Reply Obj. 2: Temporal and bodily goods are indeed goods of man, but they are of small account: whereas spiritual goods are man"s chief goods. Consequently it belongs to Divine justice to give spiritual goods to the virtuous, and to award them as much temporal goods or evils, as suffices for virtue: for, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom.
viii), "Divine justice does not enfeeble the fort.i.tude of the virtuous man, by material gifts." The very fact that others receive temporal goods, is detrimental to their spiritual good; wherefore the psalm quoted concludes (verse 6): "Therefore pride hath held them fast."
Reply Obj. 3: Christ bore a satisfactory punishment, not for His, but for our sins.
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EIGHTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 87, Art. 8]
Whether Anyone Is Punished for Another"s Sin?
Objection 1: It would seem that one may be punished for another"s sin. For it is written (Ex. 20:5): "I am ... G.o.d ... jealous, visiting the iniquity of the fathers upon the children, unto the third and fourth generation of them that hate Me"; and (Matt. 23:35): "That upon you may come all the just blood that hath been shed upon the earth."
Obj. 2: Further, human justice springs from Divine justice. Now, according to human justice, children are sometimes punished for their parents, as in the case of high treason. Therefore also according to Divine justice, one is punished for another"s sin.
Obj. 3: Further, if it be replied that the son is punished, not for the father"s sin, but for his own, inasmuch as he imitates his father"s wickedness; this would not be said of the children rather than of outsiders, who are punished in like manner as those whose crimes they imitate. It seems, therefore, that children are punished, not for their own sins, but for those of their parents.
_On the contrary,_ It is written (Ezech. 18:20): "The son shall not bear the iniquity of the father."
_I answer that,_ If we speak of that satisfactory punishment, which one takes upon oneself voluntarily, one may bear another"s punishment, in so far as they are, in some way, one, as stated above (A. 7). If, however, we speak of punishment inflicted on account of sin, inasmuch as it is penal, then each one is punished for his own sin only, because the sinful act is something personal. But if we speak of a punishment that is medicinal, in this way it does happen that one is punished for another"s sin. For it has been stated (A. 7) that ills sustained in bodily goods or even in the body itself, are medicinal punishments intended for the health of the soul. Wherefore there is no reason why one should not have such like punishments inflicted on one for another"s sin, either by G.o.d or by man; e.g. on children for their parents, or on servants for their masters, inasmuch as they are their property so to speak; in such a way, however, that, if the children or the servants take part in the sin, this penal ill has the character of punishment in regard to both the one punished and the one he is punished for. But if they do not take part in the sin, it has the character of punishment in regard to the one for whom the punishment is borne, while, in regard to the one who is punished, it is merely medicinal (except accidentally, if he consent to the other"s sin), since it is intended for the good of his soul, if he bears it patiently.
With regard to spiritual punishments, these are not merely medicinal, because the good of the soul is not directed to a yet higher good.
Consequently no one suffers loss in the goods of the soul without some fault of his own. Wherefore Augustine says (Ep. ad Avit.) [*Ep.
ad Auxilium, ccl.], such like punishments are not inflicted on one for another"s sin, because, as regards the soul, the son is not the father"s property. Hence the Lord a.s.signs the reason for this by saying (Ezech. 18:4): "All souls are Mine."
Reply Obj. 1: Both the pa.s.sages quoted should, seemingly, be referred to temporal or bodily punishments, in so far as children are the property of their parents, and posterity, of their forefathers. Else, if they be referred to spiritual punishments, they must be understood in reference to the imitation of sin, wherefore in Exodus these words are added, "Of them that hate Me," and in the chapter quoted from Matthew (verse 32) we read: "Fill ye up then the measure of your fathers." The sins of the fathers are said to be punished in their children, because the latter are the more p.r.o.ne to sin through being brought up amid their parents" crimes, both by becoming accustomed to them, and by imitating their parents" example, conforming to their authority as it were. Moreover they deserve heavier punishment if, seeing the punishment of their parents, they fail to mend their ways.
The text adds, "to the third and fourth generation," because men are wont to live long enough to see the third and fourth generation, so that both the children can witness their parents" sins so as to imitate them, and the parents can see their children"s punishments so as to grieve for them.
