FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 123, Art. 4]
Whether Fort.i.tude Is Only About Dangers of Death?
Objection 1: It seems that fort.i.tude is not only about dangers of death. For Augustine says (De Morib. Eccl. xv) that "fort.i.tude is love bearing all things readily for the sake of the object beloved": and (Music. vi) he says that fort.i.tude is "the love which dreads no hardship, not even death." Therefore fort.i.tude is not only about danger of death, but also about other afflictions.
Obj. 2: Further, all the pa.s.sions of the soul need to be reduced to a mean by some virtue. Now there is no other virtue reducing fears to a mean. Therefore fort.i.tude is not only about fear of death, but also about other fears.
Obj. 3: Further, no virtue is about extremes. But fear of death is about an extreme, since it is the greatest of fears, as stated in _Ethic._ iii. Therefore the virtue of fort.i.tude is not about fear of death.
_On the contrary,_ Andronicus says that "fort.i.tude is a virtue of the irascible faculty that is not easily deterred by the fear of death."
_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 3), it belongs to the virtue of fort.i.tude to guard the will against being withdrawn from the good of reason through fear of bodily evil. Now it behooves one to hold firmly the good of reason against every evil whatsoever, since no bodily good is equivalent to the good of the reason. Hence fort.i.tude of soul must be that which binds the will firmly to the good of reason in face of the greatest evils: because he that stands firm against great things, will in consequence stand firm against less things, but not conversely. Moreover it belongs to the notion of virtue that it should regard something extreme: and the most fearful of all bodily evils is death, since it does away all bodily goods.
Wherefore Augustine says (De Morib. Eccl. xxii) that "the soul is shaken by its fellow body, with fear of toil and pain, lest the body be stricken and hara.s.sed with fear of death lest it be done away and destroyed." Therefore the virtue of fort.i.tude is about the fear of dangers of death.
Reply Obj. 1: Fort.i.tude behaves well in bearing all manner of adversity: yet a man is not reckoned brave simply through bearing any kind of adversity, but only through bearing well even the greatest evils; while through bearing others he is said to be brave in a restricted sense.
Reply Obj. 2: Since fear is born of love, any virtue that moderates the love of certain goods must in consequence moderate the fear of contrary evils: thus liberality, which moderates the love of money, as a consequence, moderates the fear of losing it, and the same is the case with temperance and other virtues. But to love one"s own life is natural: and hence the necessity of a special virtue modifying the fear of death.
Reply Obj. 3: In virtues the extreme consists in exceeding right reason: wherefore to undergo the greatest dangers in accordance with reason is not contrary to virtue.
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FIFTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 123, Art. 5]
Whether Fort.i.tude Is Properly About Dangers of Death in Battle?
Objection 1: It seems that fort.i.tude is not properly about dangers of death in battle. For martyrs above all are commended for their fort.i.tude. But martyrs are not commended in connection with battle.
Therefore fort.i.tude is not properly about dangers of death in battle.
Obj. 2: Further, Ambrose says (De Offic. i) that "fort.i.tude is applicable both to warlike and to civil matters": and Tully (De Offic. i), under the heading, "That it pertains to fort.i.tude to excel in battle rather than in civil life," says: "Although not a few think that the business of war is of greater importance than the affairs of civil life, this opinion must be qualified: and if we wish to judge the matter truly, there are many things in civil life that are more important and more glorious than those connected with war." Now greater fort.i.tude is about greater things. Therefore fort.i.tude is not properly concerned with death in battle.
Obj. 3: Further, war is directed to the preservation of a country"s temporal peace: for Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xix) that "wars are waged in order to insure peace." Now it does not seem that one ought to expose oneself to the danger of death for the temporal peace of one"s country, since this same peace is the occasion of much license in morals. Therefore it seems that the virtue of fort.i.tude is not about the danger of death in battle.
_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii) that fort.i.tude is chiefly about death in battle.
_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 4), fort.i.tude strengthens a man"s mind against the greatest danger, which is that of death. Now fort.i.tude is a virtue; and it is essential to virtue ever to tend to good; wherefore it is in order to pursue some good that man does not fly from the danger of death. But the dangers of death arising out of sickness, storms at sea, attacks from robbers, and the like, do not seem to come on a man through his pursuing some good. On the other hand, the dangers of death which occur in battle come to man directly on account of some good, because, to wit, he is defending the common good by a just fight. Now a just fight is of two kinds. First, there is the general combat, for instance, of those who fight in battle; secondly, there is the private combat, as when a judge or even private individual does not refrain from giving a just judgment through fear of the impending sword, or any other danger though it threaten death. Hence it belongs to fort.i.tude to strengthen the mind against dangers of death, not only such as arise in a general battle, but also such as occur in singular combat, which may be called by the general name of battle. Accordingly it must be granted that fort.i.tude is properly about dangers of death occurring in battle.
Moreover, a brave man behaves well in face of danger of any other kind of death; especially since man may be in danger of any kind of death on account of virtue: thus may a man not fail to attend on a sick friend through fear of deadly infection, or not refuse to undertake a journey with some G.o.dly object in view through fear of shipwreck or robbers.
Reply Obj. 1: Martyrs face the fight that is waged against their own person, and this for the sake of the sovereign good which is G.o.d; wherefore their fort.i.tude is praised above all. Nor is it outside the genus of fort.i.tude that regards warlike actions, for which reason they are said to have been valiant in battle. [*Office of Martyrs, ex. Heb. xi. 34.]
Reply Obj. 2: Personal and civil business is differentiated from the business of war that regards general wars. However, personal and civil affairs admit of dangers of death arising out of certain conflicts which are private wars, and so with regard to these also there may be fort.i.tude properly so called.
Reply Obj. 3: The peace of the state is good in itself, nor does it become evil because certain persons make evil use of it. For there are many others who make good use of it; and many evils prevented by it, such as murders and sacrileges, are much greater than those which are occasioned by it, and which belong chiefly to the sins of the flesh.
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SIXTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 123, Art. 6]
Whether Endurance Is the Chief Act of Fort.i.tude?
Objection 1: It seems that endurance is not the chief act of fort.i.tude. For virtue "is about the difficult and the good" (Ethic.
ii, 3). Now it is more difficult to attack than to endure. Therefore endurance is not the chief act of fort.i.tude.
Obj. 2: Further, to be able to act on another seems to argue greater power than not to be changed by another. Now to attack is to act on another, and to endure is to persevere unchangeably. Since then fort.i.tude denotes perfection of power, it seems that it belongs to fort.i.tude to attack rather than to endure.
Obj. 3: Further, one contrary is more distant from the other than its mere negation. Now to endure is merely not to fear, whereas to attack denotes a movement contrary to that of fear, since it implies pursuit. Since then fort.i.tude above all withdraws the mind from fear, it seems that it regards attack rather than endurance.
_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 9) that "certain persons are" said to be brave chiefly because they endure affliction.
_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 3), and according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 9), "fort.i.tude is more concerned to allay fear, than to moderate daring." For it is more difficult to allay fear than to moderate daring, since the danger which is the object of daring and fear, tends by its very nature to check daring, but to increase fear. Now to attack belongs to fort.i.tude in so far as the latter moderates daring, whereas to endure follows the repression of fear. Therefore the princ.i.p.al act of fort.i.tude is endurance, that is to stand immovable in the midst of dangers rather than to attack them.
Reply Obj. 1: Endurance is more difficult than aggression, for three reasons. First, because endurance seemingly implies that one is being attacked by a stronger person, whereas aggression denotes that one is attacking as though one were the stronger party; and it is more difficult to contend with a stronger than with a weaker. Secondly, because he that endures already feels the presence of danger, whereas the aggressor looks upon danger as something to come; and it is more difficult to be unmoved by the present than by the future. Thirdly, because endurance implies length of time, whereas aggression is consistent with sudden movements; and it is more difficult to remain unmoved for a long time, than to be moved suddenly to something arduous. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 8) that "some hurry to meet danger, yet fly when the danger is present; this is not the behavior of a brave man."
Reply Obj. 2: Endurance denotes indeed a pa.s.sion of the body, but an action of the soul cleaving most resolutely (_fortissime_) to good, the result being that it does not yield to the threatening pa.s.sion of the body. Now virtue concerns the soul rather than the body.
