Therefore hatred does not arise from envy.
Obj. 2: Further, hatred is opposed to love. Now love of our neighbor is referred to our love of G.o.d, as stated above (Q. 25, A. 1; Q. 26, A. 2). Therefore hatred of our neighbor is referred to our hatred of G.o.d. But hatred of G.o.d does not arise from envy, for we do not envy those who are very far removed from us, but rather those who seem to be near us, as the Philosopher states (Rhet. ii). Therefore hatred does not arise from envy.
Obj. 3: Further, to one effect there is one cause. Now hatred is caused by anger, for Augustine says in his Rule that "anger grows into hatred." Therefore hatred does not arise from envy.
_On the contrary,_ Gregory says (Moral. x.x.xi, 45) that "out of envy cometh hatred."
_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 5), hatred of his neighbor is a man"s last step in the path of sin, because it is opposed to the love which he naturally has for his neighbor. Now if a man declines from that which is natural, it is because he intends to avoid that which is naturally an object to be shunned. Now every animal naturally avoids sorrow, just as it desires pleasure, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. vii, x). Accordingly just as love arises from pleasure, so does hatred arise from sorrow. For just as we are moved to love whatever gives us pleasure, in as much as for that very reason it a.s.sumes the aspect of good; so we are moved to hate whatever displeases us, in so far as for this very reason it a.s.sumes the aspect of evil. Wherefore, since envy is sorrow for our neighbor"s good, it follows that our neighbor"s good becomes hateful to us, so that "out of envy cometh hatred."
Reply Obj. 1: Since the appet.i.tive power, like the apprehensive power, reflects on its own acts, it follows that there is a kind of circular movement in the actions of the appet.i.tive power. And so according to the first forward course of the appet.i.tive movement, love gives rise to desire, whence follows pleasure when one has obtained what one desired. And since the very fact of taking pleasure in the good one loves is a kind of good, it follows that pleasure causes love. And in the same way sorrow causes hatred.
Reply Obj. 2: Love and hatred are essentially different, for the object of love is good, which flows from G.o.d to creatures, wherefore love is due to G.o.d in the first place, and to our neighbor afterwards. On the other hand, hatred is of evil, which has no place in G.o.d Himself, but only in His effects, for which reason it has been stated above (A. 1), that G.o.d is not an object of hatred, except in so far as He is considered in relation to His effects, and consequently hatred is directed to our neighbor before being directed to G.o.d. Therefore, since envy of our neighbor is the mother of hatred of our neighbor, it becomes, in consequence, the cause of hatred towards G.o.d.
Reply Obj. 3: Nothing prevents a thing arising from various causes in various respects, and accordingly hatred may arise both from anger and from envy. However it arises more directly from envy, which looks upon the very good of our neighbor as displeasing and therefore hateful, whereas hatred arises from anger by way of increase. For at first, through anger, we desire our neighbor"s evil according to a certain measure, that is in so far as that evil has the aspect of vengeance: but afterwards, through the continuance of anger, man goes so far as absolutely to desire his neighbor"s evil, which desire is part of hatred. Wherefore it is evident that hatred is caused by envy formally as regards the aspect of the object, but dispositively by anger.
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QUESTION 35
OF SLOTH (In Four Articles)
We must now consider the vices opposed to the joy of charity. This joy is either about the Divine good, and then its contrary is sloth, or about our neighbor"s good, and then its contrary is envy. Wherefore we must consider (1) Sloth and (2) Envy.
Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether sloth is a sin?
(2) Whether it is a special vice?
(3) Whether it is a mortal sin?
(4) Whether it is a capital sin?
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FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 35, Art. 1]
Whether Sloth Is a Sin?
Objection 1: It would seem that sloth is not a sin. For we are neither praised nor blamed for our pa.s.sions, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 5). Now sloth is a pa.s.sion, since it is a kind of sorrow, according to Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 14), and as we stated above (I-II, Q. 35, A. 8). Therefore sloth is not a sin.
Obj. 2: Further, no bodily failing that occurs at fixed times is a sin. But sloth is like this, for Ca.s.sian says (De Inst.i.t. Monast. x, [*De Inst.i.tutione Caen.o.biorum]): "The monk is troubled with sloth chiefly about the sixth hour: it is like an intermittent fever, and inflicts the soul of the one it lays low with burning fires at regular and fixed intervals." Therefore sloth is not a sin.
Obj. 3: Further, that which proceeds from a good root is, seemingly, no sin. Now sloth proceeds from a good root, for Ca.s.sian says (De Inst.i.t. Monast. x) that "sloth arises from the fact that we sigh at being deprived of spiritual fruit, and think that other monasteries and those which are a long way off are much better than the one we dwell in": all of which seems to point to humility. Therefore sloth is not a sin.
