Whether an Oath Is More Binding Than a Vow?
Objection 1: It would seem that an oath is more binding than a vow. A vow is a simple promise: whereas an oath includes, besides a promise, an appeal to G.o.d as witness. Therefore an oath is more binding than a vow.
Obj. 2: Further, the weaker is wont to be confirmed by the stronger.
Now a vow is sometimes confirmed by an oath. Therefore an oath is stronger than a vow.
Obj. 3: Further, the obligation of a vow arises from the deliberation of the mind, a stated above (Q. 88, A. 1); while the obligation of an oath results from the truth of G.o.d Whose testimony is invoked. Since therefore G.o.d"s truth is something greater than human deliberation, it seems that the obligation of an oath is greater than that of a vow.
_On the contrary,_ A vow binds one to G.o.d while an oath sometimes binds one to man. Now one is more bound to G.o.d than to man. Therefore a vow is more binding than an oath.
_I answer that,_ The obligation both of vow and of an oath arises from something Divine; but in different ways. For the obligation of a vow arises from the fidelity we owe G.o.d, which binds us to fulfil our promises to Him. On the other hand, the obligation of an oath arises from the reverence we owe Him which binds us to make true what we promise in His name. Now every act of infidelity includes an irreverence, but not conversely, because the infidelity of a subject to his lord would seem to be the greatest irreverence. Hence a vow by its very nature is more binding than an oath.
Reply Obj. 1: A vow is not any kind of promise, but a promise made to G.o.d; and to be unfaithful to G.o.d is most grievous.
Reply Obj. 2: An oath is added to a vow not because it is more stable, but because greater stability results from "two immutable things" [*Heb. 6:18].
Reply Obj. 3: Deliberation of the mind gives a vow its stability, on the part of the person who takes the vow: but it has a greater cause of stability on the part of G.o.d, to Whom the vow is offered.
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NINTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 89, Art. 9]
Whether Anyone Can Dispense from an Oath?
Objection 1: It would seem that no one can dispense from an oath.
Just as truth is required for a declaratory oath, which is about the past or the present, so too is it required for a promissory oath, which is about the future. Now no one can dispense a man from swearing to the truth about present or past things. Therefore neither can anyone dispense a man from making truth that which he has promised by oath to do in the future.
Obj. 2: Further, a promissory oath is used for the benefit of the person to whom the promise is made. But, apparently, he cannot release the other from his oath, since it would be contrary to the reverence of G.o.d. Much less therefore can a dispensation from this oath be granted by anyone.
Obj. 3: Further, any bishop can grant a dispensation from a vow, except certain vows reserved to the Pope alone, as stated above (Q.
88, A. 12, ad 3). Therefore in like manner, if an oath admits of dispensation, any bishop can dispense from an oath. And yet seemingly this is to be against the law [*Caus. XV, qu. 6, can. Auctoritatem, seqq.: Cap. Si vero, de Jurejurando]. Therefore it would seem that an oath does not admit of dispensation.
_On the contrary,_ A vow is more binding than an oath, as stated above (A. 8). But a vow admits of dispensation and therefore an oath does also.
_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 88, A. 10), the necessity of a dispensation both from the law and from a vow arises from the fact that something which is useful and morally good in itself and considered in general, may be morally evil and hurtful in respect of some particular emergency: and such a case comes under neither law nor vow. Now anything morally evil or hurtful is incompatible with the matter of an oath: for if it be morally evil it is opposed to justice, and if it be hurtful it is contrary to judgment. Therefore an oath likewise admits of dispensation.
Reply Obj. 1: A dispensation from an oath does not imply a permission to do anything against the oath: for this is impossible, since the keeping of an oath comes under a Divine precept, which does not admit of dispensation: but it implies that what hitherto came under an oath no longer comes under it, as not being due matter for an oath, just as we have said with regard to vows (Q. 88, A. 10, ad 2). Now the matter of a declaratory oath, which is about something past or present, has already acquired a certain necessity, and has become unchangeable, wherefore the dispensation will regard not the matter but the act itself of the oath: so that such a dispensation would be directly contrary to the Divine precept. On the other hand, the matter of a promissory oath is something future, which admits of change, so that, to wit, in certain emergencies, it may be unlawful or hurtful, and consequently undue matter for an oath. Therefore a promissory oath admits of dispensation, since such dispensation regards the matter of an oath, and is not contrary to the Divine precept about the keeping of oaths.
