Obj. 2: Further, continency, perseverance, and patience are not reckoned to be intellectual virtues. Yet neither are they moral virtues; since they do not reduce the pa.s.sions to a mean, and are consistent with an abundance of pa.s.sion. Therefore virtue is not adequately divided into intellectual and moral.
Obj. 3: Further, faith, hope, and charity are virtues. Yet they are not intellectual virtues: for there are only five of these, viz.
science, wisdom, understanding, prudence, and art, as stated above (Q. 57, AA. 2, 3, 5). Neither are they moral virtues; since they are not about the pa.s.sions, which are the chief concern of moral virtue.
Therefore virtue is not adequately divided into intellectual and moral.
_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 1) that "virtue is twofold, intellectual and moral."
_I answer that,_ Human virtue is a habit perfecting man in view of his doing good deeds. Now, in man there are but two principles of human actions, viz. the intellect or reason and the appet.i.te: for these are the two principles of movement in man as stated in _De Anima_ iii, text. 48. Consequently every human virtue must needs be a perfection of one of these principles. Accordingly if it perfects man"s speculative or practical intellect in order that his deed may be good, it will be an intellectual virtue: whereas if it perfects his appet.i.te, it will be a moral virtue. It follows therefore that every human virtue is either intellectual or moral.
Reply Obj. 1: Prudence is essentially an intellectual virtue. But considered on the part of its matter, it has something in common with the moral virtues: for it is right reason about things to be done, as stated above (Q. 57, A. 4). It is in this sense that it is reckoned with the moral virtues.
Reply Obj. 2: Continency and perseverance are not perfections of the sensitive appet.i.te. This is clear from the fact that pa.s.sions abound in the continent and persevering man, which would not be the case if his sensitive appet.i.te were perfected by a habit making it conformable to reason. Continency and perseverance are, however, perfections of the rational faculty, and withstand the pa.s.sions lest reason be led astray. But they fall short of being virtues: since intellectual virtue, which makes reason to hold itself well in respect of moral matters, presupposes a right appet.i.te of the end, so that it may hold itself aright in respect of principles, i.e. the ends, on which it builds its argument: and this is wanting in the continent and persevering man. Nor again can an action proceeding from two principles be perfect, unless each principle be perfected by the habit corresponding to that operation: thus, however perfect be the princ.i.p.al agent employing an instrument, it will produce an imperfect effect, if the instrument be not well disposed also. Hence if the sensitive faculty, which is moved by the rational faculty, is not perfect; however perfect the rational faculty may be, the resulting action will be imperfect: and consequently the principle of that action will not be a virtue. And for this reason, continency, desisting from pleasures, and perseverance in the midst of pains, are not virtues, but something less than a virtue, as the Philosopher maintains (Ethic. vii, 1, 9).
Reply Obj. 3: Faith, hope, and charity are superhuman virtues: for they are virtues of man as sharing in the grace of G.o.d.
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FOURTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 58, Art. 4]
Whether There Can Be Moral Without Intellectual Virtue?
Objection 1: It would seem that moral can be without intellectual virtue. Because moral virtue, as Cicero says (De Invent. Rhet. ii) is "a habit like a second nature in accord with reason." Now though nature may be in accord with some sovereign reason that moves it, there is no need for that reason to be united to nature in the same subject, as is evident of natural things devoid of knowledge.
Therefore in a man there may be a moral virtue like a second nature, inclining him to consent to his reason, without his reason being perfected by an intellectual virtue.
Obj. 2: Further, by means of intellectual virtue man obtains perfect use of reason. But it happens at times that men are virtuous and acceptable to G.o.d, without being vigorous in the use of reason.
Therefore it seems that moral virtue can be without intellectual.
Obj. 3: Further moral virtue makes us inclined to do good works. But some, without depending on the judgment of reason, have a natural inclination to do good works. Therefore moral virtues can be without intellectual virtues.
_On the contrary,_ Gregory says (Moral. xxii) that "the other virtues, unless we do prudently what we desire to do, cannot be real virtues." But prudence is an intellectual virtue, as stated above (Q.
57, A. 5). Therefore moral virtues cannot be without intellectual virtues.
