Objection 1: It seems that G.o.d is composed of matter and form. For whatever has a soul is composed of matter and form; since the soul is the form of the body. But Scripture attributes a soul to G.o.d; for it is mentioned in Hebrews (Heb. 10:38), where G.o.d says: "But My just man liveth by faith; but if he withdraw himself, he shall not please My soul." Therefore G.o.d is composed of matter and form.
Obj. 2: Further, anger, joy and the like are pa.s.sions of the composite. But these are attributed to G.o.d in Scripture: "The Lord was exceeding angry with His people" (Ps. 105:40). Therefore G.o.d is composed of matter and form.
Obj. 3: Further, matter is the principle of individualization.
But G.o.d seems to be individual, for He cannot be predicated of many.
Therefore He is composed of matter and form.
_On the contrary,_ Whatever is composed of matter and form is a body; for dimensive quant.i.ty is the first property of matter. But G.o.d is not a body as proved in the preceding Article; therefore He is not composed of matter and form.
_I answer that,_ It is impossible that matter should exist in G.o.d.
First, because matter is in potentiality. But we have shown (Q. 2, A. 3) that G.o.d is pure act, without any potentiality. Hence it is impossible that G.o.d should be composed of matter and form. Secondly, because everything composed of matter and form owes its perfection and goodness to its form; therefore its goodness is partic.i.p.ated, inasmuch as matter partic.i.p.ates the form. Now the first good and the best--viz. G.o.d--is not a partic.i.p.ated good, because the essential good is prior to the partic.i.p.ated good. Hence it is impossible that G.o.d should be composed of matter and form. Thirdly, because every agent acts by its form; hence the manner in which it has its form is the manner in which it is an agent. Therefore whatever is primarily and essentially an agent must be primarily and essentially form. Now G.o.d is the first agent, since He is the first efficient cause. He is therefore of His essence a form; and not composed of matter and form.
Reply Obj. 1: A soul is attributed to G.o.d because His acts resemble the acts of a soul; for, that we will anything, is due to our soul. Hence what is pleasing to His will is said to be pleasing to His soul.
Reply Obj. 2: Anger and the like are attributed to G.o.d on account of a similitude of effect. Thus, because to punish is properly the act of an angry man, G.o.d"s punishment is metaphorically spoken of as His anger.
Reply Obj. 3: Forms which can be received in matter are individualized by matter, which cannot be in another as in a subject since it is the first underlying subject; although form of itself, unless something else prevents it, can be received by many. But that form which cannot be received in matter, but is self-subsisting, is individualized precisely because it cannot be received in a subject; and such a form is G.o.d. Hence it does not follow that matter exists in G.o.d.
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THIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 3, Art. 3]
Whether G.o.d is the Same as His Essence or Nature?
Objection 1: It seems that G.o.d is not the same as His essence or nature. For nothing can be in itself. But the substance or nature of G.o.d--i.e. the G.o.dhead--is said to be in G.o.d. Therefore it seems that G.o.d is not the same as His essence or nature.
Obj. 2: Further, the effect is a.s.similated to its cause; for every agent produces its like. But in created things the _suppositum_ is not identical with its nature; for a man is not the same as his humanity. Therefore G.o.d is not the same as His G.o.dhead.
_On the contrary,_ It is said of G.o.d that He is life itself, and not only that He is a living thing: "I am the way, the truth, and the life" (John 14:6). Now the relation between G.o.dhead and G.o.d is the same as the relation between life and a living thing. Therefore G.o.d is His very G.o.dhead.
_I answer that,_ G.o.d is the same as His essence or nature. To understand this, it must be noted that in things composed of matter and form, the nature or essence must differ from the _suppositum,_ because the essence or nature connotes only what is included in the definition of the species; as, humanity connotes all that is included in the definition of man, for it is by this that man is man, and it is this that humanity signifies, that, namely, whereby man is man. Now individual matter, with all the individualizing accidents, is not included in the definition of the species. For this particular flesh, these bones, this blackness or whiteness, etc., are not included in the definition of a man. Therefore this flesh, these bones, and the accidental qualities distinguishing this particular matter, are not included in humanity; and yet they are included in the thing which is man. Hence the thing which is a man has something more in it than has humanity. Consequently humanity and a man are not wholly identical; but humanity is taken to mean the formal part of a man, because the principles whereby a thing is defined are regarded as the formal const.i.tuent in regard to the individualizing matter. On the other hand, in things not composed of matter and form, in which individualization is not due to individual matter--that is to say, to _this_ matter--the very forms being individualized of themselves--it is necessary the forms themselves should be subsisting _supposita._ Therefore _suppositum_ and nature in them are identified. Since G.o.d then is not composed of matter and form, He must be His own G.o.dhead, His own Life, and whatever else is thus predicated of Him.
Reply Obj. 1: We can speak of simple things only as though they were like the composite things from which we derive our knowledge. Therefore in speaking of G.o.d, we use concrete nouns to signify His subsistence, because with us only those things subsist which are composite; and we use abstract nouns to signify His simplicity. In saying therefore that G.o.dhead, or life, or the like are in G.o.d, we indicate the composite way in which our intellect understands, but not that there is any composition in G.o.d.
Reply Obj. 2: The effects of G.o.d do not imitate Him perfectly, but only as far as they are able; and the imitation is here defective, precisely because what is simple and one, can only be represented by divers things; consequently, composition is accidental to them, and therefore, in them _suppositum_ is not the same as nature.
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FOURTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 3, Art. 4]
Whether Essence and Existence Are the Same in G.o.d?
Objection 1: It seems that essence and existence are not the same in G.o.d. For if it be so, then the divine being has nothing added to it.
Now being to which no addition is made is universal being which is predicated of all things. Therefore it follows that G.o.d is being in general which can be predicated of everything. But this is false: "For men gave the incommunicable name to stones and wood" (Wis. 14:21).
Therefore G.o.d"s existence is not His essence.
Obj. 2: Further, we can know _whether_ G.o.d exists as said above (Q. 2, A. 2); but we cannot know _what_ He is. Therefore G.o.d"s existence is not the same as His essence--that is, as His quiddity or nature.
_On the contrary,_ Hilary says (Trin. vii): "In G.o.d existence is not an accidental quality, but subsisting truth." Therefore what subsists in G.o.d is His existence.
_I answer that,_ G.o.d is not only His own essence, as shown in the preceding article, but also His own existence. This may be shown in several ways. First, whatever a thing has besides its essence must be caused either by the const.i.tuent principles of that essence (like a property that necessarily accompanies the species--as the faculty of laughing is proper to a man--and is caused by the const.i.tuent principles of the species), or by some exterior agent--as heat is caused in water by fire. Therefore, if the existence of a thing differs from its essence, this existence must be caused either by some exterior agent or by its essential principles. Now it is impossible for a thing"s existence to be caused by its essential const.i.tuent principles, for nothing can be the sufficient cause of its own existence, if its existence is caused. Therefore that thing, whose existence differs from its essence, must have its existence caused by another. But this cannot be true of G.o.d; because we call G.o.d the first efficient cause. Therefore it is impossible that in G.o.d His existence should differ from His essence. Secondly, existence is that which makes every form or nature actual; for goodness and humanity are spoken of as actual, only because they are spoken of as existing.
Therefore existence must be compared to essence, if the latter is a distinct reality, as actuality to potentiality. Therefore, since in G.o.d there is no potentiality, as shown above (A. 1), it follows that in Him essence does not differ from existence. Therefore His essence is His existence. Thirdly, because, just as that which has fire, but is not itself fire, is on fire by partic.i.p.ation; so that which has existence but is not existence, is a being by partic.i.p.ation.
But G.o.d is His own essence, as shown above (A. 3); if, therefore, He is not His own existence He will be not essential, but partic.i.p.ated being. He will not therefore be the first being--which is absurd.
Therefore G.o.d is His own existence, and not merely His own essence.
Reply Obj. 1: A thing that has nothing added to it can be of two kinds. Either its essence precludes any addition; thus, for example, it is of the essence of an irrational animal to be without reason. Or we may understand a thing to have nothing added to it, inasmuch as its essence does not require that anything should be added to it; thus the genus animal is without reason, because it is not of the essence of animal in general to have reason; but neither is it to lack reason. And so the divine being has nothing added to it in the first sense; whereas universal being has nothing added to it in the second sense.
Reply Obj. 2: "To be" can mean either of two things. It may mean the act of essence, or it may mean the composition of a proposition effected by the mind in joining a predicate to a subject.
Taking "to be" in the first sense, we cannot understand G.o.d"s existence nor His essence; but only in the second sense. We know that this proposition which we form about G.o.d when we say "G.o.d is," is true; and this we know from His effects (Q. 2, A. 2).
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FIFTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 3, Art. 5]
Whether G.o.d Is Contained in a Genus?
Objection 1: It seems that G.o.d is contained in a genus. For a substance is a being that subsists of itself. But this is especially true of G.o.d. Therefore G.o.d is in a genus of substance.
Obj. 2: Further, nothing can be measured save by something of its own genus; as length is measured by length and numbers by number. But G.o.d is the measure of all substances, as the Commentator shows (Metaph. x). Therefore G.o.d is in the genus of substance.
_On the contrary,_ In the mind, genus is prior to what it contains. But nothing is prior to G.o.d either really or mentally. Therefore G.o.d is not in any genus.
_I answer that,_ A thing can be in a genus in two ways; either absolutely and properly, as a species contained under a genus; or as being reducible to it, as principles and privations. For example, a point and unity are reduced to the genus of quant.i.ty, as its principles; while blindness and all other privations are reduced to the genus of habit. But in neither way is G.o.d in a genus. That He cannot be a species of any genus may be shown in three ways. First, because a species is const.i.tuted of genus and difference. Now that from which the difference const.i.tuting the species is derived, is always related to that from which the genus is derived, as actuality is related to potentiality. For animal is derived from sensitive nature, by concretion as it were, for that is animal, which has a sensitive nature. Rational being, on the other hand, is derived from intellectual nature, because that is rational, which has an intellectual nature, and intelligence is compared to sense, as actuality is to potentiality. The same argument holds good in other things. Hence since in G.o.d actuality is not added to potentiality, it is impossible that He should be in any genus as a species. Secondly, since the existence of G.o.d is His essence, if G.o.d were in any genus, He would be the genus _being,_ because, since genus is predicated as an essential it refers to the essence of a thing. But the Philosopher has shown (Metaph. iii) that being cannot be a genus, for every genus has differences distinct from its generic essence. Now no difference can exist distinct from being; for non-being cannot be a difference.
It follows then that G.o.d is not in a genus. Thirdly, because all in one genus agree in the quiddity or essence of the genus which is predicated of them as an essential, but they differ in their existence. For the existence of man and of horse is not the same; as also of this man and that man: thus in every member of a genus, existence and quiddity--i.e. essence--must differ. But in G.o.d they do not differ, as shown in the preceding article. Therefore it is plain that G.o.d is not in a genus as if He were a species. From this it is also plain that He has no genus nor difference, nor can there be any definition of Him; nor, save through His effects, a demonstration of Him: for a definition is from genus and difference; and the mean of a demonstration is a definition. That G.o.d is not in a genus, as reducible to it as its principle, is clear from this, that a principle reducible to any genus does not extend beyond that genus; as, a point is the principle of continuous quant.i.ty alone; and unity, of discontinuous quant.i.ty. But G.o.d is the principle of all being.
Therefore He is not contained in any genus as its principle.
Reply Obj. 1: The word substance signifies not only what exists of itself--for existence cannot of itself be a genus, as shown in the body of the article; but, it also signifies an essence that has the property of existing in this way--namely, of existing of itself; this existence, however, is not its essence. Thus it is clear that G.o.d is not in the genus of substance.
Reply Obj. 2: This objection turns upon proportionate measure which must be h.o.m.ogeneous with what is measured. Now, G.o.d is not a measure proportionate to anything. Still, He is called the measure of all things, in the sense that everything has being only according as it resembles Him.
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SIXTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 3, Art. 6]
Whether in G.o.d There Are Any Accidents?
Objection 1: It seems that there are accidents in G.o.d. For substance cannot be an accident, as Aristotle says (Phys. i). Therefore that which is an accident in one, cannot, in another, be a substance. Thus it is proved that heat cannot be the substantial form of fire, because it is an accident in other things. But wisdom, virtue, and the like, which are accidents in us, are attributes of G.o.d. Therefore in G.o.d there are accidents.
Obj. 2: Further, in every genus there is a first principle. But there are many genera of accidents. If, therefore, the primal members of these genera are not in G.o.d, there will be many primal beings other than G.o.d--which is absurd.
_On the contrary,_ Every accident is in a subject. But G.o.d cannot be a subject, for "no simple form can be a subject", as Boethius says (De Trin.). Therefore in G.o.d there cannot be any accident.
_I answer that,_ From all we have said, it is clear there can be no accident in G.o.d. First, because a subject is compared to its accidents as potentiality to actuality; for a subject is in some sense made actual by its accidents. But there can be no potentiality in G.o.d, as was shown (Q. 2, A. 3). Secondly, because G.o.d is His own existence; and as Boethius says (Hebdom.), although every essence may have something superadded to it, this cannot apply to absolute being: thus a heated substance can have something extraneous to heat added to it, as whiteness, nevertheless absolute heat can have nothing else than heat. Thirdly, because what is essential is prior to what is accidental. Whence as G.o.d is absolute primal being, there can be in Him nothing accidental. Neither can He have any essential accidents (as the capability of laughing is an essential accident of man), because such accidents are caused by the const.i.tuent principles of the subject. Now there can be nothing caused in G.o.d, since He is the first cause. Hence it follows that there is no accident in G.o.d.
Reply Obj. 1: Virtue and wisdom are not predicated of G.o.d and of us univocally. Hence it does not follow that there are accidents in G.o.d as there are in us.
Reply Obj. 2: Since substance is prior to its accidents, the principles of accidents are reducible to the principles of the substance as to that which is prior; although G.o.d is not first as if contained in the genus of substance; yet He is first in respect to all being, outside of every genus.
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SEVENTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 3, Art. 7]
Whether G.o.d Is Altogether Simple?