Obj. 2: Further, prudence is only practical, whereas foresight may be also speculative, because _seeing,_ whence we have the word "to foresee," has more to do with speculation than operation. Therefore foresight is not a part of prudence.
Obj. 3: Further, the chief act of prudence is to command, while its secondary act is to judge and to take counsel. But none of these seems to be properly implied by foresight. Therefore foresight is not part of prudence.
On the contrary stands the authority of Tully and Macrobius, who number foresight among the parts of prudence, as stated above (Q. 48).
_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 47, A. 1, ad 2, AA. 6, 13), prudence is properly about the means to an end, and its proper work is to set them in due order to the end. And although certain things are necessary for an end, which are subject to divine providence, yet nothing is subject to human providence except the contingent matters of actions which can be done by man for an end. Now the past has become a kind of necessity, since what has been done cannot be undone. In like manner, the present as such, has a kind of necessity, since it is necessary that Socrates sit, so long as he sits.
Consequently, future contingents, in so far as they can be directed by man to the end of human life, are the matter of prudence: and each of these things is implied in the word foresight, for it implies the notion of something distant, to which that which occurs in the present has to be directed. Therefore foresight is part of prudence.
Reply Obj. 1: Whenever many things are requisite for a unity, one of them must needs be the princ.i.p.al to which all the others are subordinate. Hence in every whole one part must be formal and predominant, whence the whole has unity. Accordingly foresight is the princ.i.p.al of all the parts of prudence, since whatever else is required for prudence, is necessary precisely that some particular thing may be rightly directed to its end. Hence it is that the very name of prudence is taken from foresight (_providentia_) as from its princ.i.p.al part.
Reply Obj. 2: Speculation is about universal and necessary things, which, in themselves, are not distant, since they are everywhere and always, though they are distant from us, in so far as we fail to know them. Hence foresight does not apply properly to speculative, but only to practical matters.
Reply Obj. 3: Right order to an end which is included in the notion of foresight, contains rect.i.tude of counsel, judgment and command, without which no right order to the end is possible.
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SEVENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 49, Art. 7]
Whether Circ.u.mspection Can Be a Part of Prudence?
Objection 1: It would seem that circ.u.mspection cannot be a part of prudence. For circ.u.mspection seems to signify looking at one"s surroundings. But these are of infinite number, and cannot be considered by the reason wherein is prudence. Therefore circ.u.mspection should not be reckoned a part of prudence.
Obj. 2: Further, circ.u.mstances seem to be the concern of moral virtues rather than of prudence. But circ.u.mspection seems to denote nothing but attention to circ.u.mstances. Therefore circ.u.mspection apparently belongs to the moral virtues rather than to prudence.
Obj. 3: Further, whoever can see things afar off can much more see things that are near. Now foresight enables a man to look on distant things. Therefore there is no need to account circ.u.mspection a part of prudence in addition to foresight.
On the contrary stands the authority of Macrobius, quoted above (Q.
48).
_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 6), it belongs to prudence chiefly to direct something aright to an end; and this is not done aright unless both the end be good, and the means good and suitable.
Since, however, prudence, as stated above (Q. 47, A. 3) is about singular matters of action, which contain many combinations of circ.u.mstances, it happens that a thing is good in itself and suitable to the end, and nevertheless becomes evil or unsuitable to the end, by reason of some combination of circ.u.mstances. Thus to show signs of love to someone seems, considered in itself, to be a fitting way to arouse love in his heart, yet if pride or suspicion of flattery arise in his heart, it will no longer be a means suitable to the end. Hence the need of circ.u.mspection in prudence, viz. of comparing the means with the circ.u.mstances.
Reply Obj. 1: Though the number of possible circ.u.mstances be infinite, the number of actual circ.u.mstances is not; and the judgment of reason in matters of action is influenced by things which are few in number.
Reply Obj. 2: Circ.u.mstances are the concern of prudence, because prudence has to fix them; on the other hand they are the concern of moral virtues, in so far as moral virtues are perfected by the fixing of circ.u.mstances.
Reply Obj. 3: Just as it belongs to foresight to look on that which is by its nature suitable to an end, so it belongs to circ.u.mspection to consider whether it be suitable to the end in view of the circ.u.mstances. Now each of these presents a difficulty of its own, and therefore each is reckoned a distinct part of prudence.
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EIGHTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 49, Art. 8]
Whether Caution Should Be Reckoned a Part of Prudence?
Objection 1: It would seem that caution should not be reckoned a part of prudence. For when no evil is possible, no caution is required.
Now no man makes evil use of virtue, as Augustine declares (De Lib.
Arb. ii, 19). Therefore caution does not belong to prudence which directs the virtues.
