But since it seems unbecoming that the apostles, in order to avoid scandal, should have hidden things pertaining to the truth of life and doctrine, and that they should have made use of pretense, in things pertaining to the salvation of the faithful; therefore Augustine (Epist. lx.x.xii) more fittingly distinguished three periods of time. One was the time that preceded the Pa.s.sion of Christ, during which the legal ceremonies were neither deadly nor dead: another period was after the publication of the Gospel, during which the legal ceremonies are both dead and deadly. The third is a middle period, viz. from the Pa.s.sion of Christ until the publication of the Gospel, during which the legal ceremonies were dead indeed, because they had neither effect nor binding force; but were not deadly, because it was lawful for the Jewish converts to Christianity to observe them, provided they did not put their trust in them so as to hold them to be necessary unto salvation, as though faith in Christ could not justify without the legal observances. On the other hand, there was no reason why those who were converted from heathendom to Christianity should observe them. Hence Paul circ.u.mcised Timothy, who was born of a Jewish mother; but was unwilling to circ.u.mcise t.i.tus, who was of heathen nationality.
The reason why the Holy Ghost did not wish the converted Jews to be debarred at once from observing the legal ceremonies, while converted heathens were forbidden to observe the rites of heathendom, was in order to show that there is a difference between these rites. For heathenish ceremonial was rejected as absolutely unlawful, and as prohibited by G.o.d for all time; whereas the legal ceremonial ceased as being fulfilled through Christ"s Pa.s.sion, being inst.i.tuted by G.o.d as a figure of Christ.
Reply Obj. 2: According to Jerome, Peter withdrew himself from the Gentiles by pretense, in order to avoid giving scandal to the Jews, of whom he was the Apostle. Hence he did not sin at all in acting thus. On the other hand, Paul in like manner made a pretense of blaming him, in order to avoid scandalizing the Gentiles, whose Apostle he was. But Augustine disapproves of this solution: because in the canonical Scripture (viz. Gal. 2:11), wherein we must not hold anything to be false, Paul says that Peter "was to be blamed."
Consequently it is true that Peter was at fault: and Paul blamed him in very truth and not with pretense. Peter, however, did not sin, by observing the legal ceremonial for the time being; because this was lawful for him who was a converted Jew. But he did sin by excessive minuteness in the observance of the legal rites lest he should scandalize the Jews, the result being that he gave scandal to the Gentiles.
Reply Obj. 3: Some have held that this prohibition of the apostles is not to be taken literally, but spiritually: namely, that the prohibition of blood signifies the prohibition of murder; the prohibition of things strangled, that of violence and rapine; the prohibition of things offered to idols, that of idolatry; while fornication is forbidden as being evil in itself: which opinion they gathered from certain glosses, which expound these prohibitions in a mystical sense. Since, however, murder and rapine were held to be unlawful even by the Gentiles, there would have been no need to give this special commandment to those who were converted to Christ from heathendom. Hence others maintain that those foods were forbidden literally, not to prevent the observance of legal ceremonies, but in order to prevent gluttony. Thus Jerome says on Ezech. 44:31 ("The priest shall not eat of anything that is dead"): "He condemns those priests who from gluttony did not keep these precepts."
But since certain foods are more delicate than these and more conducive to gluttony, there seems no reason why these should have been forbidden more than the others.
We must therefore follow the third opinion, and hold that these foods were forbidden literally, not with the purpose of enforcing compliance with the legal ceremonies, but in order to further the union of Gentiles and Jews living side by side. Because blood and things strangled were loathsome to the Jews by ancient custom; while the Jews might have suspected the Gentiles of relapse into idolatry if the latter had partaken of things offered to idols. Hence these things were prohibited for the time being, during which the Gentiles and Jews were to become united together. But as time went on, with the lapse of the cause, the effect lapsed also, when the truth of the Gospel teaching was divulged, wherein Our Lord taught that "not that which entereth into the mouth defileth a man" (Matt. 15:11); and that "nothing is to be rejected that is received with thanksgiving" (1 Tim. 4:4). With regard to fornication a special prohibition was made, because the Gentiles did not hold it to be sinful.
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QUESTION 104
OF THE JUDICIAL PRECEPTS (In Four Articles)
We must now consider the judicial precepts: and first of all we shall consider them in general; in the second place we shall consider their reasons. Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) What is meant by the judicial precepts?
(2) Whether they are figurative?
(3) Their duration;
(4) Their division.
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FIRST ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 104, Art. 1]
Whether the Judicial Precepts Were Those Which Directed Man in Relation to His Neighbor?
Objection 1: It would seem that the judicial precepts were not those which directed man in his relations to his neighbor. For judicial precepts take their name from _judgment._ But there are many things that direct man as to his neighbor, which are not subordinate to judgment. Therefore the judicial precepts were not those which directed man in his relations to his neighbor.
Obj. 2: Further, the judicial precepts are distinct from the moral precepts, as stated above (Q. 99, A. 4). But there are many moral precepts which direct man as to his neighbor: as is evidently the case with the seven precepts of the second table. Therefore the judicial precepts are not so called from directing man as to his neighbor.
