is the root of all sins, shall be explained further on (Q. 84, A. 1).
Reply Obj. 2: "Concupiscence of the eyes" does not mean here the concupiscence for all things which can be seen by the eyes, but only for such things as afford, not carnal pleasure in respect of touch, but in respect of the eyes, i.e. of any apprehensive power.
Reply Obj. 3: The sense of sight is the most excellent of all the senses, and covers a larger ground, as stated in _Metaph._ i: and so its name is transferred to all the other senses, and even to the inner apprehensions, as Augustine states (De Verb. Dom., serm.
x.x.xiii).
Reply Obj. 4: Avoidance of evil is caused by the appet.i.te for good, as stated above (Q. 25, A. 2; Q. 39, A. 2); and so those pa.s.sions alone are mentioned which incline to good, as being the causes of those which cause inordinately the avoidance of evil.
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SIXTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 77, Art. 6]
Whether Sin Is Alleviated on Account of a Pa.s.sion?
Objection 1: It would seem that sin is not alleviated on account of pa.s.sion. For increase of cause adds to the effect: thus if a hot thing causes something to melt, a hotter will do so yet more. Now pa.s.sion is a cause of sin, as stated (A. 5). Therefore the more intense the pa.s.sion, the greater the sin. Therefore pa.s.sion does not diminish sin, but increases it.
Obj. 2: Further, a good pa.s.sion stands in the same relation to merit, as an evil pa.s.sion does to sin. Now a good pa.s.sion increases merit: for a man seems to merit the more, according as he is moved by a greater pity to help a poor man. Therefore an evil pa.s.sion also increases rather than diminishes a sin.
Obj. 3: Further, a man seems to sin the more grievously, according as he sins with a more intense will. But the pa.s.sion that impels the will makes it tend with greater intensity to the sinful act.
Therefore pa.s.sion aggravates a sin.
_On the contrary,_ The pa.s.sion of concupiscence is called a temptation of the flesh. But the greater the temptation that overcomes a man, the less grievous his sin, as Augustine states (De Civ. Dei iv, 12).
_I answer that,_ Sin consists essentially in an act of the free will, which is a faculty of the will and reason; while pa.s.sion is a movement of the sensitive appet.i.te. Now the sensitive appet.i.te can be related to the free-will, antecedently and consequently: antecedently, according as a pa.s.sion of the sensitive appet.i.te draws or inclines the reason or will, as stated above (AA. 1, 2; Q. 10, A.
3); and consequently, in so far as the movements of the higher powers redound on to the lower, since it is not possible for the will to be moved to anything intensely, without a pa.s.sion being aroused in the sensitive appet.i.te.
Accordingly if we take pa.s.sion as preceding the sinful act, it must needs diminish the sin: because the act is a sin in so far as it is voluntary, and under our control. Now a thing is said to be under our control, through the reason and will: and therefore the more the reason and will do anything of their own accord, and not through the impulse of a pa.s.sion, the more is it voluntary and under our control.
In this respect pa.s.sion diminishes sin, in so far as it diminishes its voluntariness.
On the other hand, a consequent pa.s.sion does not diminish a sin, but increases it; or rather it is a sign of its gravity, in so far, to wit, as it shows the intensity of the will towards the sinful act; and so it is true that the greater the pleasure or the concupiscence with which anyone sins, the greater the sin.
Reply Obj. 1: Pa.s.sion is the cause of sin on the part of that to which the sinner turns. But the gravity of a sin is measured on the part of that from which he turns, which results accidentally from his turning to something else--accidentally, i.e. beside his intention.
Now an effect is increased by the increase, not of its accidental cause, but of its direct cause.
Reply Obj. 2: A good pa.s.sion consequent to the judgment of reason increases merit; but if it precede, so that a man is moved to do well, rather by his pa.s.sion than by the judgment of his reason, such a pa.s.sion diminishes the goodness and praiseworthiness of his action.
Reply Obj. 3: Although the movement of the will incited by the pa.s.sion is more intense, yet it is not so much the will"s own movement, as if it were moved to sin by the reason alone.
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SEVENTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 77, Art. 7]
Whether Pa.s.sion Excuses from Sin Altogether?
Objection 1: It would seem that pa.s.sion excuses from sin altogether.
For whatever causes an act to be involuntary, excuses from sin altogether. But concupiscence of the flesh, which is a pa.s.sion, makes an act to be involuntary, according to Gal. 5:17: "The flesh l.u.s.teth against the spirit ... so that you do not the things that you would." Therefore pa.s.sion excuses from sin altogether.
Obj. 2: Further, pa.s.sion causes a certain ignorance of a particular matter, as stated above (A. 2; Q. 76, A. 3). But ignorance of a particular matter excuses from sin altogether, as stated above (Q. 6, A. 8). Therefore pa.s.sion excuses from sin altogether.
Obj. 3: Further, disease of the soul is graver than disease of the body. But bodily disease excuses from sin altogether, as in the case of mad people. Much more, therefore, does pa.s.sion, which is a disease of the soul.
_On the contrary,_ The Apostle (Rom. 7:5) speaks of the pa.s.sions as "pa.s.sions of sins," for no other reason than that they cause sin: which would not be the case if they excused from sin altogether.
Therefore pa.s.sion does not excuse from sin altogether.
