(2) Whether the cause of the ceremonial precepts was literal or figurative?
(3) The causes of the sacrifices;
(4) The causes of the sacrifices;
(5) The causes of the sacred things;
(6) The causes of the observances.
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FIRST ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 102, Art. 1]
Whether There Was Any Cause for the Ceremonial Precepts?
Objection 1: It would seem that there was no cause for the ceremonial precepts. Because on Eph. 2:15, "Making void the law of the commandments," the gloss says, (i.e.) "making void the Old Law as to the carnal observances, by subst.i.tuting decrees, i.e. evangelical precepts, which are based on reason." But if the observances of the Old Law were based on reason, it would have been useless to void them by the reasonable decrees of the New Law. Therefore there was no reason for the ceremonial observances of the Old Law.
Obj. 2: Further, the Old Law succeeded the law of nature. But in the law of nature there was a precept for which there was no reason save that man"s obedience might be tested; as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit.
viii, 6, 13), concerning the prohibition about the tree of life.
Therefore in the Old Law there should have been some precepts for the purpose of testing man"s obedience, having no reason in themselves.
Obj. 3: Further, man"s works are called moral according as they proceed from reason. If therefore there is any reason for the ceremonial precepts, they would not differ from the moral precepts.
It seems therefore that there was no cause for the ceremonial precepts: for the reason of a precept is taken from some cause.
_On the contrary,_ It is written (Ps. 18:9): "The commandment of the Lord is lightsome, enlightening the eyes." But the ceremonial precepts are commandments of G.o.d. Therefore they are lightsome: and yet they would not be so, if they had no reasonable cause. Therefore the ceremonial precepts have a reasonable cause.
_I answer that,_ Since, according to the Philosopher (Metaph. i, 2), it is the function of a "wise man to do everything in order," those things which proceed from the Divine wisdom must needs be well ordered, as the Apostle states (Rom. 13:1). Now there are two conditions required for things to be well ordered. First, that they be ordained to their due end, which is the principle of the whole order in matters of action: since those things that happen by chance outside the intention of the end, or which are not done seriously but for fun, are said to be inordinate. Secondly, that which is done in view of the end should be proportionate to the end. From this it follows that the reason for whatever conduces to the end is taken from the end: thus the reason for the disposition of a saw is taken from cutting, which is its end, as stated in _Phys._ ii, 9. Now it is evident that the ceremonial precepts, like all the other precepts of the Law, were inst.i.tutions of Divine wisdom: hence it is written (Deut. 4:6): "This is your wisdom and understanding in the sight of nations." Consequently we must needs say that the ceremonial precepts were ordained to a certain end, wherefrom their reasonable causes can be gathered.
Reply Obj. 1: It may be said there was no reason for the observances of the Old Law, in the sense that there was no reason in the very nature of the thing done: for instance that a garment should not be made of wool and linen. But there could be a reason for them in relation to something else: namely, in so far as something was signified or excluded thereby. On the other hand, the decrees of the New Law, which refer chiefly to faith and the love of G.o.d, are reasonable from the very nature of the act.
Reply Obj. 2: The reason for the prohibition concerning the tree of knowledge of good and evil was not that this tree was naturally evil: and yet this prohibition was reasonable in its relation to something else, in as much as it signified something. And so also the ceremonial precepts of the Old Law were reasonable on account of their relation to something else.
Reply Obj. 3: The moral precepts in their very nature have reasonable causes: as for instance, "Thou shalt not kill," "Thou shalt not steal." But the ceremonial precepts have a reasonable cause in their relation to something else, as stated above.
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SECOND ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 102, Art. 2]
Whether the Ceremonial Precepts Have a Literal Cause or Merely a Figurative Cause?
Objection 1: It would seem that the ceremonial precepts have not a literal, but merely a figurative cause. For among the ceremonial precepts, the chief was circ.u.mcision and the sacrifice of the paschal lamb. But neither of these had any but a figurative cause: because each was given as a sign. For it is written (Gen. 17:11): "You shall circ.u.mcise the flesh of your foreskin, that it may be a sign of the covenant between Me and you": and of the celebration of the Pa.s.sover it is written (Ex. 13:9): "It shall be as a sign in thy hand, and as a memorial before thy eyes." Therefore much more did the other ceremonial precepts have none but a figurative reason.
Obj. 2: Further, an effect is proportionate to its cause. But all the ceremonial precepts are figurative, as stated above (Q. 101, A. 2).
Therefore they have no other than a figurative cause.
Obj. 3: Further, if it be a matter of indifference whether a certain thing, considered in itself, be done in a particular way or not, it seems that it has not a literal cause. Now there are certain points in the ceremonial precepts, which appear to be a matter of indifference, as to whether they be done in one way or in another: for instance, the number of animals to be offered, and other such particular circ.u.mstances. Therefore there is no literal cause for the precepts of the Old Law.
