Reply Obj. 1: Some said, as Simplicius reports in his _Commentary on the Predicaments,_ that, since every operation of man is to a certain extent an operation of the _conjunctum,_ as the Philosopher says (De Anima i, text. 64); therefore no habit is in the soul only, but in the _conjunctum._ And from this it follows that no habit is in the intellect, for the intellect is separate, as ran the argument, given above. But the argument is not cogent. For habit is not a disposition of the object to the power, but rather a disposition of the power to the object: wherefore the habit needs to be in that power which is principle of the act, and not in that which is compared to the power as its object.
Now the act of understanding is not said to be common to soul and body, except in respect of the phantasm, as is stated in _De Anima_, text. 66. But it is clear that the phantasm is compared as object to the pa.s.sive intellect (De Anima iii, text. 3, 39). Whence it follows that the intellective habit is chiefly on the part of the intellect itself; and not on the part of the phantasm, which is common to soul and body. And therefore we must say that the "possible" intellect is the subject of habit, which is in potentiality to many: and this belongs, above all, to the "possible" intellect. Wherefore the "possible" intellect is the subject of intellectual habits.
Reply Obj. 2: As potentiality to sensible being belongs to corporeal matter, so potentiality to intellectual being belongs to the "possible" intellect. Wherefore nothing forbids habit to be in the "possible" intellect, for it is midway between pure potentiality and perfect act.
Reply Obj. 3: Because the apprehensive powers inwardly prepare their proper objects for the _possible intellect,_ therefore it is by the good disposition of these powers, to which the good disposition of the body cooperates, that man is rendered apt to understand. And so in a secondary way the intellective habit can be in these powers. But princ.i.p.ally it is in the "possible" intellect.
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FIFTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 50, Art. 5]
Whether Any Habit Is in the Will?
Objection 1: It would seem that there is not a habit in the will. For the habit which is in the intellect is the intelligible species, by means of which the intellect actually understands. But the will does not act by means of species. Therefore the will is not the subject of habit.
Obj. 2: Further, no habit is allotted to the active intellect, as there is to the "possible" intellect, because the former is an active power. But the will is above all an active power, because it moves all the powers to their acts, as stated above (Q. 9, A. 1). Therefore there is no habit in the will.
Obj. 3: Further, in the natural powers there is no habit, because, by reason of their nature, they are determinate to one thing. But the will, by reason of its nature, is ordained to tend to the good which reason directs. Therefore there is no habit in the will.
_On the contrary,_ Justice is a habit. But justice is in the will; for it is "a habit whereby men will and do that which is just"
(Ethic. v, 1). Therefore the will is the subject of a habit.
_I answer that,_ Every power which may be variously directed to act, needs a habit whereby it is well disposed to its act. Now since the will is a rational power, it may be variously directed to act. And therefore in the will we must admit the presence of a habit whereby it is well disposed to its act. Moreover, from the very nature of habit, it is clear that it is princ.i.p.ally related to the will; inasmuch as habit "is that which one uses when one wills," as stated above (A. 1).
Reply Obj. 1: Even as in the intellect there is a species which is the likeness of the object; so in the will, and in every appet.i.tive power there must be something by which the power is inclined to its object; for the act of the appet.i.tive power is nothing but a certain inclination, as we have said above (Q. 6, A. 4; Q. 22, A. 2). And therefore in respect of those things to which it is inclined sufficiently by the nature of the power itself, the power needs no quality to incline it. But since it is necessary, for the end of human life, that the appet.i.tive power be inclined to something fixed, to which it is not inclined by the nature of the power, which has a relation to many and various things, therefore it is necessary that, in the will and in the other appet.i.tive powers, there be certain qualities to incline them, and these are called habits.
Reply Obj. 2: The active intellect is active only, and in no way pa.s.sive. But the will, and every appet.i.tive power, is both mover and moved (De Anima iii, text. 54). And therefore the comparison between them does not hold; for to be susceptible of habit belongs to that which is somehow in potentiality.
Reply Obj. 3: The will from the very nature of the power is inclined to the good of the reason. But because this good is varied in many ways, the will needs to be inclined, by means of a habit, to some fixed good of the reason, in order that action may follow more promptly.
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SIXTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 50, Art. 6]
Whether There Are Habits in the Angels?
Objection 1: It would seem that there are no habits in the angels.
For Maximus, commentator of Dionysius (Coel. Hier. vii), says: "It is not proper to suppose that there are intellectual (i.e. spiritual) powers in the divine intelligences (i.e. in the angels) after the manner of accidents, as in us: as though one were in the other as in a subject: for accident of any kind is foreign to them." But every habit is an accident. Therefore there are no habits in the angels.
Obj. 2: Further, as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. iv): "The holy dispositions of the heavenly essences partic.i.p.ate, above all other things, in G.o.d"s goodness." But that which is of itself (_per se_) is prior to and more powerful than that which is by another (_per aliud_). Therefore the angelic essences are perfected of themselves unto conformity with G.o.d, and therefore not by means of habits. And this seems to have been the reasoning of Maximus, who in the same pa.s.sage adds: "For if this were the case, surely their essence would not remain in itself, nor could it have been as far as possible deified of itself."
Obj. 3: Further, habit is a disposition (Metaph. v, text. 25). But disposition, as is said in the same book, is "the order of that which has parts." Since, therefore, angels are simple substances, it seems that there are no dispositions and habits in them.
