SIXTEENTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 14, Art. 16]
Whether G.o.d Has a Speculative Knowledge of Things?
Objection 1: It seems that G.o.d has not a speculative knowledge of things. For the knowledge of G.o.d is the cause of things, as shown above (A. 8). But speculative knowledge is not the cause of the things known. Therefore the knowledge of G.o.d is not speculative.
Obj. 2: Further, speculative knowledge comes by abstraction from things; which does not belong to the divine knowledge. Therefore the knowledge of G.o.d is not speculative.
_On the contrary,_ Whatever is the more excellent must be attributed to G.o.d. But speculative knowledge is more excellent than practical knowledge, as the Philosopher says in the beginning of Metaphysics.
Therefore G.o.d has a speculative knowledge of things.
_I answer that,_ Some knowledge is speculative only; some is practical only; and some is partly speculative and partly practical. In proof whereof it must be observed that knowledge can be called speculative in three ways: first, on the part of the things known, which are not operable by the knower; such is the knowledge of man about natural or divine thing[s]. Secondly, as regards the manner of knowing--as, for instance, if a builder consider a house by defining and dividing, and considering what belongs to it in general: for this is to consider operable things in a speculative manner, and not as practically operable; for operable means the application of form to matter, and not the resolution of the composite into its universal formal principles. Thirdly, as regards the end; "for the practical intellect differs in its end from the speculative," as the Philosopher says (De Anima iii). For the practical intellect is ordered to the end of the operation; whereas the end of the speculative intellect is the consideration of truth. Hence if a builder should consider how a house can be made, not ordering this to the end of operation, but only to know (how to do it), this would be only a speculative considerations as regards the end, although it concerns an operable thing. Therefore knowledge which is speculative by reason of the thing itself known, is merely speculative. But that which is speculative either in its mode or as to its end is partly speculative and partly practical: and when it is ordained to an operative end it is simply practical.
In accordance with this, therefore, it must be said that G.o.d has of Himself a speculative knowledge only; for He Himself is not operable.
But of all other things He has both speculative and practical knowledge. He has speculative knowledge as regards the mode; for whatever we know speculatively in things by defining and dividing, G.o.d knows all this much more perfectly.
Now of things which He can make, but does not make at any time, He has not a practical knowledge, according as knowledge is called practical from the end. But He has a practical knowledge of what He makes in some period of time. And, as regards evil things, although they are not operable by Him, yet they fall under His practical knowledge, like good things, inasmuch as He permits, or impedes, or directs them; as also sicknesses fall under the practical knowledge of the physician, inasmuch as he cures them by his art.
Reply Obj. 1: The knowledge of G.o.d is the cause, not indeed of Himself, but of other things. He is actually the cause of some, that is, of things that come to be in some period of time; and He is virtually the cause of others, that is, of things which He can make, and which nevertheless are never made.
Reply Obj. 2: The fact that knowledge is derived from things known does not essentially belong to speculative knowledge, but only accidentally in so far as it is human.
In answer to what is objected on the contrary, we must say that perfect knowledge of operable things is obtainable only if they are known in so far as they are operable. Therefore, since the knowledge of G.o.d is in every way perfect, He must know what is operable by Him, formally as such, and not only in so far as they are speculative.
Nevertheless this does not impair the n.o.bility of His speculative knowledge, forasmuch as He sees all things other than Himself in Himself, and He knows Himself speculatively; and so in the speculative knowledge of Himself, he possesses both speculative and practical knowledge of all other things.
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QUESTION 15
OF IDEAS (In Three Articles)
After considering the knowledge of G.o.d, it remains to consider ideas.
And about this there are three points of inquiry:
(1) Whether there are ideas?
(2) Whether they are many, or one only?
(3) Whether there are ideas of all things known by G.o.d?
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FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 15, Art. 1]
Whether There Are Ideas?
