(9) Whether the mode of observing a virtue comes under the precept of the Law?
(10) Whether the mode of charity comes under the precept?
(11) The distinction of other moral precepts;
(12) Whether the moral precepts of the Old Law justified man?
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FIRST ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 100, Art. 1]
Whether All the Moral Precepts of the Old Law Belong to the Law of Nature?
Objection 1: It would seem that not all the moral precepts belong to the law of nature. For it is written (Ecclus. 17:9): "Moreover He gave them instructions, and the law of life for an inheritance." But instruction is in contradistinction to the law of nature; since the law of nature is not learnt, but instilled by natural instinct.
Therefore not all the moral precepts belong to the natural law.
Obj. 2: Further, the Divine law is more perfect than human law. But human law adds certain things concerning good morals, to those that belong to the law of nature: as is evidenced by the fact that the natural law is the same in all men, while these moral inst.i.tutions are various for various people. Much more reason therefore was there why the Divine law should add to the law of nature, ordinances pertaining to good morals.
Obj. 3: Further, just as natural reason leads to good morals in certain matters, so does faith: hence it is written (Gal. 5:6) that faith "worketh by charity." But faith is not included in the law of nature; since that which is of faith is above nature. Therefore not all the moral precepts of the Divine law belong to the law of nature.
_On the contrary,_ The Apostle says (Rom. 2:14) that "the Gentiles, who have not the Law, do by nature those things that are of the Law": which must be understood of things pertaining to good morals.
Therefore all the moral precepts of the Law belong to the law of nature.
_I answer that,_ The moral precepts, distinct from the ceremonial and judicial precepts, are about things pertaining of their very nature to good morals. Now since human morals depend on their relation to reason, which is the proper principle of human acts, those morals are called good which accord with reason, and those are called bad which are discordant from reason. And as every judgment of speculative reason proceeds from the natural knowledge of first principles, so every judgment of practical reason proceeds from principles known naturally, as stated above (Q. 94, AA. 2, 4): from which principles one may proceed in various ways to judge of various matters. For some matters connected with human actions are so evident, that after very little consideration one is able at once to approve or disapprove of them by means of these general first principles: while some matters cannot be the subject of judgment without much consideration of the various circ.u.mstances, which all are not competent to do carefully, but only those who are wise: just as it is not possible for all to consider the particular conclusions of sciences, but only for those who are versed in philosophy: and lastly there are some matters of which man cannot judge unless he be helped by Divine instruction; such as the articles of faith.
It is therefore evident that since the moral precepts are about matters which concern good morals; and since good morals are those which are in accord with reason; and since also every judgment of human reason must needs by derived in some way from natural reason; it follows, of necessity, that all the moral precepts belong to the law of nature; but not all in the same way. For there are certain things which the natural reason of every man, of its own accord and at once, judges to be done or not to be done: e.g. "Honor thy father and thy mother," and "Thou shalt not kill," "Thou shalt not steal": and these belong to the law of nature absolutely. And there are certain things which, after a more careful consideration, wise men deem obligatory. Such belong to the law of nature, yet so that they need to be inculcated, the wiser teaching the less wise: e.g. "Rise up before the h.o.a.ry head, and honor the person of the aged man," and the like. And there are some things, to judge of which, human reason needs Divine instruction, whereby we are taught about the things of G.o.d: e.g. "Thou shalt not make to thyself a graven thing, nor the likeness of anything"; "Thou shalt not take the name of the Lord thy G.o.d in vain."
This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.
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SECOND ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 100, Art. 2]
Whether the Moral Precepts of the Law Are About All the Acts of Virtue?
Objection 1: It would seem that the moral precepts of the Law are not about all the acts of virtue. For observance of the precepts of the Old Law is called justification, according to Ps. 118:8: "I will keep Thy justifications." But justification is the execution of justice.
Therefore the moral precepts are only about acts of justice.
Obj. 2: Further, that which comes under a precept has the character of a duty. But the character of duty belongs to justice alone and to none of the other virtues, for the proper act of justice consists in rendering to each one his due. Therefore the precepts of the moral law are not about the acts of the other virtues, but only about the acts of justice.
Obj. 3: Further, every law is made for the common good, as Isidore says (Etym. v, 21). But of all the virtues justice alone regards the common good, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 1). Therefore the moral precepts are only about the acts of justice.
_On the contrary,_ Ambrose says (De Paradiso viii) that "a sin is a transgression of the Divine law, and a disobedience to the commandments of heaven." But there are sins contrary to all the acts of virtue. Therefore it belongs to Divine law to direct all the acts of virtue.
_I answer that,_ Since the precepts of the Law are ordained to the common good, as stated above (Q. 90, A. 2), the precepts of the Law must needs be diversified according to the various kinds of community: hence the Philosopher (Polit. iv, 1) teaches that the laws which are made in a state which is ruled by a king must be different from the laws of a state which is ruled by the people, or by a few powerful men in the state. Now human law is ordained for one kind of community, and the Divine law for another kind. Because human law is ordained for the civil community, implying mutual duties of man and his fellows: and men are ordained to one another by outward acts, whereby men live in communion with one another. This life in common of man with man pertains to justice, whose proper function consists in directing the human community. Wherefore human law makes precepts only about acts of justice; and if it commands acts of other virtues, this is only in so far as they a.s.sume the nature of justice, as the Philosopher explains (Ethic. v, 1).
But the community for which the Divine law is ordained, is that of men in relation to G.o.d, either in this life or in the life to come.
And therefore the Divine law proposes precepts about all those matters whereby men are well ordered in their relations to G.o.d. Now man is united to G.o.d by his reason or mind, in which is G.o.d"s image.
Wherefore the Divine law proposes precepts about all those matters whereby human reason is well ordered. But this is effected by the acts of all the virtues: since the intellectual virtues set in good order the acts of the reason in themselves: while the moral virtues set in good order the acts of the reason in reference to the interior pa.s.sions and exterior actions. It is therefore evident that the Divine law fittingly proposes precepts about the acts of all the virtues: yet so that certain matters, without which the order of virtue, which is the order of reason, cannot even exist, come under an obligation of precept; while other matters, which pertain to the well-being of perfect virtue, come under an admonition of counsel.
Reply Obj. 1: The fulfilment of the commandments of the Law, even of those which are about the acts of the other virtues, has the character of justification, inasmuch as it is just that man should obey G.o.d: or again, inasmuch as it is just that all that belongs to man should be subject to reason.
Reply Obj. 2: Justice properly so called regards the duty of one man to another: but all the other virtues regard the duty of the lower powers to reason. It is in relation to this latter duty that the Philosopher speaks (Ethic. v, 11) of a kind of metaphorical justice.
The Reply to the Third Objection is clear from what has been said about the different kinds of community.
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THIRD ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 100, Art. 3]
Whether All the Moral Precepts of the Old Law Are Reducible to the Ten Precepts of the Decalogue?
Objection 1: It would seem that not all the moral precepts of the Old Law are reducible to the ten precepts of the decalogue. For the first and princ.i.p.al precepts of the Law are, "Thou shalt love the Lord thy G.o.d," and "Thou shalt love thy neighbor," as stated in Matt. 22:37, 39. But these two are not contained in the precepts of the decalogue.
Therefore not all the moral precepts are contained in the precepts of the decalogue.
Obj. 2: Further, the moral precepts are not reducible to the ceremonial precepts, but rather vice versa. But among the precepts of the decalogue, one is ceremonial, viz. "Remember that thou keep holy the Sabbath-day." Therefore the moral precepts are not reducible to all the precepts of the decalogue.
Obj. 3: Further, the moral precepts are about all the acts of virtue.
But among the precepts of the decalogue are only such as regard acts of justice; as may be seen by going through them all. Therefore the precepts of the decalogue do not include all the moral precepts.
_On the contrary,_ The gloss on Matt. 5:11: "Blessed are ye when they shall revile you," etc. says that "Moses, after propounding the ten precepts, set them out in detail." Therefore all the precepts of the Law are so many parts of the precepts of the decalogue.
_I answer that,_ The precepts of the decalogue differ from the other precepts of the Law, in the fact that G.o.d Himself is said to have given the precepts of the decalogue; whereas He gave the other precepts to the people through Moses. Wherefore the decalogue includes those precepts the knowledge of which man has immediately from G.o.d. Such are those which with but slight reflection can be gathered at once from the first general principles: and those also which become known to man immediately through divinely infused faith.
