Reply Obj. 1: It belongs to prudence to keep money, lest it be stolen or spent uselessly. But to spend it usefully is not less but more prudent than to keep it usefully: since more things have to be considered in money"s use, which is likened to movement, than in its keeping, which is likened to rest. As to those who, having received money that others have earned, spend it more liberally, through not having experienced the want of it, if their inexperience is the sole cause of their liberal expenditure they have not the virtue of liberality. Sometimes, however, this inexperience merely removes the impediment to liberality, so that it makes them all the more ready to act liberally, because, not unfrequently, the fear of want that results from the experience of want hinders those who have acquired money from using it up by acting with liberality; as does likewise the love they have for it as being their own effect, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 1).
Reply Obj. 2: As stated in this and the preceding Article, it belongs to liberality to make fitting use of money, and consequently to give it in a fitting manner, since this is a use of money. Again, every virtue is grieved by whatever is contrary to its act, and avoids whatever hinders that act. Now two things are opposed to suitable giving; namely, not giving what ought suitably to be given, and giving something unsuitably. Wherefore the liberal man is grieved at both: but especially at the former, since it is more opposed to his proper act. For this reason, too, he does not give to all: since his act would be hindered were he to give to everyone: for he would not have the means of giving to those to whom it were fitting for him to give.
Reply Obj. 3: Giving and receiving are related to one another as action and pa.s.sion. Now the same thing is not the principle of both action and pa.s.sion. Hence, since liberality is a principle of giving, it does not belong to the liberal man to be ready to receive, and still less to beg. Hence the verse:
In this world he that wishes to be pleasing to many Should give often, take seldom, ask never.
But he makes provision in order to give certain things according as liberality requires; such are the fruits of his own possessions, for he is careful about realizing them that he may make a liberal use thereof.
Reply Obj. 4: To spend on oneself is an inclination of nature; hence to spend money on others belongs properly to a virtue.
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FIFTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 117, Art. 5]
Whether Liberality Is a Part of Justice?
Objection 1: It seems that liberality is not a part of justice. For justice regards that which is due. Now the more a thing is due the less liberally is it given. Therefore liberality is not a part of justice, but is incompatible with it.
Obj. 2: Further, justice is about operation as stated above (Q. 58, A. 9; I-II, Q. 60, AA. 2, 3): whereas liberality is chiefly about the love and desire of money, which are pa.s.sions. Therefore liberality seems to belong to temperance rather than to justice.
Obj. 3: Further, it belongs chiefly to liberality to give becomingly, as stated (A. 4). But giving becomingly belongs to beneficence and mercy, which pertain to charity, as state above (QQ. 30, 31).
Therefore liberality is a part of charity rather than of justice.
_On the contrary,_ Ambrose says (De Offic. i): "Justice has to do with the fellowship of mankind. For the notion of fellowship is divided into two parts, justice and beneficence, also called liberality or kind-heartedness." Therefore liberality pertains to justice.
_I answer that,_ Liberality is not a species of justice, since justice pays another what is his whereas liberality gives another what is one"s own. There are, however, two points in which it agrees with justice: first, that it is directed chiefly to another, as justice is; secondly, that it is concerned with external things, and so is justice, albeit under a different aspect, a stated in this Article and above (A. 2, ad 3). Hence it is that liberality is reckoned by some to be a part of justice, being annexed thereto as to a princ.i.p.al virtue.
Reply Obj. 1: Although liberality does not consider the legal due that justice considers, it considers a certain moral due. This due is based on a certain fittingness and not on an obligation: so that it answers to the idea of due in the lowest degree.
Reply Obj. 2: Temperance is about concupiscence in pleasures of the body. But the concupiscence and delight in money is not referable to the body but rather to the soul. Hence liberality does not properly pertain to temperance.
Reply Obj. 3: The giving of beneficence and mercy proceeds from the fact that a man has a certain affection towards the person to whom he gives: wherefore this giving belongs to charity or friendship. But the giving of liberality arises from a person being affected in a certain way towards money, in that he desires it not nor loves it: so that when it is fitting he gives it not only to his friends but also to those whom he knows not. Hence it belong not to charity, but to justice, which is about external things.
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SIXTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 117, Art. 6]
Whether Liberality Is the Greatest of the Virtues?
Objection 1: It seems that liberality is the greatest of the virtues.
For every virtue of man is a likeness to the divine goodness. Now man is likened chiefly by liberality to G.o.d, "Who giveth to all men abundantly, and upbraideth not" (James 1:5). Therefore liberality is the greatest of the virtues.
Obj. 2: Further, according to Augustine (De Trin. vi, 8), "in things that are great, but not in bulk, to be greatest is to be best." Now the nature of goodness seems to pertain mostly to liberality, since "the good is self-communicative," according to Dionysius (Div. Nom.
iv). Hence Ambrose says (De Offic. i) that "justice reclines to severity, liberality to goodness." Therefore liberality is the greatest of virtues.
Obj. 3: Further, men are honored and loved on account of virtue. Now Boethius says (De Consol. ii) that "bounty above all makes a man famous": and the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 1) that "among the virtuous the liberal are the most beloved." Therefore liberality is the greatest of virtues.
