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SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 111, Art. 2]
Whether Hypocrisy Is the Same As Dissimulation?
Objection 1: It seems that hypocrisy is not the same as dissimulation. For dissimulation consists in lying by deeds. But there may be hypocrisy in showing outwardly what one does inwardly, according to Matt. 6:2, "When thou dost an alms-deed sound not a trumpet before thee, as the hypocrites do." Therefore hypocrisy is not the same as dissimulation.
Obj. 2: Further, Gregory says (Moral. x.x.xi, 7): "Some there are who wear the habit of holiness, yet are unable to attain the merit of perfection. We must by no means deem these to have joined the ranks of the hypocrites, since it is one thing to sin from weakness, and another to sin from malice." Now those who wear the habit of holiness, without attaining the merit of perfection, are dissemblers, since the outward habit signifies works of perfection. Therefore dissimulation is not the same as hypocrisy.
Obj. 3: Further, hypocrisy consists in the mere intention. For our Lord says of hypocrites (Matt. 23:5) that "all their works they do for to be seen of men": and Gregory says (Moral. x.x.xi, 7) that "they never consider what it is that they do, but how by their every action they may please men." But dissimulation consists, not in the mere intention, but in the outward action: wherefore a gloss on Job 36:13, "Dissemblers and crafty men prove the wrath of G.o.d," says that "the dissembler simulates one thing and does another: he pretends chast.i.ty, and delights in lewdness, he makes a show of poverty and fills his purse." Therefore hypocrisy is not the same as dissimulation.
_On the contrary,_ Isidore says (Etym. x): ""Hypocrite" is a Greek word corresponding to the Latin "simulator," for whereas he is evil within," he "shows himself outwardly as being good; _hypo_ denoting falsehood, and _krisis_, judgment."
_I answer that,_ As Isidore says (Etym. x), "the word hypocrite is derived from the appearance of those who come on to the stage with a disguised face, by changing the color of their complexion, so as to imitate the complexion of the person they simulate, at one time under the guise of a man, at another under the guise of a woman, so as to deceive the people in their acting." Hence Augustine says (De Serm.
Dom. ii) that "just as hypocrites by simulating other persons act the parts of those they are not (since he that acts the part of Agamemnon is not that man himself but pretends to be), so too in the Church and in every department of human life, whoever wishes to seem what he is not is a hypocrite: for he pretends to be just without being so in reality."
We must conclude, therefore, that hypocrisy is dissimulation, not, however, any form of dissimulation, but only when one person simulates another, as when a sinner simulates the person of a just man.
Reply Obj. 1: The outward deed is a natural sign of the intention.
Accordingly when a man does good works pertaining by their genus to the service of G.o.d, and seeks by their means to please, not G.o.d but man, he simulates a right intention which he has not. Wherefore Gregory says (Moral.) that "hypocrites make G.o.d"s interests subservient to worldly purposes, since by making a show of saintly conduct they seek, not to turn men to G.o.d, but to draw to themselves the applause of their approval:" and so they make a lying pretense of having a good intention, which they have not, although they do not pretend to do a good deed without doing it.
Reply Obj. 2: The habit of holiness, for instance the religious or the clerical habit, signifies a state whereby one is bound to perform works of perfection. And so when a man puts on the habit of holiness, with the intention of entering the state of perfection, if he fail through weakness, he is not a dissembler or a hypocrite, because he is not bound to disclose his sin by laying aside the habit of holiness. If, however, he were to put on the habit of holiness in order to make a show of righteousness, he would be a hypocrite and a dissembler.
Reply Obj. 3: In dissimulation, as in a lie, there are two things: one by way of sign, the other by way of thing signified. Accordingly the evil intention in hypocrisy is considered as a thing signified, which does not tally with the sign: and the outward words, or deeds, or any sensible objects are considered in every dissimulation and lie as a sign.
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THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 111, Art. 3]
Whether Hypocrisy Is Contrary to the Virtue of Truth?
Objection 1: It seems that hypocrisy is not contrary to the virtue of truth. For in dissimulation or hypocrisy there is a sign and a thing signified. Now with regard to neither of these does it seem to be opposed to any special virtue: for a hypocrite simulates any virtue, and by means of any virtuous deeds, such as fasting, prayer and alms deeds, as stated in Matt. 6:1-18. Therefore hypocrisy is not specially opposed to the virtue of truth.
