Happiness Through the Action of Some Higher Creature?
Objection 1: It would seem that man can be made happy through the action of some higher creature, viz. an angel. For since we observe a twofold order in things--one, of the parts of the universe to one another, the other, of the whole universe to a good which is outside the universe; the former order is ordained to the second as to its end (Metaph. xii, 10). Thus the mutual order of the parts of an army is dependent on the order of the parts of an army is dependent on the order of the whole army to the general. But the mutual order of the parts of the universe consists in the higher creatures acting on the lower, as stated in the First Part (Q. 109, A. 2): while happiness consists in the order of man to a good which is outside the universe, i.e. G.o.d. Therefore man is made happy, through a higher creature, viz.
an angel, acting on him.
Obj. 2: Further, that which is such in potentiality, can be reduced to act, by that which is such actually: thus what is potentially hot, is made actually hot, by something that is actually hot. But man is potentially happy. Therefore he can be made actually happy by an angel who is actually happy.
Obj. 3: Further, Happiness consists in an operation of the intellect as stated above (Q. 3, A. 4). But an angel can enlighten man"s intellect as shown in the First Part (Q. 111, A. 1). Therefore an angel can make a man happy.
_On the contrary,_ It is written (Ps. 83:12): "The Lord will give grace and glory."
_I answer that,_ Since every creature is subject to the laws of nature, from the very fact that its power and action are limited: that which surpa.s.ses created nature, cannot be done by the power of any creature. Consequently if anything need to be done that is above nature, it is done by G.o.d immediately; such as raising the dead to life, restoring sight to the blind, and such like. Now it has been shown above (A. 5) that Happiness is a good surpa.s.sing created nature. Therefore it is impossible that it be bestowed through the action of any creature: but by G.o.d alone is man made happy, if we speak of perfect Happiness. If, however, we speak of imperfect happiness, the same is to be said of it as of the virtue, in whose act it consists.
Reply Obj. 1: It often happens in the case of active powers ordained to one another, that it belongs to the highest power to reach the last end, while the lower powers contribute to the attainment of that last end, by causing a disposition thereto: thus to the art of sailing, which commands the art of shipbuilding, it belongs to use a ship for the end for which it was made. Thus, too, in the order of the universe, man is indeed helped by the angels in the attainment of his last end, in respect of certain preliminary dispositions thereto: whereas he attains the last end itself through the First Agent, which is G.o.d.
Reply Obj. 2: When a form exists perfectly and naturally in something, it can be the principle of action on something else: for instance a hot thing heats through heat. But if a form exist in something imperfectly, and not naturally, it cannot be the principle whereby it is communicated to something else: thus the _intention_ of color which is in the pupil, cannot make a thing white; nor indeed can everything enlightened or heated give heat or light to something else; for if they could, enlightening and heating would go on to infinity. But the light of glory, whereby G.o.d is seen, is in G.o.d perfectly and naturally; whereas in any creature, it is imperfectly and by likeness or partic.i.p.ation. Consequently no creature can communicate its Happiness to another.