Summa Theologica

Chapter 440

_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 4, ad 1), the mode which is essential to an act of virtue comes under the precept which prescribes that virtuous act. Now the order of charity is essential to the virtue, since it is based on the proportion of love to the thing beloved, as shown above (Q. 25, A. 12; Q. 26, AA. 1, 2). It is therefore evident that the order of charity must come under the precept.

Reply Obj. 1: A man gratifies more the person he loves more, so that if he loved less one whom he ought to love more, he would wish to gratify more one whom he ought to gratify less, and so he would do an injustice to the one he ought to love more.

Reply Obj. 2: The order of those four things we have to love out of charity is expressed in Holy Writ. For when we are commanded to love G.o.d with our "whole heart," we are given to understand that we must love Him above all things. When we are commanded to love our neighbor "as ourselves," the love of self is set before love of our neighbor.

In like manner where we are commanded (1 John 3:16) "to lay down our souls," i.e. the life of our bodies, "for the brethren," we are given to understand that a man ought to love his neighbor more than his own body; and again when we are commanded (Gal. 6:10) to "work good ...

especially to those who are of the household of the faith," and when a man is blamed (1 Tim. 5:8) if he "have not care of his own, and especially of those of his house," it means that we ought to love most those of our neighbors who are more virtuous or more closely united to us.

Reply Obj. 3: It follows from the very words, "Thou shalt love thy neighbor" that those who are nearer to us are to be loved more.

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QUESTION 45

OF THE GIFT OF WISDOM (In Six Articles)

We must now consider the gift of wisdom which corresponds to charity; and firstly, wisdom itself, secondly, the opposite vice. Under the first head there are six points of inquiry:

(1) Whether wisdom should be reckoned among the gifts of the Holy Ghost?

(2) What is its subject?

(3) Whether wisdom is only speculative or also practical?

(4) Whether the wisdom that is a gift is compatible with mortal sin?

(5) Whether it is in all those who have sanctifying grace?

(6) Which beat.i.tude corresponds to it?

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FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 45, Art. 1]

Whether Wisdom Should Be Reckoned Among the Gifts of the Holy Ghost?

Objection 1: It would seem that wisdom ought not to be reckoned among the gifts of the Holy Ghost. For the gifts are more perfect than the virtues, as stated above (I-II, Q. 68, A. 8). Now virtue is directed to the good alone, wherefore Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. ii, 19) that "no man makes bad use of the virtues." Much more therefore are the gifts of the Holy Ghost directed to the good alone. But wisdom is directed to evil also, for it is written (James 3:15) that a certain wisdom is "earthly, sensual, devilish." Therefore wisdom should not be reckoned among the gifts of the Holy Ghost.

Obj. 2: Further, according to Augustine (De Trin. xii, 14) "wisdom is the knowledge of Divine things." Now that knowledge of Divine things which man can acquire by his natural endowments, belongs to the wisdom which is an intellectual virtue, while the supernatural knowledge of Divine things belongs to faith which is a theological virtue, as explained above (Q. 4, A. 5; I-II, Q. 62, A. 3). Therefore wisdom should be called a virtue rather than a gift.

Obj. 3: Further, it is written (Job 28:28): "Behold the fear of the Lord, that is wisdom, and to depart from evil, that is understanding." And in this pa.s.sage according to the rendering of the Septuagint which Augustine follows (De Trin. xii, 14; xiv, 1) we read: "Behold piety, that is wisdom." Now both fear and piety are gifts of the Holy Ghost. Therefore wisdom should not be reckoned among the gifts of the Holy Ghost, as though it were distinct from the others.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (Isa. 11:2): "The Spirit of the Lord shall rest upon Him; the spirit of wisdom and of understanding."

_I answer that,_ According to the Philosopher (Metaph. i: 2), it belongs to wisdom to consider the highest cause. By means of that cause we are able to form a most certain judgment about other causes, and according thereto all things should be set in order. Now the highest cause may be understood in two ways, either simply or in some particular genus. Accordingly he that knows the highest cause in any particular genus, and by its means is able to judge and set in order all the things that belong to that genus, is said to be wise in that genus, for instance in medicine or architecture, according to 1 Cor.

3:10: "As a wise architect, I have laid a foundation." On the other hand, he who knows the cause that is simply the highest, which is G.o.d, is said to be wise simply, because he is able to judge and set in order all things according to Divine rules.

Now man obtains this judgment through the Holy Ghost, according to 1 Cor. 2:15: "The spiritual man judgeth all things," because as stated in the same chapter (1 Cor. 2:10), "the Spirit searcheth all things, yea the deep things of G.o.d." Wherefore it is evident that wisdom is a gift of the Holy Ghost.

Reply Obj. 1: A thing is said to be good in two senses: first in the sense that it is truly good and simply perfect, secondly, by a kind of likeness, being perfect in wickedness; thus we speak of a good or a perfect thief, as the Philosopher observes (Metaph. v, text. 21).

And just as with regard to those things which are truly good, we find a highest cause, namely the sovereign good which is the last end, by knowing which, man is said to be truly wise, so too in evil things something is to be found to which all others are to be referred as to a last end, by knowing which, man is said to be wise unto evil doing, according to Jer. 4:22: "They are wise to do evils, but to do good they have no knowledge." Now whoever turns away from his due end, must needs fix on some undue end, since every agent acts for an end.

Wherefore, if he fixes his end in external earthly things, his "wisdom" is called "earthly," if in the goods of the body, it is called "sensual wisdom," if in some excellence, it is called "devilish wisdom" because it imitates the devil"s pride, of which it is written (Job 41:25): "He is king over all the children of pride."

