_On the contrary,_ Servile fear is a gift of the Holy Ghost, as stated above (A. 4). Now the gifts of the Holy Ghost are not forfeited through the advent of charity, whereby the Holy Ghost dwells in us. Therefore servile fear is not driven out when charity comes.
_I answer that,_ Servile fear proceeds from self-love, because it is fear of punishment which is detrimental to one"s own good. Hence the fear of punishment is consistent with charity, in the same way as self-love is: because it comes to the same that a man love his own good and that he fear to be deprived of it.
Now self-love may stand in a threefold relationship to charity. In one way it is contrary to charity, when a man places his end in the love of his own good. In another way it is included in charity, when a man loves himself for the sake of G.o.d and in G.o.d. In a third way, it is indeed distinct from charity, but is not contrary thereto, as when a man loves himself from the point of view of his own good, yet not so as to place his end in this his own good: even as one may have another special love for one"s neighbor, besides the love of charity which is founded on G.o.d, when we love him by reason of usefulness, consanguinity, or some other human consideration, which, however, is referable to charity.
Accordingly fear of punishment is, in one way, included in charity, because separation from G.o.d is a punishment, which charity shuns exceedingly; so that this belongs to chaste fear. In another way, it is contrary to charity, when a man shrinks from the punishment that is opposed to his natural good, as being the princ.i.p.al evil in opposition to the good which he loves as an end; and in this way fear of punishment is not consistent with charity. In another way fear of punishment is indeed substantially distinct from chaste fear, when, to wit, a man fears a penal evil, not because it separates him from G.o.d, but because it is hurtful to his own good, and yet he does not place his end in this good, so that neither does he dread this evil as being the princ.i.p.al evil. Such fear of punishment is consistent with charity; but it is not called servile, except when punishment is dreaded as a princ.i.p.al evil, as explained above (AA. 2, 4). Hence fear considered as servile, does not remain with charity, but the substance of servile fear can remain with charity, even as self-love can remain with charity.
Reply Obj. 1: Augustine is speaking of fear considered as servile: and such is the sense of the two other objections.
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SIXTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 19, Art. 6]
Whether Fear Is the Beginning of Wisdom?
Objection 1: It would seem that fear is not the beginning of wisdom.
For the beginning of a thing is a part thereof. But fear is not a part of wisdom, since fear is seated in the appet.i.tive faculty, while wisdom is in the intellect. Therefore it seems that fear is not the beginning of wisdom.
Obj. 2: Further, nothing is the beginning of itself. "Now fear of the Lord, that is wisdom," according to Job 28:28. Therefore it seems that fear of G.o.d is not the beginning of wisdom.
Obj. 3: Further, nothing is prior to the beginning. But something is prior to fear, since faith precedes fear. Therefore it seems that fear is not the beginning of wisdom.
_On the contrary,_ It is written in the Ps. 110:10: "The fear of the Lord is the beginning of wisdom."
_I answer that,_ A thing may be called the beginning of wisdom in two ways: in one way because it is the beginning of wisdom itself as to its essence; in another way, as to its effect. Thus the beginning of an art as to its essence consists in the principles from which that art proceeds, while the beginning of an art as to its effect is that wherefrom it begins to operate: for instance we might say that the beginning of the art of building is the foundation because that is where the builder begins his work.
Now, since wisdom is the knowledge of Divine things, as we shall state further on (Q. 45, A. 1), it is considered by us in one way, and in another way by philosophers. For, seeing that our life is ordained to the enjoyment of G.o.d, and is directed thereto according to a partic.i.p.ation of the Divine Nature, conferred on us through grace, wisdom, as we look at it, is considered not only as being cognizant of G.o.d, as it is with the philosophers, but also as directing human conduct; since this is directed not only by the human law, but also by the Divine law, as Augustine shows (De Trin. xii, 14). Accordingly the beginning of wisdom as to its essence consists in the first principles of wisdom, i.e. the articles of faith, and in this sense faith is said to be the beginning of wisdom. But as regards the effect, the beginning of wisdom is the point where wisdom begins to work, and in this way fear is the beginning of wisdom, yet servile fear in one way, and filial fear, in another. For servile fear is like a principle disposing a man to wisdom from without, in so far as he refrains from sin through fear of punishment, and is thus fashioned for the effect of wisdom, according to Ecclus. 1:27, "The fear of the Lord driveth out sin." On the other hand, chaste or filial fear is the beginning of wisdom, as being the first effect of wisdom. For since the regulation of human conduct by the Divine law belongs to wisdom, in order to make a beginning, man must first of all fear G.o.d and submit himself to Him: for the result will be that in all things he will be ruled by G.o.d.