Consequently two kinds of precepts are not reckoned among the precepts of the decalogue: viz. first general principles, for they need no further promulgation after being once imprinted on the natural reason to which they are self-evident; as, for instance, that one should do evil to no man, and other similar principles: and again those which the careful reflection of wise men shows to be in accord with reason; since the people receive these principles from G.o.d, through being taught by wise men. Nevertheless both kinds of precepts are contained in the precepts of the decalogue; yet in different ways. For the first general principles are contained in them, as principles in their proximate conclusions; while those which are known through wise men are contained, conversely, as conclusions in their principles.
Reply Obj. 1: Those two principles are the first general principles of the natural law, and are self-evident to human reason, either through nature or through faith. Wherefore all the precepts of the decalogue are referred to these, as conclusions to general principles.
Reply Obj. 2: The precept of the Sabbath observance is moral in one respect, in so far as it commands man to give some time to the things of G.o.d, according to Ps. 45:11: "Be still and see that I am G.o.d." In this respect it is placed among the precepts of the decalogue: but not as to the fixing of the time, in which respect it is a ceremonial precept.
Reply Obj. 3: The notion of duty is not so patent in the other virtues as it is in justice. Hence the precepts about the acts of the other virtues are not so well known to the people as are the precepts about acts of justice. Wherefore the acts of justice especially come under the precepts of the decalogue, which are the primary elements of the Law.
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FOURTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 100, Art. 4]
Whether the Precepts of the Decalogue Are Suitably Distinguished from One Another?
Objection 1: It would seem that the precepts of the decalogue are unsuitably distinguished from one another. For worship is a virtue distinct from faith. Now the precepts are about acts of virtue. But that which is said at the beginning of the decalogue, "Thou shalt not have strange G.o.ds before Me," belongs to faith: and that which is added, "Thou shalt not make ... any graven thing," etc. belongs to worship. Therefore these are not one precept, as Augustine a.s.serts (Qq. in Exod. qu. lxxi), but two.
Obj. 2: Further, the affirmative precepts in the Law are distinct from the negative precepts; e.g. "Honor thy father and thy mother,"
and, "Thou shalt not kill." But this, "I am the Lord thy G.o.d," is affirmative: and that which follows, "Thou shalt not have strange G.o.ds before Me," is negative. Therefore these are two precepts, and do not, as Augustine says (Qq. in Exod. qu. lxxi), make one.
Obj. 3: Further, the Apostle says (Rom. 7:7): "I had not known concupiscence, if the Law did not say: "Thou shalt not covet."" Hence it seems that this precept, "Thou shalt not covet," is one precept; and, therefore, should not be divided into two.
_On the contrary,_ stands the authority of Augustine who, in commenting on Exodus (Qq. in Exod. qu. lxxi) distinguishes three precepts as referring to G.o.d, and seven as referring to our neighbor.
_I answer that,_ The precepts of the decalogue are differently divided by different authorities. For Hesychius commenting on Lev.
26:26, "Ten women shall bake your bread in one oven," says that the precept of the Sabbath-day observance is not one of the ten precepts, because its observance, in the letter, is not binding for all time.
But he distinguishes four precepts pertaining to G.o.d, the first being, "I am the Lord thy G.o.d"; the second, "Thou shalt not have strange G.o.ds before Me," (thus also Jerome distinguishes these two precepts, in his commentary on Osee 10:10, "On thy" [Vulg.: "their"]
"two iniquities"); the third precept according to him is, "Thou shalt not make to thyself any graven thing"; and the fourth, "Thou shalt not take the name of the Lord thy G.o.d in vain." He states that there are six precepts pertaining to our neighbor; the first, "Honor thy father and thy mother"; the second, "Thou shalt not kill"; the third, "Thou shalt not commit adultery"; the fourth, "Thou shalt not steal"; the fifth, "Thou shalt not bear false witness"; the sixth, "Thou shalt not covet."
But, in the first place, it seems unbecoming for the precept of the Sabbath-day observance to be put among the precepts of the decalogue, if it nowise belonged to the decalogue. Secondly, because, since it is written (Matt. 6:24), "No man can serve two masters," the two statements, "I am the Lord thy G.o.d," and, "Thou shalt not have strange G.o.ds before Me" seem to be of the same nature and to form one precept. Hence Origen (Hom. viii in Exod.) who also distinguishes four precepts as referring to G.o.d, unites these two under one precept; and reckons in the second place, "Thou shalt not make ...