FIRST ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 29, Art. 1]
Whether Evil Is the Cause and Object of Hatred?
Objection 1: It would seem that evil is not the object and cause of hatred. For everything that exists, as such, is good. If therefore evil be the object of hatred, it follows that nothing but the lack of something can be the object of hatred: which is clearly untrue.
Obj. 2: Further, hatred of evil is praiseworthy; hence (2 Macc. 3:1) some are praised for that "the laws were very well kept, because of the G.o.dliness of Onias the high-priest, and the hatred of their souls [Douay: "his soul"] had no evil." If, therefore, nothing but evil be the object of hatred, it would follow that all hatred is commendable: and this is clearly false.
Obj. 3: Further, the same thing is not at the same time both good and evil. But the same thing is lovable and hateful to different subjects. Therefore hatred is not only of evil, but also of good.
_On the contrary,_ Hatred is the opposite of love. But the object of love is good, as stated above (Q. 26, A. 1; Q. 27, A. 1). Therefore the object of hatred is evil.
_I answer that,_ Since the natural appet.i.te is the result of apprehension (though this apprehension is not in the same subject as the natural appet.i.te), it seems that what applies to the inclination of the natural appet.i.te, applies also to the animal appet.i.te, which does result from an apprehension in the same subject, as stated above (Q. 26, A. 1). Now, with regard to the natural appet.i.te, it is evident, that just as each thing is naturally attuned and adapted to that which is suitable to it, wherein consists natural love; so has it a natural dissonance from that which opposes and destroys it; and this is natural hatred. So, therefore, in the animal appet.i.te, or in the intellectual appet.i.te, love is a certain harmony of the appet.i.te with that which is apprehended as suitable; while hatred is dissonance of the appet.i.te from that which is apprehended as repugnant and hurtful. Now, just as whatever is suitable, as such, bears the aspect of good; so whatever is repugnant, as such, bears the aspect of evil. And therefore, just as good is the object of love, so evil is the object of hatred.
Reply Obj. 1: Being, as such, has not the aspect of repugnance but only of fittingness; because being is common to all things. But being, inasmuch as it is this determinate being, has an aspect of repugnance to some determinate being. And in this way, one being is hateful to another, and is evil; though not in itself, but by comparison with something else.
Reply Obj. 2: Just as a thing may be apprehended as good, when it is not truly good; so a thing may be apprehended as evil, whereas it is not truly evil. Hence it happens sometimes that neither hatred of evil nor love of good is good.
Reply Obj. 3: To different things the same thing may be lovable or hateful: in respect of the natural appet.i.te, owing to one and the same thing being naturally suitable to one thing, and naturally unsuitable to another: thus heat is becoming to fire and unbecoming to water: and in respect of the animal appet.i.te, owing to one and the same thing being apprehended by one as good, by another as bad.
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SECOND ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 29, Art. 2]
Whether Love Is a Cause of Hatred?
Objection 1: It would seem that love is not a cause of hatred. For "the opposite members of a division are naturally simultaneous"
(Praedic. x). But love and hatred are opposite members of a division, since they are contrary to one another. Therefore they are naturally simultaneous. Therefore love is not the cause of hatred.
Obj. 2: Further, of two contraries, one is not the cause of the other. But love and hatred are contraries. Therefore love is not the cause of hatred.
Obj. 3: Further, that which follows is not the cause of that which precedes. But hatred precedes love, seemingly: since hatred implies a turning away from evil, whereas love implies a turning towards good.
Therefore love is not the cause of hatred.
_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 7, 9) that all emotions are caused by love. Therefore hatred also, since it is an emotion of the soul, is caused by love.
_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1), love consists in a certain agreement of the lover with the object loved, while hatred consists in a certain disagreement or dissonance. Now we should consider in each thing, what agrees with it, before that which disagrees: since a thing disagrees with another, through destroying or hindering that which agrees with it. Consequently love must needs precede hatred; and nothing is hated, save through being contrary to a suitable thing which is loved. And hence it is that every hatred is caused by love.
Reply Obj. 1: The opposite members of a division are sometimes naturally simultaneous, both really and logically; e.g. two species of animal, or two species of color. Sometimes they are simultaneous logically, while, in reality, one precedes, and causes the other; e.g. the species of numbers, figures and movements. Sometimes they are not simultaneous either really or logically; e.g. substance and accident; for substance is in reality the cause of accident; and being is predicated of substance before it is predicated of accident, by a priority of reason, because it is not predicated of accident except inasmuch as the latter is in substance. Now love and hatred are naturally simultaneous, logically but not really. Wherefore nothing hinders love from being the cause of hatred.
Reply Obj. 2: Love and hatred are contraries if considered in respect of the same thing. But if taken in respect of contraries, they are not themselves contrary, but consequent to one another: for it amounts to the same that one love a certain thing, or that one hate its contrary. Thus love of one thing is the cause of one"s hating its contrary.
Reply Obj. 3: In the order of execution, the turning away from one term precedes the turning towards the other. But the reverse is the case in the order of intention: since approach to one term is the reason for turning away from the other. Now the appet.i.tive movement belongs rather to the order of intention than to that of execution.
Wherefore love precedes hatred: because each is an appet.i.tive movement.
