Reply Obj. 2: In weighing the gravity of a sin we must consider the essential rather than the accidental. Wherefore he who kills a just man, sins more grievously than he who slays a sinful man: first, because he injures one whom he should love more, and so acts more in opposition to charity: secondly, because he inflicts an injury on a man who is less deserving of one, and so acts more in opposition to justice: thirdly, because he deprives the community of a greater good: fourthly, because he despises G.o.d more, according to Luke 10:16, "He that despiseth you despiseth Me." On the other hand it is accidental to the slaying that the just man whose life is taken be received by G.o.d into glory.
Reply Obj. 3: If the judge knows that a man who has been convicted by false witnesses, is innocent he must, like Daniel, examine the witnesses with great care, so as to find a motive for acquitting the innocent: but if he cannot do this he should remit him for judgment by a higher tribunal. If even this is impossible, he does not sin if he p.r.o.nounce sentence in accordance with the evidence, for it is not he that puts the innocent man to death, but they who stated him to be guilty. He that carries out the sentence of the judge who has condemned an innocent man, if the sentence contains an inexcusable error, he should not obey, else there would be an excuse for the executions of the martyrs: if however it contain no manifest injustice, he does not sin by carrying out the sentence, because he has no right to discuss the judgment of his superior; nor is it he who slays the innocent man, but the judge whose minister he is.
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SEVENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 64, Art. 7]
Whether It Is Lawful to Kill a Man in Self-defense?
Objection 1: It would seem that n.o.body may lawfully kill a man in self-defense. For Augustine says to Publicola (Ep. xlvii): "I do not agree with the opinion that one may kill a man lest one be killed by him; unless one be a soldier, exercise a public office, so that one does it not for oneself but for others, having the power to do so, provided it be in keeping with one"s person." Now he who kills a man in self-defense, kills him lest he be killed by him. Therefore this would seem to be unlawful.
Obj. 2: Further, he says (De Lib. Arb. i, 5): "How are they free from sin in sight of Divine providence, who are guilty of taking a man"s life for the sake of these contemptible things?" Now among contemptible things he reckons "those which men may forfeit unwillingly," as appears from the context (De Lib. Arb. i, 5): and the chief of these is the life of the body. Therefore it is unlawful for any man to take another"s life for the sake of the life of his own body.
Obj. 3: Further, Pope Nicolas [*Nicolas I, Dist. 1, can. De his clericis] says in the Decretals: "Concerning the clerics about whom you have consulted Us, those, namely, who have killed a pagan in self-defense, as to whether, after making amends by repenting, they may return to their former state, or rise to a higher degree; know that in no case is it lawful for them to kill any man under any circ.u.mstances whatever." Now clerics and laymen are alike bound to observe the moral precepts. Therefore neither is it lawful for laymen to kill anyone in self-defense.
Obj. 4: Further, murder is a more grievous sin than fornication or adultery. Now n.o.body may lawfully commit simple fornication or adultery or any other mortal sin in order to save his own life; since the spiritual life is to be preferred to the life of the body.
Therefore no man may lawfully take another"s life in self-defense in order to save his own life.
Obj. 5: Further, if the tree be evil, so is the fruit, according to Matt. 7:17. Now self-defense itself seems to be unlawful, according to Rom. 12:19: "Not defending [Douay: "revenging"] yourselves, my dearly beloved." Therefore its result, which is the slaying of a man, is also unlawful.
_On the contrary,_ It is written (Ex. 22:2): "If a thief be found breaking into a house or undermining it, and be wounded so as to die; he that slew him shall not be guilty of blood." Now it is much more lawful to defend one"s life than one"s house. Therefore neither is a man guilty of murder if he kill another in defense of his own life.
_I answer that,_ Nothing hinders one act from having two effects, only one of which is intended, while the other is beside the intention. Now moral acts take their species according to what is intended, and not according to what is beside the intention, since this is accidental as explained above (Q. 43, A. 3; I-II, Q. 12, A.
1). Accordingly the act of self-defense may have two effects, one is the saving of one"s life, the other is the slaying of the aggressor.
Therefore this act, since one"s intention is to save one"s own life, is not unlawful, seeing that it is natural to everything to keep itself in _being,_ as far as possible. And yet, though proceeding from a good intention, an act may be rendered unlawful, if it be out of proportion to the end. Wherefore if a man, in self-defense, uses more than necessary violence, it will be unlawful: whereas if he repel force with moderation his defense will be lawful, because according to the jurists [*Cap. Significasti, De Homicid. volunt. vel casual.], "it is lawful to repel force by force, provided one does not exceed the limits of a blameless defense." Nor is it necessary for salvation that a man omit the act of moderate self-defense in order to avoid killing the other man, since one is bound to take more care of one"s own life than of another"s. But as it is unlawful to take a man"s life, except for the public authority acting for the common good, as stated above (A. 3), it is not lawful for a man to intend killing a man in self-defense, except for such as have public authority, who while intending to kill a man in self-defense, refer this to the public good, as in the case of a soldier fighting against the foe, and in the minister of the judge struggling with robbers, although even these sin if they be moved by private animosity.
Reply Obj. 1: The words quoted from Augustine refer to the case when one man intends to kill another to save himself from death. The pa.s.sage quoted in the Second Objection is to be understood in the same sense. Hence he says pointedly, "for the sake of these things,"
whereby he indicates the intention. This suffices for the Reply to the Second Objection.
Reply Obj. 3: Irregularity results from the act though sinless of taking a man"s life, as appears in the case of a judge who justly condemns a man to death. For this reason a cleric, though he kill a man in self-defense, is irregular, albeit he intends not to kill him, but to defend himself.
Reply Obj. 4: The act of fornication or adultery is not necessarily directed to the preservation of one"s own life, as is the act whence sometimes results the taking of a man"s life.
Reply Obj. 5: The defense forbidden in this pa.s.sage is that which comes from revengeful spite. Hence a gloss says: "Not defending yourselves--that is, not striking your enemy back."
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EIGHTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 64, Art. 8]
Whether One Is Guilty of Murder Through Killing Someone by Chance?
Objection 1: It would seem that one is guilty of murder through killing someone by chance. For we read (Gen. 4:23, 24) that Lamech slew a man in mistake for a wild beast [*The text of the Bible does not say so, but this was the Jewish traditional commentary on Gen.
4:23], and that he was accounted guilty of murder. Therefore one incurs the guilt of murder through killing a man by chance.
Obj. 2: Further, it is written (Ex. 21:22): "If ... one strike a woman with child, and she miscarry indeed ... if her death ensue thereupon, he shall render life for life." Yet this may happen without any intention of causing her death. Therefore one is guilty of murder through killing someone by chance.
Obj. 3: Further, the Decretals [*Dist. 1] contain several canons prescribing penalties for unintentional homicide. Now penalty is not due save for guilt. Therefore he who kills a man by chance, incurs the guilt of murder.
_On the contrary,_ Augustine says to Publicola (Ep. xlvii): "When we do a thing for a good and lawful purpose, if thereby we unintentionally cause harm to anyone, it should by no means be imputed to us." Now it sometimes happens by chance that a person is killed as a result of something done for a good purpose. Therefore the person who did it is not accounted guilty.
_I answer that,_ According to the Philosopher (Phys. ii, 6) "chance is a cause that acts beside one"s intention." Hence chance happenings, strictly speaking, are neither intended nor voluntary.
And since every sin is voluntary, according to Augustine (De Vera Relig. xiv) it follows that chance happenings, as such, are not sins.
Nevertheless it happens that what is not actually and directly voluntary and intended, is voluntary and intended accidentally, according as that which removes an obstacle is called an accidental cause. Wherefore he who does not remove something whence homicide results whereas he ought to remove it, is in a sense guilty of voluntary homicide. This happens in two ways: first when a man causes another"s death through occupying himself with unlawful things which he ought to avoid: secondly, when he does not take sufficient care.
Hence, according to jurists, if a man pursue a lawful occupation and take due care, the result being that a person loses his life, he is not guilty of that person"s death: whereas if he be occupied with something unlawful, or even with something lawful, but without due care, he does not escape being guilty of murder, if his action results in someone"s death.
Reply Obj. 1: Lamech did not take sufficient care to avoid taking a man"s life: and so he was not excused from being guilty of homicide.
Reply Obj. 2: He that strikes a woman with child does something unlawful: wherefore if there results the death either of the woman or of the animated fetus, he will not be excused from homicide, especially seeing that death is the natural result of such a blow.
Reply Obj. 3: According to the canons a penalty is inflicted on those who cause death unintentionally, through doing something unlawful, or failing to take sufficient care.