Objection 1: It seems that there are no ideas. For Dionysius says (Div. Nom. vii), that G.o.d does not know things by ideas. But ideas are for nothing else except that things may be known through them.
Therefore there are no ideas.
Obj. 2: Further, G.o.d knows all things in Himself, as has been already said (Q. 14, A. 5). But He does not know Himself through an idea; neither therefore other things.
Obj. 3: Further, an idea is considered to be the principle of knowledge and action. But the divine essence is a sufficient principle of knowing and effecting all things. It is not therefore necessary to suppose ideas.
_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (Octog. Tri. Quaest. qu. xlvi), "Such is the power inherent in ideas, that no one can be wise unless they are understood."
_I answer that,_ It is necessary to suppose ideas in the divine mind.
For the Greek word _Idea_ is in Latin _Forma._ Hence by ideas are understood the forms of things, existing apart from the things themselves. Now the form of anything existing apart from the thing itself can be for one of two ends: either to be the type of that of which it is called the form, or to be the principle of the knowledge of that thing, inasmuch as the forms of things knowable are said to be in him who knows them. In either case we must suppose ideas, as is clear for the following reason:
In all things not generated by chance, the form must be the end of any generation whatsoever. But an agent does not act on account of the form, except in so far as the likeness of the form is in the agent, as may happen in two ways. For in some agents the form of the thing to be made pre-exists according to its natural being, as in those that act by their nature; as a man generates a man, or fire generates fire. Whereas in other agents (the form of the thing to be made pre-exists) according to intelligible being, as in those that act by the intellect; and thus the likeness of a house pre-exists in the mind of the builder. And this may be called the idea of the house, since the builder intends to build his house like to the form conceived in his mind. As then the world was not made by chance, but by G.o.d acting by His intellect, as will appear later (Q. 46, A. 1), there must exist in the divine mind a form to the likeness of which the world was made. And in this the notion of an idea consists.
Reply Obj. 1: G.o.d does not understand things according to an idea existing outside Himself. Thus Aristotle (Metaph. ix) rejects the opinion of Plato, who held that ideas existed of themselves, and not in the intellect.
Reply Obj. 2: Although G.o.d knows Himself and all else by His own essence, yet His essence is the operative principle of all things, except of Himself. It has therefore the nature of an idea with respect to other things; though not with respect to Himself.
Reply Obj. 3: G.o.d is the similitude of all things according to His essence; therefore an idea in G.o.d is identical with His essence.
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SECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 15, Art. 2]
Whether Ideas Are Many?
Objection 1: It seems that ideas are not many. For an idea in G.o.d is His essence. But G.o.d"s essence is one only. Therefore there is only one idea.
Obj. 2: Further, as the idea is the principle of knowing and operating, so are art and wisdom. But in G.o.d there are not several arts or wisdoms. Therefore in Him there is no plurality of ideas.
Obj. 3: Further, if it be said that ideas are multiplied according to their relations to different creatures, it may be argued on the contrary that the plurality of ideas is eternal. If, then, ideas are many, but creatures temporal, then the temporal must be the cause of the eternal.
Obj. 4: Further, these relations are either real in creatures only, or in G.o.d also. If in creatures only, since creatures are not from eternity, the plurality of ideas cannot be from eternity, if ideas are multiplied only according to these relations. But if they are real in G.o.d, it follows that there is a real plurality in G.o.d other than the plurality of Persons: and this is against the teaching of Damascene (De Fide Orth. i, 10), who says, in G.o.d all things are one, except "ingenerability, generation, and procession." Ideas therefore are not many.
_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (Octog. Tri. Quaest. qu. xlvi), "Ideas are certain princ.i.p.al forms, or permanent and immutable types of things, they themselves not being formed. Thus they are eternal, and existing always in the same manner, as being contained in the divine intelligence. Whilst, however, they themselves neither come into being nor decay, yet we say that in accordance with them everything is formed that can rise or decay, and all that actually does so."