Obj. 2: Further, all dissimulation seems to proceed from guile, wherefore it is opposed to simplicity. Now guile is opposed to prudence as above stated (Q. 55, A. 4). Therefore, hypocrisy which is dissimulation is not opposed to truth, but rather to prudence or simplicity.
Obj. 3: Further, the species of moral acts is taken from their end.
Now the end of hypocrisy is the acquisition of gain or vainglory: wherefore a gloss on Job 27:8, "What is the hope of the hypocrite, if through covetousness he take by violence," says: "A hypocrite or, as the Latin has it, a dissimulator, is a covetous thief: for through desire of being honored for holiness, though guilty of wickedness, he steals praise for a life which is not his." [*The quotation is from St. Gregory"s _Moralia,_ Bk XVIII.] Therefore since covetousness or vainglory is not directly opposed to truth, it seems that neither is hypocrisy or dissimulation.
_On the contrary,_ All dissimulation is a lie, as stated above (A.
1). Now a lie is directly opposed to truth. Therefore dissimulation or hypocrisy is also.
_I answer that,_ According to the Philosopher (Metaph. text. 13, 24, x), "contrariety is opposition as regards form," i.e. the specific form. Accordingly we must reply that dissimulation or hypocrisy may be opposed to a virtue in two ways, in one way directly, in another way indirectly. Its direct opposition or contrariety is to be considered with regard to the very species of the act, and this species depends on that act"s proper object. Wherefore since hypocrisy is a kind of dissimulation, whereby a man simulates a character which is not his, as stated in the preceding article, it follows that it is directly opposed to truth whereby a man shows himself in life and speech to be what he is, as stated in _Ethic._ iv, 7.
The indirect opposition or contrariety of hypocrisy may be considered in relation to any accident, for instance a remote end, or an instrument of action, or anything else of that kind.
Reply Obj. 1: The hypocrite in simulating a virtue regards it as his end, not in respect of its existence, as though he wished to have it, but in respect of appearance, since he wishes to seem to have it.
Hence his hypocrisy is not opposed to that virtue, but to truth, inasmuch as he wishes to deceive men with regard to that virtue. And he performs acts of that virtue, not as intending them for their own sake, but instrumentally, as signs of that virtue, wherefore his hypocrisy has not, on that account, a direct opposition to that virtue.
Reply Obj. 2: As stated above (Q. 55, AA. 3, 4, 5), the vice directly opposed to prudence is cunning, to which it belongs to discover ways of achieving a purpose, that are apparent and not real: while it accomplishes that purpose, by guile in words, and by fraud in deeds: and it stands in relation to prudence, as guile and fraud to simplicity. Now guile and fraud are directed chiefly to deception, and sometimes secondarily to injury. Wherefore it belongs directly to simplicity to guard oneself from deception, and in this way the virtue of simplicity is the same as the virtue of truth as stated above (Q. 109, A. 2, ad 4). There is, however, a mere logical difference between them, because by truth we mean the concordance between sign and thing signified, while simplicity indicates that one does not tend to different things, by intending one thing inwardly, and pretending another outwardly.
Reply Obj. 3: Gain or glory is the remote end of the dissembler as also of the liar. Hence it does not take its species from this end, but from the proximate end, which is to show oneself other than one is. Wherefore it sometimes happens to a man to pretend great things of himself, for no further purpose than the mere l.u.s.t of hypocrisy, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 7), and as also we have said above with regard to lying (Q. 110, A. 2).
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FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 111, Art. 4]
Whether Hypocrisy Is Always a Mortal Sin?
Objection 1: It seems that hypocrisy is always a mortal sin. For Jerome says on Isa. 16:14: "Of the two evils it is less to sin openly than to simulate holiness": and a gloss on Job 1:21 [*St. Augustine, on Ps. 63:7], "As it hath pleased the Lord," etc., says that "pretended justice is no justice, but a twofold sin": and again a gloss on Lam. 4:6, "The iniquity ... of my people is made greater than the sin of Sodom," says: "He deplores the sins of the soul that falls into hypocrisy, which is a greater iniquity than the sin of Sodom." Now the sins of Sodom are mortal sin. Therefore hypocrisy is always a mortal sin.
