1). It may, however, be said that being also is in things and in the intellect, as is the true; although truth is primarily in the intellect, while being is primarily in things; and this is so because truth and being differ in idea.
Reply Obj. 2: Not-being has nothing in itself whereby it can be known; yet it is known in so far as the intellect renders it knowable. Hence the true is based on being, inasmuch as not-being is a kind of logical being, apprehended, that is, by reason.
Reply Obj. 3: When it is said that being cannot be apprehended except under the notion of the true, this can be understood in two ways. In the one way so as to mean that being is not apprehended, unless the idea of the true follows apprehension of being; and this is true. In the other way, so as to mean that being cannot be apprehended unless the idea of the true be apprehended also; and this is false. But the true cannot be apprehended unless the idea of being be apprehended also; since being is included in the idea of the true. The case is the same if we compare the intelligible object with being. For being cannot be understood, unless being is intelligible. Yet being can be understood while its intelligibility is not understood. Similarly, being when understood is true, yet the true is not understood by understanding being.
_______________________
FOURTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 16, Art. 4]
Whether Good Is Logically Prior to the True?
Objection 1: It seems that good is logically prior to the true. For what is more universal is logically prior, as is evident from _Phys._ i. But the good is more universal than the true, since the true is a kind of good, namely, of the intellect. Therefore the good is logically prior to the true.
Obj. 2: Further, good is in things, but the true in the intellect composing and dividing as said above (A. 2). But that which is in things is prior to that which is in the intellect. Therefore good is logically prior to the true.
Obj. 3: Further, truth is a species of virtue, as is clear from _Ethic._ iv. But virtue is included under good; since, as Augustine says (De Lib. Arbit. ii, 19), it is a good quality of the mind.
Therefore the good is prior to the true.
_On the contrary,_ What is in more things is prior logically. But the true is in some things wherein good is not, as, for instance, in mathematics. Therefore the true is prior to good.
_I answer that,_ Although the good and the true are convertible with being, as to suppositum, yet they differ logically. And in this manner the true, speaking absolutely, is prior to good, as appears from two reasons. First, because the true is more closely related to being than is good. For the true regards being itself simply and immediately; while the nature of good follows being in so far as being is in some way perfect; for thus it is desirable. Secondly, it is evident from the fact that knowledge naturally precedes appet.i.te. Hence, since the true regards knowledge, but the good regards the appet.i.te, the true must be prior in idea to the good.
Reply Obj. 1: The will and the intellect mutually include one another: for the intellect understands the will, and the will wills the intellect to understand. So then, among things directed to the object of the will, are comprised also those that belong to the intellect; and conversely. Whence in the order of things desirable, good stands as the universal, and the true as the particular; whereas in the order of intelligible things the converse is the case. From the fact, then, that the true is a kind of good, it follows that the good is prior in the order of things desirable; but not that it is prior absolutely.
Reply Obj. 2: A thing is prior logically in so far as it is prior to the intellect. Now the intellect apprehends primarily being itself; secondly, it apprehends that it understands being; and thirdly, it apprehends that it desires being. Hence the idea of being is first, that of truth second, and the idea of good third, though good is in things.
Reply Obj. 3: The virtue which is called "truth" is not truth in general, but a certain kind of truth according to which man shows himself in deed and word as he really is. But truth as applied to "life" is used in a particular sense, inasmuch as a man fulfills in his life that to which he is ordained by the divine intellect, as it has been said that truth exists in other things (A. 1). Whereas the truth of "justice" is found in man as he fulfills his duty to his neighbor, as ordained by law. Hence we cannot argue from these particular truths to truth in general.
_______________________
FIFTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 16, Art. 5]
Whether G.o.d Is Truth?
Objection 1: It seems that G.o.d is not truth. For truth consists in the intellect composing and dividing. But in G.o.d there is not composition and division. Therefore in Him there is not truth.
Obj. 2: Further, truth, according to Augustine (De Vera Relig. x.x.xvi) is a "likeness to the principle." But in G.o.d there is no likeness to a principle. Therefore in G.o.d there is not truth.