_I answer that,_ Moral virtue can be without some of the intellectual virtues, viz. wisdom, science, and art; but not without understanding and prudence. Moral virtue cannot be without prudence, because it is a habit of choosing, i.e. making us choose well. Now in order that a choice be good, two things are required. First, that the intention be directed to a due end; and this is done by moral virtue, which inclines the appet.i.tive faculty to the good that is in accord with reason, which is a due end. Secondly, that man take rightly those things which have reference to the end: and this he cannot do unless his reason counsel, judge and command aright, which is the function of prudence and the virtues annexed to it, as stated above (Q. 57, AA. 5, 6). Wherefore there can be no moral virtue without prudence: and consequently neither can there be without understanding. For it is by the virtue of understanding that we know self-evident principles both in speculative and in practical matters. Consequently just as right reason in speculative matters, in so far as it proceeds from naturally known principles, presupposes the understanding of those principles, so also does prudence, which is the right reason about things to be done.
Reply Obj. 1: The inclination of nature in things devoid of reason is without choice: wherefore such an inclination does not of necessity require reason. But the inclination of moral virtue is with choice: and consequently in order that it may be perfect it requires that reason be perfected by intellectual virtue.
Reply Obj. 2: A man may be virtuous without having full use of reason as to everything, provided he have it with regard to those things which have to be done virtuously. In this way all virtuous men have full use of reason. Hence those who seem to be simple, through lack of worldly cunning, may possibly be prudent, according to Matt.
10:16: "Be ye therefore prudent (Douay: "wise") as serpents, and simple as doves."
Reply Obj. 3: The natural inclination to a good of virtue is a kind of beginning of virtue, but is not perfect virtue. For the stronger this inclination is, the more perilous may it prove to be, unless it be accompanied by right reason, which rectifies the choice of fitting means towards the due end. Thus if a running horse be blind, the faster it runs the more heavily will it fall, and the more grievously will it be hurt. And consequently, although moral virtue be not right reason, as Socrates held, yet not only is it "according to right reason," in so far as it inclines man to that which is, according to right reason, as the Platonists maintained [*Cf. Plato, Meno xli.]; but also it needs to be "joined with right reason," as Aristotle declares (Ethic. vi, 13).
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FIFTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 58, Art. 5]
Whether There Can Be Intellectual Without Moral Virtue?
Objection 1: It would seem that there can be intellectual without moral virtue. Because perfection of what precedes does not depend on the perfection of what follows. Now reason precedes and moves the sensitive appet.i.te. Therefore intellectual virtue, which is a perfection of the reason, does not depend on moral virtue, which is a perfection of the appet.i.tive faculty; and can be without it.
Obj. 2: Further, morals are the matter of prudence, even as things makeable are the matter of art. Now art can be without its proper matter, as a smith without iron. Therefore prudence can be without the moral virtues, although of all the intellectual virtues, it seems most akin to the moral virtues.
Obj. 3: Further, prudence is "a virtue whereby we are of good counsel" (Ethic. vi, 9). Now many are of good counsel without having the moral virtues. Therefore prudence can be without a moral virtue.
_On the contrary,_ To wish to do evil is directly opposed to moral virtue; and yet it is not opposed to anything that can be without moral virtue. Now it is contrary to prudence "to sin willingly"
(Ethic. vi, 5). Therefore prudence cannot be without moral virtue.
_I answer that,_ Other intellectual virtues can, but prudence cannot, be without moral virtue. The reason for this is that prudence is the right reason about things to be done (and this, not merely in general, but also in particular); about which things actions are. Now right reason demands principles from which reason proceeds to argue.
And when reason argues about particular cases, it needs not only universal but also particular principles. As to universal principles of action, man is rightly disposed by the natural understanding of principles, whereby he understands that he should do no evil; or again by some practical science. But this is not enough in order that man may reason aright about particular cases. For it happens sometimes that the aforesaid universal principle, known by means of understanding or science, is destroyed in a particular case by a pa.s.sion: thus to one who is swayed by concupiscence, when he is overcome thereby, the object of his desire seems good, although it is opposed to the universal judgment of his reason. Consequently, as by the habit of natural understanding or of science, man is made to be rightly disposed in regard to the universal principles of action; so, in order that he be rightly disposed with regard to the particular principles of action, viz. the ends, he needs to be perfected by certain habits, whereby it becomes connatural, as it were, to man to judge aright to the end. This is done by moral virtue: for the virtuous man judges aright of the end of virtue, because "such a man is, such does the end seem to him" (Ethic. iii, 5). Consequently the right reason about things to be done, viz. prudence, requires man to have moral virtue.