Obj. 4: Further, all sin is to be avoided, according to Ecclus. 21:2: "Flee from sins as from the face of a serpent." Now Ca.s.sian says (De Inst.i.t. Monast. x): "Experience shows that the onslaught of sloth is not to be evaded by flight but to be conquered by resistance."
Therefore sloth is not a sin.
_On the contrary,_ Whatever is forbidden in Holy Writ is a sin. Now such is sloth (_acedia_): for it is written (Ecclus. 6:26): "Bow down thy shoulder, and bear her," namely spiritual wisdom, "and be not grieved (_acedieris_) with her bands." Therefore sloth is a sin.
_I answer that,_ Sloth, according to Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 14) is an oppressive sorrow, which, to wit, so weighs upon man"s mind, that he wants to do nothing; thus acid things are also cold. Hence sloth implies a certain weariness of work, as appears from a gloss on Ps. 106:18, "Their soul abhorred all manner of meat," and from the definition of some who say that sloth is a "sluggishness of the mind which neglects to begin good."
Now this sorrow is always evil, sometimes in itself, sometimes in its effect. For sorrow is evil in itself when it is about that which is apparently evil but good in reality, even as, on the other hand, pleasure is evil if it is about that which seems to be good but is, in truth, evil. Since, then, spiritual good is a good in very truth, sorrow about spiritual good is evil in itself. And yet that sorrow also which is about a real evil, is evil in its effect, if it so oppresses man as to draw him away entirely from good deeds. Hence the Apostle (2 Cor. 2:7) did not wish those who repented to be "swallowed up with overmuch sorrow."
Accordingly, since sloth, as we understand it here, denotes sorrow for spiritual good, it is evil on two counts, both in itself and in point of its effect. Consequently it is a sin, for by sin we mean an evil movement of the appet.i.te, as appears from what has been said above (Q. 10, A. 2; I-II, Q. 74, A. 4).
Reply Obj. 1: Pa.s.sions are not sinful in themselves; but they are blameworthy in so far as they are applied to something evil, just as they deserve praise in so far as they are applied to something good.
Wherefore sorrow, in itself, calls neither for praise nor for blame: whereas moderate sorrow for evil calls for praise, while sorrow for good, and again immoderate sorrow for evil, call for blame. It is in this sense that sloth is said to be a sin.
Reply Obj. 2: The pa.s.sions of the sensitive appet.i.te may either be venial sins in themselves, or incline the soul to mortal sin. And since the sensitive appet.i.te has a bodily organ, it follows that on account of some bodily trans.m.u.tation a man becomes apt to commit some particular sin. Hence it may happen that certain sins may become more insistent, through certain bodily trans.m.u.tations occurring at certain fixed times. Now all bodily effects, of themselves, dispose one to sorrow; and thus it is that those who fast are hara.s.sed by sloth towards mid-day, when they begin to feel the want of food, and to be parched by the sun"s heat.
Reply Obj. 3: It is a sign of humility if a man does not think too much of himself, through observing his own faults; but if a man contemns the good things he has received from G.o.d, this, far from being a proof of humility, shows him to be ungrateful: and from such like contempt results sloth, because we sorrow for things that we reckon evil and worthless. Accordingly we ought to think much of the goods of others, in such a way as not to disparage those we have received ourselves, because if we did they would give us sorrow.
Reply Obj. 4: Sin is ever to be shunned, but the a.s.saults of sin should be overcome, sometimes by flight, sometimes by resistance; by flight when a continued thought increases the incentive to sin, as in l.u.s.t; for which reason it is written (1 Cor. 6:18): "Fly fornication"; by resistance, when perseverance in the thought diminishes the incentive to sin, which incentive arises from some trivial consideration. This is the case with sloth, because the more we think about spiritual goods, the more pleasing they become to us, and forthwith sloth dies away.
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SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 35, Art. 2]
Whether Sloth Is a Special Vice?
Objection 1: It would seem that sloth is not a special vice. For that which is common to all vices does not const.i.tute a special kind of vice. But every vice makes a man sorrowful about the opposite spiritual good: for the l.u.s.tful man is sorrowful about the good of continence, and the glutton about the good of abstinence. Since then sloth is sorrow for spiritual good, as stated above (A. 1), it seems that sloth is not a special sin.
Obj. 2: Further, sloth, through being a kind of sorrow, is opposed to joy. Now joy is not accounted one special virtue. Therefore sloth should not be reckoned a special vice.
