Obj. 2: Further, "Man"s merit springs from grace" as Augustine says (De Gratia et Lib. Arbit. vi). Now merit consists in acts, which proceed from a power. Hence it seems that grace is a perfection of a power of the soul.
Obj. 3: Further, if the essence of the soul is the proper subject of grace, the soul, inasmuch as it has an essence, must be capable of grace. But this is false; since it would follow that every soul would be capable of grace. Therefore the essence of the soul is not the proper subject of grace.
Obj. 4: Further, the essence of the soul is prior to its powers. Now what is prior may be understood without what is posterior. Hence it follows that grace may be taken to be in the soul, although we suppose no part or power of the soul--viz. neither the will, nor the intellect, nor anything else; which is impossible.
_On the contrary,_ By grace we are born again sons of G.o.d. But generation terminates at the essence prior to the powers. Therefore grace is in the soul"s essence prior to being in the powers.
_I answer that,_ This question depends on the preceding. For if grace is the same as virtue, it must necessarily be in the powers of the soul as in a subject; since the soul"s powers are the proper subject of virtue, as stated above (Q. 56, A. 1). But if grace differs from virtue, it cannot be said that a power of the soul is the subject of grace, since every perfection of the soul"s powers has the nature of virtue, as stated above (Q. 55, A. 1; Q. 56, A. 1). Hence it remains that grace, as it is prior to virtue, has a subject prior to the powers of the soul, so that it is in the essence of the soul. For as man in his intellective powers partic.i.p.ates in the Divine knowledge through the virtue of faith, and in his power of will partic.i.p.ates in the Divine love through the virtue of charity, so also in the nature of the soul does he partic.i.p.ate in the Divine Nature, after the manner of a likeness, through a certain regeneration or re-creation.
Reply Obj. 1: As from the essence of the soul flows its powers, which are the principles of deeds, so likewise the virtues, whereby the powers are moved to act, flow into the powers of the soul from grace.
And thus grace is compared to the will as the mover to the moved, which is the same comparison as that of a horseman to the horse--but not as an accident to a subject.
And thereby is made clear the Reply to the Second Objection. For grace is the principle of meritorious works through the medium of virtues, as the essence of the soul is the princ.i.p.al of vital deeds through the medium of the powers.
Reply Obj. 3: The soul is the subject of grace, as being in the species of intellectual or rational nature. But the soul is not cla.s.sed in a species by any of its powers, since the powers are natural properties of the soul following upon the species. Hence the soul differs specifically in its essence from other souls, viz. of dumb animals, and of plants. Consequently it does not follow that, if the essence of the human soul is the subject of grace, every soul may be the subject of grace; since it belongs to the essence of the soul, inasmuch as it is of such a species.
Reply Obj. 4: Since the powers of the soul are natural properties following upon the species, the soul cannot be without them. Yet, granted that it was without them, the soul would still be called intellectual or rational in its species, not that it would actually have these powers, but on account of the essence of such a species, from which these powers naturally flow.
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QUESTION 111
OF THE DIVISION OF GRACE (In Five Articles)
We must now consider the division of grace; under which head there are five points of inquiry:
(1) Whether grace is fittingly divided into gratuitous grace and sanctifying grace?
(2) Of the division into operating and cooperating grace;
(3) Of the division of it into prevenient and subsequent grace;
(4) Of the division of gratuitous grace;
(5) Of the comparison between sanctifying and gratuitous grace.
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FIRST ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 111, Art. 1]
Whether Grace Is Fittingly Divided into Sanctifying Grace and Gratuitous Grace?
Objection 1: It would seem that grace is not fittingly divided into sanctifying grace and gratuitous grace. For grace is a gift of G.o.d, as is clear from what has been already stated (Q. 110, A. 1). But man is not therefore pleasing to G.o.d because something is given him by G.o.d, but rather on the contrary; since something is freely given by G.o.d, because man is pleasing to Him. Hence there is no sanctifying grace.
Obj. 2: Further, whatever is not given on account of preceding merits is given gratis. Now even natural good is given to man without preceding merit, since nature is presupposed to merit. Therefore nature itself is given gratuitously by G.o.d. But nature is condivided with grace. Therefore to be gratuitously given is not fittingly set down as a difference of grace, since it is found outside the genus of grace.
Obj. 3: Further, members of a division are mutually opposed. But even sanctifying grace, whereby we are justified, is given to us gratuitously, according to Rom. 3:24: "Being justified freely (_gratis_) by His grace." Hence sanctifying grace ought not to be divided against gratuitous grace.
_On the contrary,_ The Apostle attributes both to grace, viz. to sanctify and to be gratuitously given. For with regard to the first he says (Eph. 1:6): "He hath graced us in His beloved son." And with regard to the second (Rom. 2:6): "And if by grace, it is not now by works, otherwise grace is no more grace." Therefore grace can be distinguished by its having one only or both.
_I answer that,_ As the Apostle says (Rom. 13:1), "those things that are of G.o.d are well ordered [Vulg.: "those that are, are ordained by G.o.d]." Now the order of things consists in this, that things are led to G.o.d by other things, as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. iv). And hence since grace is ordained to lead men to G.o.d, this takes place in a certain order, so that some are led to G.o.d by others.
And thus there is a twofold grace: one whereby man himself is united to G.o.d, and this is called "sanctifying grace"; the other is that whereby one man cooperates with another in leading him to G.o.d, and this gift is called "gratuitous grace," since it is bestowed on a man beyond the capability of nature, and beyond the merit of the person.
But whereas it is bestowed on a man, not to justify him, but rather that he may cooperate in the justification of another, it is not called sanctifying grace. And it is of this that the Apostle says (1 Cor. 12:7): "And the manifestation of the Spirit is given to every man unto utility," i.e. of others.
Reply Obj. 1: Grace is said to make pleasing, not efficiently but formally, i.e. because thereby a man is justified, and is made worthy to be called pleasing to G.o.d, according to Col. 1:21: "He hath made us worthy to be made partakers of the lot of the saints in light."
Reply Obj. 2: Grace, inasmuch as it is gratuitously given, excludes the notion of debt. Now debt may be taken in two ways: first, as arising from merit; and this regards the person whose it is to do meritorious works, according to Rom. 4:4: "Now to him that worketh, the reward is not reckoned according to grace, but according to debt." The second debt regards the condition of nature. Thus we say it is due to a man to have reason, and whatever else belongs to human nature. Yet in neither way is debt taken to mean that G.o.d is under an obligation to His creature, but rather that the creature ought to be subject to G.o.d, that the Divine ordination may be fulfilled in it, which is that a certain nature should have certain conditions or properties, and that by doing certain works it should attain to something further. And hence natural endowments are not a debt in the first sense but in the second. But supernatural gifts are due in neither sense. Hence they especially merit the name of grace.
Reply Obj. 3: Sanctifying grace adds to the notion of gratuitous grace something pertaining to the nature of grace, since it makes man pleasing to G.o.d. And hence gratuitous grace which does not do this keeps the common name, as happens in many other cases; and thus the two parts of the division are opposed as sanctifying and non-sanctifying grace.
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SECOND ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 111, Art. 2]
Whether Grace Is Fittingly Divided into Operating and Cooperating Grace?
Objection 1: It would seem that grace is not fittingly divided into operating and cooperating grace. For grace is an accident, as stated above (Q. 110, A. 2). Now no accident can act upon its subject.
Therefore no grace can be called operating.
Obj. 2: Further, if grace operates anything in us it a.s.suredly brings about justification. But not only grace works this. For Augustine says, on John 14:12, "the works that I do he also shall do," says (Serm. clxix): "He Who created thee without thyself, will not justify thee without thyself." Therefore no grace ought to be called simply operating.
Obj. 3: Further, to cooperate seems to pertain to the inferior agent, and not to the princ.i.p.al agent. But grace works in us more than free-will, according to Rom. 9:16: "It is not of him that willeth, nor of him that runneth, but of G.o.d that sheweth mercy." Therefore no grace ought to be called cooperating.
Obj. 4: Further, division ought to rest on opposition. But to operate and to cooperate are not opposed; for one and the same thing can both operate and cooperate. Therefore grace is not fittingly divided into operating and cooperating.
_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Gratia et Lib. Arbit. xvii): "G.o.d by cooperating with us, perfects what He began by operating in us, since He who perfects by cooperation with such as are willing, begins by operating that they may will." But the operations of G.o.d whereby He moves us to good pertain to grace. Therefore grace is fittingly divided into operating and cooperating.
_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 110, A. 2) grace may be taken in two ways; first, as a Divine help, whereby G.o.d moves us to will and to act; secondly, as a habitual gift divinely bestowed on us.
Now in both these ways grace is fittingly divided into operating and cooperating. For the operation of an effect is not attributed to the thing moved but to the mover. Hence in that effect in which our mind is moved and does not move, but in which G.o.d is the sole mover, the operation is attributed to G.o.d, and it is with reference to this that we speak of "operating grace." But in that effect in which our mind both moves and is moved, the operation is not only attributed to G.o.d, but also to the soul; and it is with reference to this that we speak of "cooperating grace." Now there is a double act in us. First, there is the interior act of the will, and with regard to this act the will is a thing moved, and G.o.d is the mover; and especially when the will, which hitherto willed evil, begins to will good. And hence, inasmuch as G.o.d moves the human mind to this act, we speak of operating grace.
But there is another, exterior act; and since it is commanded by the will, as was shown above (Q. 17, A. 9) the operation of this act is attributed to the will. And because G.o.d a.s.sists us in this act, both by strengthening our will interiorly so as to attain to the act, and by granting outwardly the capability of operating, it is with respect to this that we speak of cooperating grace. Hence after the aforesaid words Augustine subjoins: "He operates that we may will; and when we will, He cooperates that we may perfect." And thus if grace is taken for G.o.d"s gratuitous motion whereby He moves us to meritorious good, it is fittingly divided into operating and cooperating grace.
But if grace is taken for the habitual gift, then again there is a double effect of grace, even as of every other form; the first of which is _being,_ and the second, _operation;_ thus the work of heat is to make its subject hot, and to give heat outwardly. And thus habitual grace, inasmuch as it heals and justifies the soul, or makes it pleasing to G.o.d, is called operating grace; but inasmuch as it is the principle of meritorious works, which spring from the free-will, it is called cooperating grace.
Reply Obj. 1: Inasmuch as grace is a certain accidental quality, it does not act upon the soul efficiently, but formally, as whiteness makes a surface white.
Reply Obj. 2: G.o.d does not justify us without ourselves, because whilst we are being justified we consent to G.o.d"s justification (_just.i.tiae_) by a movement of our free-will. Nevertheless this movement is not the cause of grace, but the effect; hence the whole operation pertains to grace.
Reply Obj. 3: One thing is said to cooperate with another not merely when it is a secondary agent under a princ.i.p.al agent, but when it helps to the end intended. Now man is helped by G.o.d to will the good, through the means of operating grace. And hence, the end being already intended, grace cooperates with us.
Reply Obj. 4: Operating and cooperating grace are the same grace; but are distinguished by their different effects, as is plain from what has been said.
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THIRD ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 111, Art. 3]
Whether Grace Is Fittingly Divided into Prevenient and Subsequent Grace?
Objection 1: It would seem that grace is not fittingly divided into prevenient and subsequent. For grace is an effect of the Divine love.
But G.o.d"s love is never subsequent, but always prevenient, according to 1 John 4:10: "Not as though we had loved G.o.d, but because He hath first loved us." Therefore grace ought not to be divided into prevenient and subsequent.
Obj. 2: Further, there is but one sanctifying grace in man, since it is sufficient, according to 2 Cor. 12:9: "My grace is sufficient for thee." But the same thing cannot be before and after. Therefore grace is not fittingly divided into prevenient and subsequent.