Obj. 3: Further, as the ceremonial precepts relate to G.o.d, so do the judicial precepts relate to one"s neighbor, as stated above (Q. 99, A. 4; Q. 101, A. 1). But among the ceremonial precepts there are some which concern man himself, such as observances in matter of food and apparel, of which we have already spoken (Q. 102, A. 6, ad 1, 6).
Therefore the judicial precepts are not so called from directing man as to his neighbor.
_On the contrary,_ It is reckoned (Ezech. 18:8) among other works of a good and just man, that "he hath executed true judgment between man and man." But judicial precepts are so called from "judgment."
Therefore it seems that the judicial precepts were those which directed the relations between man and man.
_I answer that,_ As is evident from what we have stated above (Q. 95, A. 2; Q. 99, A. 4), in every law, some precepts derive their binding force from the dictate of reason itself, because natural reason dictates that something ought to be done or to be avoided. These are called "moral" precepts: since human morals are based on reason. At the same time there are other precepts which derive their binding force, not from the very dictate of reason (because, considered in themselves, they do not imply an obligation of something due or undue); but from some inst.i.tution, Divine or human: and such are certain determinations of the moral precepts. When therefore the moral precepts are fixed by Divine inst.i.tution in matters relating to man"s subordination to G.o.d, they are called "ceremonial" precepts: but when they refer to man"s relations to other men, they are called "judicial" precepts. Hence there are two conditions attached to the judicial precepts: viz. first, that they refer to man"s relations to other men; secondly, that they derive their binding force not from reason alone, but in virtue of their inst.i.tution.
Reply Obj. 1: Judgments emanate through the official p.r.o.nouncement of certain men who are at the head of affairs, and in whom the judicial power is vested. Now it belongs to those who are at the head of affairs to regulate not only litigious matters, but also voluntary contracts which are concluded between man and man, and whatever matters concern the community at large and the government thereof.
Consequently the judicial precepts are not only those which concern actions at law; but also all those that are directed to the ordering of one man in relation to another, which ordering is subject to the direction of the sovereign as supreme judge.
Reply Obj. 2: This argument holds in respect of those precepts which direct man in his relations to his neighbor, and derive their binding force from the mere dictate of reason.
Reply Obj. 3: Even in those precepts which direct us to G.o.d, some are moral precepts, which the reason itself dictates when it is quickened by faith; such as that G.o.d is to be loved and worshipped. There are also ceremonial precepts, which have no binding force except in virtue of their Divine inst.i.tution. Now G.o.d is concerned not only with the sacrifices that are offered to Him, but also with whatever relates to the fitness of those who offer sacrifices to Him and worship Him. Because men are ordained to G.o.d as to their end; wherefore it concerns G.o.d and, consequently, is a matter of ceremonial precept, that man should show some fitness for the divine worship. On the other hand, man is not ordained to his neighbor as to his end, so as to need to be disposed in himself with regard to his neighbor, for such is the relationship of a slave to his master, since a slave "is his master"s in all that he is," as the Philosopher says (Polit. i, 2). Hence there are no judicial precepts ordaining man in himself; all such precepts are moral: because the reason, which is the princip[le] in moral matters, holds the same position, in man, with regard to things that concern him, as a prince or judge holds in the state. Nevertheless we must take note that, since the relations of man to his neighbor are more subject to reason than the relations of man to G.o.d, there are more precepts whereby man is directed in his relations to his neighbor, than whereby he is directed to G.o.d. For the same reason there had to be more ceremonial than judicial precepts in the Law.
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SECOND ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 104, Art. 2]
Whether the Judicial Precepts Were Figurative?
Objection 1: It would seem that the judicial precepts were not figurative. Because it seems proper to the ceremonial precepts to be inst.i.tuted as figures of something else. Therefore, if the judicial precepts are figurative, there will be no difference between the judicial and ceremonial precepts.
Obj. 2: Further, just as certain judicial precepts were given to the Jewish people, so also were some given to other heathen peoples. But the judicial precepts given to other peoples were not figurative, but stated what had to be done. Therefore it seems that neither were the judicial precepts of the Old Law figures of anything.
Obj. 3: Further, those things which relate to the divine worship had to be taught under certain figures, because the things of G.o.d are above our reason, as stated above (Q. 101, A. 2, ad 2). But things concerning our neighbor are not above our reason. Therefore the judicial precepts which direct us in relation to our neighbor should not have been figurative.
_On the contrary,_ The judicial precepts are expounded both in the allegorical and in the moral sense (Ex. 21).
_I answer that,_ A precept may be figurative in two ways. First, primarily and in itself: because, to wit, it is inst.i.tuted princ.i.p.ally that it may be the figure of something. In this way the ceremonial precepts are figurative; since they were inst.i.tuted for the very purpose that they might foreshadow something relating to the worship of G.o.d and the mystery of Christ. But some precepts are figurative, not primarily and in themselves, but consequently. In this way the judicial precepts of the Old Law are figurative. For they were not inst.i.tuted for the purpose of being figurative, but in order that they might regulate the state of that people according to justice and equity. Nevertheless they did foreshadow something consequently: since, to wit, the entire state of that people, who were directed by these precepts, was figurative, according to 1 Cor.
10:11: "All ... things happened to them in figure."
Reply Obj. 1: The ceremonial precepts are not figurative in the same way as the judicial precepts, as explained above.
Reply Obj. 2: The Jewish people were chosen by G.o.d that Christ might be born of them. Consequently the entire state of that people had to be prophetic and figurative, as Augustine states (Contra Faust. xxii, 24). For this reason even the judicial precepts that were given to this people were more figurative that those which were given to other nations. Thus, too, the wars and deeds of this people are expounded in the mystical sense: but not the wars and deeds of the a.s.syrians or Romans, although the latter are more famous in the eyes of men.
Reply Obj. 3: In this people the direction of man in regard to his neighbor, considered in itself, was subject to reason. But in so far as it was referred to the worship of G.o.d, it was above reason: and in this respect it was figurative.
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THIRD ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 104, Art. 3]
Whether the Judicial Precepts of the Old Law Bind for Ever?
Objection 1: It would seem that the judicial precepts of the Old Law bind for ever. Because the judicial precepts relate to the virtue of justice: since a judgment is an execution of the virtue of justice.
Now "justice is perpetual and immortal" (Wis. 1:15). Therefore the judicial precepts bind for ever.
Obj. 2: Further, Divine inst.i.tutions are more enduring than human inst.i.tutions. But the judicial precepts of human laws bind for ever.
Therefore much more do the judicial precepts of the Divine Law.
Obj. 3: Further, the Apostle says (Heb. 7:18) that "there is a setting aside of the former commandment, because of the weakness and unprofitableness thereof." Now this is true of the ceremonial precept, which "could [Vulg.: "can"] not, as to the conscience, make him perfect that serveth only in meats and in drinks, and divers washings and justices of the flesh," as the Apostle declares (Heb.
9:9, 10). On the other hand, the judicial precepts were useful and efficacious in respect of the purpose for which they were inst.i.tuted, viz. to establish justice and equity among men. Therefore the judicial precepts of the Old Law are not set aside, but still retain their efficacy.
_On the contrary,_ The Apostle says (Heb. 7:12) that "the priesthood being translated it is necessary that a translation also be made of the Law." But the priesthood was transferred from Aaron to Christ.
Therefore the entire Law was also transferred. Therefore the judicial precepts are no longer in force.
_I answer that,_ The judicial precepts did not bind for ever, but were annulled by the coming of Christ: yet not in the same way as the ceremonial precepts. For the ceremonial precepts were annulled so far as to be not only "dead," but also deadly to those who observe them since the coming of Christ, especially since the promulgation of the Gospel. On the other hand, the judicial precepts are dead indeed, because they have no binding force: but they are not deadly. For if a sovereign were to order these judicial precepts to be observed in his kingdom, he would not sin: unless perchance they were observed, or ordered to be observed, as though they derived their binding force through being inst.i.tutions of the Old Law: for it would be a deadly sin to intend to observe them thus.
The reason for this difference may be gathered from what has been said above (A. 2). For it has been stated that the ceremonial precepts are figurative primarily and in themselves, as being inst.i.tuted chiefly for the purpose of foreshadowing the mysteries of Christ to come. On the other hand, the judicial precepts were not inst.i.tuted that they might be figures, but that they might shape the state of that people who were directed to Christ. Consequently, when the state of that people changed with the coming of Christ, the judicial precepts lost their binding force: for the Law was a pedagogue, leading men to Christ, as stated in Gal. 3:24. Since, however, these judicial precepts are inst.i.tuted, not for the purpose of being figures, but for the performance of certain deeds, the observance thereof is not prejudicial to the truth of faith. But the intention of observing them, as though one were bound by the Law, is prejudicial to the truth of faith: because it would follow that the former state of the people still lasts, and that Christ has not yet come.
Reply Obj. 1: The obligation of observing justice is indeed perpetual. But the determination of those things that are just, according to human or Divine inst.i.tution, must needs be different, according to the different states of mankind.
Reply Obj. 2: The judicial precepts established by men retain their binding force for ever, so long as the state of government remains the same. But if the state or nation pa.s.s to another form of government, the laws must needs be changed. For democracy, which is government by the people, demands different laws from those of oligarchy, which is government by the rich, as the Philosopher shows (Polit. iv, 1). Consequently when the state of that people changed, the judicial precepts had to be changed also.
Reply Obj. 3: Those judicial precepts directed the people to justice and equity, in keeping with the demands of that state. But after the coming of Christ, there had to be a change in the state of that people, so that in Christ there was no distinction between Gentile and Jew, as there had been before. For this reason the judicial precepts needed to be changed also.