_On the contrary,_ Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. vii) that the angels of the first hierarchy are called: "Fire-bearers and Thrones and Outpouring of Wisdom, by which is indicated the G.o.dlike nature of their habits."
_I answer that,_ Some have thought that there are no habits in the angels, and that whatever is said of them, is said essentially.
Whence Maximus, after the words which we have quoted, says: "Their dispositions, and the powers which are in them, are essential, through the absence of matter in them." And Simplicius says the same in his _Commentary on the Predicaments:_ "Wisdom which is in the soul is its habit: but that which is in the intellect, is its substance.
For everything divine is sufficient of itself, and exists in itself."
Now this opinion contains some truth, and some error. For it is manifest from what we have said (Q. 49, A. 4) that only a being in potentiality is the subject of habit. So the above-mentioned commentators considered that angels are immaterial substances, and that there is no material potentiality in them, and on that account, excluded from them habit and any kind of accident. Yet since though there is no material potentiality in angels, there is still some potentiality in them (for to be pure act belongs to G.o.d alone), therefore, as far as potentiality is found to be in them, so far may habits be found in them. But because the potentiality of matter and the potentiality of intellectual substance are not of the same kind.
Whence, Simplicius says in his _Commentary on the Predicaments_ that: "The habits of the intellectual substance are not like the habits here below, but rather are they like simple and immaterial images which it contains in itself."
However, the angelic intellect and the human intellect differ with regard to this habit. For the human intellect, being the lowest in the intellectual order, is in potentiality as regards all intelligible things, just as primal matter is in respect of all sensible forms; and therefore for the understanding of all things, it needs some habit. But the angelic intellect is not as a pure potentiality in the order of intelligible things, but as an act; not indeed as pure act (for this belongs to G.o.d alone), but with an admixture of some potentiality: and the higher it is, the less potentiality it has. And therefore, as we said in the First Part (Q.
55, A. 1), so far as it is in potentiality, so far is it in need of habitual perfection by means of intelligible species in regard to its proper operation: but so far as it is in act, through its own essence it can understand some things, at least itself, and other things according to the mode of its substance, as stated in _De Causis:_ and the more perfect it is, the more perfectly will it understand.
But since no angel attains to the perfection of G.o.d, but all are infinitely distant therefrom; for this reason, in order to attain to G.o.d Himself, through intellect and will, the angels need some habits, being as it were in potentiality in regard to that Pure Act.
Wherefore Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. vii) that their habits are "G.o.dlike," that is to say, that by them they are made like to G.o.d.
But those habits that are dispositions to the natural being are not in angels, since they are immaterial.
Reply Obj. 1: This saying of Maximus must be understood of material habits and accidents.
Reply Obj. 2: As to that which belongs to angels by their essence, they do not need a habit. But as they are not so far beings of themselves, as not to partake of Divine wisdom and goodness, therefore, so far as they need to partake of something from without, so far do they need to have habits.
Reply Obj. 3: In angels there are no essential parts: but there are potential parts, in so far as their intellect is perfected by several species, and in so far as their will has a relation to several things.
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QUESTION 51
OF THE CAUSE OF HABITS, AS TO THEIR FORMATION (In Four Articles)
We must next consider the cause of habits: and firstly, as to their formation; secondly, as to their increase; thirdly, as to their diminution and corruption. Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether any habit is from nature?
(2) Whether any habit is caused by acts?
(3) Whether any habit can be caused by one act?
(4) Whether any habits are infused in man by G.o.d?
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FIRST ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 51, Art. 1]
Whether Any Habit Is from Nature?
Objection 1: It would seem that no habit is from nature. For the use of those things which are from nature does not depend on the will.
But habit "is that which we use when we will," as the Commentator says on _De Anima_ iii. Therefore habit is not from nature.
Obj. 2: Further, nature does not employ two where one is sufficient.
But the powers of the soul are from nature. If therefore the habits of the powers were from nature, habit and power would be one.
Obj. 3: Further, nature does not fail in necessaries. But habits are necessary in order to act well, as we have stated above (Q. 49, A.
4). If therefore any habits were from nature, it seems that nature would not fail to cause all necessary habits: but this is clearly false. Therefore habits are not from nature.
_On the contrary,_ In _Ethic._ vi, 6, among other habits, place is given to understanding of first principles, which habit is from nature: wherefore also first principles are said to be known naturally.
_I answer that,_ One thing can be natural to another in two ways.
First in respect of the specific nature, as the faculty of laughing is natural to man, and it is natural to fire to have an upward tendency. Secondly, in respect of the individual nature, as it is natural to Socrates or Plato to be p.r.o.ne to sickness or inclined to health, in accordance with their respective temperaments. Again, in respect of both natures, something may be called natural in two ways: first, because it entirely is from the nature; secondly, because it is partly from nature, and partly from an extrinsic principle. For instance, when a man is healed by himself, his health is entirely from nature; but when a man is healed by means of medicine, health is partly from nature, partly from an extrinsic principle.
Thus, then, if we speak of habit as a disposition of the subject in relation to form or nature, it may be natural in either of the foregoing ways. For there is a certain natural disposition demanded by the human species, so that no man can be without it. And this disposition is natural in respect of the specific nature. But since such a disposition has a certain lat.i.tude, it happens that different grades of this disposition are becoming to different men in respect of the individual nature. And this disposition may be either entirely from nature, or partly from nature, and partly from an extrinsic principle, as we have said of those who are healed by means of art.