G.o.d"S LOVE (In Four Articles)
We next consider those things that pertain absolutely to the will of G.o.d. In the appet.i.tive part of the soul there are found in ourselves both the pa.s.sions of the soul, as joy, love, and the like; and the habits of the moral virtues, as justice, fort.i.tude and the like.
Hence we shall first consider the love of G.o.d, and secondly His justice and mercy. About the first there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether love exists in G.o.d?
(2) Whether He loves all things?
(3) Whether He loves one thing more than another?
(4) Whether He loves more the better things?
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FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 20, Art. 1]
Whether Love Exists in G.o.d?
Objection 1: It seems that love does not exist in G.o.d. For in G.o.d there are no pa.s.sions. Now love is a pa.s.sion. Therefore love is not in G.o.d.
Obj. 2: Further, love, anger, sorrow and the like, are mutually divided against one another. But sorrow and anger are not attributed to G.o.d, unless by metaphor. Therefore neither is love attributed to Him.
Obj. 3: Further, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv): "Love is a uniting and binding force." But this cannot take place in G.o.d, since He is simple. Therefore love does not exist in G.o.d.
_On the contrary,_ It is written: "G.o.d is love" (John 4:16).
_I answer that,_ We must needs a.s.sert that in G.o.d there is love: because love is the first movement of the will and of every appet.i.tive faculty. For since the acts of the will and of every appet.i.tive faculty tend towards good and evil, as to their proper objects: and since good is essentially and especially the object of the will and the appet.i.te, whereas evil is only the object secondarily and indirectly, as opposed to good; it follows that the acts of the will and appet.i.te that regard good must naturally be prior to those that regard evil; thus, for instance, joy is prior to sorrow, love to hate: because what exists of itself is always prior to that which exists through another. Again, the more universal is naturally prior to what is less so. Hence the intellect is first directed to universal truth; and in the second place to particular and special truths. Now there are certain acts of the will and appet.i.te that regard good under some special condition, as joy and delight regard good present and possessed; whereas desire and hope regard good not as yet possessed. Love, however, regards good universally, whether possessed or not. Hence love is naturally the first act of the will and appet.i.te; for which reason all the other appet.i.te movements presuppose love, as their root and origin. For n.o.body desires anything nor rejoices in anything, except as a good that is loved: nor is anything an object of hate except as opposed to the object of love. Similarly, it is clear that sorrow, and other things like to it, must be referred to love as to their first principle. Hence, in whomsoever there is will and appet.i.te, there must also be love: since if the first is wanting, all that follows is also wanting. Now it has been shown that will is in G.o.d (Q. 19, A.
1), and hence we must attribute love to Him.
Reply Obj. 1: The cognitive faculty does not move except through the medium of the appet.i.tive: and just as in ourselves the universal reason moves through the medium of the particular reason, as stated in _De Anima_ iii, 58, 75, so in ourselves the intellectual appet.i.te, or the will as it is called, moves through the medium of the sensitive appet.i.te. Hence, in us the sensitive appet.i.te is the proximate motive-force of our bodies. Some bodily change therefore always accompanies an act of the sensitive appet.i.te, and this change affects especially the heart, which, as the Philosopher says (De part. animal. iii, 4), is the first principle of movement in animals.
Therefore acts of the sensitive appet.i.te, inasmuch as they have annexed to them some bodily change, are called pa.s.sions; whereas acts of the will are not so called. Love, therefore, and joy and delight are pa.s.sions; in so far as they denote acts of the intellective appet.i.te, they are not pa.s.sions. It is in this latter sense that they are in G.o.d. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii): "G.o.d rejoices by an operation that is one and simple," and for the same reason He loves without pa.s.sion.
Reply Obj. 2: In the pa.s.sions of the sensitive appet.i.te there may be distinguished a certain material element--namely, the bodily change--and a certain formal element, which is on the part of the appet.i.te. Thus in anger, as the Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 15, 63, 64), the material element is the kindling of the blood about the heart; but the formal, the appet.i.te for revenge. Again, as regards the formal element of certain pa.s.sions a certain imperfection is implied, as in desire, which is of the good we have not, and in sorrow, which is about the evil we have. This applies also to anger, which supposes sorrow. Certain other pa.s.sions, however, as love and joy, imply no imperfection. Since therefore none of these can be attributed to G.o.d on their material side, as has been said (ad 1); neither can those that even on their formal side imply imperfection be attributed to Him; except metaphorically, and from likeness of effects, as already show (Q. 3, A. 2, ad 2; Q. 19, A. 11). Whereas, those that do not imply imperfection, such as love and joy, can be properly predicated of G.o.d, though without attributing pa.s.sion to Him, as said before (Q. 19, A. 11).
Reply Obj. 3: An act of love always tends towards two things; to the good that one wills, and to the person for whom one wills it: since to love a person is to wish that person good. Hence, inasmuch as we love ourselves, we wish ourselves good; and, so far as possible, union with that good. So love is called the unitive force, even in G.o.d, yet without implying composition; for the good that He wills for Himself, is no other than Himself, Who is good by His essence, as above shown (Q. 6, AA. 1, 3). And by the fact that anyone loves another, he wills good to that other. Thus he puts the other, as it were, in the place of himself; and regards the good done to him as done to himself. So far love is a binding force, since it aggregates another to ourselves, and refers his good to our own. And then again the divine love is a binding force, inasmuch as G.o.d wills good to others; yet it implies no composition in G.o.d.
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SECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 20, Art. 2]
Whether G.o.d Loves All Things?
Objection 1: It seems that G.o.d does not love all things. For according to Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv, 1), love places the lover outside himself, and causes him to pa.s.s, as it were, into the object of his love. But it is not admissible to say that G.o.d is placed outside of Himself, and pa.s.ses into other things. Therefore it is inadmissible to say that G.o.d loves things other than Himself.
Obj. 2: Further, the love of G.o.d is eternal. But things apart from G.o.d are not from eternity; except in G.o.d. Therefore G.o.d does not love anything, except as it exists in Himself. But as existing in Him, it is no other than Himself. Therefore G.o.d does not love things other than Himself.
Obj. 3: Further, love is twofold--the love, namely, of desire, and the love of friendship. Now G.o.d does not love irrational creatures with the love of desire, since He needs no creature outside Himself.
Nor with the love of friendship; since there can be no friendship with irrational creatures, as the Philosopher shows (Ethic. viii, 2).
Therefore G.o.d does not love all things.
Obj. 4: Further, it is written (Ps. 5:7): "Thou hatest all the workers of iniquity." Now nothing is at the same time hated and loved. Therefore G.o.d does not love all things.
_On the contrary,_ It is said (Wis. 11:25): "Thou lovest all things that are, and hatest none of the things which Thou hast made."
_I answer that,_ G.o.d loves all existing things. For all existing things, in so far as they exist, are good, since the existence of a thing is itself a good; and likewise, whatever perfection it possesses. Now it has been shown above (Q. 19, A. 4) that G.o.d"s will is the cause of all things. It must needs be, therefore, that a thing has existence, or any kind of good, only inasmuch as it is willed by G.o.d. To every existing thing, then, G.o.d wills some good. Hence, since to love anything is nothing else than to will good to that thing, it is manifest that G.o.d loves everything that exists. Yet not as we love. Because since our will is not the cause of the goodness of things, but is moved by it as by its object, our love, whereby we will good to anything, is not the cause of its goodness; but conversely its goodness, whether real or imaginary, calls forth our love, by which we will that it should preserve the good it has, and receive besides the good it has not, and to this end we direct our actions: whereas the love of G.o.d infuses and creates goodness.
Reply Obj. 1: A lover is placed outside himself, and made to pa.s.s into the object of his love, inasmuch as he wills good to the beloved; and works for that good by his providence even as he works for his own. Hence Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv, 1): "On behalf of the truth we must make bold to say even this, that He Himself, the cause of all things, by His abounding love and goodness, is placed outside Himself by His providence for all existing things."
Reply Obj. 2: Although creatures have not existed from eternity, except in G.o.d, yet because they have been in Him from eternity, G.o.d has known them eternally in their proper natures; and for that reason has loved them, even as we, by the images of things within us, know things existing in themselves.