_I answer that,_ An act which, in its genus, is evil, cannot be excused from sin altogether, unless it be rendered altogether involuntary. Consequently, if the pa.s.sion be such that it renders the subsequent act wholly involuntary, it entirely excuses from sin; otherwise, it does not excuse entirely. In this matter two points apparently should be observed: first, that a thing may be voluntary either _in itself,_ as when the will tends towards it directly; or _in its cause,_ when the will tends towards that cause and not towards the effect; as is the case with one who wilfully gets drunk, for in that case he is considered to do voluntarily whatever he does through being drunk. Secondly, we must observe that a thing is said to be voluntary "directly" or "indirectly"; directly, if the will tends towards it; indirectly, if the will could have prevented it, but did not.
Accordingly therefore we must make a distinction: because a pa.s.sion is sometimes so strong as to take away the use of reason altogether, as in the case of those who are mad through love or anger; and then if such a pa.s.sion were voluntary from the beginning, the act is reckoned a sin, because it is voluntary in its cause, as we have stated with regard to drunkenness. If, however, the cause be not voluntary but natural, for instance, if anyone through sickness or some such cause fall into such a pa.s.sion as deprives him of the use of reason, his act is rendered wholly involuntary, and he is entirely excused from sin. Sometimes, however, the pa.s.sion is not such as to take away the use of reason altogether; and then reason can drive the pa.s.sion away, by turning to other thoughts, or it can prevent it from having its full effect; since the members are not put to work, except by the consent of reason, as stated above (Q. 17, A. 9): wherefore such a pa.s.sion does not excuse from sin altogether.
Reply Obj. 1: The words, "So that you do not the things that you would" are not to be referred to outward deeds, but to the inner movement of concupiscence; for a man would wish never to desire evil, in which sense we are to understand the words of Rom. 7:19: "The evil which I will not, that I do." Or again they may be referred to the will as preceding the pa.s.sion, as is the case with the incontinent, who act counter to their resolution on account of their concupiscence.
Reply Obj. 2: The particular ignorance which excuses altogether, is ignorance of a circ.u.mstance, which a man is unable to know even after taking due precautions. But pa.s.sion causes ignorance of law in a particular case, by preventing universal knowledge from being applied to a particular act, which pa.s.sion the reason is able to drive away, as stated.
Reply Obj. 3: Bodily disease is involuntary: there would be a comparison, however, if it were voluntary, as we have stated about drunkenness, which is a kind of bodily disease.
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EIGHTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 77, Art. 8]
Whether a Sin Committed Through Pa.s.sion Can Be Mortal?
Objection 1: It would seem that sin committed through pa.s.sion cannot be mortal. Because venial sin is condivided with mortal sin. Now sin committed from weakness is venial, since it has in itself a motive for pardon (_venia_). Since therefore sin committed through pa.s.sion is a sin of weakness, it seems that it cannot be mortal.
Obj. 2: Further, the cause is more powerful than its effect. But pa.s.sion cannot be a mortal sin, for there is no mortal sin in the sensuality, as stated above (Q. 74, A. 4). Therefore a sin committed through pa.s.sion cannot be mortal.
Obj. 3: Further, pa.s.sion is a hindrance to reason, as explained above (AA. 1, 2). Now it belongs to the reason to turn to G.o.d, or to turn away from Him, which is the essence of a mortal sin. Therefore a sin committed through pa.s.sion cannot be mortal.
_On the contrary,_ The Apostle says (Rom. 7:5) that "the pa.s.sions of the sins ... work [Vulg.: "did work"] in our members to bring forth fruit unto death." Now it is proper to mortal sin to bring forth fruit unto death. Therefore sin committed through pa.s.sion may be mortal.
_I answer that,_ Mortal sin, as stated above (Q. 72, A. 5), consists in turning away from our last end which is G.o.d, which aversion pertains to the deliberating reason, whose function it is also to direct towards the end. Therefore that which is contrary to the last end can happen not to be a mortal sin, only when the deliberating reason is unable to come to the rescue, which is the case in sudden movements. Now when anyone proceeds from pa.s.sion to a sinful act, or to a deliberate consent, this does not happen suddenly: and so the deliberating reason can come to the rescue here, since it can drive the pa.s.sion away, or at least prevent it from having its effect, as stated above: wherefore if it does not come to the rescue, there is a mortal sin; and it is thus, as we see, that many murders and adulteries are committed through pa.s.sion.
Reply Obj. 1: A sin may be venial in three ways. First, through its cause, i.e. through having cause to be forgiven, which cause lessens the sin; thus a sin that is committed through weakness or ignorance is said to be venial. Secondly, through its issue; thus every sin, through repentance, becomes venial, i.e. receives pardon (_veniam_).
Thirdly, by its genus, e.g. an idle word. This is the only kind of venial sin that is opposed to mortal sin: whereas the objection regards the first kind.
Reply Obj. 2: Pa.s.sion causes sin as regards the adherence to something. But that this be a mortal sin regards the aversion, which follows accidentally from the adherence, as stated above (A. 6, ad 1): hence the argument does not prove.
Reply Obj. 3: Pa.s.sion does not always hinder the act of reason altogether: consequently the reason remains in possession of its free-will, so as to turn away from G.o.d, or turn to Him. If, however, the use of reason be taken away altogether, the sin is no longer either mortal or venial.
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QUESTION 78
OF THAT CAUSE OF SIN WHICH IS MALICE (In Four Articles)
We must now consider the cause of sin on the part of the will, viz.
malice: and under this head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether it is possible for anyone to sin through certain malice, i.e. purposely?
(2) Whether everyone that sins through habit, sins through certain malice?
(3) Whether every one that sins through certain malice, sins through habit?
(4) Whether it is more grievous to sin through certain malice, than through pa.s.sion?