Obj. 3: Further, the will is evil when it is at variance with erring reason. If, therefore, the will is evil also when it abides by erring reason, it seems that the will is always evil when in conjunction with erring reason: so that in such a case a man would be in a dilemma, and, of necessity, would sin: which is unreasonable.
Therefore the will is good when it abides by erring reason.
_On the contrary,_ The will of those who slew the apostles was evil.
And yet it was in accord with the erring reason, according to John 16:2: "The hour cometh, that whosoever killeth you, will think that he doth a service to G.o.d." Therefore the will can be evil, when it abides by erring reason.
_I answer that,_ Whereas the previous question is the same as inquiring "whether an erring conscience binds"; so this question is the same as inquiring "whether an erring conscience excuses." Now this question depends on what has been said above about ignorance.
For it was said (Q. 6, A. 8) that ignorance sometimes causes an act to be involuntary, and sometimes not. And since moral good and evil consist in action in so far as it is voluntary, as was stated above (A. 2); it is evident that when ignorance causes an act to be involuntary, it takes away the character of moral good and evil; but not, when it does not cause the act to be involuntary. Again, it has been stated above (Q. 6, A. 8) that when ignorance is in any way willed, either directly or indirectly, it does not cause the act to be involuntary. And I call that ignorance "directly" voluntary, to which the act of the will tends: and that, "indirectly" voluntary, which is due to negligence, by reason of a man not wishing to know what he ought to know, as stated above (Q. 6, A. 8).
If then reason or conscience err with an error that is voluntary, either directly, or through negligence, so that one errs about what one ought to know; then such an error of reason or conscience does not excuse the will, that abides by that erring reason or conscience, from being evil. But if the error arise from ignorance of some circ.u.mstance, and without any negligence, so that it cause the act to be involuntary, then that error of reason or conscience excuses the will, that abides by that erring reason, from being evil. For instance, if erring reason tell a man that he should go to another man"s wife, the will that abides by that erring reason is evil; since this error arises from ignorance of the Divine Law, which he is bound to know. But if a man"s reason, errs in mistaking another for his wife, and if he wish to give her her right when she asks for it, his will is excused from being evil: because this error arises from ignorance of a circ.u.mstance, which ignorance excuses, and causes the act to be involuntary.
Reply Obj. 1: As Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv), "good results from the entire cause, evil from each particular defect." Consequently in order that the thing to which the will tends be called evil, it suffices, either that it be evil in itself, or that it be apprehended as evil. But in order for it to be good, it must be good in both ways.
Reply Obj. 2: The eternal law cannot err, but human reason can.
Consequently the will that abides by human reason, is not always right, nor is it always in accord with the eternal law.
Reply Obj. 3: Just as in syllogistic arguments, granted one absurdity, others must needs follow; so in moral matters, given one absurdity, others must follow too. Thus suppose a man to seek vainglory, he will sin, whether he does his duty for vainglory or whether he omit to do it. Nor is he in a dilemma about the matter: because he can put aside his evil intention. In like manner, suppose a man"s reason or conscience to err through inexcusable ignorance, then evil must needs result in the will. Nor is this man in a dilemma: because he can lay aside his error, since his ignorance is vincible and voluntary.
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SEVENTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 19, Art. 7]
Whether the Goodness of the Will, As Regards the Means, Depends on the Intention of the End?
Objection 1: It would seem that the goodness of the will does not depend on the intention of the end. For it has been stated above (A.
2) that the goodness of the will depends on the object alone. But as regards the means, the object of the will is one thing, and the end intended is another. Therefore in such matters the goodness of the will does not depend on the intention of the end.
Obj. 2: Further, to wish to keep G.o.d"s commandment, belongs to a good will. But this can be referred to an evil end, for instance, to vainglory or covetousness, by willing to obey G.o.d for the sake of temporal gain. Therefore the goodness of the will does not depend on the intention of the end.
Obj. 3: Further, just as good and evil diversify the will, so do they diversify the end. But malice of the will does not depend on the malice of the end intended; since a man who wills to steal in order to give alms, has an evil will, although he intends a good end.
Therefore neither does the goodness of the will depend on the goodness of the end intended.