Reply Obj. 1: Reason, as apprehending the end, precedes the appet.i.te for the end: but appet.i.te for the end precedes the reason, as arguing about the choice of the means, which is the concern of prudence. Even so, in speculative matters the understanding of principles is the foundation on which the syllogism of the reason is based.
Reply Obj. 2: It does not depend on the disposition of our appet.i.te whether we judge well or ill of the principles of art, as it does, when we judge of the end which is the principle in moral matters: in the former case our judgment depends on reason alone. Hence art does not require a virtue perfecting the appet.i.te, as prudence does.
Reply Obj. 3: Prudence not only helps us to be of good counsel, but also to judge and command well. This is not possible unless the impediment of the pa.s.sions, destroying the judgment and command of prudence, be removed; and this is done by moral virtue.
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QUESTION 59
OF MORAL VIRTUE IN RELATION TO THE Pa.s.sIONS (In Five Articles)
We must now consider the difference of one moral virtue from another.
And since those moral virtues which are about the pa.s.sions, differ accordingly to the difference of pa.s.sions, we must consider (1) the relation of virtue to pa.s.sion; (2) the different kinds of moral virtue in relation to the pa.s.sions. Under the first head there are five points of inquiry:
(1) Whether moral virtue is a pa.s.sion?
(2) Whether there can be moral virtue with pa.s.sion?
(3) Whether sorrow is compatible with moral virtue?
(4) Whether every moral virtue is about a pa.s.sion?
(5) Whether there can be moral virtue without pa.s.sion?
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FIRST ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 59, Art. 1]
Whether Moral Virtue Is a Pa.s.sion?
Objection 1: It would seem that moral virtue is a pa.s.sion. Because the mean is of the same genus as the extremes. But moral virtue is a mean between two pa.s.sions. Therefore moral virtue is a pa.s.sion.
Obj. 2: Further, virtue and vice, being contrary to one another, are in the same genus. But some pa.s.sions are reckoned to be vices, such as envy and anger. Therefore some pa.s.sions are virtues.
Obj. 3: Further, pity is a pa.s.sion, since it is sorrow for another"s ills, as stated above (Q. 35, A. 8). Now "Cicero the renowned orator did not hesitate to call pity a virtue," as Augustine states in _De Civ. Dei_ ix, 5. Therefore a pa.s.sion may be a moral virtue.
_On the contrary,_ It is stated in _Ethic._ ii, 5 that "pa.s.sions are neither virtues nor vices."
_I answer that,_ Moral virtue cannot be a pa.s.sion. This is clear for three reasons. First, because a pa.s.sion is a movement of the sensitive appet.i.te, as stated above (Q. 22, A. 3): whereas moral virtue is not a movement, but rather a principle of the movement of the appet.i.te, being a kind of habit. Secondly, because pa.s.sions are not in themselves good or evil. For man"s good or evil is something in reference to reason: wherefore the pa.s.sions, considered in themselves, are referable both to good and evil, for as much as they may accord or disaccord with reason. Now nothing of this sort can be a virtue: since virtue is referable to good alone, as stated above (Q. 55, A. 3). Thirdly, because, granted that some pa.s.sions are, in some way, referable to good only, or to evil only; even then the movement of pa.s.sion, as pa.s.sion, begins in the appet.i.te, and ends in the reason, since the appet.i.te tends to conformity with reason. On the other hand, the movement of virtue is the reverse, for it begins in the reason and ends in the appet.i.te, inasmuch as the latter is moved by reason. Hence the definition of moral virtue (Ethic. ii, 6) states that it is "a habit of choosing the mean appointed by reason as a prudent man would appoint it."
Reply Obj. 1: Virtue is a mean between pa.s.sions, not by reason of its essence, but on account of its effect; because, to wit, it establishes the mean between pa.s.sions.