(15) Whether prudence is in us naturally?
(16) Whether prudence is lost by forgetfulness?
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FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 47, Art. 1]
Whether Prudence Is in the Cognitive or in the Appet.i.tive Faculty?
Objection 1: It would seem that prudence is not in the cognitive but in the appet.i.tive faculty. For Augustine says (De Morib. Eccl. xv): "Prudence is love choosing wisely between the things that help and those that hinder." Now love is not in the cognitive, but in the appet.i.tive faculty. Therefore prudence is in the appet.i.tive faculty.
Obj. 2: Further, as appears from the foregoing definition it belongs to prudence "to choose wisely." But choice is an act of the appet.i.tive faculty, as stated above (I-II, Q. 13, A. 1). Therefore prudence is not in the cognitive but in the appet.i.tive faculty.
Obj. 3: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 5) that "in art it is better to err voluntarily than involuntarily, whereas in the case of prudence, as of the virtues, it is worse." Now the moral virtues, of which he is treating there, are in the appet.i.tive faculty, whereas art is in the reason. Therefore prudence is in the appet.i.tive rather than in the rational faculty.
_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (QQ. lx.x.xiii, qu. 61): "Prudence is the knowledge of what to seek and what to avoid."
_I answer that,_ As Isidore says (Etym. x): "A prudent man is one who sees as it were from afar, for his sight is keen, and he foresees the event of uncertainties." Now sight belongs not to the appet.i.tive but to the cognitive faculty. Wherefore it is manifest that prudence belongs directly to the cognitive, and not to the sensitive faculty, because by the latter we know nothing but what is within reach and offers itself to the senses: while to obtain knowledge of the future from knowledge of the present or past, which pertains to prudence, belongs properly to the reason, because this is done by a process of comparison. It follows therefore that prudence, properly speaking, is in the reason.
Reply Obj. 1: As stated above (I, Q. 82, A. 4) the will moves all the faculties to their acts. Now the first act of the appet.i.tive faculty is love, as stated above (I-II, Q. 25, AA. 1, 2). Accordingly prudence is said to be love, not indeed essentially, but in so far as love moves to the act of prudence. Wherefore Augustine goes on to say that "prudence is love discerning aright that which helps from that which hinders us in tending to G.o.d." Now love is said to discern because it moves the reason to discern.
Reply Obj. 2: The prudent man considers things afar off, in so far as they tend to be a help or a hindrance to that which has to be done at the present time. Hence it is clear that those things which prudence considers stand in relation to this other, as in relation to the end.
Now of those things that are directed to the end there is counsel in the reason, and choice in the appet.i.te, of which two, counsel belongs more properly to prudence, since the Philosopher states (Ethic. vi, 5, 7, 9) that a prudent man "takes good counsel." But as choice presupposes counsel, since it is "the desire for what has been already counselled" (Ethic. iii, 2), it follows that choice can also be ascribed to prudence indirectly, in so far, to wit, as prudence directs the choice by means of counsel.
Reply Obj. 3: The worth of prudence consists not in thought merely, but in its application to action, which is the end of the practical reason. Wherefore if any defect occur in this, it is most contrary to prudence, since, the end being of most import in everything, it follows that a defect which touches the end is the worst of all.
Hence the Philosopher goes on to say (Ethic. vi, 5) that prudence is "something more than a merely rational habit," such as art is, since, as stated above (I-II, Q. 57, A. 4) it includes application to action, which application is an act of the will.
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SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 47, Art. 2]
Whether Prudence Belongs to the Practical Reason Alone or Also to the Speculative Reason?
Objection 1: It would seem that prudence belongs not only to the practical, but also to the speculative reason. For it is written (Prov. 10:23): "Wisdom is prudence to a man." Now wisdom consists chiefly in contemplation. Therefore prudence does also.
Obj. 2: Further, Ambrose says (De Offic. i, 24): "Prudence is concerned with the quest of truth, and fills us with the desire of fuller knowledge." Now this belongs to the speculative reason.
Therefore prudence resides also in the speculative reason.
Obj. 3: Further, the Philosopher a.s.signs art and prudence to the same part of the soul (Ethic. vi, 1). Now art may be not only practical but also speculative, as in the case of the liberal arts. Therefore prudence also is both practical and speculative.
_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 5) that prudence is right reason applied to action. Now this belongs to none but the practical reason. Therefore prudence is in the practical reason only.
_I answer that,_ According to the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 5) "a prudent man is one who is capable of taking good counsel." Now counsel is about things that we have to do in relation to some end: and the reason that deals with things to be done for an end is the practical reason. Hence it is evident that prudence resides only in the practical reason.
Reply Obj. 1: As stated above (Q. 45, AA. 1, 3), wisdom considers the absolutely highest cause: so that the consideration of the highest cause in any particular genus belongs to wisdom in that genus. Now in the genus of human acts the highest cause is the common end of all human life, and it is this end that prudence intends. For the Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 5) that just as he who reasons well for the realization of a particular end, such as victory, is said to be prudent, not absolutely, but in a particular genus, namely warfare, so he that reasons well with regard to right conduct as a whole, is said to be prudent absolutely. Wherefore it is clear that prudence is wisdom about human affairs: but not wisdom absolutely, because it is not about the absolutely highest cause, for it is about human good, and this is not the best thing of all. And so it is stated significantly that "prudence is wisdom for man," but not wisdom absolutely.
