THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 36, Art. 3]
Whether Envy Is a Mortal Sin?
Objection 1: It would seem that envy is not a mortal sin. For since envy is a kind of sorrow, it is a pa.s.sion of the sensitive appet.i.te.
Now there is no mortal sin in the sensuality, but only in the reason, as Augustine declares (De Trin. xii, 12) [*Cf. I-II, Q. 74, A. 4].
Therefore envy is not a mortal sin.
Obj. 2: Further, there cannot be mortal sin in infants. But envy can be in them, for Augustine says (Confess. i): "I myself have seen and known even a baby envious, it could not speak, yet it turned pale and looked bitterly on its foster-brother." Therefore envy is not a mortal sin.
Obj. 3: Further, every mortal sin is contrary to some virtue. But envy is contrary, not to a virtue but to _nemesis_, which is a pa.s.sion, according to the Philosopher (Rhet. ii, 9). Therefore envy is not a mortal sin.
_On the contrary,_ It is written (Job 5:2): "Envy slayeth the little one." Now nothing slays spiritually, except mortal sin. Therefore envy is a mortal sin.
_I answer that,_ Envy is a mortal sin, in respect of its genus. For the genus of a sin is taken from its object; and envy according to the aspect of its object is contrary to charity, whence the soul derives its spiritual life, according to 1 John 3:14: "We know that we have pa.s.sed from death to life, because we love the brethren." Now the object both of charity and of envy is our neighbor"s good, but by contrary movements, since charity rejoices in our neighbor"s good, while envy grieves over it, as stated above (A. 1). Therefore it is evident that envy is a mortal sin in respect of its genus.
Nevertheless, as stated above (Q. 35, A. 4; I-II, Q. 72, A. 5, ad 1), in every kind of mortal sin we find certain imperfect movements in the sensuality, which are venial sins: such are the first movement of concupiscence, in the genus of adultery, and the first movement of anger, in the genus of murder, and so in the genus of envy we find sometimes even in perfect men certain first movements, which are venial sins.
Reply Obj. 1: The movement of envy in so far as it is a pa.s.sion of the sensuality, is an imperfect thing in the genus of human acts, the principle of which is the reason, so that envy of that kind is not a mortal sin. The same applies to the envy of little children who have not the use of reason: wherefore the Reply to the Second Objection is manifest.
Reply Obj. 3: According to the Philosopher (Rhet. ii, 9), envy is contrary both to _nemesis_ and to pity, but for different reasons.
For it is directly contrary to pity, their princ.i.p.al objects being contrary to one another, since the envious man grieves over his neighbor"s good, whereas the pitiful man grieves over his neighbor"s evil, so that the envious have no pity, as he states in the same pa.s.sage, nor is the pitiful man envious. On the other hand, envy is contrary to _nemesis_ on the part of the man whose good grieves the envious man, for _nemesis_ is sorrow for the good of the undeserving according to Ps. 72:3: "I was envious of the wicked, when I saw the prosperity of sinners" [*Douay: "because I had a zeal on occasion of the wicked, seeing the prosperity of sinners"], whereas the envious grieves over the good of those who are deserving of it. Hence it is clear that the former contrariety is more direct than the latter. Now pity is a virtue, and an effect proper to charity: so that envy is contrary to pity and charity.
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FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 36, Art. 4]
Whether Envy Is a Capital Vice?
Objection 1: It would seem that envy is not a capital vice. For the capital vices are distinct from their daughters. Now envy is the daughter of vainglory; for the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 10) that "those who love honor and glory are more envious." Therefore envy is not a capital vice.
Obj. 2: Further, the capital vices seem to be less grave than the other vices which arise from them. For Gregory says (Moral. x.x.xi, 45): "The leading vices seem to worm their way into the deceived mind under some kind of pretext, but those which follow them provoke the soul to all kinds of outrage, and confuse the mind with their wild outcry." Now envy is seemingly a most grave sin, for Gregory says (Moral. v, 46): "Though in every evil thing that is done, the venom of our old enemy is infused into the heart of man, yet in this wickedness the serpent stirs his whole bowels and discharges the bane of spite fitted to enter deep into the mind." Therefore envy is not a capital sin.