Reply Obj. 3: Friendship cannot exist except towards rational creatures, who are capable of returning love, and communicating one with another in the various works of life, and who may fare well or ill, according to the changes of fortune and happiness; even as to them is benevolence properly speaking exercised. But irrational creatures cannot attain to loving G.o.d, nor to any share in the intellectual and beatific life that He lives. Strictly speaking, therefore, G.o.d does not love irrational creatures with the love of friendship; but as it were with the love of desire, in so far as He orders them to rational creatures, and even to Himself. Yet this is not because He stands in need of them; but only on account of His goodness, and of the services they render to us. For we can desire a thing for others as well as for ourselves.
Reply Obj. 4: Nothing prevents one and the same thing being loved under one aspect, while it is hated under another. G.o.d loves sinners in so far as they are existing natures; for they have existence and have it from Him. In so far as they are sinners, they have not existence at all, but fall short of it; and this in them is not from G.o.d. Hence under this aspect, they are hated by Him.
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THIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 20, Art. 3]
Whether G.o.d Loves All Things Equally?
Objection 1: It seems that G.o.d loves all things equally. For it is said: "He hath equally care of all" (Wis. 6:8). But G.o.d"s providence over things comes from the love wherewith He loves them. Therefore He loves all things equally.
Obj. 2: Further, the love of G.o.d is His essence. But G.o.d"s essence does not admit of degree; neither therefore does His love. He does not therefore love some things more than others.
Obj. 3: Further, as G.o.d"s love extends to created things, so do His knowledge and will extend. But G.o.d is not said to know some things more than others; nor will one thing more than another. Neither therefore does He love some things more than others.
_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (Tract. in Joan. cx): "G.o.d loves all things that He has made, and amongst them rational creatures more, and of these especially those who are members of His only-begotten Son Himself."
_I answer that,_ Since to love a thing is to will it good, in a twofold way anything may be loved more, or less. In one way on the part of the act of the will itself, which is more or less intense. In this way G.o.d does not love some things more than others, because He loves all things by an act of the will that is one, simple, and always the same. In another way on the part of the good itself that a person wills for the beloved. In this way we are said to love that one more than another, for whom we will a greater good, though our will is not more intense. In this way we must needs say that G.o.d loves some things more than others. For since G.o.d"s love is the cause of goodness in things, as has been said (A. 2), no one thing would be better than another, if G.o.d did not will greater good for one than for another.
Reply Obj. 1: G.o.d is said to have equally care of all, not because by His care He deals out equal good to all, but because He administers all things with a like wisdom and goodness.
Reply Obj. 2: This argument is based on the intensity of love on the part of the act of the will, which is the divine essence. But the good that G.o.d wills for His creatures, is not the divine essence.
Therefore there is no reason why it may not vary in degree.
Reply Obj. 3: To understand and to will denote the act alone, and do not include in their meaning objects from the diversity of which G.o.d may be said to know or will more or less, as has been said with respect to G.o.d"s love.
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FOURTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 20, Art. 4]
Whether G.o.d Always Loves More the Better Things?
Objection 1: It seems that G.o.d does not always love more the better things. For it is manifest that Christ is better than the whole human race, being G.o.d and man. But G.o.d loved the human race more than He loved Christ; for it is said: "He spared not His own Son, but delivered Him up for us all" (Rom. 8:32). Therefore G.o.d does not always love more the better things.
Obj. 2: Further, an angel is better than a man. Hence it is said of man: "Thou hast made him a little less than the angels" (Ps. 8:6).
But G.o.d loved men more than He loved the angels, for it is said: "Nowhere doth He take hold of the angels, but of the seed of Abraham He taketh hold" (Heb. 2:16). Therefore G.o.d does not always love more the better things.
Obj. 3: Further, Peter was better than John, since he loved Christ more. Hence the Lord, knowing this to be true, asked Peter, saying: "Simon, son of John, lovest thou Me more than these?" Yet Christ loved John more than He loved Peter. For as Augustine says, commenting on the words, "Simon, son of John, lovest thou Me?": "By this very mark is John distinguished from the other disciples, not that He loved him only, but that He loved him more than the rest."
Therefore G.o.d does not always love more the better things.
Obj. 4: Further, the innocent man is better than the repentant, since repentance is, as Jerome says (Cap. 3 in Isa.), "a second plank after shipwreck." But G.o.d loves the penitent more than the innocent; since He rejoices over him the more. For it is said: "I say to you that there shall be joy in heaven upon the one sinner that doth penance, more than upon ninety-nine just who need not penance" (Luke 15:7).