Obj. 2: Further, Gregory says (Moral. x.x.xi, 8) that hypocrites sin out of malice. But this is most grievous, for it pertains to the sin against the Holy Ghost. Therefore a hypocrite always sins mortally.
Obj. 3: Further, no one deserves the anger of G.o.d and exclusion from seeing G.o.d, save on account of mortal sin. Now the anger of G.o.d is deserved through hypocrisy according to Job 36:13, "Dissemblers and crafty men prove the wrath of G.o.d": and the hypocrite is excluded from seeing G.o.d, according to Job 13:16, "No hypocrite shall come before His presence." Therefore hypocrisy is always a mortal sin.
_On the contrary,_ Hypocrisy is lying by deed since it is a kind of dissimulation. But it is not always a mortal sin to lie by deed.
Neither therefore is all hypocrisy a mortal sin.
Further, the intention of a hypocrite is to appear to be good. But this is not contrary to charity. Therefore hypocrisy is not of itself a mortal sin.
Further, hypocrisy is born of vainglory, as Gregory says (Moral.
x.x.xi, 17). But vainglory is not always a mortal sin. Neither therefore is hypocrisy.
_I answer that,_ There are two things in hypocrisy, lack of holiness, and simulation thereof. Accordingly if by a hypocrite we mean a person whose intention is directed to both the above, one, namely, who cares not to be holy but only to appear so, in which sense Sacred Scripture is wont to use the term, it is evident that hypocrisy is a mortal sin: for no one is entirely deprived of holiness save through mortal sin. But if by a hypocrite we mean one who intends to simulate holiness, which he lacks through mortal sin, then, although he is in mortal sin, whereby he is deprived of holiness, yet, in his case, the dissimulation itself is not always a mortal sin, but sometimes a venial sin. This will depend on the end in view; for if this be contrary to the love of G.o.d or of his neighbor, it will be a mortal sin: for instance if he were to simulate holiness in order to disseminate false doctrine, or that he may obtain ecclesiastical preferment, though unworthy, or that he may obtain any temporal good in which he fixes his end. If, however, the end intended be not contrary to charity, it will be a venial sin, as for instance when a man takes pleasure in the pretense itself: of such a man it is said in _Ethic._ iv, 7 that "he would seem to be vain rather than evil"; for the same applies to simulation as to a lie.
It happens also sometimes that a man simulates the perfection of holiness which is not necessary for spiritual welfare. Simulation of this kind is neither a mortal sin always, nor is it always a.s.sociated with mortal sin.
This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.
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QUESTION 112
OF BOASTING (In Two Articles)
We must now consider boasting and irony, which are parts of lying according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 7). Under the first head, namely, boasting, there are two points of inquiry:
(1) To which virtue is it opposed?
(2) Whether it is a mortal sin?
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FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 112, Art. 1]
Whether Boasting Is Opposed to the Virtue of Truth?
Objection 1: It seems that boasting is not opposed to the virtue of truth. For lying is opposed to truth. But it is possible to boast even without lying, as when a man makes a show of his own excellence.
Thus it is written (Esther 1:3, 4) that a.s.suerus "made a great feast ... that he might show the riches of the glory" and "of his kingdom, and the greatness and boasting of his power." Therefore boasting is not opposed to the virtue of truth.
Obj. 2: Further, boasting is reckoned by Gregory (Moral. xxiii, 4) to be one of the four species of pride, "when," to wit, "a man boasts of having what he has not." Hence it is written (Jer. 48:29, 30): "We have heard the pride of Moab, he is exceeding proud: his haughtiness, and his arrogancy, and his pride, and the loftiness of his heart. I know, saith the Lord, his boasting, and that the strength thereof is not according to it." Moreover, Gregory says (Moral. x.x.xi, 7) that boasting arises from vainglory. Now pride and vainglory are opposed to the virtue of humility. Therefore boasting is opposed, not to truth, but to humility.
Obj. 3: Further, boasting seems to be occasioned by riches; wherefore it is written (Wis. 5:8): "What hath pride profited us? or what advantage hath the boasting of riches brought us?" Now excess of riches seems to belong to the sin of covetousness, which is opposed to justice or liberality. Therefore boasting is not opposed to truth.