Obj. 3: Further, it seems that its daughters are unfittingly a.s.signed by Gregory (Moral. x.x.xi, 45), who says that from envy arise "hatred, tale-bearing, detraction, joy at our neighbor"s misfortunes, and grief for his prosperity." For joy at our neighbor"s misfortunes and grief for his prosperity seem to be the same as envy, as appears from what has been said above (A. 3). Therefore these should not be a.s.signed as daughters of envy.
On the contrary stands the authority of Gregory (Moral. x.x.xi, 45) who states that envy is a capital sin and a.s.signs the aforesaid daughters thereto.
_I answer that,_ Just as sloth is grief for a Divine spiritual good, so envy is grief for our neighbor"s good. Now it has been stated above (Q. 35, A. 4) that sloth is a capital vice for the reason that it incites man to do certain things, with the purpose either of avoiding sorrow or of satisfying its demands. Wherefore envy is accounted a capital vice for the same reason.
Reply Obj. 1: As Gregory says (Moral. x.x.xi, 45), "the capital vices are so closely akin to one another that one springs from the other.
For the first offspring of pride is vainglory, which by corrupting the mind it occupies begets envy, since while it craves for the power of an empty name, it repines for fear lest another should acquire that power." Consequently the notion of a capital vice does not exclude its originating from another vice, but it demands that it should have some princ.i.p.al reason for being itself the origin of several kinds of sin. However it is perhaps because envy manifestly arises from vainglory, that it is not reckoned a capital sin, either by Isidore (De Summo Bono) or by Ca.s.sian (De Inst.i.t. Caen.o.b. v, 1).
Reply Obj. 2: It does not follow from the pa.s.sage quoted that envy is the greatest of sins, but that when the devil tempts us to envy, he is enticing us to that which has its chief place in his heart, for as quoted further on in the same pa.s.sage, "by the envy of the devil, death came into the world" (Wis. 2:24).
There is, however, a kind of envy which is accounted among the most grievous sins, viz. envy of another"s spiritual good, which envy is a sorrow for the increase of G.o.d"s grace, and not merely for our neighbor"s good. Hence it is accounted a sin against the Holy Ghost, because thereby a man envies, as it were, the Holy Ghost Himself, Who is glorified in His works.
Reply Obj. 3: The number of envy"s daughters may be understood for the reason that in the struggle aroused by envy there is something by way of beginning, something by way of middle, and something by way of term. The beginning is that a man strives to lower another"s reputation, and this either secretly, and then we have _tale-bearing,_ or openly, and then we have _detraction._ The middle consists in the fact that when a man aims at defaming another, he is either able to do so, and then we have _joy at another"s misfortune,_ or he is unable, and then we have _grief at another"s prosperity._ The term is hatred itself, because just as good which delights causes love, so does sorrow cause hatred, as stated above (Q. 34, A. 6).
Grief at another"s prosperity is in one way the very same as envy, when, to Wit, a man grieves over another"s prosperity, in so far as it gives the latter a good name, but in another way it is a daughter of envy, in so far as the envious man sees his neighbor prosper notwithstanding his efforts to prevent it. On the other hand, _joy at another"s misfortune_ is not directly the same as envy, but is a result thereof, because grief over our neighbor"s good which is envy, gives rise to joy in his evil.
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QUESTION 37
OF DISCORD, WHICH IS CONTRARY TO PEACE (In Two Articles)
We must now consider the sins contrary to peace, and first we shall consider discord which is in the heart, secondly contention, which is on the lips, thirdly, those things which consist in deeds, viz.
schism, quarrelling, war, and sedition. Under the first head there are two points of inquiry:
(1) Whether discord is a sin?
(2) Whether it is a daughter of vainglory?
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FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 37, Art. 1]
Whether Discord Is a Sin?
Objection 1: It would seem that discord is not a sin. For to disaccord with man is to sever oneself from another"s will. But this does not seem to be a sin, because G.o.d"s will alone, and not our neighbor"s, is the rule of our own will. Therefore discord is not a sin.
Obj. 2: Further, whoever induces another to sin, sins also himself.
But it appears not to be a sin to incite others to discord, for it is written (Acts 23:6) that Paul, knowing that the one part were Sadducees, and the other Pharisees, cried out in the council: "Men brethren, I am a Pharisee, the son of Pharisees, concerning the hope and resurrection of the dead I am called in question. And when he had so said, there arose a dissension between the Pharisees and the Sadducees." Therefore discord is not a sin.
