Summa Theologica

Chapter 203

_I answer that,_ Counsel properly implies a conference held between several; the very word (_consilium_) denotes this, for it means a sitting together (_considium_), from the fact that many sit together in order to confer with one another. Now we must take note that in contingent particular cases, in order that anything be known for certain, it is necessary to take several conditions or circ.u.mstances into consideration, which it is not easy for one to consider, but are considered by several with greater certainty, since what one takes note of, escapes the notice of another; whereas in necessary and universal things, our view is brought to bear on matters much more absolute and simple, so that one man by himself may be sufficient to consider these things. Wherefore the inquiry of counsel is concerned, properly speaking, with contingent singulars. Now the knowledge of the truth in such matters does not rank so high as to be desirable of itself, as is the knowledge of things universal and necessary; but it is desired as being useful towards action, because actions bear on things singular and contingent. Consequently, properly speaking, counsel is about things done by us.

Reply Obj. 1: Counsel implies conference, not of any kind, but about what is to be done, for the reason given above.

Reply Obj. 2: Although that which is laid down by the law is not due to the action of him who seeks counsel, nevertheless it directs him in his action: since the mandate of the law is one reason for doing something.

Reply Obj. 3: Counsel is not only about what is done, but also about whatever has relation to what is done. And for this reason we speak of consulting about future events, in so far as man is induced to do or omit something, through the knowledge of future events.

Reply Obj. 4: We seek counsel about the actions of others, in so far as they are, in some way, one with us; either by union of affection--thus a man is solicitous about what concerns his friend, as though it concerned himself; or after the manner of an instrument, for the princ.i.p.al agent and the instrument are, in a way, one cause, since one acts through the other; thus the master takes counsel about what he would do through his servant.

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FOURTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 14, Art. 4]

Whether Counsel Is About All Things That We Do?

Objection 1: It would seem that counsel is about all things that we have to do. For choice is the "desire of what is counselled" as stated above (A. 1). But choice is about all things that we do.

Therefore counsel is too.

Obj. 2: Further, counsel implies the reason"s inquiry. But, whenever we do not act through the impulse of pa.s.sion, we act in virtue of the reason"s inquiry. Therefore there is counsel about everything that we do.

Obj. 3: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 3) that "if it appears that something can be done by more means than one, we take counsel by inquiring whereby it may be done most easily and best; but if it can be accomplished by one means, how it can be done by this."

But whatever is done, is done by one means or by several. Therefore counsel takes place in all things that we do.

_On the contrary,_ Gregory of Nyssa [*Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. x.x.xiv.]

says that "counsel has no place in things that are done according to science or art."

_I answer that,_ Counsel is a kind of inquiry, as stated above (A. 1). But we are wont to inquire about things that admit of doubt; hence the process of inquiry, which is called an argument, "is a reason that attests something that admitted of doubt" [*Cicero, _Topic._ ad Trebat.]. Now, that something in relation to human acts admits of no doubt, arises from a twofold source. First, because certain determinate ends are gained by certain determinate means: as happens in the arts which are governed by certain fixed rules of action; thus a writer does not take counsel how to form his letters, for this is determined by art. Secondly, from the fact that it little matters whether it is done this or that way; this occurs in minute matters, which help or hinder but little with regard to the end aimed at; and reason looks upon small things as mere nothings. Consequently there are two things of which we do not take counsel, although they conduce to the end, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 3): namely, minute things, and those which have a fixed way of being done, as in works produced by art, with the exception of those arts that admit of conjecture such as medicine, commerce, and the like, as Gregory of Nyssa says [*Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xxiv.].

Reply Obj. 1: Choice presupposes counsel by reason of its judgment or decision. Consequently when the judgment or decision is evident without inquiry, there is no need for the inquiry of counsel.

Reply Obj. 2: In matters that are evident, the reason makes no inquiry, but judges at once. Consequently there is no need of counsel in all that is done by reason.

Reply Obj. 3: When a thing can be accomplished by one means, but in different ways, doubt may arise, just as when it can be accomplished by several means: hence the need of counsel. But when not only the means, but also the way of using the means, is fixed, then there is no need of counsel.

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FIFTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 14, Art. 5]

Whether the Process of Counsel Is One of a.n.a.lysis?

Objection 1: It would seem that the process of counsel is not one of a.n.a.lysis. For counsel is about things that we do. But the process of our actions is not one of a.n.a.lysis, but rather one of synthesis, viz.

from the simple to the composite. Therefore counsel does not always proceed by way of a.n.a.lysis.

Obj. 2: Further, counsel is an inquiry of the reason. But reason proceeds from things that precede to things that follow, according to the more appropriate order. Since then, the past precedes the present, and the present precedes the future, it seems that in taking counsel one should proceed from the past and present to the future: which is not an a.n.a.lytical process. Therefore the process of counsel is not one of a.n.a.lysis.