_I answer that,_ It must necessarily be held that ideas are many. In proof of which it is to be considered that in every effect the ultimate end is the proper intention of the princ.i.p.al agent, as the order of an army (is the proper intention) of the general. Now the highest good existing in things is the good of the order of the universe, as the Philosopher clearly teaches in _Metaph._ xii.
Therefore the order of the universe is properly intended by G.o.d, and is not the accidental result of a succession of agents, as has been supposed by those who have taught that G.o.d created only the first creature, and that this creature created the second creature, and so on, until this great mult.i.tude of beings was produced. According to this opinion G.o.d would have the idea of the first created thing alone; whereas, if the order itself of the universe was created by Him immediately, and intended by Him, He must have the idea of the order of the universe. Now there cannot be an idea of any whole, unless particular ideas are had of those parts of which the whole is made; just as a builder cannot conceive the idea of a house unless he has the idea of each of its parts. So, then, it must needs be that in the divine mind there are the proper ideas of all things. Hence Augustine says (Octog. Tri. Quaest. qu. xlvi), "that each thing was created by G.o.d according to the idea proper to it," from which it follows that in the divine mind ideas are many. Now it can easily be seen how this is not repugnant to the simplicity of G.o.d, if we consider that the idea of a work is in the mind of the operator as that which is understood, and not as the image whereby he understands, which is a form that makes the intellect in act. For the form of the house in the mind of the builder, is something understood by him, to the likeness of which he forms the house in matter. Now, it is not repugnant to the simplicity of the divine mind that it understand many things; though it would be repugnant to its simplicity were His understanding to be formed by a plurality of images. Hence many ideas exist in the divine mind, as things understood by it; as can be proved thus. Inasmuch as He knows His own essence perfectly, He knows it according to every mode in which it can be known. Now it can be known not only as it is in itself, but as it can be partic.i.p.ated in by creatures according to some degree of likeness. But every creature has its own proper species, according to which it partic.i.p.ates in some degree in likeness to the divine essence. So far, therefore, as G.o.d knows His essence as capable of such imitation by any creature, He knows it as the particular type and idea of that creature; and in like manner as regards other creatures. So it is clear that G.o.d understands many particular types of things and these are many ideas.
Reply Obj. 1: The divine essence is not called an idea in so far as it is that essence, but only in so far as it is the likeness or type of this or that thing. Hence ideas are said to be many, inasmuch as many types are understood through the self-same essence.
Reply Obj. 2: By wisdom and art we signify that by which G.o.d understands; but an idea, that which G.o.d understands. For G.o.d by one understands many things, and that not only according to what they are in themselves, but also according as they are understood, and this is to understand the several types of things. In the same way, an architect is said to understand a house, when he understands the form of the house in matter. But if he understands the form of a house, as devised by himself, from the fact that he understands that he understands it, he thereby understands the type or idea of the house.
Now not only does G.o.d understand many things by His essence, but He also understands that He understands many things by His essence. And this means that He understands the several types of things; or that many ideas are in His intellect as understood by Him.
Reply Obj. 3: Such relations, whereby ideas are multiplied, are caused not by the things themselves, but by the divine intellect comparing its own essence with these things.
Reply Obj. 4: Relations multiplying ideas do not exist in created things, but in G.o.d. Yet they are not real relations, such as those whereby the Persons are distinguished, but relations understood by G.o.d.
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THIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 15, Art. 3]
Whether There Are Ideas of All Things That G.o.d Knows?
Objection 1: It seems that there are not ideas in G.o.d of all things that He knows. For the idea of evil is not in G.o.d; since it would follow that evil was in Him. But evil things are known by G.o.d.
Therefore there are not ideas of all things that G.o.d knows.
Obj. 2: Further, G.o.d knows things that neither are, nor will be, nor have been, as has been said above (A. 9). But of such things there are no ideas, since, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. v): "Acts of the divine will are the determining and effective types of things."