(10) Whether we ought to love the angels out of charity?
(11) Whether we ought to love the demons?
(12) How to enumerate the things we are bound to love out of charity.
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FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 25, Art. 1]
Whether the Love of Charity Stops at G.o.d, or Extends to Our Neighbor?
Objection 1: It would seem that the love of charity stops at G.o.d and does not extend to our neighbor. For as we owe G.o.d love, so do we owe Him fear, according Deut. 10:12: "And now Israel, what doth the Lord thy G.o.d require of thee, but that thou fear ... and love Him?" Now the fear with which we fear man, and which is called human fear, is distinct from the fear with which we fear G.o.d, and which is either servile or filial, as is evident from what has been stated above (Q.
10, A. 2). Therefore also the love with which we love G.o.d, is distinct from the love with which we love our neighbor.
Obj. 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. viii, 8) that "to be loved is to be honored." Now the honor due to G.o.d, which is known as _latria,_ is distinct from the honor due to a creature, and known as _dulia._ Therefore again the love wherewith we love G.o.d, is distinct from that with which we love our neighbor.
Obj. 3: Further, hope begets charity, as a gloss states on Matt. 1:2.
Now hope is so due to G.o.d that it is reprehensible to hope in man, according to Jer. 17:5: "Cursed be the man that trusteth in man."
Therefore charity is so due to G.o.d, as not to extend to our neighbor.
_On the contrary,_ It is written (1 John 4:21): "This commandment we have from G.o.d, that he, who loveth G.o.d, love also his brother."
_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 17, A. 6; Q. 19, A. 3; I-II, Q.
54, A. 3) habits are not differentiated except their acts be of different species. For every act of the one species belongs to the same habit. Now since the species of an act is derived from its object, considered under its formal aspect, it follows of necessity that it is specifically the same act that tends to an aspect of the object, and that tends to the object under that aspect: thus it is specifically the same visual act whereby we see the light, and whereby we see the color under the aspect of light.
Now the aspect under which our neighbor is to be loved, is G.o.d, since what we ought to love in our neighbor is that he may be in G.o.d. Hence it is clear that it is specifically the same act whereby we love G.o.d, and whereby we love our neighbor. Consequently the habit of charity extends not only to the love of G.o.d, but also to the love of our neighbor.
Reply Obj. 1: We may fear our neighbor, even as we may love him, in two ways: first, on account of something that is proper to him, as when a man fears a tyrant on account of his cruelty, or loves him by reason of his own desire to get something from him. Such like human fear is distinct from the fear of G.o.d, and the same applies to love.
Secondly, we fear a man, or love him on account of what he has of G.o.d; as when we fear the secular power by reason of its exercising the ministry of G.o.d for the punishment of evildoers, and love it for its justice: such like fear of man is not distinct from fear of G.o.d, as neither is such like love.
Reply Obj. 2: Love regards good in general, whereas honor regards the honored person"s own good, for it is given to a person in recognition of his own virtue. Hence love is not differentiated specifically on account of the various degrees of goodness in various persons, so long as it is referred to one good common to all, whereas honor is distinguished according to the good belonging to individuals.
Consequently we love all our neighbors with the same love of charity, in so far as they are referred to one good common to them all, which is G.o.d; whereas we give various honors to various people, according to each one"s own virtue, and likewise to G.o.d we give the singular honor of latria on account of His singular virtue.
Reply Obj. 3: It is wrong to hope in man as though he were the princ.i.p.al author of salvation, but not, to hope in man as helping us ministerially under G.o.d. In like manner it would be wrong if a man loved his neighbor as though he were his last end, but not, if he loved him for G.o.d"s sake; and this is what charity does.
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SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 25, Art. 2]
Whether We Should Love Charity Out of Charity?
Objection 1: It would seem that charity need not be loved out of charity. For the things to be loved out of charity are contained in the two precepts of charity (Matt. 22:37-39): and neither of them includes charity, since charity is neither G.o.d nor our neighbor.
Therefore charity need not be loved out of charity.
Obj. 2: Further, charity is founded on the fellowship of happiness, as stated above (Q. 23, A. 1). But charity cannot partic.i.p.ate in happiness. Therefore charity need not be loved out of charity.
Obj. 3: Further, charity is a kind of friendship, as stated above (Q. 23, A. 1). But no man can have friendship for charity or for an accident, since such things cannot return love for love, which is essential to friendship, as stated in _Ethic._ viii. Therefore charity need not be loved out of charity.
_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Trin. viii, 8): "He that loves his neighbor, must, in consequence, love love itself." But we love our neighbor out of charity. Therefore it follows that charity also is loved out of charity.
_I answer that,_ Charity is love. Now love, by reason of the nature of the power whose act it is, is capable of reflecting on itself; for since the object of the will is the universal good, whatever has the aspect of good, can be the object of an act of the will: and since to will is itself a good, man can will himself to will. Even so the intellect, whose object is the true, understands that it understands, because this again is something true. Love, however, even by reason of its own species, is capable of reflecting on itself, because it is a spontaneous movement of the lover towards the beloved, wherefore from the moment a man loves, he loves himself to love.
Yet charity is not love simply, but has the nature of friendship, as stated above (Q. 23, A. 1). Now by friendship a thing is loved in two ways: first, as the friend for whom we have friendship, and to whom we wish good things: secondly, as the good which we wish to a friend.