Reply Obj. 1: This argument proves that fear is not the beginning of wisdom as to the essence of wisdom.
Reply Obj. 2: The fear of G.o.d is compared to a man"s whole life that is ruled by G.o.d"s wisdom, as the root to the tree: hence it is written (Ecclus. 1:25): "The root of wisdom is to fear the Lord, for [Vulg.: "and"] the branches thereof are longlived." Consequently, as the root is said to be virtually the tree, so the fear of G.o.d is said to be wisdom.
Reply Obj. 3: As stated above, faith is the beginning of wisdom in one way, and fear, in another. Hence it is written (Ecclus.
25:16): "The fear of G.o.d is the beginning of love: and the beginning of faith is to be fast joined to it."
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SEVENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 19, Art. 7]
Whether Initial Fear Differs Substantially from Filial Fear?
Objection 1: It would seem that initial fear differs substantially from filial fear. For filial fear is caused by love. Now initial fear is the beginning of love, according to Ecclus. 25:16, "The fear of G.o.d is the beginning of love." Therefore initial fear is distinct from filial fear.
Obj. 2: Further, initial fear dreads punishment, which is the object of servile fear, so that initial and servile fear would seem to be the same. But servile fear is distinct from filial fear. Therefore initial fear also is substantially distinct from initial fear.
Obj. 3: Further, a mean differs in the same ratio from both the extremes. Now initial fear is the mean between servile and filial fear. Therefore it differs from both filial and servile fear.
_On the contrary,_ Perfect and imperfect do not diversify the substance of a thing. Now initial and filial fear differ in respect of perfection and imperfection of charity, as Augustine states (In prim. canon. Joan. Tract. ix). Therefore initial fear does not differ substantially from filial fear.
_I answer that,_ Initial fear is so called because it is a beginning (_initium_). Since, however, both servile and filial fear are, in some way, the beginning of wisdom, each may be called in some way, initial.
It is not in this sense, however, that we are to understand initial fear in so far as it is distinct from servile and filial fear, but in the sense according to which it belongs to the state of beginners, in whom there is a beginning of filial fear resulting from a beginning of charity, although they do not possess the perfection of filial fear, because they have not yet attained to the perfection of charity. Consequently initial fear stands in the same relation to filial fear as imperfect to perfect charity. Now perfect and imperfect charity differ, not as to essence but as to state.
Therefore we must conclude that initial fear, as we understand it here, does not differ essentially from filial fear.
Reply Obj. 1: The fear which is a beginning of love is servile fear, which is the herald of charity, just as the bristle introduces the thread, as Augustine states (Tract. ix in Ep. i Joan.). Or else, if it be referred to initial fear, this is said to be the beginning of love, not absolutely, but relatively to the state of perfect charity.
Reply Obj. 2: Initial fear does not dread punishment as its proper object, but as having something of servile fear connected with it: for this servile fear, as to its substance, remains indeed, with charity, its servility being cast aside; whereas its act remains with imperfect charity in the man who is moved to perform good actions not only through love of justice, but also through fear of punishment, though this same act ceases in the man who has perfect charity, which "casteth out fear," according to 1 John 4:18.
Reply Obj. 3: Initial fear is a mean between servile and filial fear, not as between two things of the same genus, but as the imperfect is a mean between a perfect being and a non-being, as stated in _Metaph._ ii, for it is the same substantially as the perfect being, while it differs altogether from non-being.
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NINTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 19, Art. 9]
Whether Fear Is a Gift of the Holy Ghost?
Objection 1: It would seem that fear is not a gift of the Holy Ghost.
For no gift of the Holy Ghost is opposed to a virtue, which is also from the Holy Ghost; else the Holy Ghost would be in opposition to Himself. Now fear is opposed to hope, which is a virtue. Therefore fear is not a gift of the Holy Ghost.
Obj. 2: Further, it is proper to a theological virtue to have G.o.d for its object. But fear has G.o.d for its object, in so far as G.o.d is feared. Therefore fear is not a gift, but a theological virtue.
