Reply Obj. 1: The Philosopher here takes "to live" to mean an operation of life. Or it would be better to say that sensation and intelligence and the like, are sometimes taken for the operations, sometimes for the existence itself of the operator. For he says (Ethic. ix, 9) that to live is to sense or to understand--in other words, to have a nature capable of sensation or understanding. Thus, then, he distinguishes life by the four operations mentioned. For in this lower world there are four kinds of living things. It is the nature of some to be capable of nothing more than taking nourishment, and, as a consequence, of growing and generating. Others are able, in addition, to sense, as we see in the case of sh.e.l.lfish and other animals without movement. Others have the further power of moving from place to place, as perfect animals, such as quadrupeds, and birds, and so on. Others, as man, have the still higher faculty of understanding.
Reply Obj. 2: By vital operations are meant those whose principles are within the operator, and in virtue of which the operator produces such operations of itself. It happens that there exist in men not merely such natural principles of certain operations as are their natural powers, but something over and above these, such as habits inclining them like a second nature to particular kinds of operations, so that the operations become sources of pleasure. Thus, as by a similitude, any kind of work in which a man takes delight, so that his bent is towards it, his time spent in it, and his whole life ordered with a view to it, is said to be the life of that man. Hence some are said to lead a life of self-indulgence, others a life of virtue. In this way the contemplative life is distinguished from the active, and thus to know G.o.d is said to be life eternal.
Wherefore the Reply to the Third Objection is clear.
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THIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 18, Art. 3]
Whether Life Is Properly Attributed to G.o.d?
Objection 1: It seems that life is not properly attributed to G.o.d.
For things are said to live inasmuch as they move themselves, as previously stated (A. 2). But movement does not belong to G.o.d.
Neither therefore does life.
Obj. 2: Further, in all living things we must needs suppose some principle of life. Hence it is said by the Philosopher (De Anima ii, 4) that "the soul is the cause and principle of the living body." But G.o.d has no principle. Therefore life cannot be attributed to Him.
Obj. 3: Further, the principle of life in the living things that exist among us is the vegetative soul. But this exists only in corporeal things. Therefore life cannot be attributed to incorporeal things.
_On the contrary,_ It is said (Ps. 83:3): "My heart and my flesh have rejoiced in the living G.o.d."
_I answer that,_ Life is in the highest degree properly in G.o.d. In proof of which it must be considered that since a thing is said to live in so far as it operates of itself and not as moved by another, the more perfectly this power is found in anything, the more perfect is the life of that thing. In things that move and are moved, a threefold order is found. In the first place, the end moves the agent: and the princ.i.p.al agent is that which acts through its form, and sometimes it does so through some instrument that acts by virtue not of its own form, but of the princ.i.p.al agent, and does no more than execute the action. Accordingly there are things that move themselves, not in respect of any form or end naturally inherent in them, but only in respect of the executing of the movement; the form by which they act, and the end of the action being alike determined for them by their nature. Of this kind are plants, which move themselves according to their inherent nature, with regard only to executing the movements of growth and decay.
Other things have self-movement in a higher degree, that is, not only with regard to executing the movement, but even as regards to the form, the principle of movement, which form they acquire of themselves. Of this kind are animals, in which the principle of movement is not a naturally implanted form; but one received through sense. Hence the more perfect is their sense, the more perfect is their power of self-movement. Such as have only the sense of touch, as sh.e.l.lfish, move only with the motion of expansion and contraction; and thus their movement hardly exceeds that of plants. Whereas such as have the sensitive power in perfection, so as to recognize not only connection and touch, but also objects apart from themselves, can move themselves to a distance by progressive movement. Yet although animals of the latter kind receive through sense the form that is the principle of their movement, nevertheless they cannot of themselves propose to themselves the end of their operation, or movement; for this has been implanted in them by nature; and by natural instinct they are moved to any action through the form apprehended by sense.
Hence such animals as move themselves in respect to an end they themselves propose are superior to these. This can only be done by reason and intellect; whose province it is to know the proportion between the end and the means to that end, and duly coordinate them.
Hence a more perfect degree of life is that of intelligent beings; for their power of self-movement is more perfect. This is shown by the fact that in one and the same man the intellectual faculty moves the sensitive powers; and these by their command move the organs of movement. Thus in the arts we see that the art of using a ship, i.e.
the art of navigation, rules the art of ship-designing; and this in its turn rules the art that is only concerned with preparing the material for the ship.
But although our intellect moves itself to some things, yet others are supplied by nature, as are first principles, which it cannot doubt; and the last end, which it cannot but will. Hence, although with respect to some things it moves itself, yet with regard to other things it must be moved by another. Wherefore that being whose act of understanding is its very nature, and which, in what it naturally possesses, is not determined by another, must have life in the most perfect degree. Such is G.o.d; and hence in Him princ.i.p.ally is life.
From this the Philosopher concludes (Metaph. xii, 51), after showing G.o.d to be intelligent, that G.o.d has life most perfect and eternal, since His intellect is most perfect and always in act.
Reply Obj. 1: As stated in _Metaph._ ix, 16, action is twofold. Actions of one kind pa.s.s out to external matter, as to heat or to cut; whilst actions of the other kind remain in the agent, as to understand, to sense and to will. The difference between them is this, that the former action is the perfection not of the agent that moves, but of the thing moved; whereas the latter action is the perfection of the agent. Hence, because movement is an act of the thing in movement, the latter action, in so far as it is the act of the operator, is called its movement, by this similitude, that as movement is an act of the thing moved, so an act of this kind is the act of the agent, although movement is an act of the imperfect, that is, of what is in potentiality; while this kind of act is an act of the perfect, that is to say, of what is in act as stated in _De Anima_ iii, 28. In the sense, therefore, in which understanding is movement, that which understands itself is said to move itself. It is in this sense that Plato also taught that G.o.d moves Himself; not in the sense in which movement is an act of the imperfect.
