Because venial sin is equally distant from mortal, as mortal sin is from venial. But a venial sin can become mortal, as stated above (A.
5). Therefore also a mortal sin can become venial.
Obj. 2: Further, venial and mortal sin are said to differ in this, that he who sins mortally loves a creature more than G.o.d, while he who sins venially loves the creature less than G.o.d. Now it may happen that a person in committing a sin generically mortal, loves a creature less than G.o.d; for instance, if anyone being ignorant that simple fornication is a mortal sin, and contrary to the love of G.o.d, commits the sin of fornication, yet so as to be ready, for the love of G.o.d, to refrain from that sin if he knew that by committing it he was acting counter to the love of G.o.d. Therefore his will be a venial sin; and accordingly a mortal sin can become venial.
Obj. 3: Further, as stated above (A. 5, Obj. 3), good is more distant from evil, than venial from mortal sin. But an act which is evil in itself, can become good; thus to kill a man may be an act of justice, as when a judge condemns a thief to death. Much more therefore can a mortal sin become venial.
_On the contrary,_ An eternal thing can never become temporal. But mortal sin deserves eternal punishment, whereas venial sin deserves temporal punishment. Therefore a mortal sin can never become venial.
_I answer that,_ Venial and mortal differ as perfect and imperfect in the genus of sin, as stated above (A. 1, ad 1). Now the imperfect can become perfect, by some sort of addition: and, consequently, a venial sin can become mortal, by the addition of some deformity pertaining to the genus of mortal sin, as when a man utters an idle word for the purpose of fornication. On the other hand, the perfect cannot become imperfect, by addition; and so a mortal sin cannot become venial, by the addition of a deformity pertaining to the genus of venial sin, for the sin is not diminished if a man commit fornication in order to utter an idle word; rather is it aggravated by the additional deformity.
Nevertheless a sin which is generically mortal, can become venial by reason of the imperfection of the act, because then it does not completely fulfil the conditions of a moral act, since it is not a deliberate, but a sudden act, as is evident from what we have said above (A. 2). This happens by a kind of subtraction, namely, of deliberate reason. And since a moral act takes its species from deliberate reason, the result is that by such a subtraction the species of the act is destroyed.
Reply Obj. 1: Venial differs from mortal as imperfect from perfect, even as a boy differs from a man. But the boy becomes a man and not vice versa. Hence the argument does not prove.
Reply Obj. 2: If the ignorance be such as to excuse sin altogether, as the ignorance of a madman or an imbecile, then he that commits fornication in a state of such ignorance, commits no sin either mortal or venial. But if the ignorance be not invincible, then the ignorance itself is a sin, and contains within itself the lack of the love of G.o.d, in so far as a man neglects to learn those things whereby he can safeguard himself in the love of G.o.d.
Reply Obj. 3: As Augustine says (Contra Mendacium vii), "those things which are evil in themselves, cannot be well done for any good end." Now murder is the slaying of the innocent, and this can nowise be well done. But, as Augustine states (De Lib. Arb. i, 4, 5), the judge who sentences a thief to death, or the soldier who slays the enemy of the common weal, are not murderers.
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QUESTION 89
OF VENIAL SIN IN ITSELF (In Six Articles)
We must now consider venial sin in itself, and under this head there are six points of inquiry:
(1) Whether venial sin causes a stain in the soul?
(2) Of the different kinds of venial sin, as denoted by "wood,"
"hay," "stubble" (1 Cor. 3:12);
(3) Whether man could sin venially in the state of innocence?
(4) Whether a good or a wicked angel can sin venially?
(5) Whether the movements of unbelievers are venial sins?
(6) Whether venial sin can be in a man with original sin alone?
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FIRST ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 89, Art. 1]
Whether Venial Sin Causes a Stain on the Soul?
Objection 1: It would seem that venial sin causes a stain in the soul. For Augustine says (De Poenit.) [*Hom. 50, inter. L., 2], that if venial sins be multiplied, they destroy the beauty of our souls so as to deprive us of the embraces of our heavenly spouse. But the stain of sin is nothing else but the loss of the soul"s beauty.
Therefore venial sins cause a stain in the soul.
Obj. 2: Further, mortal sin causes a stain in the soul, on account of the inordinateness of the act and of the sinner"s affections. But, in venial sin, there is an inordinateness of the act and of the affections. Therefore venial sin causes a stain in the soul.
Obj. 3: Further, the stain on the soul is caused by contact with a temporal thing, through love thereof as stated above (Q. 86, A. 1).
But, in venial sin, the soul is in contact with a temporal thing through inordinate love. therefore, venial sin brings a stain on the soul.
_On the contrary,_ it is written, (Eph. 5:27): "That He might present it to Himself a glorious church, not having spot or wrinkle," on which the gloss says: "i.e., some grievous sin." Therefore it seems proper to mortal sin to cause a stain on the soul.
I answer that as stated above (Q. 86, A. 1), a stain denotes a loss of comeliness due to contact with something, as may be seen in corporeal matters, from which the term has been transferred to the soul, by way of similitude. Now, just as in the body there is a twofold comeliness, one resulting from the inward disposition of the members and colors, the other resulting from outward refulgence supervening, so too, in the soul, there is a twofold comeliness, one habitual and, so to speak, intrinsic, the other actual like an outward flash of light. Now venial sin is a hindrance to actual comeliness, but not to habitual comeliness, because it neither destroys nor diminishes the habit of charity and of the other virtues, as we shall show further on (II-II, Q. 24, A. 10; Q. 133, A.
1, ad 2), but only hinders their acts. On the other hand a stain denotes something permanent in the thing stained, wherefore it seems in the nature of a loss of habitual rather than of actual comeliness.