Reply Obj. 3: He that endures fears not, though he is confronted with the cause of fear, whereas this cause is not present to the aggressor.
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SEVENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 123, Art. 7]
Whether the Brave Man Acts for the Sake of the Good of His Habit?
Objection 1: It seems that the brave man does not act for the sake of the good of his habit. For in matters of action the end, though first in intention, is last in execution. Now the act of fort.i.tude, in the order of execution, follows the habit of fort.i.tude. Therefore it is impossible for the brave man to act for the sake of the good of his habit.
Obj. 2: Further, Augustine says (De Trin. xiii): "We love virtues for the sake of happiness, and yet some make bold to counsel us to be virtuous," namely by saying that we should desire virtue for its own sake, "without loving happiness. If they succeed in their endeavor, we shall surely cease to love virtue itself, since we shall no longer love that for the sake of which alone we love virtue." But fort.i.tude is a virtue. Therefore the act of fort.i.tude is directed not to fort.i.tude but to happiness.
Obj. 3: Further, Augustine says (De Morib. Eccl. xv) that "fort.i.tude is love ready to bear all things for G.o.d"s sake." Now G.o.d is not the habit of fort.i.tude, but something better, since the end must needs be better than what is directed to the end. Therefore the brave man does not act for the sake of the good of his habit.
_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 7) that "to the brave man fort.i.tude itself is a good": and such is his end.
_I answer that,_ An end is twofold: proximate and ultimate. Now the proximate end of every agent is to introduce a likeness of that agent"s form into something else: thus the end of fire in heating is to introduce the likeness of its heat into some pa.s.sive matter, and the end of the builder is to introduce into matter the likeness of his art. Whatever good ensues from this, if it be intended, may be called the remote end of the agent. Now just as in things made, external matter is fashioned by art, so in things done, human deeds are fashioned by prudence. Accordingly we must conclude that the brave man intends as his proximate end to reproduce in action a likeness of his habit, for he intends to act in accordance with his habit: but his remote end is happiness or G.o.d.
This suffices for the Replies to the Objections: for the First Objection proceeds as though the very essence of a habit were its end, instead of the likeness of the habit in act, as stated. The other two objections consider the ultimate end.
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EIGHTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 123, Art. 8]
Whether the Brave Man Delights in His Act?
Objection 1: It seems that the brave man delights in his act. For "delight is the unhindered action of a connatural habit" (Ethic. x, 4, 6, 8). Now the brave deed proceeds from a habit which acts after the manner of nature. Therefore the brave man takes pleasure in his act.
Obj. 2: Further, Ambrose, commenting on Gal. 5:22, "But the fruit of the Spirit is charity, joy, peace," says that deeds of virtue are called "fruits because they refresh man"s mind with a holy and pure delight." Now the brave man performs acts of virtue. Therefore he takes pleasure in his act.
Obj. 3: Further, the weaker is overcome by the stronger. Now the brave man has a stronger love for the good of virtue than for his own body, which he exposes to the danger of death. Therefore the delight in the good of virtue banishes the pain of the body; and consequently the brave man does all things with pleasure.
_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 9) that "the brave man seems to have no delight in his act."
_I answer that,_ As stated above (I-II, Q. 31, AA. 3, 4, 5) where we were treating of the pa.s.sions, pleasure is twofold; one is bodily, resulting from bodily contact, the other is spiritual, resulting from an apprehension of the soul. It is the latter which properly results from deeds of virtue, since in them we consider the good of reason.
Now the princ.i.p.al act of fort.i.tude is to endure, not only certain things that are unpleasant as apprehended by the soul--for instance, the loss of bodily life, which the virtuous man loves not only as a natural good, but also as being necessary for acts of virtue, and things connected with them--but also to endure things unpleasant in respect of bodily contact, such as wounds and blows. Hence the brave man, on one side, has something that affords him delight, namely as regards spiritual pleasure, in the act itself of virtue and the end thereof: while, on the other hand, he has cause for both spiritual sorrow, in the thought of losing his life, and for bodily pain. Hence we read (2 Macc. 6:30) that Eleazar said: "I suffer grievous pains in body: but in soul am well content to suffer these things because I fear Thee."