Obj. 3: Further, counsel is only of such things as are possible to us, according to _Ethic._ iii, 3. But the question as to whether a certain thing is possible to us, depends on what we are able or unable to do, in order to gain such and such an end. Therefore the inquiry of counsel should begin from things present.

_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 3) that "he who takes counsel seems to inquire and a.n.a.lyze."

_I answer that,_ In every inquiry one must begin from some principle.

And if this principle precedes both in knowledge and in being, the process is not a.n.a.lytic, but synthetic: because to proceed from cause to effect is to proceed synthetically, since causes are more simple than effects. But if that which precedes in knowledge is later in the order of being, the process is one of a.n.a.lysis, as when our judgment deals with effects, which by a.n.a.lysis we trace to their simple causes. Now the principle in the inquiry of counsel is the end, which precedes indeed in intention, but comes afterwards into execution.

Hence the inquiry of counsel must needs be one of a.n.a.lysis, beginning that is to say, from that which is intended in the future, and continuing until it arrives at that which is to be done at once.

Reply Obj. 1: Counsel is indeed about action. But actions take their reason from the end; and consequently the order of reasoning about actions is contrary to the order of actions.

Reply Obj. 2: Reason begins with that which is first according to reason; but not always with that which is first in point of time.

Reply Obj. 3: We should not want to know whether something to be done for an end be possible, if it were not suitable for gaining that end.

Hence we must first inquire whether it be conducive to the end, before considering whether it be possible.

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SIXTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 14, Art. 6]

Whether the Process of Counsel Is Indefinite?

Objection 1: It would seem that the process of counsel is indefinite.

For counsel is an inquiry about the particular things with which action is concerned. But singulars are infinite. Therefore the process of counsel is indefinite.

Obj. 2: Further, the inquiry of counsel has to consider not only what is to be done, but how to avoid obstacles. But every human action can be hindered, and an obstacle can be removed by some human reason.

Therefore the inquiry about removing obstacles can go on indefinitely.

Obj. 3: Further, the inquiry of demonstrative science does not go on indefinitely, because one can come to principles that are self-evident, which are absolutely certain. But such like certainty is not to be had in contingent singulars, which are variable and uncertain. Therefore the inquiry of counsel goes on indefinitely.

_On the contrary,_ "No one is moved to that which he cannot possibly reach" (De Coelo i, 7). But it is impossible to pa.s.s through the infinite. If therefore the inquiry of counsel is infinite, no one would begin to take counsel. Which is clearly untrue.

_I answer that,_ The inquiry of counsel is actually finite on both sides, on that of its principle and on that of its term. For a twofold principle is available in the inquiry of counsel. One is proper to it, and belongs to the very genus of things pertaining to operation: this is the end which is not the matter of counsel, but is taken for granted as its principle, as stated above (A. 2). The other principle is taken from another genus, so to speak; thus in demonstrative sciences one science postulates certain things from another, without inquiring into them. Now these principles which are taken for granted in the inquiry of counsel are any facts received through the senses--for instance, that this is bread or iron: and also any general statements known either through speculative or through practical science; for instance, that adultery is forbidden by G.o.d, or that man cannot live without suitable nourishment. Of such things counsel makes no inquiry. But the term of inquiry is that which we are able to do at once. For just as the end is considered in the light of a principle, so the means are considered in the light of a conclusion. Wherefore that which presents itself as to be done first, holds the position of an ultimate conclusion whereat the inquiry comes to an end. Nothing however prevents counsel from being infinite potentially, for as much as an infinite number of things may present themselves to be inquired into by means of counsel.

Reply Obj. 1: Singulars are infinite; not actually, but only potentially.

Reply Obj. 2: Although human action can be hindered, the hindrance is not always at hand. Consequently it is not always necessary to take counsel about removing the obstacle.

Reply Obj. 3: In contingent singulars, something may be taken for certain, not simply, indeed, but for the time being, and as far as it concerns the work to be done. Thus that Socrates is sitting is not a necessary statement; but that he is sitting, as long as he continues to sit, is necessary; and this can be taken for a certain fact.

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QUESTION 15

OF CONSENT, WHICH IS AN ACT OF THE WILL IN REGARD TO THE MEANS (In Four Articles)

We must now consider consent; concerning which there are four points of inquiry:

(1) Whether consent is an act of the appet.i.tive or of the apprehensive power?

(2) Whether it is to be found in irrational animals?

(3) Whether it is directed to the end or to the means?

(4) Whether consent to an act belongs to the higher part of the soul only?

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FIRST ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 15, Art. 1]

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