_On the contrary,_ Ambrose says (De Offic. i) that "justice seems to be more excellent than liberality, although liberality is more pleasing." The Philosopher also says (Rhet. i, 9) that "brave and just men are honored chiefly and, after them, those who are liberal."
_I answer that,_ Every virtue tends towards a good; wherefore the greater virtue is that which tends towards the greater good. Now liberality tends towards a good in two ways: in one way, primarily and of its own nature; in another way, consequently. Primarily and of its very nature it tends to set in order one"s own affection towards the possession and use of money. In this way temperance, which moderates desires and pleasures relating to one"s own body, takes precedence of liberality: and so do fort.i.tude and justice, which, in a manner, are directed to the common good, one in time of peace, the other in time of war: while all these are preceded by those virtues which are directed to the Divine good. For the Divine good surpa.s.ses all manner of human good; and among human goods the public good surpa.s.ses the good of the individual; and of the last named the good of the body surpa.s.ses those goods that consist of external things.
Again, liberality is ordained to a good consequently, and in this way it is directed to all the aforesaid goods. For by reason of his not being a lover of money, it follows that a man readily makes use of it, whether for himself, or for the good of others, or for G.o.d"s glory. Thus it derives a certain excellence from being useful in many ways. Since, however, we should judge of things according to that which is competent to them primarily and in respect of their nature, rather than according to that which pertains to them. Consequently, it remains to be said that liberality is not the greatest of virtues.
Reply Obj. 1: G.o.d"s giving proceeds from His love for those to whom He gives, not from His affection towards the things He gives, wherefore it seems to pertain to charity, the greatest of virtues, rather than to liberality.
Reply Obj. 2: Every virtue shares the nature of goodness by giving forth its own act: and the acts of certain other virtues are better than money which liberality gives forth.
Reply Obj. 3: The friendship whereby a liberal man is beloved is not that which is based on virtue, as though he were better than others, but that which is based on utility, because he is more useful in external goods, which as a rule men desire above all others. For the same reason he becomes famous.
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QUESTION 118
OF THE VICES OPPOSED TO LIBERALITY, AND IN THE FIRST PLACE, OF COVETOUSNESS (In Eight Articles)
We must now consider the vices opposed to liberality: and (1) covetousness; (2) prodigality.
Under the first head there are eight points of inquiry:
(1) Whether covetousness is a sin?
(2) Whether it is a special sin?
(3) To which virtue it is opposed;
(4) Whether it is a mortal sin?
(5) Whether it is the most grievous of sins?
(6) Whether it is a sin of the flesh or a spiritual sin?
(7) Whether it is a capital vice?
(8) Of its daughters.
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FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 118, Art. 1]
Whether Covetousness Is a Sin?
Objection 1: It seems that covetousness is not a sin. For covetousness (_avaritia_) denotes a certain greed for gold (_aeris aviditas_),* because, to wit, it consists in a desire for money, under which all external goods may be comprised. [*The Latin for covetousness _avaritia_ is derived from _aveo_ to desire; but the Greek _philargyria_ signifies literally "love of money": and it is to this that St. Thomas is alluding (cf. A. 2, Obj. 2)]. Now it is not a sin to desire external goods: since man desires them naturally, both because they are naturally subject to man, and because by their means man"s life is sustained (for which reason they are spoken of as his substance). Therefore covetousness is not a sin.
Obj. 2: Further, every sin is against either G.o.d, or one"s neighbor, or oneself, as stated above (I-II, Q. 72, A. 4). But covetousness is not, properly speaking, a sin against G.o.d: since it is opposed neither to religion nor to the theological virtues, by which man is directed to G.o.d. Nor again is it a sin against oneself, for this pertains properly to gluttony and l.u.s.t, of which the Apostle says (1 Cor. 6:18): "He that committeth fornication sinneth against his own body." In like manner neither is it apparently a sin against one"s neighbor, since a man harms no one by keeping what is his own.
Therefore covetousness is not a sin.
Obj. 3: Further, things that occur naturally are not sins. Now covetousness comes naturally to old age and every kind of defect, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 1). Therefore covetousness is not a sin.
_On the contrary,_ It is written (Heb. 13:5): "Let your manners be without covetousness, contented with such things as you have."
_I answer that,_ In whatever things good consists in a due measure, evil must of necessity ensue through excess or deficiency of that measure. Now in all things that are for an end, the good consists in a certain measure: since whatever is directed to an end must needs be commensurate with the end, as, for instance, medicine is commensurate with health, as the Philosopher observes (Polit. i, 6). External goods come under the head of things useful for an end, as stated above (Q. 117, A. 3; I-II, Q. 2, A. 1). Hence it must needs be that man"s good in their respect consists in a certain measure, in other words, that man seeks, according to a certain measure, to have external riches, in so far as they are necessary for him to live in keeping with his condition of life. Wherefore it will be a sin for him to exceed this measure, by wishing to acquire or keep them immoderately. This is what is meant by covetousness, which is defined as "immoderate love of possessing." It is therefore evident that covetousness is a sin.