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THIRD ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 29, Art. 3]
Whether Hatred Is Stronger Than Love?
Objection 1: It would seem that hatred is stronger than love. For Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 36): "There is no one who does not flee from pain, more than he desires pleasure." But flight from pain pertains to hatred; while desire for pleasure belongs to love.
Therefore hatred is stronger than love.
Obj. 2: Further, the weaker is overcome by the stronger. But love is overcome by hatred: when, that is to say, love is turned into hatred.
Therefore hatred is stronger than love.
Obj. 3: Further, the emotions of the soul are shown by their effects.
But man insists more on repelling what is hateful, than on seeking what is pleasant: thus also irrational animals refrain from pleasure for fear of the whip, as Augustine instances (QQ. 83, qu. 36).
Therefore hatred is stronger than love.
_On the contrary,_ Good is stronger than evil; because "evil does nothing except in virtue of good," as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv).
But hatred and love differ according to the difference of good and evil. Therefore love is stronger than hatred.
_I answer that,_ It is impossible for an effect to be stronger than its cause. Now every hatred arises from some love as its cause, as above stated (A. 2). Therefore it is impossible for hatred to be stronger than love absolutely.
But furthermore, love must needs be, absolutely speaking, stronger than hatred. Because a thing is moved to the end more strongly than to the means. Now turning away from evil is directed as a means to the gaining of good. Wherefore, absolutely speaking, the soul"s movement in respect of good is stronger than its movement in respect of evil.
Nevertheless hatred sometimes seems to be stronger than love, for two reasons. First, because hatred is more keenly felt than love. For, since the sensitive perception is accompanied by a certain impression; when once the impression has been received it is not felt so keenly as in the moment of receiving it. Hence the heat of a hectic fever, though greater, is nevertheless not felt so much as the heat of tertian fever; because the heat of the hectic fever is habitual and like a second nature. For this reason, love is felt more keenly in the absence of the object loved; thus Augustine says (De Trin. x, 12) that "love is felt more keenly when we lack what we love." And for the same reason, the unbecomingness of that which is hated is felt more keenly than the becomingness of that which is loved. Secondly, because comparison is made between a hatred and a love which are not mutually corresponding. Because, according to different degrees of good there are different degrees of love to which correspond different degrees of hatred. Wherefore a hatred that corresponds to a greater love, moves us more than a lesser love.
Hence it is clear how to reply to the First Objection. For the love of pleasure is less than the love of self-preservation, to which corresponds flight from pain. Wherefore we flee from pain more than we love pleasure.
Reply Obj. 2: Hatred would never overcome love, were it not for the greater love to which that hatred corresponds. Thus man loves himself, more than he loves his friend: and because he loves himself, his friend is hateful to him, if he oppose him.
Reply Obj. 3: The reason why we act with greater insistence in repelling what is hateful, is because we feel hatred more keenly.
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FOURTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 29, Art. 4]
Whether a Man Can Hate Himself?
Objection 1: It would seem that a man can hate himself. For it is written (Ps. 10:6): "He that loveth iniquity, hateth his own soul."
But many love iniquity. Therefore many hate themselves.
Obj. 2: Further, him we hate, to whom we wish and work evil. But sometimes a man wishes and works evil to himself, e.g. a man who kills himself. Therefore some men hate themselves.
Obj. 3: Further, Boethius says (De Consol. ii) that "avarice makes a man hateful"; whence we may conclude that everyone hates a miser. But some men are misers. Therefore they hate themselves.
_On the contrary,_ The Apostle says (Eph. 5:29) that "no man ever hated his own flesh."
_I answer that,_ Properly speaking, it is impossible for a man to hate himself. For everything naturally desires good, nor can anyone desire anything for himself, save under the aspect of good: for "evil is outside the scope of the will," as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv).
Now to love a man is to will good to him, as stated above (Q. 26, A.
4). Consequently, a man must, of necessity, love himself; and it is impossible for a man to hate himself, properly speaking.
But accidentally it happens that a man hates himself: and this in two ways. First, on the part of the good which a man wills to himself.
For it happens sometimes that what is desired as good in some particular respect, is simply evil; and in this way, a man accidentally wills evil to himself; and thus hates himself. Secondly, in regard to himself, to whom he wills good. For each thing is that which is predominant in it; wherefore the state is said to do what the king does, as if the king were the whole state. Now it is clear that man is princ.i.p.ally the mind of man. And it happens that some men account themselves as being princ.i.p.ally that which they are in their material and sensitive nature. Wherefore they love themselves according to what they take themselves to be, while they hate that which they really are, by desiring what is contrary to reason. And in both these ways, "he that loveth iniquity hateth" not only "his own soul," but also himself.
Wherefore the reply to the First Objection is evident.
Reply Obj. 2: No man wills and works evil to himself, except he apprehend it under the aspect of good. For even they who kill themselves, apprehend death itself as a good, considered as putting an end to some unhappiness or pain.
Reply Obj. 3: The miser hates something accidental to himself, but not for that reason does he hate himself: thus a sick man hates his sickness for the very reason that he loves himself. Or we may say that avarice makes man hateful to others, but not to himself. In fact, it is caused by inordinate self-love, in respect of which, man desires temporal goods for himself more than he should.