It is in the latter and not in the former way that charity is loved out of charity, because charity is the good which we desire for all those whom we love out of charity. The same applies to happiness, and to the other virtues.
Reply Obj. 1: G.o.d and our neighbor are those with whom we are friends, but love of them includes the loving of charity, since we love both G.o.d and our neighbor, in so far as we love ourselves and our neighbor to love G.o.d, and this is to love charity.
Reply Obj. 2: Charity is itself the fellowship of the spiritual life, whereby we arrive at happiness: hence it is loved as the good which we desire for all whom we love out of charity.
Reply Obj. 3: This argument considers friendship as referred to those with whom we are friends.
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THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 25, Art. 3]
Whether Irrational Creatures Also Ought to Be Loved Out of Charity?
Objection 1: It would seem that irrational creatures also ought to be loved out of charity. For it is chiefly by charity that we are conformed to G.o.d. Now G.o.d loves irrational creatures out of charity, for He loves "all things that are" (Wis. 11:25), and whatever He loves, He loves by Himself Who is charity. Therefore we also should love irrational creatures out of charity.
Obj. 2: Further, charity is referred to G.o.d princ.i.p.ally, and extends to other things as referable to G.o.d. Now just as the rational creature is referable to G.o.d, in as much as it bears the resemblance of image, so too, are the irrational creatures, in as much as they bear the resemblance of a trace [*Cf. I, Q. 45, A. 7]. Therefore charity extends also to irrational creatures.
Obj. 3: Further, just as the object of charity is G.o.d. so is the object of faith. Now faith extends to irrational creatures, since we believe that heaven and earth were created by G.o.d, that the fishes and birds were brought forth out of the waters, and animals that walk, and plants, out of the earth. Therefore charity extends also to irrational creatures.
_On the contrary,_ The love of charity extends to none but G.o.d and our neighbor. But the word neighbor cannot be extended to irrational creatures, since they have no fellowship with man in the rational life. Therefore charity does not extend to irrational creatures.
_I answer that,_ According to what has been stated above (Q. 13, A.
1) charity is a kind of friendship. Now the love of friendship is twofold: first, there is the love for the friend to whom our friendship is given, secondly, the love for those good things which we desire for our friend. With regard to the first, no irrational creature can be loved out of charity; and for three reasons. Two of these reasons refer in a general way to friendship, which cannot have an irrational creature for its object: first because friendship is towards one to whom we wish good things, while, properly speaking, we cannot wish good things to an irrational creature, because it is not competent, properly speaking, to possess good, this being proper to the rational creature which, through its free-will, is the master of its disposal of the good it possesses. Hence the Philosopher says (Phys. ii, 6) that we do not speak of good or evil befalling such like things, except metaphorically. Secondly, because all friendship is based on some fellowship in life; since "nothing is so proper to friendship as to live together," as the Philosopher proves (Ethic.
viii, 5). Now irrational creatures can have no fellowship in human life which is regulated by reason. Hence friendship with irrational creatures is impossible, except metaphorically speaking. The third reason is proper to charity, for charity is based on the fellowship of everlasting happiness, to which the irrational creature cannot attain. Therefore we cannot have the friendship of charity towards an irrational creature.
Nevertheless we can love irrational creatures out of charity, if we regard them as the good things that we desire for others, in so far, to wit, as we wish for their preservation, to G.o.d"s honor and man"s use; thus too does G.o.d love them out of charity.
Wherefore the Reply to the First Objection is evident.
Reply Obj. 2: The likeness by way of trace does not confer the capacity for everlasting life, whereas the likeness of image does: and so the comparison fails.
Reply Obj. 3: Faith can extend to all that is in any way true, whereas the friendship of charity extends only to such things as have a natural capacity for everlasting life; wherefore the comparison fails.
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FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 25, Art. 4]
Whether a Man Ought to Love Himself Out of Charity?
Objection 1: It would seem that a man is [not] bound to love himself out of charity. For Gregory says in a homily (In Evang. xvii) that there "can be no charity between less than two." Therefore no man has charity towards himself.
Obj. 2: Further, friendship, by its very nature, implies mutual love and equality (Ethic. viii, 2, 7), which cannot be of one man towards himself. But charity is a kind of friendship, as stated above (Q. 23, A. 1). Therefore a man cannot have charity towards himself.
Obj. 3: Further, anything relating to charity cannot be blameworthy, since charity "dealeth not perversely" (1 Cor. 23:4). Now a man deserves to be blamed for loving himself, since it is written (2 Tim.
3:1, 2): "In the last days shall come dangerous times, men shall be lovers of themselves." Therefore a man cannot love himself out of charity.
_On the contrary,_ It is written (Lev. 19:18): "Thou shalt love thy friend as thyself." Now we love our friends out of charity. Therefore we should love ourselves too out of charity.
_I answer that,_ Since charity is a kind of friendship, as stated above (Q. 23, A. 1), we may consider charity from two standpoints: first, under the general notion of friendship, and in this way we must hold that, properly speaking, a man is not a friend to himself, but something more than a friend, since friendship implies union, for Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that "love is a unitive force," whereas a man is one with himself which is more than being united to another.