_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (Confess. ix, 3) that G.o.d rewards the intention. But G.o.d rewards a thing because it is good. Therefore the goodness of the will depends on the intention of the end.
_I answer that,_ The intention may stand in a twofold relation to the act of the will; first, as preceding it, secondly as following [*Leonine edn.: "accompanying"] it. The intention precedes the act of the will causally, when we will something because we intend a certain end. And then the order to the end is considered as the reason of the goodness of the thing willed: for instance, when a man wills to fast for G.o.d"s sake; because the act of fasting is specifically good from the very fact that it is done for G.o.d"s sake. Wherefore, since the goodness of the will depends on the goodness of the thing willed, as stated above (AA. 1, 2), it must, of necessity, depend on the intention of the end.
On the other hand, intention follows the act of the will, when it is added to a preceding act of the will; for instance, a man may will to do something, and may afterwards refer it to G.o.d. And then the goodness of the previous act of the will does not depend on the subsequent intention, except in so far as that act is repeated with the subsequent intention.
Reply Obj. 1: When the intention is the cause of the act of willing, the order to the end is considered as the reason of the goodness of the object, as stated above.
Reply Obj. 2: The act of the will cannot be said to be good, if an evil intention is the cause of willing. For when a man wills to give an alms for the sake of vainglory, he wills that which is good in itself, under a species of evil; and therefore, as willed by him, it is evil. Wherefore his will is evil. If, however, the intention is subsequent to the act of the will, then the latter may be good: and the intention does not spoil that act of the will which preceded, but that which is repeated.
Reply Obj. 3: As we have already stated (A. 6, ad 1), "evil results from each particular defect, but good from the whole and entire cause." Hence, whether the will tend to what is evil in itself, even under the species of good; or to the good under the species of evil, it will be evil in either case. But in order for the will to be good, it must tend to the good under the species of good; in other words, it must will the good for the sake of the good.
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EIGHTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 19, Art. 8]
Whether the Degree of Goodness or Malice in the Will Depends on the Degree of Good or Evil in the Intention?
Objection 1: It would seem that the degree of goodness in the will depends on the degree of good in the intention. Because on Matt.
12:35, "A good man out of the good treasure of his heart bringeth forth that which is good," a gloss says: "A man does as much good as he intends." But the intention gives goodness not only to the external action, but also to the act of the will, as stated above (A.
7). Therefore the goodness of a man"s will is according to the goodness of his intention.
Obj. 2: Further, if you add to the cause, you add to the effect. But the goodness of the intention is the cause of the good will.
Therefore a man"s will is good, according as his intention is good.
Obj. 3: Further, in evil actions, a man sins in proportion to his intention: for if a man were to throw a stone with a murderous intention, he would be guilty of murder. Therefore, for the same reason, in good actions, the will is good in proportion to the good intended.
_On the contrary,_ The intention can be good, while the will is evil.
Therefore, for the same reason, the intention can be better, and the will less good.
_I answer that,_ In regard to both the act, and the intention of the end, we may consider a twofold quant.i.ty: one, on the part of the object, by reason of a man willing or doing a good that is greater; the other, taken from the intensity of the act, according as a man wills or acts intensely; and this is more on the part of the agent.
If then we speak of these respective quant.i.ties from the point of view of the object, it is evident that the quant.i.ty in the act does not depend on the quant.i.ty in the intention. With regard to the external act this may happen in two ways. First, through the object that is ordained to the intended end not being proportionate to that end; for instance, if a man were to give ten pounds, he could not realize his intention, if he intended to buy a thing worth a hundred pounds. Secondly, on account of the obstacles that may supervene in regard to the exterior action, which obstacles we are unable to remove: for instance, a man intends to go to Rome, and encounters obstacles, which prevent him from going. On the other hand, with regard to the interior act of the will, this happens in only one way: because the interior acts of the will are in our power, whereas the external actions are not. But the will can will an object that is not proportionate to the intended end: and thus the will that tends to that object considered absolutely, is not so good as the intention.
Yet because the intention also belongs, in a way, to the act of the will, inasmuch, to wit, as it is the reason thereof; it comes to pa.s.s that the quant.i.ty of goodness in the intention redounds upon the act of the will; that is to say, in so far as the will wills some great good for an end, although that by which it wills to gain so great a good, is not proportionate to that good.