Reply Obj. 2: One man may promise something under oath to another in two ways. First, when he promises something for his benefit: for instance, if he promise to serve him, or to give him money: and from such a promise he can be released by the person to whom he made it: for he is understood to have already kept his promise to him when he acts towards him according to his will. Secondly, one man promises another something pertaining to G.o.d"s honor or to the benefit of others: for instance, if a man promise another under oath that he will enter religion, or perform some act of kindness. In this case the person to whom the promise is made cannot release him that made the promise, because it was made princ.i.p.ally not to him but to G.o.d: unless perchance it included some condition, for instance, "provided he give his consent" or some such like condition.
Reply Obj. 3: Sometimes that which is made the matter of a promissory oath is manifestly opposed to justice, either because it is a sin, as when a man swears to commit a murder, or because it is an obstacle to a greater good, as when a man swears not to enter religion: and such an oath requires no dispensation. But in the former case a man is bound not to keep such an oath, while in the latter it is lawful for him to keep or not to keep the oath, as stated above (A. 7, ad 2).
Sometimes what is promised on oath is doubtfully right or wrong, useful or harmful, either in itself or under the circ.u.mstance. In this case any bishop can dispense. Sometimes, however, that which is promised under oath is manifestly lawful and beneficial. An oath of this kind seemingly admits not of dispensation but of commutation, when there occurs something better to be done for the common good, in which case the matter would seem to belong chiefly to the power of the Pope, who has charge over the whole Church; and even of absolute relaxation, for this too belongs in general to the Pope in all matters regarding the administration of things ecclesiastical. Thus it is competent to any man to cancel an oath made by one of his subjects in matters that come under his authority: for instance, a father may annul his daughter"s oath, and a husband his wife"s (Num.
30:6, seqq.), as stated above with regard to vows (Q. 88, AA. 8, 9).
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TENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 89, Art. 10]
Whether an Oath Is Voided by a Condition of Person or Time?
Objection 1: It would seem that an oath is not voided by a condition of person or time. An oath, according to the Apostle (Heb. 6:16), is employed for the purpose of confirmation. Now it is competent to anyone to confirm his a.s.sertion, and at any time. Therefore it would seem that an oath is not voided by a condition of person or time.
Obj. 2: Further, to swear by G.o.d is more than to swear by the Gospels: wherefore Chrysostom [*Hom. xliv in the Opus Imperfectum falsely ascribed to St. John Chrysostom] says: "If there is a reason for swearing, it seems a small thing to swear by G.o.d, but a great thing to swear by the Gospels. To those who think thus, it must be said: Nonsense! the Scriptures were made for G.o.d"s sake, not G.o.d for the sake of the Scriptures." Now men of all conditions and at all times are wont to swear by G.o.d. Much more, therefore, is it lawful to swear by the Gospels.
Obj. 3: Further, the same effect does not proceed from contrary causes, since contrary causes produce contrary effects. Now some are debarred from swearing on account of some personal defect; children, for instance, before the age of fourteen, and persons who have already committed perjury. Therefore it would seem that a person ought not to be debarred from swearing either on account of his dignity, as clerics, or on account of the solemnity of the time.
Obj. 4: Further, in this world no living man is equal in dignity to an angel: for it is written (Matt. 11:11) that "he that is the lesser in the kingdom of heaven is greater than he," namely than John the Baptist, while yet living. Now an angel is competent to swear, for it is written (Apoc. 10:6) that the angel "swore by Him that liveth for ever and ever." Therefore no man ought to be excused from swearing, on account of his dignity.
_On the contrary,_ It is stated (II, qu. v, can. Si quis presbyter): "Let a priest be examined "by his sacred consecration," instead of being put on his oath": and (22, qu. v, can. Nullus): "Let no one in ecclesiastical orders dare to swear on the Holy Gospels to a layman."
