Objection 1: It would seem that the human will need not always be conformed to the Divine will, as regards the thing willed. For we cannot will what we know not: since the apprehended good is the object of the will. But in many things we know not what G.o.d wills. Therefore the human will cannot be conformed to the Divine will as to the thing willed.
Obj. 2: Further, G.o.d wills to d.a.m.n the man whom He foresees about to die in mortal sin. If therefore man were bound to conform his will to the Divine will, in the point of the thing willed, it would follow that a man is bound to will his own d.a.m.nation. Which is inadmissible.
Obj. 3: Further, no one is bound to will what is against filial piety. But if man were to will what G.o.d wills, this would sometimes be contrary to filial piety: for instance, when G.o.d wills the death of a father: if his son were to will it also, it would be against filial piety. Therefore man is not bound to conform his will to the Divine will, as to the thing willed.
_On the contrary,_ (1) On Ps. 32:1, "Praise becometh the upright," a gloss says: "That man has an upright heart, who wills what G.o.d wills."
But everyone is bound to have an upright heart. Therefore everyone is bound to will what G.o.d wills.
(2) Moreover, the will takes its form from the object, as does every act. If therefore man is bound to conform his will to the Divine will, it follows that he is bound to conform it, as to the thing willed.
(3) Moreover, opposition of wills arises from men willing different things. But whoever has a will in opposition to the Divine will, has an evil will. Therefore whoever does not conform his will to the Divine will, as to the thing willed, has an evil will.
_I answer that,_ As is evident from what has been said above (AA. 3, 5), the will tends to its object, according as it is proposed by the reason. Now a thing may be considered in various ways by the reason, so as to appear good from one point of view, and not good from another point of view. And therefore if a man"s will wills a thing to be, according as it appears to be good, his will is good: and the will of another man, who wills that thing not to be, according as it appears evil, is also good. Thus a judge has a good will, in willing a thief to be put to death, because this is just: while the will of another--e.g. the thief"s wife or son, who wishes him not to be put to death, inasmuch as killing is a natural evil, is also good.
Now since the will follows the apprehension of the reason or intellect; the more universal the aspect of the apprehended good, the more universal the good to which the will tends. This is evident in the example given above: because the judge has care of the common good, which is justice, and therefore he wishes the thief"s death, which has the aspect of good in relation to the common estate; whereas the thief"s wife has to consider the private good of the family, and from this point of view she wishes her husband, the thief, not to be put to death. Now the good of the whole universe is that which is apprehended by G.o.d, Who is the Maker and Governor of all things: hence whatever He wills, He wills it under the aspect of the common good; this is His own Goodness, which is the good of the whole universe. On the other hand, the apprehension of a creature, according to its nature, is of some particular good, proportionate to that nature. Now a thing may happen to be good under a particular aspect, and yet not good under a universal aspect, or vice versa, as stated above. And therefore it comes to pa.s.s that a certain will is good from willing something considered under a particular aspect, which thing G.o.d wills not, under a universal aspect, and vice versa.
And hence too it is, that various wills of various men can be good in respect of opposite things, for as much as, under various aspects, they wish a particular thing to be or not to be.
But a man"s will is not right in willing a particular good, unless he refer it to the common good as an end: since even the natural appet.i.te of each part is ordained to the common good of the whole. Now it is the end that supplies the formal reason, as it were, of willing whatever is directed to the end. Consequently, in order that a man will some particular good with a right will, he must will that particular good materially, and the Divine and universal good, formally. Therefore the human will is bound to be conformed to the Divine will, as to that which is willed formally, for it is bound to will the Divine and universal good; but not as to that which is willed materially, for the reason given above.
At the same time in both these respects, the human will is conformed to the Divine, in a certain degree. Because inasmuch as it is conformed to the Divine will in the common aspect of the thing willed, it is conformed thereto in the point of the last end. While, inasmuch as it is not conformed to the Divine will in the thing willed materially, it is conformed to that will considered as efficient cause; since the proper inclination consequent to nature, or to the particular apprehension of some particular thing, comes to a thing from G.o.d as its efficient cause. Hence it is customary to say that a man"s will, in this respect, is conformed to the Divine will, because it wills what G.o.d wishes him to will.
There is yet another kind of conformity in respect of the formal cause, consisting in man"s willing something from charity, as G.o.d wills it. And this conformity is also reduced to the formal conformity, that is in respect of the last end, which is the proper object of charity.
Reply Obj. 1: We can know in a general way what G.o.d wills. For we know that whatever G.o.d wills, He wills it under the aspect of good.
Consequently whoever wills a thing under any aspect of good, has a will conformed to the Divine will, as to the reason of the thing willed. But we know not what G.o.d wills in particular: and in this respect we are not bound to conform our will to the Divine will.
But in the state of glory, every one will see in each thing that he wills, the relation of that thing to what G.o.d wills in that particular matter. Consequently he will conform his will to G.o.d in all things not only formally, but also materially.
Reply Obj. 2: G.o.d does not will the d.a.m.nation of a man, considered precisely as d.a.m.nation, nor a man"s death, considered precisely as death, because, "He wills all men to be saved" (1 Tim. 2:4); but He wills such things under the aspect of justice. Wherefore in regard to such things it suffices for man to will the upholding of G.o.d"s justice and of the natural order.
Wherefore the reply to the Third Objection is evident.
To the first argument advanced in a contrary sense, it should be said that a man who conforms his will to G.o.d"s, in the aspect of reason of the thing willed, wills what G.o.d wills, more than the man, who conforms his will to G.o.d"s, in the point of the very thing willed; because the will tends more to the end, than to that which is on account of the end.
To the second, it must be replied that the species and form of an act are taken from the object considered formally, rather than from the object considered materially.
To the third, it must be said that there is no opposition of wills when several people desire different things, but not under the same aspect: but there is opposition of wills, when under one and the same aspect, one man wills a thing which another wills not. But there is no question of this here.
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QUESTION 20
OF GOODNESS AND MALICE IN EXTERNAL HUMAN ACTIONS (In Six Articles)
We must next consider goodness and malice as to external actions: under which head there are six points of inquiry:
(1) Whether goodness and malice is first in the act of the will, or in the external action?
(2) Whether the whole goodness or malice of the external action depends on the goodness of the will?
(3) Whether the goodness and malice of the interior act are the same as those of the external action?
(4) Whether the external action adds any goodness or malice to that of the interior act?
(5) Whether the consequences of an external action increase its goodness or malice?
(6) Whether one and the same external action can be both good and evil?
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FIRST ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 20, Art. 1]
Whether Goodness or Malice Is First in the Action of the Will, or in the External Action?
Objection 1: It would seem that good and evil are in the external action prior to being in the act of the will. For the will derives goodness from its object, as stated above (Q. 19, AA. 1, 2). But the external action is the object of the interior act of the will: for a man is said to will to commit a theft, or to will to give an alms.
Therefore good and evil are in the external action, prior to being in the act of the will.
Obj. 2: Further, the aspect of good belongs first to the end: since what is directed to the end receives the aspect of good from its relation to the end. Now whereas the act of the will cannot be an end, as stated above (Q. 1, A. 1, ad 2), the act of another power can be an end. Therefore good is in the act of some other power prior to being in the act of the will.
Obj. 3: Further, the act of the will stands in a formal relation to the external action, as stated above (Q. 18, A. 6). But that which is formal is subsequent; since form is something added to matter.
Therefore good and evil are in the external action, prior to being in the act of the will.
_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (Retract. i, 9) that "it is by the will that we sin, and that we behave aright." Therefore moral good and evil are first in the will.
_I answer that,_ External actions may be said to be good or bad in two ways. First, in regard to their genus, and the circ.u.mstances connected with them: thus the giving of alms, if the required conditions be observed, is said to be good. Secondly, a thing is said to be good or evil, from its relation to the end: thus the giving of alms for vainglory is said to be evil. Now, since the end is the will"s proper object, it is evident that this aspect of good or evil, which the external action derives from its relation to the end, is to be found first of all in the act of the will, whence it pa.s.ses to the external action. On the other hand, the goodness or malice which the external action has of itself, on account of its being about due matter and its being attended by due circ.u.mstances, is not derived from the will, but rather from the reason. Consequently, if we consider the goodness of the external action, in so far as it comes from reason"s ordination and apprehension, it is prior to the goodness of the act of the will: but if we consider it in so far as it is in the execution of the action done, it is subsequent to the goodness of the will, which is its principle.
Reply Obj. 1: The exterior action is the object of the will, inasmuch as it is proposed to the will by the reason, as good apprehended and ordained by the reason: and thus it is prior to the good in the act of the will. But inasmuch as it is found in the execution of the action, it is an effect of the will, and is subsequent to the will.
Reply Obj. 2: The end precedes in the order of intention, but follows in the order of execution.
Reply Obj. 3: A form as received into matter, is subsequent to matter in the order of generation, although it precedes it in the order of nature: but inasmuch as it is in the active cause, it precedes in every way. Now the will is compared to the exterior action, as its efficient cause. Wherefore the goodness of the act of the will, as existing in the active cause, is the form of the exterior action.
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SECOND ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 20, Art. 2]
Whether the Whole Goodness and Malice of the External Action Depends on the Goodness of the Will?
Objection 1: It would seem that the whole goodness and malice of the external action depend on the goodness of the will. For it is written (Matt. 7:18): "A good tree cannot bring forth evil fruit, neither can an evil tree bring forth good fruit." But, according to the gloss, the tree signifies the will, and fruit signifies works. Therefore, it is impossible for the interior act of the will to be good, and the external action evil, or vice versa.
Obj. 2: Further, Augustine says (Retract. i, 9) that there is no sin without the will. If therefore there is no sin in the will, there will be none in the external action. And so the whole goodness or malice of the external action depends on the will.
Obj. 3: Further, the good and evil of which we are speaking now are differences of the moral act. Now differences make an essential division in a genus, according to the Philosopher (Metaph. vii, 12).
Since therefore an act is moral from being voluntary, it seems that goodness and malice in an act are derived from the will alone.
_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (Contra Mendac. vii), that "there are some actions which neither a good end nor a good will can make good."
_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1), we may consider a twofold goodness or malice in the external action: one in respect of due matter and circ.u.mstances; the other in respect of the order to the end. And that which is in respect of the order to the end, depends entirely on the will: while that which is in respect of due matter or circ.u.mstances, depends on the reason: and on this goodness depends the goodness of the will, in so far as the will tends towards it.
Now it must be observed, as was noted above (Q. 19, A. 6, ad 1), that for a thing to be evil, one single defect suffices, whereas, for it to be good simply, it is not enough for it to be good in one point only, it must be good in every respect. If therefore the will be good, both from its proper object and from its end, if follows that the external action is good. But if the will be good from its intention of the end, this is not enough to make the external action good: and if the will be evil either by reason of its intention of the end, or by reason of the act willed, it follows that the external action is evil.