Reply Obj. 2: The punishments which human justice inflicts on one for another"s sin are bodily and temporal. They are also remedies or medicines against future sins, in order that either they who are punished, or others may be restrained from similar faults.
Reply Obj. 3: Those who are near of kin are said to be punished, rather than outsiders, for the sins of others, both because the punishment of kindred redounds somewhat upon those who sinned, as stated above, in so far as the child is the father"s property, and because the examples and the punishments that occur in one"s own household are more moving. Consequently when a man is brought up amid the sins of his parents, he is more eager to imitate them, and if he is not deterred by their punishments, he would seem to be the more obstinate, and, therefore, to deserve more severe punishment.
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QUESTION 88
OF VENIAL AND MORTAL SIN (In Six Articles)
In the next place, since venial and mortal sins differ in respect of the debt of punishment, we must consider them. First, we shall consider venial sin as compared with mortal sin; secondly, we shall consider venial sin in itself.
Under the first head there are six points of inquiry:
(1) Whether venial sin is fittingly condivided with mortal sin?
(2) Whether they differ generically?
(3) Whether venial sin is a disposition to mortal sin?
(4) Whether a venial sin can become mortal?
(5) Whether a venial sin can become mortal by reason of an aggravating circ.u.mstance?
(6) Whether a mortal sin can become venial?
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FIRST ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 88, Art. 1]
Whether Venial Sin Is Fittingly Condivided with Mortal Sin?
Objection 1: It would seem that venial sin is unfittingly condivided with mortal sin. For Augustine says (Contra Faust. xxii, 27): "Sin is a word, deed or desire contrary to the eternal law." But the fact of being against the eternal law makes a sin to be mortal. Consequently every sin is mortal. Therefore venial sin is not condivided with mortal sin.
Obj. 2: Further, the Apostle says (1 Cor. 10:31): "Whether you eat or drink, or whatever else you do; do all to the glory of G.o.d." Now whoever sins breaks this commandment, because sin is not done for G.o.d"s glory. Consequently, since to break a commandment is to commit a mortal sin, it seems that whoever sins, sins mortally.
Obj. 3: Further, whoever cleaves to a thing by love, cleaves either as enjoying it, or as using it, as Augustine states (De Doctr.
Christ. i, 3, 4). But no person, in sinning, cleaves to a mutable good as using it: because he does not refer it to that good which gives us happiness, which, properly speaking, is to use, according to Augustine (De Doctr. Christ. i, 3, 4). Therefore whoever sins enjoys a mutable good. Now "to enjoy what we should use is human perverseness," as Augustine again says (Qq. lx.x.xiii, qu. 30).
Therefore, since "perverseness" [*The Latin "pervertere" means to overthrow, to destroy, hence "perversion" of G.o.d"s law is a mortal sin.] denotes a mortal sin, it seems that whoever sins, sins mortally.
Obj. 4: Further, whoever approaches one term, from that very fact turns away from the opposite. Now whoever sins, approaches a mutable good, and, consequently turns away from the immutable good, so that he sins mortally. Therefore venial sin is unfittingly condivided with mortal sin.
_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (Tract. xli in Joan.), that "a crime is one that merits d.a.m.nation, and a venial sin, one that does not." But a crime denotes a mortal sin. Therefore venial sin is fittingly condivided with mortal sin.
_I answer that,_ Certain terms do not appear to be mutually opposed, if taken in their proper sense, whereas they are opposed if taken metaphorically: thus "to smile" is not opposed to "being dry"; but if we speak of the smiling meadows when they are decked with flowers and fresh with green hues this is opposed to drought. In like manner if mortal be taken literally as referring to the death of the body, it does not imply opposition to venial, nor belong to the same genus.
But if mortal be taken metaphorically, as applied to sin, it is opposed to that which is venial.
For sin, being a sickness of the soul, as stated above (Q. 71, A. 1, ad 3; Q. 72, A. 5; Q. 74, A. 9, ad 2), is said to be mortal by comparison with a disease, which is said to be mortal, through causing an irreparable defect consisting in the corruption of a principle, as stated above (Q. 72, A. 5). Now the principle of the spiritual life, which is a life in accord with virtue, is the order to the last end, as stated above (Q. 72, A. 5; Q. 87, A. 3): and if this order be corrupted, it cannot be repaired by any intrinsic principle, but by the power of G.o.d alone, as stated above (Q. 87, A.
3), because disorders in things referred to the end, are repaired through the end, even as an error about conclusions can be repaired through the truth of the principles. Hence the defect of order to the last end cannot be repaired through something else as a higher principle, as neither can an error about principles. Wherefore such sins are called mortal, as being irreparable. On the other hand, sins which imply a disorder in things referred to the end, the order to the end itself being preserved, are reparable. These sins are called venial: because a sin receives its acquittal (_veniam_) when the debt of punishment is taken away, and this ceases when the sin ceases, as explained above (Q. 87, A. 6).
Accordingly, mortal and venial are mutually opposed as reparable and irreparable: and I say this with reference to the intrinsic principle, but not to the Divine power, which can repair all diseases, whether of the body or of the soul. Therefore venial sin is fittingly condivided with mortal sin.
Reply Obj. 1: The division of sin into venial and mortal is not a division of a genus into its species which have an equal share of the generic nature: but it is the division of an a.n.a.logous term into its parts, of which it is predicated, of the one first, and of the other afterwards. Consequently the perfect notion of sin, which Augustine gives, applies to mortal sin. On the other hand, venial sin is called a sin, in reference to an imperfect notion of sin, and in relation to mortal sin: even as an accident is called a being, in relation to substance, in reference to the imperfect notion of being. For it is not _against_ the law, since he who sins venially neither does what the law forbids, nor omits what the law prescribes to be done; but he acts _beside_ the law, through not observing the mode of reason, which the law intends.
Reply Obj. 2: This precept of the Apostle is affirmative, and so it does not bind for all times. Consequently everyone who does not actually refer all his actions to the glory of G.o.d, does not therefore act against this precept. In order, therefore, to avoid mortal sin each time that one fails actually to refer an action to G.o.d"s glory, it is enough to refer oneself and all that one has to G.o.d habitually. Now venial sin excludes only actual reference of the human act to G.o.d"s glory, and not habitual reference: because it does not exclude charity, which refers man to G.o.d habitually. Therefore it does not follow that he who sins venially, sins mortally.
Reply Obj. 3: He that sins venially, cleaves to temporal good, not as enjoying it, because he does not fix his end in it, but as using it, by referring it to G.o.d, not actually but habitually.
Reply Obj. 4: Mutable good is not considered to be a term in contraposition to the immutable good, unless one"s end is fixed therein: because what is referred to the end has not the character of finality.
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SECOND ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 88, Art. 2]
Whether Mortal and Venial Sin Differ Generically?
Objection 1: It would seem that venial and mortal sin do not differ generically, so that some sins be generically mortal, and some generically venial. Because human acts are considered to be generically good or evil according to their matter or object, as stated above (Q. 18, A. 2). Now either mortal or venial sin may be committed in regard to any object or matter: since man can love any mutable good, either less than G.o.d, which may be a venial sin, or more than G.o.d, which is a mortal sin. Therefore venial and mortal sin do not differ generically.
Obj. 2: Further, as stated above (A. 1; Q. 72, A. 5; Q. 87, A. 3), a sin is called mortal when it is irreparable, venial when it can be repaired. Now irreparability belongs to sin committed out of malice, which, according to some, is irremissible: whereas reparability belongs to sins committed through weakness or ignorance, which are remissible. Therefore mortal and venial sin differ as sin committed through malice differs from sin committed through weakness or ignorance. But, in this respect, sins differ not in genus but in cause, as stated above (Q. 77, A. 8, ad 1). Therefore venial and mortal sin do not differ generically.
Obj. 3: Further, it was stated above (Q. 74, A. 3, ad 3; A. 10) that sudden movements both of the sensuality and of the reason are venial sins. But sudden movements occur in every kind of sin. Therefore no sins are generically venial.
_On the contrary,_ Augustine, in a sermon on Purgatory (De Sanctis, serm. xli), enumerates certain generic venial sins, and certain generic mortal sins.
_I answer that,_ Venial sin is so called from _venia_ (pardon).