Obj. 2: Further, to foresee good and to avoid evil belong to the same faculty, just as the same art gives health and cures ill-health. Now it belongs to foresight to foresee good, and consequently, also to avoid evil. Therefore caution should not be accounted a part of prudence, distinct from foresight.
Obj. 3: Further, no prudent man strives for the impossible. But no man can take precautions against all possible evils. Therefore caution does not belong to prudence.
_On the contrary,_ The Apostle says (Eph. 5:15): "See how you walk cautiously [Douay: "circ.u.mspectly"]."
_I answer that,_ The things with which prudence is concerned, are contingent matters of action, wherein, even as false is found with true, so is evil mingled with good, on account of the great variety of these matters of action, wherein good is often hindered by evil, and evil has the appearance of good. Wherefore prudence needs caution, so that we may have such a grasp of good as to avoid evil.
Reply Obj. 1: Caution is required in moral acts, that we may be on our guard, not against acts of virtue, but against the hindrance of acts of virtue.
Reply Obj. 2: It is the same in idea, to ensue good and to avoid the opposite evil, but the avoidance of outward hindrances is different in idea. Hence caution differs from foresight, although they both belong to the one virtue of prudence.
Reply Obj. 3: Of the evils which man has to avoid, some are of frequent occurrence; the like can be grasped by reason, and against them caution is directed, either that they may be avoided altogether, or that they may do less harm. Others there are that occur rarely and by chance, and these, since they are infinite in number, cannot be grasped by reason, nor is man able to take precautions against them, although by exercising prudence he is able to prepare against all the surprises of chance, so as to suffer less harm thereby.
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QUESTION 50
OF THE SUBJECTIVE PARTS OF PRUDENCE (In Four Articles)
We must, in due sequence, consider the subjective parts of prudence.
And since we have already spoken of the prudence with which a man rules himself (Q. 47, seqq.), it remains for us to discuss the species of prudence whereby a mult.i.tude is governed. Under this head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether a species of prudence is regnative?
(2) Whether political and (3) domestic economy are species of prudence?
(4) Whether military prudence is?
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FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 50, Art. 1]
Whether a Species of Prudence Is Regnative?
Objection 1: It would seem that regnative should not be reckoned a species of prudence. For regnative prudence is directed to the preservation of justice, since according to _Ethic._ v, 6 the prince is the guardian of justice. Therefore regnative prudence belongs to justice rather than to prudence.
Obj. 2: Further, according to the Philosopher (Polit. iii, 5) a kingdom (_regnum_) is one of six species of government. But no species of prudence is ascribed to the other five forms of government, which are "aristocracy," "polity," also called "timocracy" [*Cf. _Ethic._ viii, 10], "tyranny," "oligarchy" and "democracy." Therefore neither should a regnative species be ascribed to a kingdom.
Obj. 3: Further, lawgiving belongs not only to kings, but also to certain others placed in authority, and even to the people, according to Isidore (Etym. v). Now the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 8) reckons a part of prudence to be "legislative." Therefore it is not becoming to subst.i.tute regnative prudence in its place.
_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Polit. iii, 11) that "prudence is a virtue which is proper to the prince." Therefore a special kind of prudence is regnative.
_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 47, AA. 8, 10), it belongs to prudence to govern and command, so that wherever in human acts we find a special kind of governance and command, there must be a special kind of prudence. Now it is evident that there is a special and perfect kind of governance in one who has to govern not only himself but also the perfect community of a city or kingdom; because a government is the more perfect according as it is more universal, extends to more matters, and attains a higher end. Hence prudence in its special and most perfect sense, belongs to a king who is charged with the government of a city or kingdom: for which reason a species of prudence is reckoned to be regnative.
Reply Obj. 1: All matters connected with moral virtue belong to prudence as their guide, wherefore "right reason in accord with prudence" is included in the definition of moral virtue, as stated above (Q. 47, A. 5, ad 1; I-II, Q. 58, A. 2, ad 4). For this reason also the execution of justice in so far as it is directed to the common good, which is part of the kingly office, needs the guidance of prudence. Hence these two virtues--prudence and justice--belong most properly to a king, according to Jer. 23:5: "A king shall reign and shall be wise, and shall execute justice and judgment in the earth." Since, however, direction belongs rather to the king, and execution to his subjects, regnative prudence is reckoned a species of prudence which is directive, rather than to justice which is executive.
Reply Obj. 2: A kingdom is the best of all governments, as stated in _Ethic._ viii, 10: wherefore the species of prudence should be denominated rather from a kingdom, yet so as to comprehend under regnative all other rightful forms of government, but not perverse forms which are opposed to virtue, and which, accordingly, do not pertain to prudence.
Reply Obj. 3: The Philosopher names regnative prudence after the princ.i.p.al act of a king which is to make laws, and although this applies to the other forms of government, this is only in so far as they have a share of kingly government.
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SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 50, Art. 2]