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QUESTION 65
OF OTHER INJURIES COMMITTED ON THE PERSON (In Four Articles)
We must now consider other sinful injuries committed on the person.
Under this head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) The mutilation of members;
(2) Blows;
(3) Imprisonment;
(4) Whether the sins that consist in inflicting such like injuries are aggravated through being perpetrated on persons connected with others?
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FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 65, Art. 1]
Whether in Some Cases It May Be Lawful to Maim Anyone?
Objection 1: It would seem that in no case can it be lawful to maim anyone. For Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iv, 20) that "sin consists in departing from what is according to nature, towards that which is contrary to nature." Now according to nature it is appointed by G.o.d that a man"s body should be entire in its members, and it is contrary to nature that it should be deprived of a member. Therefore it seems that it is always a sin to maim a person.
Obj. 2: Further, as the whole soul is to the whole body, so are the parts of the soul to the parts of the body (De Anima ii, 1). But it is unlawful to deprive a man of his soul by killing him, except by public authority. Therefore neither is it lawful to maim anyone, except perhaps by public authority.
Obj. 3: Further, the welfare of the soul is to be preferred to the welfare of the body. Now it is not lawful for a man to maim himself for the sake of the soul"s welfare: since the council of Nicea [*P.
I, sect. 4, can. i] punished those who castrated themselves that they might preserve chast.i.ty. Therefore it is not lawful for any other reason to maim a person.
_On the contrary,_ It is written (Ex. 21:24): "Eye for eye, tooth for tooth, hand for hand, foot for foot."
_I answer that,_ Since a member is part of the whole human body, it is for the sake of the whole, as the imperfect for the perfect. Hence a member of the human body is to be disposed of according as it is expedient for the body. Now a member of the human body is of itself useful to the good of the whole body, yet, accidentally it may happen to be hurtful, as when a decayed member is a source of corruption to the whole body. Accordingly so long as a member is healthy and retains its natural disposition, it cannot be cut off without injury to the whole body. But as the whole of man is directed as to his end to the whole of the community of which he is a part, as stated above (Q. 61, A. 1; Q. 64, AA. 2, 5), it may happen that although the removal of a member may be detrimental to the whole body, it may nevertheless be directed to the good of the community, in so far as it is applied to a person as a punishment for the purpose of restraining sin. Hence just as by public authority a person is lawfully deprived of life altogether on account of certain more heinous sins, so is he deprived of a member on account of certain lesser sins. But this is not lawful for a private individual, even with the consent of the owner of the member, because this would involve an injury to the community, to whom the man and all his parts belong. If, however, the member be decayed and therefore a source of corruption to the whole body, then it is lawful with the consent of the owner of the member, to cut away the member for the welfare of the whole body, since each one is entrusted with the care of his own welfare. The same applies if it be done with the consent of the person whose business it is to care for the welfare of the person who has a decayed member: otherwise it is altogether unlawful to maim anyone.
Reply Obj. 1: Nothing prevents that which is contrary to a particular nature from being in harmony with universal nature: thus death and corruption, in the physical order, are contrary to the particular nature of the thing corrupted, although they are in keeping with universal nature. In like manner to maim anyone, though contrary to the particular nature of the body of the person maimed, is nevertheless in keeping with natural reason in relation to the common good.
Reply Obj. 2: The life of the entire man is not directed to something belonging to man; on the contrary whatever belongs to man is directed to his life. Hence in no case does it pertain to a person to take anyone"s life, except to the public authority to whom is entrusted the procuring of the common good. But the removal of a member can be directed to the good of one man, and consequently in certain cases can pertain to him.
Reply Obj. 3: A member should not be removed for the sake of the bodily health of the whole, unless otherwise nothing can be done to further the good of the whole. Now it is always possible to further one"s spiritual welfare otherwise than by cutting off a member, because sin is always subject to the will: and consequently in no case is it allowable to maim oneself, even to avoid any sin whatever.
Hence Chrysostom, in his exposition on Matt. 19:12 (Hom. lxii in Matth.), "There are eunuchs who have made themselves eunuchs for the kingdom of heaven," says: "Not by maiming themselves, but by destroying evil thoughts, for a man is accursed who maims himself, since they are murderers who do such things." And further on he says: "Nor is l.u.s.t tamed thereby, on the contrary it becomes more importunate, for the seed springs in us from other sources, and chiefly from an incontinent purpose and a careless mind: and temptation is curbed not so much by cutting off a member as by curbing one"s thoughts."