_I answer that,_ Prudence is threefold. There is a false prudence, which takes its name from its likeness to true prudence. For since a prudent man is one who disposes well of the things that have to be done for a good end, whoever disposes well of such things as are fitting for an evil end, has false prudence, in far as that which he takes for an end, is good, not in truth but in appearance. Thus man is called "a good robber," and in this way may speak of "a prudent robber," by way of similarity, because he devises fitting ways of committing robbery. This is the prudence of which the Apostle says (Rom. 8:6): "The prudence [Douay: "wisdom"] of the flesh is death,"
because, to wit, it places its ultimate end in the pleasures of the flesh.
The second prudence is indeed true prudence, because it devises fitting ways of obtaining a good end; and yet it is imperfect, from a twofold source. First, because the good which it takes for an end, is not the common end of all human life, but of some particular affair; thus when a man devises fitting ways of conducting business or of sailing a ship, he is called a prudent businessman, or a prudent sailor; secondly, because he fails in the chief act of prudence, as when a man takes counsel aright, and forms a good judgment, even about things concerning life as a whole, but fails to make an effective command.
The third prudence is both true and perfect, for it takes counsel, judges and commands aright in respect of the good end of man"s whole life: and this alone is prudence simply so-called, and cannot be in sinners, whereas the first prudence is in sinners alone, while imperfect prudence is common to good and wicked men, especially that which is imperfect through being directed to a particular end, since that which is imperfect on account of a failing in the chief act, is only in the wicked.
Reply Obj. 1: This saying of our Lord is to be understood of the first prudence, wherefore it is not said that they are prudent absolutely, but that they are prudent in "their generation."
Reply Obj. 2: The nature of faith consists not in conformity with the appet.i.te for certain right actions, but in knowledge alone. On the other hand prudence implies a relation to a right appet.i.te. First because its principles are the ends in matters of action; and of such ends one forms a right estimate through the habits of moral virtue, which rectify the appet.i.te: wherefore without the moral virtues there is no prudence, as shown above (I-II, Q. 58, A. 5); secondly because prudence commands right actions, which does not happen unless the appet.i.te be right. Wherefore though faith on account of its object is more excellent than prudence, yet prudence, by its very nature, is more opposed to sin, which arises from a disorder of the appet.i.te.
Reply Obj. 3: Sinners can take good counsel for an evil end, or for some particular good, but they do not perfectly take good counsel for the end of their whole life, since they do not carry that counsel into effect. Hence they lack prudence which is directed to the good only; and yet in them, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 12) there is "cleverness," [*_deinotike_] i.e. natural diligence which may be directed to both good and evil; or "cunning," [*_panourgia_]
which is directed only to evil, and which we have stated above, to be "false prudence" or "prudence of the flesh."
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FOURTEENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 47, Art. 14]
Whether Prudence Is in All Who Have Grace?
Objection 1: It would seem that prudence is not in all who have grace.
Prudence requires diligence, that one may foresee aright what has to be done. But many who have grace have not this diligence. Therefore not all who have grace have prudence.
Obj. 2: Further, a prudent man is one who takes good counsel, as stated above (A. 8, Obj. 2; A. 13, Obj. 3). Yet many have grace who do not take good counsel, and need to be guided by the counsel of others.
Therefore not all who have grace, have prudence.
Obj. 3: Further, the Philosopher says (Topic. iii, 2) that "young people are not obviously prudent." Yet many young people have grace.
Therefore prudence is not to be found in all who have grace.
_On the contrary,_ No man has grace unless he be virtuous. Now no man can be virtuous without prudence, for Gregory says (Moral. ii, 46) that "the other virtues cannot be virtues at all unless they effect prudently what they desire to accomplish." Therefore all who have grace have prudence.
_I answer that,_ The virtues must needs be connected together, so that whoever has one has all, as stated above (I-II, Q. 65, A. 1). Now whoever has grace has charity, so that he must needs have all the other virtues, and hence, since prudence is a virtue, as shown above (A. 4), he must, of necessity, have prudence also.
Reply Obj. 1: Diligence is twofold: one is merely sufficient with regard to things necessary for salvation; and such diligence is given to all who have grace, whom "His unction teacheth of all things"
(1 John 2:27). There is also another diligence which is more than sufficient, whereby a man is able to make provision both for himself and for others, not only in matters necessary for salvation, but also in all things relating to human life; and such diligence as this is not in all who have grace.
Reply Obj. 2: Those who require to be guided by the counsel of others, are able, if they have grace, to take counsel for themselves in this point at least, that they require the counsel of others and can discern good from evil counsel.
Reply Obj. 3: Acquired prudence is caused by the exercise of acts, wherefore "its acquisition demands experience and time" (Ethic.
ii, 1), hence it cannot be in the young, neither in habit nor in act.
On the other hand gratuitous prudence is caused by divine infusion.
Wherefore, in children who have been baptized but have not come to the use of reason, there is prudence as to habit but not as to act, even as in idiots; whereas in those who have come to the use of reason, it is also as to act, with regard to things necessary for salvation. This by practice merits increase, until it becomes perfect, even as the other virtues. Hence the Apostle says (Heb. 5:14) that "strong meat is for the perfect, for them who by custom have their senses exercised to the discerning of good and evil."
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FIFTEENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 47, Art. 15]
Whether Prudence Is in Us by Nature?