Reply Obj. 2: Ambrose, and Tully also (De Invent. ii, 53) take the word prudence in a broad sense for any human knowledge, whether speculative or practical. And yet it may also be replied that the act itself of the speculative reason, in so far as it is voluntary, is a matter of choice and counsel as to its exercise; and consequently comes under the direction of prudence. On the other hand, as regards its specification in relation to its object which is the "necessary true," it comes under neither counsel nor prudence.
Reply Obj. 3: Every application of right reason in the work of production belongs to art: but to prudence belongs only the application of right reason in matters of counsel, which are those wherein there is no fixed way of obtaining the end, as stated in _Ethic._ iii, 3. Since then, the speculative reason makes things such as syllogisms, propositions and the like, wherein the process follows certain and fixed rules, consequently in respect of such things it is possible to have the essentials of art, but not of prudence; and so we find such a thing as a speculative art, but not a speculative prudence.
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THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 47, Art. 3]
Whether Prudence Takes Cognizance of Singulars?
Objection 1: It would seem that prudence does not take cognizance of singulars. For prudence is in the reason, as stated above (AA. 1, 2).
But "reason deals with universals," according to _Phys._ i, 5.
Therefore prudence does not take cognizance except of universals.
Obj. 2: Further, singulars are infinite in number. But the reason cannot comprehend an infinite number of things. Therefore prudence which is right reason, is not about singulars.
Obj. 3: Further, particulars are known by the senses. But prudence is not in a sense, for many persons who have keen outward senses are devoid of prudence. Therefore prudence does not take cognizance of singulars.
_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 7) that "prudence does not deal with universals only, but needs to take cognizance of singulars also."
_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1, ad 3), to prudence belongs not only the consideration of the reason, but also the application to action, which is the end of the practical reason. But no man can conveniently apply one thing to another, unless he knows both the thing to be applied, and the thing to which it has to be applied. Now actions are in singular matters: and so it is necessary for the prudent man to know both the universal principles of reason, and the singulars about which actions are concerned.
Reply Obj. 1: Reason first and chiefly is concerned with universals, and yet it is able to apply universal rules to particular cases: hence the conclusions of syllogisms are not only universal, but also particular, because the intellect by a kind of reflection extends to matter, as stated in _De Anima_ iii.
Reply Obj. 2: It is because the infinite number of singulars cannot be comprehended by human reason, that "our counsels are uncertain"
(Wis. 9:14). Nevertheless experience reduces the infinity of singulars to a certain finite number which occur as a general rule, and the knowledge of these suffices for human prudence.
Reply Obj. 3: As the Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 8), prudence does not reside in the external senses whereby we know sensible objects, but in the interior sense, which is perfected by memory and experience so as to judge promptly of particular cases. This does not mean however that prudence is in the interior sense as in its princip[al] subject, for it is chiefly in the reason, yet by a kind of application it extends to this sense.
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FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 47, Art. 4]
Whether Prudence Is a Virtue?
Objection 1: It would seem that prudence is not a virtue. For Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. i, 13) that "prudence is the science of what to desire and what to avoid." Now science is condivided with virtue, as appears in the _Predicaments_ (vi). Therefore prudence is not a virtue.
Obj. 2: Further, there is no virtue of a virtue: but "there is a virtue of art," as the Philosopher states (Ethic. vi, 5): wherefore art is not a virtue. Now there is prudence in art, for it is written (2 Paralip. ii, 14) concerning Hiram, that he knew "to grave all sort of graving, and to devise ingeniously (_prudenter_) all that there may be need of in the work." Therefore prudence is not a virtue.
Obj. 3: Further, no virtue can be immoderate. But prudence is immoderate, else it would be useless to say (Prov. 23:4): "Set bounds to thy prudence." Therefore prudence is not a virtue.
_On the contrary,_ Gregory states (Moral. ii, 49) that prudence, temperance, fort.i.tude and justice are four virtues.
_I answer that,_ As stated above (I-II, Q. 55, A. 3; Q. 56, A. 1) when we were treating of virtues in general, "virtue is that which makes its possessor good, and his work good likewise." Now good may be understood in a twofold sense: first, materially, for the thing that is good, secondly, formally, under the aspect of good. Good, under the aspect of good, is the object of the appet.i.tive power.
Hence if any habits rectify the consideration of reason, without regarding the rect.i.tude of the appet.i.te, they have less of the nature of a virtue since they direct man to good materially, that is to say, to the thing which is good, but without considering it under the aspect of good. On the other hand those virtues which regard the rect.i.tude of the appet.i.te, have more of the nature of virtue, because they consider the good not only materially, but also formally, in other words, they consider that which is good under the aspect of good.
Now it belongs to prudence, as stated above (A. 1, ad 3; A. 3) to apply right reason to action, and this is not done without a right appet.i.te. Hence prudence has the nature of virtue not only as the other intellectual virtues have it, but also as the moral virtues have it, among which virtues it is enumerated.
Reply Obj. 1: Augustine there takes science in the broad sense for any kind of right reason.
Reply Obj. 2: The Philosopher says that there is a virtue of art, because art does not require rect.i.tude of the appet.i.te; wherefore in order that a man may make right use of his art, he needs to have a virtue which will rectify his appet.i.te. Prudence however has nothing to do with the matter of art, because art is both directed to a particular end, and has fixed means of obtaining that end. And yet, by a kind of comparison, a man may be said to act prudently in matters of art. Moreover in certain arts, on account of the uncertainty of the means for obtaining the end, there is need for counsel, as for instance in the arts of medicine and navigation, as stated in _Ethic._ iii, 3.
Reply Obj. 3: This saying of the wise man does not mean that prudence itself should be moderate, but that moderation must be imposed on other things according to prudence.
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FIFTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 47, Art. 5]