Obj. 3: Further, whatever is said of G.o.d, is said of Him as of the first cause of all things; thus the being of G.o.d is the cause of all being; and His goodness the cause of all good. If therefore there is truth in G.o.d, all truth will be from Him. But it is true that someone sins. Therefore this will be from G.o.d; which is evidently false.
_On the contrary,_ Our Lord says, "I am the Way, the Truth, and the Life" (John 14:6).
_I answer that,_ As said above (A. 1), truth is found in the intellect according as it apprehends a thing as it is; and in things according as they have being conformable to an intellect. This is to the greatest degree found in G.o.d. For His being is not only conformed to His intellect, but it is the very act of His intellect; and His act of understanding is the measure and cause of every other being and of every other intellect, and He Himself is His own existence and act of understanding. Whence it follows not only that truth is in Him, but that He is truth itself, and the sovereign and first truth.
Reply Obj. 1: Although in the divine intellect there is neither composition nor division, yet in His simple act of intelligence He judges of all things and knows all things complex; and thus there is truth in His intellect.
Reply Obj. 2: The truth of our intellect is according to its conformity with its principle, that is to say, to the things from which it receives knowledge. The truth also of things is according to their conformity with their principle, namely, the divine intellect.
Now this cannot be said, properly speaking, of divine truth; unless perhaps in so far as truth is appropriated to the Son, Who has a principle. But if we speak of divine truth in its essence, we cannot understand this unless the affirmative must be resolved into the negative, as when one says: "the Father is of Himself, because He is not from another." Similarly, the divine truth can be called a "likeness to the principle," inasmuch as His existence is not dissimilar to His intellect.
Reply Obj. 3: Not-being and privation have no truth of themselves, but only in the apprehension of the intellect. Now all apprehension of the intellect is from G.o.d. Hence all the truth that exists in the statement--"that a person commits fornication is true"--is entirely from G.o.d. But to argue, "Therefore that this person fornicates is from G.o.d", is a fallacy of Accident.
_______________________
SIXTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 16, Art. 6]
Whether There Is Only One Truth, According to Which All Things Are True?
Objection 1: It seems that there is only one truth, according to which all things are true. For according to Augustine (De Trin. xv, 1), "nothing is greater than the mind of man, except G.o.d." Now truth is greater than the mind of man; otherwise the mind would be the judge of truth: whereas in fact it judges all things according to truth, and not according to its own measure. Therefore G.o.d alone is truth.
Therefore there is no other truth but G.o.d.
Obj. 2: Further, Anselm says (De Verit. xiv), that, "as is the relation of time to temporal things, so is that of truth to true things." But there is only one time for all temporal things.
Therefore there is only one truth, by which all things are true.
_On the contrary,_ it is written (Ps. 11:2), "Truths are decayed from among the children of men."
_I answer that,_ In one sense truth, whereby all things are true, is one, and in another sense it is not. In proof of which we must consider that when anything is predicated of many things univocally, it is found in each of them according to its proper nature; as animal is found in each species of animal. But when anything is predicated of many things a.n.a.logically, it is found in only one of them according to its proper nature, and from this one the rest are denominated. So healthiness is predicated of animal, of urine, and of medicine, not that health is only in the animal; but from the health of the animal, medicine is called healthy, in so far as it is the cause of health, and urine is called healthy, in so far as it indicates health. And although health is neither in medicine nor in urine, yet in either there is something whereby the one causes, and the other indicates health. Now we have said (A. 1) that truth resides primarily in the intellect; and secondarily in things, according as they are related to the divine intellect. If therefore we speak of truth, as it exists in the intellect, according to its proper nature, then are there many truths in many created intellects; and even in one and the same intellect, according to the number of things known. Whence a gloss on Ps. 11:2, "Truths are decayed from among the children of men," says: "As from one man"s face many likenesses are reflected in a mirror, so many truths are reflected from the one divine truth." But if we speak of truth as it is in things, then all things are true by one primary truth; to which each one is a.s.similated according to its own ent.i.ty. And thus, although the essences or forms of things are many, yet the truth of the divine intellect is one, in conformity to which all things are said to be true.