Reply Obj. 2: As G.o.d is His own very existence and understanding, so is He His own life; and therefore He so lives that He has no principle of life.
Reply Obj. 3: Life in this lower world is bestowed on a corruptible nature, that needs generation to preserve the species, and nourishment to preserve the individual. For this reason life is not found here below apart from a vegetative soul: but this does not hold good with incorruptible natures.
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FOURTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 18, Art. 4]
Whether All Things Are Life in G.o.d?
Objection 1: It seems that not all things are life in G.o.d. For it is said (Acts 17:28), "In Him we live, and move, and be." But not all things in G.o.d are movement. Therefore not all things are life in Him.
Obj. 2: Further, all things are in G.o.d as their first model. But things modelled ought to conform to the model. Since, then, not all things have life in themselves, it seems that not all things are life in G.o.d.
Obj. 3: Further, as Augustine says (De Vera Relig. 29), a living substance is better than a substance that does not live. If, therefore, things which in themselves have not life, are life in G.o.d, it seems that things exist more truly in G.o.d than themselves. But this appears to be false; since in themselves they exist actually, but in G.o.d potentially.
Obj. 4: Further, just as good things and things made in time are known by G.o.d, so are bad things, and things that G.o.d can make, but that never will be made. If, therefore, all things are life in G.o.d, inasmuch as known by Him, it seems that even bad things and things that will never be made are life in G.o.d, as known by Him, and this appears inadmissible.
_On the contrary,_ (John 1:3, 4), it is said, "What was made, in Him was life." But all things were made, except G.o.d. Therefore all things are life in G.o.d.
_I answer that,_ In G.o.d to live is to understand, as before stated (A. 3). In G.o.d intellect, the thing understood, and the act of understanding, are one and the same. Hence whatever is in G.o.d as understood is the very living or life of G.o.d. Now, wherefore, since all things that have been made by G.o.d are in Him as things understood, it follows that all things in Him are the divine life itself.
Reply Obj. 1: Creatures are said to be in G.o.d in a twofold sense. In one way, so far are they are held together and preserved by the divine power; even as we say that things that are in our power are in us. And creatures are thus said to be in G.o.d, even as they exist in their own natures. In this sense we must understand the words of the Apostle when he says, "In Him we live, move, and be"; since our being, living, and moving are themselves caused by G.o.d. In another sense things are said to be in G.o.d, as in Him who knows them, in which sense they are in G.o.d through their proper ideas, which in G.o.d are not distinct from the divine essence. Hence things as they are in G.o.d are the divine essence. And since the divine essence is life and not movement, it follows that things existing in G.o.d in this manner are not movement, but life.
Reply Obj. 2: The thing modelled must be like the model according to the form, not the mode of being. For sometimes the form has being of another kind in the model from that which it has in the thing modelled. Thus the form of a house has in the mind of the architect immaterial and intelligible being; but in the house that exists outside his mind, material and sensible being. Hence the ideas of things, though not existing in themselves, are life in the divine mind, as having a divine existence in that mind.
Reply Obj. 3: If form only, and not matter, belonged to natural things, then in all respects natural things would exist more truly in the divine mind, by the ideas of them, than in themselves. For which reason, in fact, Plato held that the _separate_ man was the true man; and that man as he exists in matter, is man only by partic.i.p.ation.
But since matter enters into the being of natural things, we must say that those things have simply being in the divine mind more truly than in themselves, because in that mind they have an uncreated being, but in themselves a created being: whereas this particular being, a man, or horse, for example, has this being more truly in its own nature than in the divine mind, because it belongs to human nature to be material, which, as existing in the divine mind, it is not. Even so a house has n.o.bler being in the architect"s mind than in matter; yet a material house is called a house more truly than the one which exists in the mind; since the former is actual, the latter only potential.
Reply Obj. 4: Although bad things are in G.o.d"s knowledge, as being comprised under that knowledge, yet they are not in G.o.d as created by Him, or preserved by Him, or as having their type in Him. They are known by G.o.d through the types of good things. Hence it cannot be said that bad things are life in G.o.d. Those things that are not in time may be called life in G.o.d in so far as life means understanding only, and inasmuch as they are understood by G.o.d; but not in so far as life implies a principle of operation.
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QUESTION 19
THE WILL OF G.o.d (In Twelve Articles)
After considering the things belonging to the divine knowledge, we consider what belongs to the divine will. The first consideration is about the divine will itself; the second about what belongs strictly to His will; the third about what belongs to the intellect in relation to His will. About His will itself there are twelve points of inquiry:
(1) Whether there is will in G.o.d?
(2) Whether G.o.d wills things apart from Himself?
(3) Whether whatever G.o.d wills, He wills necessarily?
(4) Whether the will of G.o.d is the cause of things?
(5) Whether any cause can be a.s.signed to the divine will?
(6) Whether the divine will is always fulfilled?
(7) Whether the will of G.o.d is mutable?
(8) Whether the will of G.o.d imposes necessity on the things willed?
(9) Whether there is in G.o.d the will of evil?
(10) Whether G.o.d has free will?
(11) Whether the will of expression is distinguished in G.o.d?
(12) Whether five expressions of will are rightly a.s.signed to the divine will?
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FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 19, Art. 1]
Whether There Is Will in G.o.d?