Obj. 3: Further, fear arises from love. But love is reckoned a theological virtue. Therefore fear also is a theological virtue, being connected with the same matter, as it were.
Obj. 4: Further, Gregory says (Moral. ii, 49) that "fear is bestowed as a remedy against pride." But the virtue of humility is opposed to pride. Therefore again, fear is a kind of virtue.
Obj. 5: Further, the gifts are more perfect than the virtues, since they are bestowed in support of the virtues as Gregory says (Moral.
ii, 49). Now hope is more perfect than fear, since hope regards good, while fear regards evil. Since, then, hope is a virtue, it should not be said that fear is a gift.
_On the contrary,_ The fear of the Lord is numbered among the seven gifts of the Holy Ghost (Isa. 11:3).
_I answer that,_ Fear is of several kinds, as stated above (A. 2).
Now it is not "human fear," according to Augustine (De Gratia et Lib.
Arb. xviii), "that is a gift of G.o.d"--for it was by this fear that Peter denied Christ--but that fear of which it was said (Matt.
10:28): "Fear Him that can destroy both soul and body into h.e.l.l."
Again servile fear is not to be reckoned among the seven gifts of the Holy Ghost, though it is from Him, because according to Augustine (De Nat. et Grat. lvii) it is compatible with the will to sin: whereas the gifts of the Holy Ghost are incompatible with the will to sin, as they are inseparable from charity, as stated above (I-II, Q. 68, A.
5).
It follows, therefore, that the fear of G.o.d, which is numbered among the seven gifts of the Holy Ghost, is filial or chaste fear. For it was stated above (I-II, Q. 68, AA. 1, 3) that the gifts of the Holy Ghost are certain habitual perfections of the soul"s powers, whereby these are rendered amenable to the motion of the Holy Ghost, just as, by the moral virtues, the appet.i.tive powers are rendered amenable to the motion of reason. Now for a thing to be amenable to the motion of a certain mover, the first condition required is that it be a non-resistant subject of that mover, because resistance of the movable subject to the mover hinders the movement. This is what filial or chaste fear does, since thereby we revere G.o.d and avoid separating ourselves from Him. Hence, according to Augustine (De Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 4) filial fear holds the first place, as it were, among the gifts of the Holy Ghost, in the ascending order, and the last place, in the descending order.
Reply Obj. 1: Filial fear is not opposed to the virtue of hope: since thereby we fear, not that we may fail of what we hope to obtain by G.o.d"s help, but lest we withdraw ourselves from this help. Wherefore filial fear and hope cling together, and perfect one another.
Reply Obj. 2: The proper and princ.i.p.al object of fear is the evil shunned, and in this way, as stated above (A. 1), G.o.d cannot be an object of fear. Yet He is, in this way, the object of hope and the other theological virtues, since, by the virtue of hope, we trust in G.o.d"s help, not only to obtain any other goods, but, chiefly, to obtain G.o.d Himself, as the princ.i.p.al good. The same evidently applies to the other theological virtues.
Reply Obj. 3: From the fact that love is the origin of fear, it does not follow that the fear of G.o.d is not a distinct habit from charity which is the love of G.o.d, since love is the origin of all the emotions, and yet we are perfected by different habits in respect of different emotions. Yet love is more of a virtue than fear is, because love regards good, to which virtue is princ.i.p.ally directed by reason of its own nature, as was shown above (I-II, Q. 55, AA. 3, 4); for which reason hope is also reckoned as a virtue; whereas fear princ.i.p.ally regards evil, the avoidance of which it denotes, wherefore it is something less than a theological virtue.
Reply Obj. 4: According to Ecclus. 10:14, "the beginning of the pride of man is to fall off from G.o.d," that is to refuse submission to G.o.d, and this is opposed to filial fear, which reveres G.o.d. Thus fear cuts off the source of pride for which reason it is bestowed as a remedy against pride. Yet it does not follow that it is the same as the virtue of humility, but that it is its origin. For the gifts of the Holy Ghost are the origin of the intellectual and moral virtues, as stated above (I-II, Q. 68, A. 4), while the theological virtues are the origin of the gifts, as stated above (I-II, Q. 69, A. 4, ad 3).
This suffices for the Reply to the Fifth Objection.
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TENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 19, Art. 10]