Reply Obj. 1: The soul does not judge of things according to any kind of truth, but according to the primary truth, inasmuch as it is reflected in the soul, as in a mirror, by reason of the first principles of the understanding. It follows, therefore, that the primary truth is greater than the soul. And yet, even created truth, which resides in our intellect, is greater than the soul, not simply, but in a certain degree, in so far as it is its perfection; even as science may be said to be greater than the soul. Yet it is true that nothing subsisting is greater than the rational soul, except G.o.d.
Reply Obj. 2: The saying of Anselm is correct in so far as things are said to be true by their relation to the divine intellect.
_______________________
SEVENTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 16, Art. 7]
Whether Created Truth Is Eternal?
Objection 1: It seems that created truth is eternal. For Augustine says (De Lib. Arbit. ii, 8) "Nothing is more eternal than the nature of a circle, and that two added to three make five." But the truth of these is a created truth. Therefore created truth is eternal.
Obj. 2: Further, that which is always, is eternal. But universals are always and everywhere; therefore they are eternal. So therefore is truth, which is the most universal.
Obj. 3: Further, it was always true that what is true in the present was to be in the future. But as the truth of a proposition regarding the present is a created truth, so is that of a proposition regarding the future. Therefore some created truth is eternal.
Obj. 4: Further, all that is without beginning and end is eternal.
But the truth of enunciables is without beginning and end; for if their truth had a beginning, since it was not before, it was true that truth was not, and true, of course, by reason of truth; so that truth was before it began to be. Similarly, if it be a.s.serted that truth has an end, it follows that it is after it has ceased to be, for it will still be true that truth is not. Therefore truth is eternal.
_On the contrary,_ G.o.d alone is eternal, as laid down before (Q. 10, Art. 3).
_I answer that,_ The truth of enunciations is no other than the truth of the intellect. For an enunciation resides in the intellect, and in speech. Now according as it is in the intellect it has truth of itself: but according as it is in speech, it is called enunciable truth, according as it signifies some truth of the intellect, not on account of any truth residing in the enunciation, as though in a subject. Thus urine is called healthy, not from any health within it but from the health of an animal which it indicates. In like manner it has been already said that things are called true from the truth of the intellect. Hence, if no intellect were eternal, no truth would be eternal. Now because only the divine intellect is eternal, in it alone truth has eternity. Nor does it follow from this that anything else but G.o.d is eternal; since the truth of the divine intellect is G.o.d Himself, as shown already (A. 5).
Reply Obj. 1: The nature of a circle, and the fact that two and three make five, have eternity in the mind of G.o.d.
Reply Obj. 2: That something is always and everywhere, can be understood in two ways. In one way, as having in itself the power of extension to all time and to all places, as it belongs to G.o.d to be everywhere and always. In the other way as not having in itself determination to any place or time, as primary matter is said to be one, not because it has one form, but by the absence of all distinguishing form. In this manner all universals are said to be everywhere and always, in so far as universals are independent of place and time. It does not, however, follow from this that they are eternal, except in an intellect, if one exists that is eternal.
Reply Obj. 3: That which now is, was future, before it (actually) was; because it was in its cause that it would be. Hence, if the cause were removed, that thing"s coming to be was not future. But the first cause is alone eternal. Hence it does not follow that it was always true that what now is would be, except in so far as its future being was in the sempiternal cause; and G.o.d alone is such a cause.
Reply Obj. 4: Because our intellect is not eternal, neither is the truth of enunciable propositions which are formed by us, eternal, but it had a beginning in time. Now before such truth existed, it was not true to say that such a truth did exist, except by reason of the divine intellect, wherein alone truth is eternal. But it is true now to say that that truth did not then exist: and this is true only by reason of the truth that is now in our intellect; and not by reason of any truth in the things. For this is truth concerning not-being; and not-being has not truth of itself, but only so far as our intellect apprehends it. Hence it is true to say that truth did not exist, in so far as we apprehend its not-being as preceding its being.
_______________________
EIGHTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 16, Art. 8]
Whether Truth Is Immutable?