Objection 1: It would seem that prudence is in us by nature. The Philosopher says that things connected with prudence "seem to be natural," namely "synesis, gnome" [*_synesis_ and _gnome_, Cf. I-II, Q. 57, A. 6] and the like, but not those which are connected with speculative wisdom. Now things belonging to the same genus have the same kind of origin. Therefore prudence also is in us from nature.
Obj. 2: Further, the changes of age are according to nature. Now prudence results from age, according to Job 12:12: "In the ancient is wisdom, and in length of days prudence." Therefore prudence is natural.
Obj. 3: Further, prudence is more consistent with human nature than with that of dumb animals. Now there are instances of a certain natural prudence in dumb animals, according to the Philosopher (De Hist. Anim. viii, 1). Therefore prudence is natural.
_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 1) that "intellectual virtue is both originated and fostered by teaching; it therefore demands experience and time." Now prudence is an intellectual virtue, as stated above (A. 4). Therefore prudence is in us, not by nature, but by teaching and experience.
_I answer that,_ As shown above (A. 3), prudence includes knowledge both of universals, and of the singular matters of action to which prudence applies the universal principles. Accordingly, as regards the knowledge of universals, the same is to be said of prudence as of speculative science, because the primary universal principles of either are known naturally, as shown above (A. 6): except that the common principles of prudence are more connatural to man; for as the Philosopher remarks (Ethic. x, 7) "the life which is according to the speculative reason is better than that which is according to man": whereas the secondary universal principles, whether of the speculative or of the practical reason, are not inherited from nature, but are acquired by discovery through experience, or through teaching.
On the other hand, as regards the knowledge of particulars which are the matter of action, we must make a further distinction, because this matter of action is either an end or the means to an end. Now the right ends of human life are fixed; wherefore there can be a natural inclination in respect of these ends; thus it has been stated above (I-II, Q. 51, A. 1; Q. 63, A. 1) that some, from a natural inclination, have certain virtues whereby they are inclined to right ends; and consequently they also have naturally a right judgment about such like ends.
But the means to the end, in human concerns, far from being fixed, are of manifold variety according to the variety of persons and affairs. Wherefore since the inclination of nature is ever to something fixed, the knowledge of those means cannot be in man naturally, although, by reason of his natural disposition, one man has a greater apt.i.tude than another in discerning them, just as it happens with regard to the conclusions of speculative sciences. Since then prudence is not about the ends, but about the means, as stated above (A. 6; I-II, Q. 57, A. 5), it follows that prudence is not from nature.
Reply Obj. 1: The Philosopher is speaking there of things relating to prudence, in so far as they are directed to ends. Wherefore he had said before (Ethic. vi, 5, 11) that "they are the principles of the _ou heneka_" [*Literally, "for the sake of which" (are the means)], namely, the end; and so he does not mention _euboulia_ among them, because it takes counsel about the means.
Reply Obj. 2: Prudence is rather in the old, not only because their natural disposition calms the movement of the sensitive pa.s.sions, but also because of their long experience.
Reply Obj. 3: Even in dumb animals there are fixed ways of obtaining an end, wherefore we observe that all the animals of a same species act in like manner. But this is impossible in man, on account of his reason, which takes cognizance of universals, and consequently extends to an infinity of singulars.
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SIXTEENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 47, Art. 16]
Whether Prudence Can Be Lost Through Forgetfulness?
Objection 1: It would seem that prudence can be lost through forgetfulness. For since science is about necessary things, it is more certain than prudence which is about contingent matters of action. But science is lost by forgetfulness. Much more therefore is prudence.
Obj. 2: Further, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 3) "the same things, but by a contrary process, engender and corrupt virtue." Now the engendering of prudence requires experience which is made up "of many memories," as he states at the beginning of his _Metaphysics_ (i, 1). Therefore since forgetfulness is contrary to memory, it seems that prudence can be lost through forgetfulness.
Obj. 3: Further, there is no prudence without knowledge of universals. But knowledge of universals can be lost through forgetfulness. Therefore prudence can also.
_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 5) that "forgetfulness is possible to art but not to prudence."
_I answer that,_ Forgetfulness regards knowledge only, wherefore one can forget art and science, so as to lose them altogether, because they belong to the reason. But prudence consists not in knowledge alone, but also in an act of the appet.i.te, because as stated above (A. 8), its princ.i.p.al act is one of command, whereby a man applies the knowledge he has, to the purpose of appet.i.tion and operation.
Hence prudence is not taken away directly by forgetfulness, but rather is corrupted by the pa.s.sions. For the Philosopher says (Ethic.
vi, 5) that "pleasure and sorrow pervert the estimate of prudence": wherefore it is written (Dan. 13:56): "Beauty hath deceived thee, and l.u.s.t hath subverted thy heart," and (Ex. 23:8): "Neither shalt thou take bribes which blind even the prudent [Douay: "wise"]."
Nevertheless forgetfulness may hinder prudence, in so far as the latter"s command depends on knowledge which may be forgotten.
Reply Obj. 1: Science is in the reason only: hence the comparison fails, as stated above [*Cf. I-II, Q. 53, A. 1].
Reply Obj. 2: The experience required by prudence results not from memory alone, but also from the practice of commanding aright.
Reply Obj. 3: Prudence consists chiefly, not in the knowledge of universals, but in applying them to action, as stated above (A. 3).
Wherefore forgetting the knowledge of universals does not destroy the princ.i.p.al part of prudence, but hinders it somewhat, as stated above.
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QUESTION 48
OF THE PARTS OF PRUDENCE (In One Article)
We must now consider the parts of prudence, under which head there are four points of inquiry: