Corresponds to the Gift of Knowledge?
Objection 1: It would seem that the third beat.i.tude, "Blessed are they that mourn," does not correspond to the gift of knowledge. For, even as evil is the cause of sorrow and grief, so is good the cause of joy.
Now knowledge brings good to light rather than evil, since the latter is known through evil: for "the straight line rules both itself and the crooked line" (De Anima i, 5). Therefore the aforesaid beat.i.tude does not suitably correspond to the gift of knowledge.
Obj. 2: Further, consideration of truth is an act of knowledge. Now there is no sorrow in the consideration of truth; rather is there joy, since it is written (Wis. 8:16): "Her conversation hath no bitterness, nor her company any tediousness, but joy and gladness."
Therefore the aforesaid beat.i.tude does not suitably correspond with the gift of knowledge.
Obj. 3: Further, the gift of knowledge consists in speculation, before operation. Now, in so far as it consists in speculation, sorrow does not correspond to it, since "the speculative intellect is not concerned about things to be sought or avoided" (De Anima iii, 9). Therefore the aforesaid beat.i.tude is not suitably reckoned to correspond with the gift of knowledge.
_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. in Monte iv): "Knowledge befits the mourner, who has discovered that he has been mastered by the evil which he coveted as though it were good."
_I answer that,_ Right judgment about creatures belongs properly to knowledge. Now it is through creatures that man"s aversion from G.o.d is occasioned, according to Wis. 14:11: "Creatures ... are turned to an abomination ... and a snare to the feet of the unwise," of those, namely, who do not judge aright about creatures, since they deem the perfect good to consist in them. Hence they sin by placing their last end in them, and lose the true good. It is by forming a right judgment of creatures that man becomes aware of the loss (of which they may be the occasion), which judgment he exercises through the gift of knowledge.
Hence the beat.i.tude of sorrow is said to correspond to the gift of knowledge.
Reply Obj. 1: Created goods do not cause spiritual joy, except in so far as they are referred to the Divine good, which is the proper cause of spiritual joy. Hence spiritual peace and the resulting joy correspond directly to the gift of wisdom: but to the gift of knowledge there corresponds, in the first place, sorrow for past errors, and, in consequence, consolation, since, by his right judgment, man directs creatures to the Divine good. For this reason sorrow is set forth in this beat.i.tude, as the merit, and the resulting consolation, as the reward; which is begun in this life, and is perfected in the life to come.
Reply Obj. 2: Man rejoices in the very consideration of truth; yet he may sometimes grieve for the thing, the truth of which he considers: it is thus that sorrow is ascribed to knowledge.
Reply Obj. 3: No beat.i.tude corresponds to knowledge, in so far as it consists in speculation, because man"s beat.i.tude consists, not in considering creatures, but in contemplating G.o.d. But man"s beat.i.tude does consist somewhat in the right use of creatures, and in well-ordered love of them: and this I say with regard to the beat.i.tude of a wayfarer. Hence beat.i.tude relating to contemplation is not ascribed to knowledge, but to understanding and wisdom, which are about Divine things.
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QUESTION 10
OF UNBELIEF IN GENERAL (In Twelve Articles)
In due sequence we must consider the contrary vices: first, unbelief, which is contrary to faith; secondly, blasphemy, which is opposed to confession of faith; thirdly, ignorance and dulness of mind, which are contrary to knowledge and understanding.
As to the first, we must consider (1) unbelief in general; (2) heresy; (3) apostasy from the faith.
Under the first head there are twelve points of inquiry:
(1) Whether unbelief is a sin?
(2) What is its subject?
(3) Whether it is the greatest of sins?
(4) Whether every action of unbelievers is a sin?
(5) Of the species of unbelief;
(6) Of their comparison, one with another;
(7) Whether we ought to dispute about faith with unbelievers?
(8) Whether they ought to be compelled to the faith?
(9) Whether we ought to have communications with them?
(10) Whether unbelievers can have authority over Christians?
(11) Whether the rites of unbelievers should be tolerated?
(12) Whether the children of unbelievers are to be baptized against their parents" will?
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FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 10, Art. 1]
Whether Unbelief Is a Sin?
Objection 1: It would seem that unbelief is not a sin. For every sin is contrary to nature, as Damascene proves (De Fide Orth. ii, 4). Now unbelief seems not to be contrary to nature; for Augustine says (De Praedest. Sanct. v) that "to be capable to having faith, just as to be capable of having charity, is natural to all men; whereas to have faith, even as to have charity, belongs to the grace of the faithful."
