Or we may reply that we have unequal love for certain persons in two ways: first, through our loving some and not loving others. As regards beneficence we are bound to observe this inequality, because we cannot do good to all: but as regards benevolence, love ought not to be thus unequal. The other inequality arises from our loving some more than others: and Augustine does not mean to exclude the latter inequality, but the former, as is evident from what he says of beneficence.
Reply Obj. 2: Our neighbors are not all equally related to G.o.d; some are nearer to Him, by reason of their greater goodness, and those we ought, out of charity, to love more than those who are not so near to Him.
Reply Obj. 3: This argument considers the quant.i.ty of love on the part of the good which we wish our friends.
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SEVENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 26, Art. 7]
Whether We Ought to Love Those Who Are Better More Than Those Who Are More Closely United Us?
Objection 1: It would seem that we ought to love those who are better more than those who are more closely united to us. For that which is in no way hateful seems more lovable than that which is hateful for some reason: just as a thing is all the whiter for having less black mixed with it. Now those who are connected with us are hateful for some reason, according to Luke 14:26: "If any man come to Me, and hate not his father," etc. On the other hand good men are not hateful for any reason. Therefore it seems that we ought to love those who are better more than those who are more closely connected with us.
Obj. 2: Further, by charity above all, man is likened to G.o.d. But G.o.d loves more the better man. Therefore man also, out of charity, ought to love the better man more than one who is more closely united to him.
Obj. 3: Further, in every friendship, that ought to be loved most which has most to do with the foundation of that friendship: for, by natural friendship we love most those who are connected with us by nature, our parents for instance, or our children. Now the friendship of charity is founded upon the fellowship of happiness, which has more to do with better men than with those who are more closely united to us. Therefore, out of charity, we ought to love better men more than those who are more closely connected with us.
_On the contrary,_ It is written (1 Tim. 5:8): "If any man have not care of his own and especially of those of his house, he hath denied the faith, and is worse than an infidel." Now the inward affection of charity ought to correspond to the outward effect. Therefore charity regards those who are nearer to us before those who are better.
_I answer that,_ Every act should be proportionate both to its object and to the agent. But from its object it takes its species, while, from the power of the agent it takes the mode of its intensity: thus movement has its species from the term to which it tends, while the intensity of its speed arises from the disposition of the thing moved and the power of the mover. Accordingly love takes its species from its object, but its intensity is due to the lover.
Now the object of charity"s love is G.o.d, and man is the lover.
Therefore the specific diversity of the love which is in accordance with charity, as regards the love of our neighbor, depends on his relation to G.o.d, so that, out of charity, we should wish a greater good to one who is nearer to G.o.d; for though the good which charity wishes to all, viz. everlasting happiness, is one in itself, yet it has various degrees according to various shares of happiness, and it belongs to charity to wish G.o.d"s justice to be maintained, in accordance with which better men have a fuller share of happiness.
And this regards the species of love; for there are different species of love according to the different goods that we wish for those whom we love.
On the other hand, the intensity of love is measured with regard to the man who loves, and accordingly man loves those who are more closely united to him, with more intense affection as to the good he wishes for them, than he loves those who are better as to the greater good he wishes for them.
Again a further difference must be observed here: for some neighbors are connected with us by their natural origin, a connection which cannot be severed, since that origin makes them to be what they are.
But the goodness of virtue, wherein some are close to G.o.d, can come and go, increase and decrease, as was shown above (Q. 24, AA. 4, 10, 11). Hence it is possible for one, out of charity, to wish this man who is more closely united to one, to be better than another, and so reach a higher degree of happiness.
Moreover there is yet another reason for which, out of charity, we love more those who are more nearly connected with us, since we love them in more ways. For, towards those who are not connected with us we have no other friendship than charity, whereas for those who are connected with us, we have certain other friendships, according to the way in which they are connected. Now since the good on which every other friendship of the virtuous is based, is directed, as to its end, to the good on which charity is based, it follows that charity commands each act of another friendship, even as the art which is about the end commands the art which is about the means.