But if we consider the quant.i.ty in the intention and in the act, according to their respective intensity, then the intensity of the intention redounds upon the interior act and the exterior act of the will: since the intention stands in relation to them as a kind of form, as is clear from what has been said above (Q. 12, A. 4; Q. 18, A. 6). And yet considered materially, while the intention is intense, the interior or exterior act may be not so intense, materially speaking: for instance, when a man does not will with as much intensity to take medicine as he wills to regain health. Nevertheless the very fact of intending health intensely, redounds, as a formal principle, upon the intense volition of medicine.
We must observe, however, that the intensity of the interior or exterior act, may be referred to the intention as its object: as when a man intends to will intensely, or to do something intensely. And yet it does not follow that he wills or acts intensely; because the quant.i.ty of goodness in the interior or exterior act does not depend on the quant.i.ty of the good intended, as is shown above. And hence it is that a man does not merit as much as he intends to merit: because the quant.i.ty of merit is measured by the intensity of the act, as we shall show later on (Q. 20, A. 4; Q. 114, A. 4).
Reply Obj. 1: This gloss speaks of good as in the estimation of G.o.d, Who considers princ.i.p.ally the intention of the end. Wherefore another gloss says on the same pa.s.sage that "the treasure of the heart is the intention, according to which G.o.d judges our works." For the goodness of the intention, as stated above, redounds, so to speak, upon the goodness of the will, which makes even the external act to be meritorious in G.o.d"s sight.
Reply Obj. 2: The goodness of the intention is not the whole cause of a good will. Hence the argument does not prove.
Reply Obj. 3: The mere malice of the intention suffices to make the will evil: and therefore too, the will is as evil as the intention is evil. But the same reasoning does not apply to goodness, as stated above (ad 2).
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NINTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 19, Art. 9]
Whether the Goodness of the Will Depends on Its Conformity to the Divine Will?
Objection 1: It would seem that the goodness of the human will does not depend on its conformity to the Divine will. Because it is impossible for man"s will to be conformed to the Divine will; as appears from the word of Isa. 55:9: "As the heavens are exalted above the earth, so are My ways exalted above your ways, and My thoughts above your thoughts." If therefore goodness of the will depended on its conformity to the Divine will, it would follow that it is impossible for man"s will to be good. Which is inadmissible.
Obj. 2: Further, just as our wills arise from the Divine will, so does our knowledge flow from the Divine knowledge. But our knowledge does not require to be conformed to G.o.d"s knowledge; since G.o.d knows many things that we know not. Therefore there is no need for our will to be conformed to the Divine will.
Obj. 3: Further, the will is a principle of action. But our action cannot be conformed to G.o.d"s. Therefore neither can our will be conformed to His.
_On the contrary,_ It is written (Matt. 26:39): "Not as I will, but as Thou wilt": which words He said, because "He wishes man to be upright and to tend to G.o.d," as Augustine expounds in the Enchiridion [*Enarr. in Ps. 32, serm. i.]. But the rect.i.tude of the will is its goodness. Therefore the goodness of the will depends on its conformity to the Divine will.
_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 7), the goodness of the will depends on the intention of the end. Now the last end of the human will is the Sovereign Good, namely, G.o.d, as stated above (Q. 1, A. 8; Q. 3, A. 1). Therefore the goodness of the human will requires it to be ordained to the Sovereign Good, that is, to G.o.d.
Now this Good is primarily and essentially compared to the Divine will, as its proper object. Again, that which is first in any genus is the measure and rule of all that belongs to that genus. Moreover, everything attains to rect.i.tude and goodness, in so far as it is in accord with its proper measure. Therefore, in order that man"s will be good it needs to be conformed to the Divine will.
Reply Obj. 1: The human will cannot be conformed to the will of G.o.d so as to equal it, but only so as to imitate it. In like manner human knowledge is conformed to the Divine knowledge, in so far as it knows truth: and human action is conformed to the Divine, in so far as it is becoming to the agent: and this by way of imitation, not by way of equality.
From the above may be gathered the replies to the Second and Third Objections.
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TENTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 19, Art. 10]
Whether It Is Necessary for the Human Will, in Order to Be Good, to Be Conformed to the Divine Will, As Regards the Thing Willed?