Obj. 3: Further, since spiritual good is a general kind of object, which virtue seeks, and vice shuns, it does not const.i.tute a special virtue or vice, unless it be determined by some addition. Now nothing, seemingly, except toil, can determine it to sloth, if this be a special vice; because the reason why a man shuns spiritual goods, is that they are toilsome, wherefore sloth is a kind of weariness: while dislike of toil, and love of bodily repose seem to be due to the same cause, viz. idleness. Hence sloth would be nothing but laziness, which seems untrue, for idleness is opposed to carefulness, whereas sloth is opposed to joy. Therefore sloth is not a special vice.
_On the contrary,_ Gregory (Moral. x.x.xi, 45) distinguishes sloth from the other vices. Therefore it is a special vice.
_I answer that,_ Since sloth is sorrow for spiritual good, if we take spiritual good in a general way, sloth will not be a special vice, because, as stated above (I-II, Q. 71, A. 1), every vice shuns the spiritual good of its opposite virtue. Again it cannot be said that sloth is a special vice, in so far as it shuns spiritual good, as toilsome, or troublesome to the body, or as a hindrance to the body"s pleasure, for this again would not sever sloth from carnal vices, whereby a man seeks bodily comfort and pleasure.
Wherefore we must say that a certain order exists among spiritual goods, since all the spiritual goods that are in the acts of each virtue are directed to one spiritual good, which is the Divine good, about which there is a special virtue, viz. charity. Hence it is proper to each virtue to rejoice in its own spiritual good, which consists in its own act, while it belongs specially to charity to have that spiritual joy whereby one rejoices in the Divine good. In like manner the sorrow whereby one is displeased at the spiritual good which is in each act of virtue, belongs, not to any special vice, but to every vice, but sorrow in the Divine good about which charity rejoices, belongs to a special vice, which is called sloth.
This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.
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THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 35, Art. 3]
Whether Sloth Is a Mortal Sin?
Objection 1: It would seem that sloth is not a mortal sin. For every mortal sin is contrary to a precept of the Divine Law. But sloth seems contrary to no precept, as one may see by going through the precepts of the Decalogue. Therefore sloth is not a mortal sin.
Obj. 2: Further, in the same genus, a sin of deed is no less grievous than a sin of thought. Now it is not a mortal sin to refrain in deed from some spiritual good which leads to G.o.d, else it would be a mortal sin not to observe the counsels. Therefore it is not a mortal sin to refrain in thought from such like spiritual works. Therefore sloth is not a mortal sin.
Obj. 3: Further, no mortal sin is to be found in a perfect man. But sloth is to be found in a perfect man: for Ca.s.sian says (De Inst.i.t.
Caen.o.b. x, l) that "sloth is well known to the solitary, and is a most vexatious and persistent foe to the hermit." Therefore sloth is not always a mortal sin.
_On the contrary,_ It is written (2 Cor. 7:20): "The sorrow of the world worketh death." But such is sloth; for it is not sorrow "according to G.o.d," which is contrasted with sorrow of the world.
Therefore it is a mortal sin.
_I answer that,_ As stated above (I-II, Q. 88, AA. 1, 2), mortal sin is so called because it destroys the spiritual life which is the effect of charity, whereby G.o.d dwells in us. Wherefore any sin which by its very nature is contrary to charity is a mortal sin by reason of its genus. And such is sloth, because the proper effect of charity is joy in G.o.d, as stated above (Q. 28, A. 1), while sloth is sorrow about spiritual good in as much as it is a Divine good. Therefore sloth is a mortal sin in respect of its genus. But it must be observed with regard to all sins that are mortal in respect of their genus, that they are not mortal, save when they attain to their perfection. Because the consummation of sin is in the consent of reason: for we are speaking now of human sins consisting in human acts, the principle of which is the reason. Wherefore if the sin be a mere beginning of sin in the sensuality alone, without attaining to the consent of reason, it is a venial sin on account of the imperfection of the act. Thus in the genus of adultery, the concupiscence that goes no further than the sensuality is a venial sin, whereas if it reach to the consent of reason, it is a mortal sin. So too, the movement of sloth is sometimes in the sensuality alone, by reason of the opposition of the flesh to the spirit, and then it is a venial sin; whereas sometimes it reaches to the reason, which consents in the dislike, horror and detestation of the Divine good, on account of the flesh utterly prevailing over the spirit. In this case it is evident that sloth is a mortal sin.
Reply Obj. 1: Sloth is opposed to the precept about hallowing the Sabbath day. For this precept, in so far as it is a moral precept, implicitly commands the mind to rest in G.o.d: and sorrow of the mind about the Divine good is contrary thereto.