Consequently this very act of loving someone because he is akin or connected with us, or because he is a fellow-countryman or for any like reason that is referable to the end of charity, can be commanded by charity, so that, out of charity both eliciting and commanding, we love in more ways those who are more nearly connected with us.
Reply Obj. 1: We are commanded to hate, in our kindred, not their kinship, but only the fact of their being an obstacle between us and G.o.d. In this respect they are not akin but hostile to us, according to Micah 7:6: "A men"s enemies are they of his own household."
Reply Obj. 2: Charity conforms man to G.o.d proportionately, by making man comport himself towards what is his, as G.o.d does towards what is His. For we may, out of charity, will certain things as becoming to us which G.o.d does not will, because it becomes Him not to will them, as stated above (I-II, Q. 19, A. 10), when we were treating of the goodness of the will.
Reply Obj. 3: Charity elicits the act of love not only as regards the object, but also as regards the lover, as stated above. The result is that the man who is more nearly united to us is more loved.
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EIGHTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 26, Art. 8]
Whether We Ought to Love More Those Who Are Connected with Us by Ties of Blood?
Objection 1: It would seem that we ought not to love more those who are more closely united to us by ties of blood. For it is written (Prov. 18:24): "A man amiable in society, shall be more friendly than a brother." Again, Valerius Maximus says (Fact. et Dict. Memor. iv 7): "The ties of friendship are most strong and in no way yield to the ties of blood." Moreover it is quite certain and undeniable, that as to the latter, the lot of birth is fortuitous, whereas we contract the former by an untrammelled will, and a solid pledge. Therefore we ought not to love more than others those who are united to us by ties of blood.
Obj. 2: Further, Ambrose says (De Officiis i, 7): "I love not less you whom I have begotten in the Gospel, than if I had begotten you in wedlock, for nature is no more eager to love than grace." Surely we ought to love those whom we expect to be with us for ever more than those who will be with us only in this world. Therefore we should not love our kindred more than those who are otherwise connected with us.
Obj. 3: Further, "Love is proved by deeds," as Gregory states (Hom.
in Evang. x.x.x). Now we are bound to do acts of love to others than our kindred: thus in the army a man must obey his officer rather than his father. Therefore we are not bound to love our kindred most of all.
_On the contrary,_ The commandments of the decalogue contain a special precept about the honor due to our parents (Ex. 20:12).
Therefore we ought to love more specially those who are united to us by ties of blood.
_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 7), we ought out of charity to love those who are more closely united to us more, both because our love for them is more intense, and because there are more reasons for loving them. Now intensity of love arises from the union of lover and beloved: and therefore we should measure the love of different persons according to the different kinds of union, so that a man is more loved in matters touching that particular union in respect of which he is loved. And, again, in comparing love to love we should compare one union with another. Accordingly we must say that friendship among blood relations is based upon their connection by natural origin, the friendship of fellow-citizens on their civic fellowship, and the friendship of those who are fighting side by side on the comradeship of battle. Wherefore in matters pertaining to nature we should love our kindred most, in matters concerning relations between citizens, we should prefer our fellow-citizens, and on the battlefield our fellow-soldiers. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. ix, 2) that "it is our duty to render to each cla.s.s of people such respect as is natural and appropriate. This is in fact the principle upon which we seem to act, for we invite our relations to a wedding ... It would seem to be a special duty to afford our parents the means of living ... and to honor them."
The same applies to other kinds of friendship.
If however we compare union with union, it is evident that the union arising from natural origin is prior to, and more stable than, all others, because it is something affecting the very substance, whereas other unions supervene and may cease altogether. Therefore the friendship of kindred is more stable, while other friendships may be stronger in respect of that which is proper to each of them.