Obj. 3: Further, sin, especially mortal sin, is not to be found in a holy man. But discord is to be found even among holy men, for it is written (Acts 15:39): "There arose a dissension" between Paul and Barnabas, "so that they departed one from another." Therefore discord is not a sin, and least of all a mortal sin.
_On the contrary,_ "Dissensions," that is, discords, are reckoned among the works of the flesh (Gal. 5:20), of which it is said afterwards (Gal. 5:21) that "they who do such things shall not obtain the kingdom of G.o.d." Now nothing, save mortal sin, excludes man from the kingdom of G.o.d. Therefore discord is a mortal sin.
_I answer that,_ Discord is opposed to concord. Now, as stated above (Q. 29, AA. 1, 3) concord results from charity, in as much as charity directs many hearts together to one thing, which is chiefly the Divine good, secondarily, the good of our neighbor. Wherefore discord is a sin, in so far as it is opposed to this concord.
But it must be observed that this concord is destroyed by discord in two ways: first, directly; secondly, accidentally. Now, human acts and movements are said to be direct when they are according to one"s intention. Wherefore a man directly disaccords with his neighbor, when he knowingly and intentionally dissents from the Divine good and his neighbor"s good, to which he ought to consent. This is a mortal sin in respect of its genus, because it is contrary to charity, although the first movements of such discord are venial sins by reason of their being imperfect acts.
The accidental in human acts is that which occurs beside the intention. Hence when several intend a good pertaining to G.o.d"s honor, or our neighbor"s profit, while one deems a certain thing good, and another thinks contrariwise, the discord is in this case accidentally contrary to the Divine good or that of our neighbor.
Such like discord is neither sinful nor against charity, unless it be accompanied by an error about things necessary to salvation, or by undue obstinacy, since it has also been stated above (Q. 29, AA. 1, 3, ad 2) that the concord which is an effect of charity, is union of wills not of opinions. It follows from this that discord is sometimes the sin of one party only, for instance, when one wills a good which the other knowingly resists; while sometimes it implies sin in both parties, as when each dissents from the other"s good, and loves his own.
Reply Obj. 1: One man"s will considered in itself is not the rule of another man"s will; but in so far as our neighbor"s will adheres to G.o.d"s will, it becomes in consequence, a rule regulated according to its proper measure. Wherefore it is a sin to disaccord with such a will, because by that very fact one disaccords with the Divine rule.
Reply Obj. 2: Just as a man"s will that adheres to G.o.d is a right rule, to disaccord with which is a sin, so too a man"s will that is opposed to G.o.d is a perverse rule, to disaccord with which is good.
Hence to cause a discord, whereby a good concord resulting from charity is destroyed, is a grave sin: wherefore it is written (Prov.
6:16): "Six things there are, which the Lord hateth, and the seventh His soul detesteth," which seventh is stated (Prov. 6:19) to be "him that soweth discord among brethren." On the other hand, to arouse a discord whereby an evil concord (i.e. concord in an evil will) is destroyed, is praiseworthy. In this way Paul was to be commended for sowing discord among those who concorded together in evil, because Our Lord also said of Himself (Matt. 10:34): "I came not to send peace, but the sword."
Reply Obj. 3: The discord between Paul and Barnabas was accidental and not direct: because each intended some good, yet the one thought one thing good, while the other thought something else, which was owing to human deficiency: for that controversy was not about things necessary to salvation. Moreover all this was ordained by Divine providence, on account of the good which would ensue.
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SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 37, Art. 2]
Whether Discord Is a Daughter of Vainglory?
Objection 1: It would seem that discord is not a daughter of vainglory. For anger is a vice distinct from vainglory. Now discord is apparently the daughter of anger, according to Prov. 15:18: "A pa.s.sionate man stirreth up strifes." Therefore it is not a daughter of vainglory.
Obj. 2: Further, Augustine expounding the words of John 7:39, "As yet the Spirit was not given," says (Tract. x.x.xii) "Malice severs, charity unites." Now discord is merely a separation of wills.
Therefore discord arises from malice, i.e. envy, rather than from vainglory.
Obj. 3: Further, whatever gives rise to many evils, would seem to be a capital vice. Now such is discord, because Jerome in commenting on Matt. 12:25, "Every kingdom divided against itself shall be made desolate," says: "Just as concord makes small things thrive, so discord brings the greatest things to ruin." Therefore discord should itself be reckoned a capital vice, rather than a daughter of vainglory.