_On the contrary,_ Just as the ceremonial precepts foreshadowed Christ, so did the stories of the Old Testament: for it is written (1 Cor. 10:11) that "all (these things) happened to them in figure." Now in the stories of the Old Testament, besides the mystical or figurative, there is the literal sense. Therefore the ceremonial precepts had also literal, besides their figurative causes.
_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1), the reason for whatever conduces to an end must be taken from that end. Now the end of the ceremonial precepts was twofold: for they were ordained to the Divine worship, for that particular time, and to the foreshadowing of Christ; just as the words of the prophets regarded the time being in such a way as to be utterances figurative of the time to come, as Jerome says on Osee 1:3. Accordingly the reasons for the ceremonial precepts of the Old Law can be taken in two ways. First, in respect of the Divine worship which was to be observed for that particular time: and these reasons are literal: whether they refer to the shunning of idolatry; or recall certain Divine benefits; or remind men of the Divine excellence; or point out the disposition of mind which was then required in those who worshipped G.o.d. Secondly, their reasons can be gathered from the point of view of their being ordained to foreshadow Christ: and thus their reasons are figurative and mystical: whether they be taken from Christ Himself and the Church, which pertains to the allegorical sense; or to the morals of the Christian people, which pertains to the moral sense; or to the state of future glory, in as much as we are brought thereto by Christ, which refers to the anagogical sense.
Reply Obj. 1: Just as the use of metaphorical expressions in Scripture belongs to the literal sense, because the words are employed in order to convey that particular meaning; so also the meaning of those legal ceremonies which commemorated certain Divine benefits, on account of which they were inst.i.tuted, and of others similar which belonged to that time, does not go beyond the order of literal causes. Consequently when we a.s.sert that the cause of the celebration of the Pa.s.sover was its signification of the delivery from Egypt, or that circ.u.mcision was a sign of G.o.d"s covenant with Abraham, we a.s.sign the literal cause.
Reply Obj. 2: This argument would avail if the ceremonial precepts had been given merely as figures of things to come, and not for the purpose of worshipping G.o.d then and there.
Reply Obj. 3: As we have stated when speaking of human laws (Q. 96, AA. 1, 6), there is a reason for them in the abstract, but not in regard to particular conditions, which depend on the judgment of those who frame them; so also many particular determinations in the ceremonies of the Old Law have no literal cause, but only a figurative cause; whereas in the abstract they have a literal cause.
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THIRD ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 102, Art. 3]
Whether a Suitable Cause Can Be a.s.signed for the Ceremonies Which Pertained to Sacrifices?
Objection 1: It would seem that no suitable cause can be a.s.signed for the ceremonies pertaining to sacrifices. For those things which were offered in sacrifice, are those which are necessary for sustaining human life: such as certain animals and certain loaves. But G.o.d needs no such sustenance; according to Ps. 49:13: "Shall I eat the flesh of bullocks? Or shall I drink the blood of goats?" Therefore such sacrifices were unfittingly offered to G.o.d.
Obj. 2: Further, only three kinds of quadrupeds were offered in sacrifice to G.o.d, viz. oxen, sheep and goats; of birds, generally the turtledove and the dove; but specially, in the cleansing of a leper, an offering was made of sparrows. Now many other animals are more n.o.ble than these. Since therefore whatever is best should be offered to G.o.d, it seems that not only of these three should sacrifices have been offered to Him.
Obj. 3: Further, just as man has received from G.o.d the dominion over birds and beasts, so also has he received dominion over fishes.
Consequently it was unfitting for fishes to be excluded from the divine sacrifices.
Obj. 4: Further, turtledoves and doves indifferently are commanded to be offered up. Since then the young of the dove are commanded to be offered, so also should the young of the turtledove.
Obj. 5: Further, G.o.d is the Author of life, not only of men, but also of animals, as is clear from Gen. 1:20, seqq. Now death is opposed to life. Therefore it was fitting that living animals rather than slain animals should be offered to G.o.d, especially as the Apostle admonishes us (Rom. 12:1), to present our bodies "a living sacrifice, holy, pleasing unto G.o.d."
Obj. 6: Further, if none but slain animals were offered in sacrifice to G.o.d, it seems that it mattered not how they were slain. Therefore it was unfitting that the manner of immolation should be determined, especially as regards birds (Lev. 1:15, seqq.).
Obj. 7: Further, every defect in an animal is a step towards corruption and death. If therefore slain animals were offered to G.o.d, it was unreasonable to forbid the offering of an imperfect animal, e.g. a lame, or a blind, or otherwise defective animal.