Reply Obj. 1: In as much as the friendship of comrades originates through their own choice, love of this kind takes precedence of the love of kindred in matters where we are free to do as we choose, for instance in matters of action. Yet the friendship of kindred is more stable, since it is more natural, and preponderates over others in matters touching nature: consequently we are more beholden to them in the providing of necessaries.
Reply Obj. 2: Ambrose is speaking of love with regard to favors respecting the fellowship of grace, namely, moral instruction. For in this matter, a man ought to provide for his spiritual children whom he has begotten spiritually, more than for the sons of his body, whom he is bound to support in bodily sustenance.
Reply Obj. 3: The fact that in the battle a man obeys his officer rather than his father proves, that he loves his father less, not simply [but] relatively, i.e. as regards the love which is based on fellowship in battle.
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NINTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 26, Art. 9]
Whether a Man Ought, Out of Charity, to Love His Children More Than His Father?
Objection 1: It seems that a man ought, out of charity, to love his children more than his father. For we ought to love those more to whom we are more bound to do good. Now we are more bound to do good to our children than to our parents, since the Apostle says (2 Cor.
12:14): "Neither ought the children to lay up for the parents, but the parents for the children." Therefore a man ought to love his children more than his parents.
Obj. 2: Further, grace perfects nature. But parents naturally love their children more than these love them, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. viii, 12). Therefore a man ought to love his children more than his parents.
Obj. 3: Further, man"s affections are conformed to G.o.d by charity.
But G.o.d loves His children more than they love Him. Therefore we also ought to love our children more than our parents.
_On the contrary,_ Ambrose [*Origen, Hom. ii in Cant.] says: "We ought to love G.o.d first, then our parents, then our children, and lastly those of our household."
_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 4, ad 1; A. 7), the degrees of love may be measured from two standpoints. First, from that of the object. In this respect the better a thing is, and the more like to G.o.d, the more is it to be loved: and in this way a man ought to love his father more than his children, because, to wit, he loves his father as his principle, in which respect he is a more exalted good and more like G.o.d.
Secondly, the degrees of love may be measured from the standpoint of the lover, and in this respect a man loves more that which is more closely connected with him, in which way a man"s children are more lovable to him than his father, as the Philosopher states (Ethic.
viii). First, because parents love their children as being part of themselves, whereas the father is not part of his son, so that the love of a father for his children, is more like a man"s love for himself. Secondly, because parents know better that so and so is their child than vice versa. Thirdly, because children are nearer to their parents, as being part of them, than their parents are to them to whom they stand in the relation of a principle. Fourthly, because parents have loved longer, for the father begins to love his child at once, whereas the child begins to love his father after a lapse of time; and the longer love lasts, the stronger it is, according to Ecclus. 9:14: "Forsake not an old friend, for the new will not be like to him."
Reply Obj. 1: The debt due to a principle is submission of respect and honor, whereas that due to the effect is one of influence and care. Hence the duty of children to their parents consists chiefly in honor: while that of parents to their children is especially one of care.
Reply Obj. 2: It is natural for a man as father to love his children more, if we consider them as closely connected with him: but if we consider which is the more exalted good, the son naturally loves his father more.
Reply Obj. 3: As Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 32), G.o.d loves us for our good and for His honor. Wherefore since our father is related to us as principle, even as G.o.d is, it belongs properly to the father to receive honor from his children, and to the children to be provided by their parents with what is good for them. Nevertheless in cases of necessity the child is bound out of the favors received to provide for his parents before all.
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TENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 26, Art. 10]
Whether a Man Ought to Love His Mother More Than His Father?
Objection 1: It would seem that a man ought to love his mother more than his father. For, as the Philosopher says (De Gener. Animal. i, 20), "the female produces the body in generation." Now man receives his soul, not from his father, but from G.o.d by creation, as stated in the First Part (Q. 90, A. 2; Q. 118). Therefore a man receives more from his mother than from his father: and consequently he ought to love her more than him.