Therefore not to have faith, which is to be an unbeliever, is not a sin.
Obj. 2: Further, no one sins that which he cannot avoid, since every sin is voluntary. Now it is not in a man"s power to avoid unbelief, for he cannot avoid it unless he have faith, because the Apostle says (Rom. 10:14): "How shall they believe in Him, of Whom they have not heard? And how shall they hear without a preacher?" Therefore unbelief does not seem to be a sin.
Obj. 3: Further, as stated above (I-II, Q. 84, A. 4), there are seven capital sins, to which all sins are reduced. But unbelief does not seem to be comprised under any of them. Therefore unbelief is not a sin.
_On the contrary,_ Vice is opposed to virtue. Now faith is a virtue, and unbelief is opposed to it. Therefore unbelief is a sin.
_I answer that,_ Unbelief may be taken in two ways: first, by way of pure negation, so that a man be called an unbeliever, merely because he has not the faith. Secondly, unbelief may be taken by way of opposition to the faith; in which sense a man refuses to hear the faith, or despises it, according to Isa. 53:1: "Who hath believed our report?" It is this that completes the notion of unbelief, and it is in this sense that unbelief is a sin.
If, however, we take it by way of pure negation, as we find it in those who have heard nothing about the faith, it bears the character, not of sin, but of punishment, because such like ignorance of Divine things is a result of the sin of our first parent. If such like unbelievers are d.a.m.ned, it is on account of other sins, which cannot be taken away without faith, but not on account of their sin of unbelief. Hence Our Lord said (John 15:22) "If I had not come, and spoken to them, they would not have sin"; which Augustine expounds (Tract. lx.x.xix in Joan.) as "referring to the sin whereby they believed not in Christ."
Reply Obj. 1: To have the faith is not part of human nature, but it is part of human nature that man"s mind should not thwart his inner instinct, and the outward preaching of the truth. Hence, in this way, unbelief is contrary to nature.
Reply Obj. 2: This argument takes unbelief as denoting a pure negation.
Reply Obj. 3: Unbelief, in so far as it is a sin, arises from pride, through which man is unwilling to subject his intellect to the rules of faith, and to the sound interpretation of the Fathers. Hence Gregory says (Moral. x.x.xi, 45) that "presumptuous innovations arise from vainglory."
It might also be replied that just as the theological virtues are not reduced to the cardinal virtues, but precede them, so too, the vices opposed to the theological virtues are not reduced to the capital vices.
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SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 10, Art. 2]
Whether Unbelief Is in the Intellect As Its Subject?
Objection 1: It would seem that unbelief is not in the intellect as its subject. For every sin is in the will, according to Augustine (De Duabus Anim. x, xi). Now unbelief is a sin, as stated above (A. 1).
Therefore unbelief resides in the will and not in the intellect.
Obj. 2: Further, unbelief is sinful through contempt of the preaching of the faith. But contempt pertains to the will. Therefore unbelief is in the will.
Obj. 3: Further, a gloss [*Augustine, Enchiridion lx.] on 2 Cor.
11:14 "Satan ... transformeth himself into an angel of light," says that if "a wicked angel pretend to be a good angel, and be taken for a good angel, it is not a dangerous or an unhealthy error, if he does or says what is becoming to a good angel." This seems to be because of the rect.i.tude of the will of the man who adheres to the angel, since his intention is to adhere to a good angel. Therefore the sin of unbelief seems to consist entirely in a perverse will: and, consequently, it does not reside in the intellect.
_On the contrary,_ Things which are contrary to one another are in the same subject. Now faith, to which unbelief is opposed, resides in the intellect. Therefore unbelief also is in the intellect.
_I answer that,_ As stated above (I-II, Q. 74, AA. 1, 2), sin is said to be in the power which is the principle of the sinful act. Now a sinful act may have two principles: one is its first and universal principle, which commands all acts of sin; and this is the will, because every sin is voluntary. The other principle of the sinful act is the proper and proximate principle which elicits the sinful act: thus the concupiscible is the principle of gluttony and l.u.s.t, wherefore these sins are said to be in the concupiscible. Now dissent, which is the act proper to unbelief, is an act of the intellect, moved, however, by the will, just as a.s.sent is.