_I answer that,_ Man"s meritorious work may be considered in two ways: first, as it proceeds from free-will; secondly, as it proceeds from the grace of the Holy Ghost. If it is considered as regards the substance of the work, and inasmuch as it springs from the free-will, there can be no condignity because of the very great inequality. But there is congruity, on account of an equality of proportion: for it would seem congruous that, if a man does what he can, G.o.d should reward him according to the excellence of his power.
If, however, we speak of a meritorious work, inasmuch as it proceeds from the grace of the Holy Ghost moving us to life everlasting, it is meritorious of life everlasting condignly. For thus the value of its merit depends upon the power of the Holy Ghost moving us to life everlasting according to John 4:14: "Shall become in him a fount of water springing up into life everlasting." And the worth of the work depends on the dignity of grace, whereby a man, being made a partaker of the Divine Nature, is adopted as a son of G.o.d, to whom the inheritance is due by right of adoption, according to Rom. 8:17: "If sons, heirs also."
Reply Obj. 1: The Apostle is speaking of the substance of these sufferings.
Reply Obj. 2: This saying is to be understood of the first cause of our reaching everlasting life, viz. G.o.d"s mercy. But our merit is a subsequent cause.
Reply Obj. 3: The grace of the Holy Ghost which we have at present, although unequal to glory in act, is equal to it virtually as the seed of a tree, wherein the whole tree is virtually. So likewise by grace of the Holy Ghost dwells in man; and He is a sufficient cause of life everlasting; hence, 2 Cor. 1:22, He is called the "pledge" of our inheritance.
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FOURTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 114, Art. 4]
Whether Grace Is the Principle of Merit Through Charity Rather Than the Other Virtues?
Objection 1: It would seem that grace is not the principle of merit through charity rather than the other virtues. For wages are due to work, according to Matt. 20:8: "Call the laborers and pay them their hire." Now every virtue is a principle of some operation, since virtue is an operative habit, as stated above (Q. 55, A. 2). Hence every virtue is equally a principle of merit.
Obj. 2: Further, the Apostle says (1 Cor. 3:8): "Every man shall receive his own reward according to his labor." Now charity lessens rather than increases the labor, because as Augustine says (De Verbis Dom., Serm. lxx), "love makes all hard and repulsive tasks easy and next to nothing." Hence charity is no greater principle of merit than any other virtue.
Obj. 3: Further, the greatest principle of merit would seem to be the one whose acts are most meritorious. But the acts of faith and patience or fort.i.tude would seem to be the most meritorious, as appears in the martyrs, who strove for the faith patiently and bravely even till death. Hence other virtues are a greater principle of merit than charity.
_On the contrary,_ Our Lord said (John 14:21): "He that loveth Me, shall be loved of My Father; and I will love him and will manifest Myself to him." Now everlasting life consists in the manifest knowledge of G.o.d, according to John 17:3: "This is eternal life: that they may know Thee, the only true" and living "G.o.d." Hence the merit of eternal life rests chiefly with charity.
_I answer that,_ As we may gather from what has been stated above (A.
1), human acts have the nature of merit from two causes: first and chiefly from the Divine ordination, inasmuch as acts are said to merit that good to which man is divinely ordained. Secondly, on the part of free-will, inasmuch as man, more than other creatures, has the power of voluntary acts by acting by himself. And in both these ways does merit chiefly rest with charity. For we must bear in mind that everlasting life consists in the enjoyment of G.o.d. Now the human mind"s movement to the fruition of the Divine good is the proper act of charity, whereby all the acts of the other virtues are ordained to this end, since all the other virtues are commanded by charity. Hence the merit of life everlasting pertains first to charity, and secondly, to the other virtues, inasmuch as their acts are commanded by charity. So, likewise, is it manifest that what we do out of love we do most willingly. Hence, even inasmuch as merit depends on voluntariness, merit is chiefly attributed to charity.
Reply Obj. 1: Charity, inasmuch as it has the last end for object, moves the other virtues to act. For the habit to which the end pertains always commands the habits to which the means pertain, as was said above (Q. 9, A. 1).