Obj. 8: Further, those who offer victims to G.o.d should partake thereof, according to the words of the Apostle (1 Cor. 10:18): "Are not they that eat of the sacrifices partakers of the altar?" It was therefore unbecoming for the offerers to be denied certain parts of the victims, namely, the blood, the fat, the breastbone and the right shoulder.
Objection 9: Further, just as holocausts were offered up in honor of G.o.d, so also were the peace-offerings and sin-offerings. But no female animals was offered up to G.o.d as a holocaust, although holocausts were offered of both quadrupeds and birds. Therefore it was inconsistent that female animals should be offered up in peace-offerings and sin-offerings, and that nevertheless birds should not be offered up in peace-offerings.
Objection 10: Further, all the peace-offerings seem to be of one kind. Therefore it was unfitting to make a distinction among them, so that it was forbidden to eat the flesh of certain peace-offerings on the following day, while it was allowed to eat the flesh of other peace-offerings, as laid down in Lev. 7:15, seqq.
Objection 11: Further, all sins agree in turning us from G.o.d.
Therefore, in order to reconcile us to G.o.d, one kind of sacrifice should have been offered up for all sins.
Objection 12: Further, all animals that were offered up in sacrifice, were offered up in one way, viz. slain. Therefore it does not seem to be suitable that products of the soil should be offered up in various ways; for sometimes an offering was made of ears of corn, sometimes of flour, sometimes of bread, this being baked sometimes in an oven, sometimes in a pan, sometimes on a gridiron.
Objection 13: Further, whatever things are serviceable to us should be recognized as coming from G.o.d. It was therefore unbecoming that besides animals, nothing but bread, wine, oil, incense, and salt should be offered to G.o.d.
Objection 14: Further, bodily sacrifices denote the inward sacrifice of the heart, whereby man offers his soul to G.o.d. But in the inward sacrifice, the sweetness, which is denoted by honey, surpa.s.ses the pungency which salt represents; for it is written (Ecclus. 24:27): "My spirit is sweet above honey." Therefore it was unbecoming that the use of honey, and of leaven which makes bread savory, should be forbidden in a sacrifice; while the use was prescribed, of salt which is pungent, and of incense which has a bitter taste. Consequently it seems that things pertaining to the ceremonies of the sacrifices have no reasonable cause.
_On the contrary,_ It is written (Lev. 1:13): "The priest shall offer it all and burn it all upon the altar, for a holocaust, and most sweet savor to the Lord." Now according to Wis. 7:28, "G.o.d loveth none but him that dwelleth with wisdom": whence it seems to follow that whatever is acceptable to G.o.d is wisely done. Therefore these ceremonies of the sacrifices were wisely done, as having reasonable causes.
_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 2), the ceremonies of the Old Law had a twofold cause, viz. a literal cause, according as they were intended for Divine worship; and a figurative or mystical cause, according as they were intended to foreshadow Christ: and on either hand the ceremonies pertaining to the sacrifices can be a.s.signed to a fitting cause.
For, according as the ceremonies of the sacrifices were intended for the divine worship, the causes of the sacrifices can be taken in two ways. First, in so far as the sacrifice represented the directing of the mind to G.o.d, to which the offerer of the sacrifice was stimulated. Now in order to direct his mind to G.o.d aright, man must recognize that whatever he has is from G.o.d as from its first principle, and direct it to G.o.d as its last end. This was denoted in the offerings and sacrifices, by the fact that man offered some of his own belongings in honor of G.o.d, as though in recognition of his having received them from G.o.d, according to the saying of David (1 Paral. xxix, 14): "All things are Thine: and we have given Thee what we received of Thy hand." Wherefore in offering up sacrifices man made protestation that G.o.d is the first principle of the creation of all things, and their last end, to which all things must be directed.
And since, for the human mind to be directed to G.o.d aright, it must recognize no first author of things other than G.o.d, nor place its end in any other; for this reason it was forbidden in the Law to offer sacrifice to any other but G.o.d, according to Ex. 22:20: "He that sacrificeth to G.o.ds, shall be put to death, save only to the Lord."
Wherefore another reasonable cause may be a.s.signed to the ceremonies of the sacrifices, from the fact that thereby men were withdrawn from offering sacrifices to idols. Hence too it is that the precepts about the sacrifices were not given to the Jewish people until after they had fallen into idolatry, by worshipping the molten calf: as though those sacrifices were inst.i.tuted, that the people, being ready to offer sacrifices, might offer those sacrifices to G.o.d rather than to idols. Thus it is written (Jer. 7:22): "I spake not to your fathers and I commanded them not, in the day that I brought them out of the land of Egypt, concerning the matter of burnt-offerings and sacrifices."