Reply Obj. 2: The wisdom which is called a gift of the Holy Ghost, differs from that which is an acquired intellectual virtue, for the latter is attained by human effort, whereas the latter is "descending from above" (James 3:15). In like manner it differs from faith, since faith a.s.sents to the Divine truth in itself, whereas it belongs to the gift of wisdom to judge according to the Divine truth. Hence the gift of wisdom presupposes faith, because "a man judges well what he knows" (Ethic. i, 3).

Reply Obj. 3: Just as piety which pertains to the worship of G.o.d is a manifestation of faith, in so far as we make profession of faith by worshipping G.o.d, so too, piety manifests wisdom. For this reason piety is stated to be wisdom, and so is fear, for the same reason, because if a man fear and worship G.o.d, this shows that he has a right judgment about Divine things.

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SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 45, Art. 2]

Whether Wisdom Is in the Intellect As Its Subject?

Objection 1: It would seem that wisdom is not in the intellect as its subject. For Augustine says (Ep. cxx) that "wisdom is the charity of G.o.d." Now charity is in the will as its subject, and not in the intellect, as stated above (Q. 24, A. 1). Therefore wisdom is not in the intellect as its subject.

Obj. 2: Further, it is written (Ecclus. 6:23): "The wisdom of doctrine is according to her name," for wisdom (_sapientia_) may be described as "sweet-tasting science (_sapida scientia_)," and this would seem to regard the appet.i.te, to which it belongs to taste spiritual pleasure or sweetness. Therefore wisdom is in the appet.i.te rather than in the intellect.

Obj. 3: Further, the intellective power is sufficiently perfected by the gift of understanding. Now it is superfluous to require two things where one suffices for the purpose. Therefore wisdom is not in the intellect.

_On the contrary,_ Gregory says (Moral. ii, 49) that "wisdom is contrary to folly." But folly is in the intellect. Therefore wisdom is also.

_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1), wisdom denotes a certain rect.i.tude of judgment according to the Eternal Law. Now rect.i.tude of judgment is twofold: first, on account of perfect use of reason, secondly, on account of a certain connaturality with the matter about which one has to judge. Thus, about matters of chast.i.ty, a man after inquiring with his reason forms a right judgment, if he has learnt the science of morals, while he who has the habit of chast.i.ty judges of such matters by a kind of connaturality.

Accordingly it belongs to the wisdom that is an intellectual virtue to p.r.o.nounce right judgment about Divine things after reason has made its inquiry, but it belongs to wisdom as a gift of the Holy Ghost to judge aright about them on account of connaturality with them: thus Dionysius says (Div. Nom. ii) that "Hierotheus is perfect in Divine things, for he not only learns, but is patient of, Divine things."

Now this sympathy or connaturality for Divine things is the result of charity, which unites us to G.o.d, according to 1 Cor. 6:17: "He who is joined to the Lord, is one spirit." Consequently wisdom which is a gift, has its cause in the will, which cause is charity, but it has its essence in the intellect, whose act is to judge aright, as stated above (I-II, Q. 14, A. 1).

Reply Obj. 1: Augustine is speaking of wisdom as to its cause, whence also wisdom (_sapientia_) takes its name, in so far as it denotes a certain sweetness (_saporem_). Hence the Reply to the Second Objection is evident, that is if this be the true meaning of the text quoted. For, apparently this is not the case, because such an exposition of the text would only fit the Latin word for wisdom, whereas it does not apply to the Greek and perhaps not in other languages. Hence it would seem that in the text quoted wisdom stands for the renown of doctrine, for which it is praised by all.

Reply Obj. 3: The intellect exercises a twofold act, perception and judgment. The gift of understanding regards the former; the gift of wisdom regards the latter according to the Divine ideas, the gift of knowledge, according to human ideas.

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THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 45, Art. 3]

Whether Wisdom Is Merely Speculative, or Practical Also?

Objection 1: It would seem that wisdom is not practical but merely speculative. For the gift of wisdom is more excellent than the wisdom which is an intellectual virtue. But wisdom, as an intellectual virtue, is merely speculative. Much more therefore is wisdom, as a gift, speculative and not practical.

Obj. 2: Further, the practical intellect is about matters of operation which are contingent. But wisdom is about Divine things which are eternal and necessary. Therefore wisdom cannot be practical.

Obj. 3: Further, Gregory says (Moral. vi, 37) that "in contemplation we seek the Beginning which is G.o.d, but in action we labor under a mighty bundle of wants." Now wisdom regards the vision of Divine things, in which there is no toiling under a load, since according to Wis. 8:16, "her conversation hath no bitterness, nor her company any tediousness." Therefore wisdom is merely contemplative, and not practical or active.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (Col. 4:5): "Walk with wisdom towards them that are without." Now this pertains to action.

Therefore wisdom is not merely speculative, but also practical.

_I answer that,_ As Augustine says (De Trin. xii, 14), the higher part of the reason is the province of wisdom, while the lower part is the domain of knowledge. Now the higher reason according to the same authority (De Trin. xii, 7) "is intent on the consideration and consultation of the heavenly," i.e. Divine, "types" [*Cf. I, Q. 79, A. 9; I-II, Q. 74, A. 7]; it considers them, in so far as it contemplates Divine things in themselves, and it consults them, in so far as it judges of human acts by Divine things, and directs human acts according to Divine rules.

Accordingly wisdom as a gift, is not merely speculative but also practical.

Reply Obj. 1: The higher a virtue is, the greater the number of things to which it extends, as stated in _De Causis,_ prop. x, xvii.

Wherefore from the very fact that wisdom as a gift is more excellent than wisdom as an intellectual virtue, since it attains to G.o.d more intimately by a kind of union of the soul with Him, it is able to direct us not only in contemplation but also in action.

Reply Obj. 2: Divine things are indeed necessary and eternal in themselves, yet they are the rules of the contingent things which are the subject-matter of human actions.

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