Reply Obj. 2: A work can be toilsome and difficult in two ways: first, from the greatness of the work, and thus the greatness of the work pertains to the increase of merit; and thus charity does not lessen the toil--rather, it makes us undertake the greatest toils, "for it does great things, if it exists," as Gregory says (Hom. in Evang. x.x.x). Secondly, from the defect of the operator; for what is not done with a ready will is hard and difficult to all of us, and this toil lessens merit and is removed by charity.
Reply Obj. 3: The act of faith is not meritorious unless "faith ...
worketh by charity" (Gal. 5:6). So, too, the acts of patience and fort.i.tude are not meritorious unless a man does them out of charity, according to 1 Cor. 13:3: "If I should deliver my body to be burned, and have not charity, it profiteth me nothing."
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FIFTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 114, Art. 5]
Whether a Man May Merit for Himself the First Grace?
Objection 1: It would seem that a man may merit for himself the first grace, because, as Augustine says (Ep. clx.x.xvi), "faith merits justification." Now a man is justified by the first grace. Therefore a man may merit the first grace.
Obj. 2: Further, G.o.d gives grace only to the worthy. Now, no one is said to be worthy of some good, unless he has merited it condignly.
Therefore we may merit the first grace condignly.
Obj. 3: Further, with men we may merit a gift already received. Thus if a man receives a horse from his master, he merits it by a good use of it in his master"s service. Now G.o.d is much more bountiful than man. Much more, therefore, may a man, by subsequent works, merit the first grace already received from G.o.d.
_On the contrary,_ The nature of grace is repugnant to reward of works, according to Rom. 4:4: "Now to him that worketh, the reward is not reckoned according to grace but according to debt." Now a man merits what is reckoned to him according to debt, as the reward of his works. Hence a man may not merit the first grace.
_I answer that,_ The gift of grace may be considered in two ways: first in the nature of a gratuitous gift, and thus it is manifest that all merit is repugnant to grace, since as the Apostle says (Rom.
11:6), "if by grace, it is not now by works." Secondly, it may be considered as regards the nature of the thing given, and thus, also, it cannot come under the merit of him who has not grace, both because it exceeds the proportion of nature, and because previous to grace a man in the state of sin has an obstacle to his meriting grace, viz.
sin. But when anyone has grace, the grace already possessed cannot come under merit, since reward is the term of the work, but grace is the principle of all our good works, as stated above (Q. 109). But of anyone merits a further gratuitous gift by virtue of the preceding grace, it would not be the first grace. Hence it is manifest that no one can merit for himself the first grace.
Reply Obj. 1: As Augustine says (Retract. i, 23), he was deceived on this point for a time, believing the beginning of faith to be from us, and its consummation to be granted us by G.o.d; and this he here retracts. And seemingly it is in this sense that he speaks of faith as meriting justification. But if we suppose, as indeed it is a truth of faith, that the beginning of faith is in us from G.o.d, the first act must flow from grace; and thus it cannot be meritorious of the first grace. Therefore man is justified by faith, not as though man, by believing, were to merit justification, but that, he believes, whilst he is being justified; inasmuch as a movement of faith is required for the justification of the unG.o.dly, as stated above (Q.
113, A. 4).
Reply Obj. 2: G.o.d gives grace to none but to the worthy, not that they were previously worthy, but that by His grace He makes them worthy, Who alone "can make him clean that is conceived of unclean seed" (Job 14:4).
Reply Obj. 3: Man"s every good work proceeds from the first grace as from its principle; but not from any gift of man. Consequently, there is no comparison between gifts of grace and gifts of men.
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SIXTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 114, Art. 6]
Whether a Man Can Merit the First Grace for Another?
Objection 1: It would seem that a man can merit the first grace for another. Because on Matt. 9:2: "Jesus seeing their faith," etc. a gloss says: "How much is our personal faith worth with G.o.d, Who set such a price on another"s faith, as to heal the man both inwardly and outwardly!" Now inward healing is brought about by grace. Hence a man can merit the first grace for another.
Obj. 2: Further, the prayers of the just are not void, but efficacious, according to James 5:16: "The continued prayer of a just man availeth much." Now he had previously said: "Pray one for another, that you may be saved." Hence, since man"s salvation can only be brought about by grace, it seems that one man may merit for another his first grace.
Obj. 3: Further, it is written (Luke 16:9): "Make unto you friends of the mammon of iniquity, that when you shall fail they may receive you into everlasting dwellings." Now it is through grace alone that anyone is received into everlasting dwellings, for by it alone does anyone merit everlasting life as stated above (A. 2; Q. 109, A. 5).