_I answer that,_ Two things are to be considered in an oath. One is on the part of G.o.d, whose testimony is invoked, and in this respect we should hold an oath in the greatest reverence. For this reason children before the age of p.u.b.erty are debarred from taking oaths [*Caus. XXII, qu. 5, can. Parvuli], and are not called upon to swear, because they have not yet attained the perfect use of reason, so as to be able to take a oath with due reverence. Perjurers also are debarred from taking an oath, because it is presumed from their antecedents that they will not treat an oath with the reverence due to it. For this same reason, in order that oaths might be treated with due reverence the law says (22, qu. v, can. Honestum): "It is becoming that he who ventures to swear on holy things should do so fasting, with all propriety and fear of G.o.d."
The other thing to be considered is on the part of the man, whose a.s.sertion is confirmed by oath. For a man"s a.s.sertion needs no confirmation save because there is a doubt about it. Now it derogates from a person"s dignity that one should doubt about the truth of what he says, wherefore "it becomes not persons of great dignity to swear." For this reason the law says (II, qu. v, can. Si quis presbyter) that "priests should not swear for trifling reasons."
Nevertheless it is lawful for them to swear if there be need for it, or if great good may result therefrom. Especially is this the case in spiritual affairs, when moreover it is becoming that they should take oath on days of solemnity, since they ought then to devote themselves to spiritual matters. Nor should they on such occasions take oaths temporal matters, except perhaps in cases grave necessity.
Reply Obj. 1: Some are unable to confirm their own a.s.sertions on account of their own defect: and some there are whose words should be so certain that they need no confirmation.
Reply Obj. 2: The greater the thing sworn by, the holier and the more binding is the oath, considered in itself, as Augustine states (Ad Public., Ep. xlvii): and accordingly it is a graver matter to swear by G.o.d than the Gospels. Yet the contrary may be the case on account of the manner of swearing for instance, an oath by the Gospels might be taken with deliberation and solemnity, and an oath by G.o.d frivolously and without deliberation.
Reply Obj. 3: Nothing prevents the same thing from arising out of contrary causes, by way of superabundance and defect. It is in this way that some are debarred from swearing, through being of so great authority that it is unbecoming for them to swear; while others are of such little authority that their oaths have no standing.
Reply Obj. 4: The angel"s oath is adduced not on account of any defect in the angel, as though one ought not to credit his mere word, but in order to show that the statement made issues from G.o.d"s infallible disposition. Thus too G.o.d is sometimes spoken of by Scripture as swearing, in order to express the immutability of His word, as the Apostle declares (Heb. 6:17).
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QUESTION 90
OF THE TAKING OF G.o.d"S NAME BY WAY OF ADJURATION (In Three Articles)
We must now consider the taking of G.o.d"s name by way of adjuration: under which head there are three points of inquiry:
(1) Whether it is lawful to adjure a man?
(2) Whether it is lawful to adjure the demons?
(3) Whether it is lawful to adjure irrational creatures?
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FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 90, Art. 1]
Whether It Is Lawful to Adjure a Man?
Objection 1: It would seem that it is not lawful to adjure a man.
Origen says (Tract. x.x.xv super Matth.): "I deem that a man who wishes to live according to the Gospel should not adjure another man. For if, according to the Gospel mandate of Christ, it be unlawful to swear, it is evident that neither is it lawful to adjure: and consequently it is manifest that the high-priest unlawfully adjured Jesus by the living G.o.d."
Obj. 2: Further, whoever adjures a man, compels him after a fashion.
But it is unlawful to compel a man against his will. Therefore seemingly it is also unlawful to adjure a man.
Obj. 3: Further, to adjure is to induce a person to swear. Now it belongs to man"s superior to induce him to swear, for the superior imposes an oath on his subject. Therefore subjects cannot adjure their superiors.
_On the contrary,_ Even when we pray G.o.d we implore Him by certain holy things: and the Apostle too besought the faithful "by the mercy of G.o.d" (Rom. 12:1): and this seems to be a kind of adjuration.