Therefore, properly speaking, venial sin does not cause a stain in the soul. If, however, we find it stated anywhere that it does induce a stain, this is in a restricted sense, in so far as it hinders the comeliness that results from acts of virtue.
Reply Obj. 1: Augustine is speaking of the case in which many venial sins lead to mortal sin dispositively: because otherwise they would not sever the soul from its heavenly spouse.
Reply Obj. 2: In mortal sin the inordinateness of the act destroys the habit of virtue, but not in venial sin.
Reply Obj. 3: In mortal sin the soul comes into contact with a temporal thing as its end, so that the shedding of the light of grace, which accrues to those who, by charity, cleave to G.o.d as their last end, is entirely cut off. _On the contrary,_ in venial sin, man does not cleave to a creature as his last end: hence there is no comparison.
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SECOND ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 89, Art. 2]
Whether Venial Sins Are Suitably Designated As "Wood, Hay, and Stubble"?
Objection 1: It would seem that venial sins are unsuitably designated as "wood, hay, and stubble." Because wood, hay, and stubble are said (1 Cor. 3:12) to be built on a spiritual foundation. Now venial sins are something outside a spiritual foundation, even as false opinions are outside the pale of science. Therefore, venial sins are not suitably designated as wood, hay, and stubble.
Obj. 2: Further, he who builds wood, hay, and stubble, "shall be saved yet so as by fire" (1 Cor. 3:15). But sometimes the man who commits a venial sin, will not be saved, even by fire, e.g. when a man dies in mortal sin to which venial sins are attached. Therefore, venial sins are unsuitably designated by wood, hay, and stubble.
Obj. 3: Further, according to the Apostle (1 Cor. 3:12) those who build "gold, silver, precious stones," i.e. love of G.o.d and our neighbor, and good works, are others from those who build wood, hay, and stubble. But those even who love G.o.d and their neighbor, and do good works, commit venial sins: for it is written (1 John 1:8): "If we say that we have no sin, we deceive ourselves." Therefore venial sins are not suitably designated by these three.
Obj. 4: Further, there are many more than three differences and degrees of venial sins. Therefore they are unsuitably comprised under these three.
_On the contrary,_ The Apostle says (1 Cor. 3:15) that the man who builds up wood, hay and stubble, "shall be saved yet so as by fire,"
so that he will suffer punishment, but not everlasting. Now the debt of temporal punishment belongs properly to venial sin, as stated above (Q. 87, A. 5). Therefore these three signify venial sins.
_I answer that,_ Some have understood the "foundation" to be dead faith, upon which some build good works, signified by gold, silver, and precious stones, while others build mortal sins, which according to them are designated by wood, hay and stubble. But Augustine disapproves of this explanation (De Fide et Oper. xv), because, as the Apostle says (Gal. 5:21), he who does the works of the flesh, "shall not obtain the kingdom of G.o.d," which signifies to be saved; whereas the Apostle says that he who builds wood, hay, and stubble "shall be saved yet so as by fire." Consequently wood, hay, stubble cannot be understood to denote mortal sins.
Others say that wood, hay, stubble designate good works, which are indeed built upon the spiritual edifice, but are mixed with venial sins: as, when a man is charged with the care of a family, which is a good thing, excessive love of his wife or of his children or of his possessions insinuates itself into his life, under G.o.d however, so that, to wit, for the sake of these things he would be unwilling to do anything in opposition to G.o.d. But neither does this seem to be reasonable. For it is evident that all good works are referred to the love of G.o.d, and one"s neighbor, wherefore they are designated by "gold," "silver," and "precious stones," and consequently not by "wood," "hay," and "stubble."
We must therefore say that the very venial sins that insinuate themselves into those who have a care for earthly things, are designated by wood, hay, and stubble. For just as these are stored in a house, without belonging to the substance of the house, and can be burnt, while the house is saved, so also venial sins are multiplied in a man, while the spiritual edifice remains, and for them, man suffers fire, either of temporal trials in this life, or of purgatory after this life, and yet he is saved for ever.
Reply Obj. 1: Venial sins are not said to be built upon the spiritual foundation, as though they were laid directly upon it, but because they are laid beside it; in the same sense as it is written (Ps.
136:1): "Upon the waters of Babylon," i.e. "beside the waters": because venial sins do not destroy the edifice.
Reply Obj. 2: It is not said that everyone who builds wood, hay and stubble, shall be saved as by fire, but only those who build "upon"
the "foundation." And this foundation is not dead faith, as some have esteemed, but faith quickened by charity, according to Eph. 3:17: "Rooted and founded in charity." Accordingly, he that dies in mortal sin with venial sins, has indeed wood, hay, and stubble, but not built upon the spiritual edifice; and consequently he will not be saved so as by fire.
Reply Obj. 3: Although those who are withdrawn from the care of temporal things, sin venially sometimes, yet they commit but slight venial sins, and in most cases they are cleansed by the fervor of charity: wherefore they do not build up venial sins, because these do not remain long in them. But the venial sins of those who are busy about earthly things remain longer, because they are unable to have such frequent recourse to the fervor of charity in order to remove them.
Reply Obj. 4: As the Philosopher says (De Coelo i, text. 2), "all things are comprised under three, the beginning, the middle, the end." Accordingly all degrees of venial sins are reduced to three, viz. to "wood," which remains longer in the fire; "stubble," which is burnt up at once; and "hay," which is between these two: because venial sins are removed by fire, quickly or slowly, according as man is more or less attached to them.
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THIRD ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 89, Art. 3]
Whether Man Could Commit a Venial Sin in the State of Innocence?