Hence one man may by merit obtain for another his first grace.
_On the contrary,_ It is written (Jer. 15:1): "If Moses and Samuel shall stand before Me, My soul is not towards this people"--yet they had great merit with G.o.d. Hence it seems that no one can merit the first grace for another.
_I answer that,_ As shown above (AA. 1, 3, 4), our works are meritorious from two causes: first, by virtue of the Divine motion; and thus we merit condignly; secondly, according as they proceed from free-will in so far as we do them willingly, and thus they have congruous merit, since it is congruous that when a man makes good use of his power G.o.d should by His super-excellent power work still higher things. And therefore it is clear that no one can merit condignly for another his first grace, save Christ alone; since each one of us is moved by G.o.d to reach life everlasting through the gift of grace; hence condign merit does not reach beyond this motion. But Christ"s soul is moved by G.o.d through grace, not only so as to reach the glory of life everlasting, but so as to lead others to it, inasmuch as He is the Head of the Church, and the Author of human salvation, according to Heb. 2:10: "Who hath brought many children into glory [to perfect] the Author of their salvation."
But one may merit the first grace for another congruously; because a man in grace fulfils G.o.d"s will, and it is congruous and in harmony with friendship that G.o.d should fulfil man"s desire for the salvation of another, although sometimes there may be an impediment on the part of him whose salvation the just man desires. And it is in this sense that the pa.s.sage from Jeremias speaks.
Reply Obj. 1: A man"s faith avails for another"s salvation by congruous and not by condign merit.
Reply Obj. 2: The impetration of prayer rests on mercy, whereas condign merit rests on justice; hence a man may impetrate many things from the Divine mercy in prayer, which he does not merit in justice, according to Dan. 9:18: "For it is not for our justifications that we present our prayers before Thy face, but for the mult.i.tude of Thy tender mercies."
Reply Obj. 3: The poor who receive alms are said to receive others into everlasting dwellings, either by impetrating their forgiveness in prayer, or by meriting congruously by other good works, or materially speaking, inasmuch as by these good works of mercy, exercised towards the poor, we merit to be received into everlasting dwellings.
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SEVENTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 114, Art. 7]
Whether a Man May Merit Restoration After a Fall?
Objection 1: It would seem that anyone may merit for himself restoration after a fall. For what a man may justly ask of G.o.d, he may justly merit. Now nothing may more justly be besought of G.o.d than to be restored after a fall, as Augustine says [*Cf. Ennar. i super Ps. lxx.], according to Ps. 70:9: "When my strength shall fail, do not Thou forsake me." Hence a man may merit to be restored after a fall.
Obj. 2: Further, a man"s works benefit himself more than another. Now a man may, to some extent, merit for another his restoration after a fall, even as his first grace. Much more, therefore, may he merit for himself restoration after a fall.
Obj. 3: Further, when a man is once in grace he merits life everlasting by the good works he does, as was shown above (A. 2; Q.
109, A. 5). Now no one can attain life everlasting unless he is restored by grace. Hence it would seem that he merits for himself restoration.
_On the contrary,_ It is written (Ezech. 18:24): "If the just man turn himself away from his justice and do iniquity ... all his justices which he hath done shall not be remembered." Therefore his previous merits will nowise help him to rise again. Hence no one can merit for himself restoration after a fall.
_I answer that,_ No one can merit for himself restoration after a future fall, either condignly or congruously. He cannot merit for himself condignly, since the reason of this merit depends on the motion of Divine grace, and this motion is interrupted by the subsequent sin; hence all benefits which he afterwards obtains from G.o.d, whereby he is restored, do not fall under merit--the motion of the preceding grace not extending to them. Again, congruous merit, whereby one merits the first grace for another, is prevented from having its effect on account of the impediment of sin in the one for whom it is merited. Much more, therefore, is the efficacy of such merit impeded by the obstacle which is in him who merits, and in him for whom it is merited; for both these are in the same person. And therefore a man can nowise merit for himself restoration after a fall.
Reply Obj. 1: The desire whereby we seek for restoration after a fall is called just, and likewise the prayer whereby this restoration is besought is called just, because it tends to justice; and not that it depends on justice by way of merit, but only on mercy.