Whether It Is Necessary for Salvation to Believe Anything Above the Natural Reason?
Objection 1: It would seem unnecessary for salvation to believe anything above the natural reason. For the salvation and perfection of a thing seem to be sufficiently insured by its natural endowments. Now matters of faith, surpa.s.s man"s natural reason, since they are things unseen as stated above (Q. 1, A. 4). Therefore to believe seems unnecessary for salvation.
Obj. 2: Further, it is dangerous for man to a.s.sent to matters, wherein he cannot judge whether that which is proposed to him be true or false, according to Job 12:11: "Doth not the ear discern words?"
Now a man cannot form a judgment of this kind in matters of faith, since he cannot trace them back to first principles, by which all our judgments are guided. Therefore it is dangerous to believe in such matters. Therefore to believe is not necessary for salvation.
Obj. 3: Further, man"s salvation rests on G.o.d, according to Ps.
36:39: "But the salvation of the just is from the Lord." Now "the invisible things" of G.o.d "are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made; His eternal power also and Divinity," according to Rom. 1:20: and those things which are clearly seen by the understanding are not an object of belief. Therefore it is not necessary for man"s salvation, that he should believe certain things.
_On the contrary,_ It is written (Heb. 11:6): "Without faith it is impossible to please G.o.d."
_I answer that,_ Wherever one nature is subordinate to another, we find that two things concur towards the perfection of the lower nature, one of which is in respect of that nature"s proper movement, while the other is in respect of the movement of the higher nature.
Thus water by its proper movement moves towards the centre (of the earth), while according to the movement of the moon, it moves round the centre by ebb and flow. In like manner the planets have their proper movements from west to east, while in accordance with the movement of the first heaven, they have a movement from east to west.
Now the created rational nature alone is immediately subordinate to G.o.d, since other creatures do not attain to the universal, but only to something particular, while they partake of the Divine goodness either in _being_ only, as inanimate things, or also in _living,_ and in _knowing singulars,_ as plants and animals; whereas the rational nature, in as much as it apprehends the universal notion of good and being, is immediately related to the universal principle of being.
Consequently the perfection of the rational creature consists not only in what belongs to it in respect of its nature, but also in that which it acquires through a supernatural partic.i.p.ation of Divine goodness. Hence it was said above (I-II, Q. 3, A. 8) that man"s ultimate happiness consists in a supernatural vision of G.o.d: to which vision man cannot attain unless he be taught by G.o.d, according to John 6:45: "Every one that hath heard of the Father and hath learned cometh to Me." Now man acquires a share of this learning, not indeed all at once, but by little and little, according to the mode of his nature: and every one who learns thus must needs believe, in order that he may acquire science in a perfect degree; thus also the Philosopher remarks (De Soph. Elench. i, 2) that "it behooves a learner to believe."
Hence in order that a man arrive at the perfect vision of heavenly happiness, he must first of all believe G.o.d, as a disciple believes the master who is teaching him.
Reply Obj. 1: Since man"s nature is dependent on a higher nature, natural knowledge does not suffice for its perfection, and some supernatural knowledge is necessary, as stated above.
Reply Obj. 2: Just as man a.s.sents to first principles, by the natural light of his intellect, so does a virtuous man, by the habit of virtue, judge aright of things concerning that virtue; and in this way, by the light of faith which G.o.d bestows on him, a man a.s.sents to matters of faith and not to those which are against faith.
Consequently "there is no" danger or "condemnation to them that are in Christ Jesus," and whom He has enlightened by faith.
Reply Obj. 3: In many respects faith perceives the invisible things of G.o.d in a higher way than natural reason does in proceeding to G.o.d from His creatures. Hence it is written (Ecclus. 3:25): "Many things are shown to thee above the understandings of man."
_______________________
FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 2, Art. 4]
Whether It Is Necessary to Believe Those Things Which Can Be Proved by Natural Reason?
Objection 1: It would seem unnecessary to believe those things which can be proved by natural reason. For nothing is superfluous in G.o.d"s works, much less even than in the works of nature. Now it is superfluous to employ other means, where one already suffices.
Therefore it would be superfluous to receive by faith, things that can be known by natural reason.
Obj. 2: Further, those things must be believed, which are the object of faith. Now science and faith are not about the same object, as stated above (Q. 1, AA. 4, 5). Since therefore all things that can be known by natural reason are an object of science, it seems that there is no need to believe what can be proved by natural reason.
Obj. 3: Further, all things knowable scientifically [*Science is certain knowledge of a demonstrated conclusion through its demonstration] would seem to come under one head: so that if some of them are proposed to man as objects of faith, in like manner the others should also be believed. But this is not true. Therefore it is not necessary to believe those things which can be proved by natural reason.
_On the contrary,_ It is necessary to believe that G.o.d is one and incorporeal: which things philosophers prove by natural reason.
_I answer that,_ It is necessary for man to accept by faith not only things which are above reason, but also those which can be known by reason: and this for three motives. First, in order that man may arrive more quickly at the knowledge of Divine truth. Because the science to whose province it belongs to prove the existence of G.o.d, is the last of all to offer itself to human research, since it presupposes many other sciences: so that it would not by until late in life that man would arrive at the knowledge of G.o.d. The second reason is, in order that the knowledge of G.o.d may be more general.
For many are unable to make progress in the study of science, either through dullness of mind, or through having a number of occupations, and temporal needs, or even through laziness in learning, all of whom would be altogether deprived of the knowledge of G.o.d, unless Divine things were brought to their knowledge under the guise of faith. The third reason is for the sake of cert.i.tude. For human reason is very deficient in things concerning G.o.d. A sign of this is that philosophers in their researches, by natural investigation, into human affairs, have fallen into many errors, and have disagreed among themselves. And consequently, in order that men might have knowledge of G.o.d, free of doubt and uncertainty, it was necessary for Divine matters to be delivered to them by way of faith, being told to them, as it were, by G.o.d Himself Who cannot lie.
Reply Obj. 1: The researches of natural reason do not suffice mankind for the knowledge of Divine matters, even of those that can be proved by reason: and so it is not superfluous if these others be believed.
Reply Obj. 2: Science and faith cannot be in the same subject and about the same object: but what is an object of science for one, can be an object of faith for another, as stated above (Q. 1, A. 5).
Reply Obj. 3: Although all things that can be known by science are of one common scientific aspect, they do not all alike lead man to beat.i.tude: hence they are not all equally proposed to our belief.
_______________________
FIFTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 2, Art. 5]
Whether Man Is Bound to Believe Anything Explicitly?
Objection 1: It would seem that man is not bound to believe anything explicitly. For no man is bound to do what is not in his power. Now it is not in man"s power to believe a thing explicitly, for it is written (Rom. 10:14, 15): "How shall they believe Him, of whom they have not heard? And how shall they hear without a preacher? And how shall they preach unless they be sent?" Therefore man is not bound to believe anything explicitly.
Obj. 2: Further, just as we are directed to G.o.d by faith, so are we by charity. Now man is not bound to keep the precepts of charity, and it is enough if he be ready to fulfil them: as is evidenced by the precept of Our Lord (Matt. 5:39): "If one strike thee on one [Vulg.: "thy right"] cheek, turn to him also the other"; and by others of the same kind, according to Augustine"s exposition (De Serm. Dom. in Monte xix). Therefore neither is man bound to believe anything explicitly, and it is enough if he be ready to believe whatever G.o.d proposes to be believed.
Obj. 3: Further, the good of faith consists in obedience, according to Rom. 1:5: "For obedience to the faith in all nations." Now the virtue of obedience does not require man to keep certain fixed precepts, but it is enough that his mind be ready to obey, according to Ps. 118:60: "I am ready and am not troubled; that I may keep Thy commandments." Therefore it seems enough for faith, too, that man should be ready to believe whatever G.o.d may propose, without his believing anything explicitly.
_On the contrary,_ It is written (Heb. 11:6): "He that cometh to G.o.d, must believe that He is, and is a rewarder to them that seek Him."
_I answer that,_ The precepts of the Law, which man is bound to fulfil, concern acts of virtue which are the means of attaining salvation. Now an act of virtue, as stated above (I-II, Q. 60, A. 5) depends on the relation of the habit to its object. Again two things may be considered in the object of any virtue; namely, that which is the proper and direct object of that virtue, and that which is accidental and consequent to the object properly so called. Thus it belongs properly and directly to the object of fort.i.tude, to face the dangers of death, and to charge at the foe with danger to oneself, for the sake of the common good: yet that, in a just war, a man be armed, or strike another with his sword, and so forth, is reduced to the object of fort.i.tude, but indirectly.
Accordingly, just as a virtuous act is required for the fulfilment of a precept, so is it necessary that the virtuous act should terminate in its proper and direct object: but, on the other hand, the fulfilment of the precept does not require that a virtuous act should terminate in those things which have an accidental or secondary relation to the proper and direct object of that virtue, except in certain places and at certain times. We must, therefore, say that the direct object of faith is that whereby man is made one of the Blessed, as stated above (Q. 1, A. 8): while the indirect and secondary object comprises all things delivered by G.o.d to us in Holy Writ, for instance that Abraham had two sons, that David was the son of Jesse, and so forth.
Therefore, as regards the primary points or articles of faith, man is bound to believe them, just as he is bound to have faith; but as to other points of faith, man is not bound to believe them explicitly, but only implicitly, or to be ready to believe them, in so far as he is prepared to believe whatever is contained in the Divine Scriptures. Then alone is he bound to believe such things explicitly, when it is clear to him that they are contained in the doctrine of faith.
Reply Obj. 1: If we understand those things alone to be in a man"s power, which we can do without the help of grace, then we are bound to do many things which we cannot do without the aid of healing grace, such as to love G.o.d and our neighbor, and likewise to believe the articles of faith. But with the help of grace we can do this, for this help "to whomsoever it is given from above it is mercifully given; and from whom it is withheld it is justly withheld, as a punishment of a previous, or at least of original, sin," as Augustine states (De Corr. et Grat. v, vi [*Cf. Ep. cxc; De Praed. Sanct.
viii.]).
Reply Obj. 2: Man is bound to love definitely those lovable things which are properly and directly the objects of charity, namely, G.o.d and our neighbor. The objection refers to those precepts of charity which belong, as a consequence, to the objects of charity.
Reply Obj. 3: The virtue of obedience is seated, properly speaking, in the will; hence promptness of the will subject to authority, suffices for the act of obedience, because it is the proper and direct object of obedience. But this or that precept is accidental or consequent to that proper and direct object.
_______________________
SIXTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 2, Art. 6]
Whether All Are Equally Bound to Have Explicit Faith?
Objection 1: It would seem that all are equally bound to have explicit faith. For all are bound to those things which are necessary for salvation, as is evidenced by the precepts of charity. Now it is necessary for salvation that certain things should be believed explicitly. Therefore all are equally bound to have explicit faith.
Obj. 2: Further, no one should be put to test in matters that he is not bound to believe. But simple persons are sometimes tested in reference to the slightest articles of faith. Therefore all are bound to believe everything explicitly.
Obj. 3: Further, if the simple are bound to have, not explicit but only implicit faith, their faith must needs be implied in the faith of the learned. But this seems unsafe, since it is possible for the learned to err. Therefore it seems that the simple should also have explicit faith; so that all are, therefore, equally bound to have explicit faith.
_On the contrary,_ It is written (Job 1:14): "The oxen were ploughing, and the a.s.ses feeding beside them," because, as Gregory expounds this pa.s.sage (Moral. ii, 17), the simple, who are signified by the a.s.ses, ought, in matters of faith, to stay by the learned, who are denoted by the oxen.
_I answer that,_ The unfolding of matters of faith is the result of Divine revelation: for matters of faith surpa.s.s natural reason. Now Divine revelation reaches those of lower degree through those who are over them, in a certain order; to men, for instance, through the angels, and to the lower angels through the higher, as Dionysius explains (Coel. Hier. iv, vii). In like manner therefore the unfolding of faith must needs reach men of lower degree through those of higher degree. Consequently, just as the higher angels, who enlighten those who are below them, have a fuller knowledge of Divine things than the lower angels, as Dionysius states (Coel. Hier. xii), so too, men of higher degree, whose business it is to teach others, are under obligation to have fuller knowledge of matters of faith, and to believe them more explicitly.
Reply Obj. 1: The unfolding of the articles of faith is not equally necessary for the salvation of all, since those of higher degree, whose duty it is to teach others, are bound to believe explicitly more things than others are.
Reply Obj. 2: Simple persons should not be put to the test about subtle questions of faith, unless they be suspected of having been corrupted by heretics, who are wont to corrupt the faith of simple people in such questions. If, however, it is found that they are free from obstinacy in their heterodox sentiments, and that it is due to their simplicity, it is no fault of theirs.
Reply Obj. 3: The simple have no faith implied in that of the learned, except in so far as the latter adhere to the Divine teaching. Hence the Apostle says (1 Cor. 4:16): "Be ye followers of me, as I also am of Christ." Hence it is not human knowledge, but the Divine truth that is the rule of faith: and if any of the learned stray from this rule, he does not harm the faith of the simple ones, who think that the learned believe aright; unless the simple hold obstinately to their individual errors, against the faith of the universal Church, which cannot err, since Our Lord said (Luke 22:32): "I have prayed for thee," Peter, "that thy faith fail not."
_______________________
SEVENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 2, Art. 7]