Whether Vainglory Is a Capital Vice?
Objection 1: It seems that vainglory is not a capital vice. For a vice that always arises from another vice is seemingly not capital.
But vainglory always arises from pride. Therefore vainglory is not a capital vice.
Obj. 2: Further, honor would seem to take precedence of glory, for this is its effect. Now ambition which is inordinate desire of honor is not a capital vice. Neither therefore is the desire of vainglory.
Obj. 3: Further, a capital vice has a certain prominence. But vainglory seems to have no prominence, neither as a sin, because it is not always a mortal sin, nor considered as an appetible good, since human glory is apparently a frail thing, and is something outside man himself. Therefore vainglory is not a capital vice.
_On the contrary,_ Gregory (Moral. x.x.xi) numbers vainglory among the seven capital vices.
_I answer that,_ The capital vices are enumerated in two ways. For some reckon pride as one of their number: and these do not place vainglory among the capital vices. Gregory, however (Moral. x.x.xi), reckons pride to be the queen of all the vices, and vainglory, which is the immediate offspring of pride, he reckons to be a capital vice: and not without reason. For pride, as we shall state farther on (Q.
152, AA. 1, 2), denotes inordinate desire of excellence. But whatever good one may desire, one desires a certain perfection and excellence therefrom: wherefore the end of every vice is directed to the end of pride, so that this vice seems to exercise a kind of causality over the other vices, and ought not to be reckoned among the special sources of vice, known as the capital vices. Now among the goods that are the means whereby man acquires honor, glory seems to be the most conducive to that effect, inasmuch as it denotes the manifestation of a man"s goodness: since good is naturally loved and honored by all.
Wherefore, just as by the glory which is in G.o.d"s sight man acquires honor in Divine things, so too by the glory which is in the sight of man he acquires excellence in human things. Hence on account of its close connection with excellence, which men desire above all, it follows that it is most desirable. And since many vices arise from the inordinate desire thereof, it follows that vainglory is a capital vice.
Reply Obj. 1: It is not impossible for a capital vice to arise from pride, since as stated above (in the body of the Article and I-II, Q.
84, A. 2) pride is the queen and mother of all the vices.
Reply Obj. 2: Praise and honor, as stated above (A. 2), stand in relation to glory as the causes from which it proceeds, so that glory is compared to them as their end. For the reason why a man loves to be honored and praised is that he thinks thereby to acquire a certain renown in the knowledge of others.
Reply Obj. 3: Vainglory stands prominent under the aspect of desirability, for the reason given above, and this suffices for it to be reckoned a capital vice. Nor is it always necessary for a capital vice to be a mortal sin; for mortal sin can arise from venial sin, inasmuch as venial sin can dispose man thereto.
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FIFTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 132, Art. 5]
Whether the Daughters of Vainglory Are Suitably Reckoned to Be Disobedience, Boastfulness, Hypocrisy, Contention, Obstinacy, Discord, and Love of Novelties?
Objection 1: It seems that the daughters of vainglory are unsuitably reckoned to be "disobedience, boastfulness, hypocrisy, contention, obstinacy, discord, and eccentricity [*_Praesumptio novitatum,_ literally "presumption of novelties"]." For according to Gregory (Moral. xxiii) boastfulness is numbered among the species of pride.
Now pride does not arise from vainglory, rather is it the other way about, as Gregory says (Moral. x.x.xi). Therefore boastfulness should not be reckoned among the daughters of vainglory.
Obj. 2: Further, contention and discord seem to be the outcome chiefly of anger. But anger is a capital vice condivided with vainglory. Therefore it seems that they are not the daughters of vainglory.
Obj. 3: Further, Chrysostom says (Hom. xix in Matth.) that vainglory is always evil, but especially in philanthropy, i.e. mercy. And yet this is nothing new, for it is an established custom among men.
Therefore eccentricity should not be specially reckoned as a daughter of vainglory.
_On the contrary,_ stands the authority of Gregory (Moral. x.x.xi), who there a.s.signs the above daughters to vainglory.
_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 34, A. 5; Q. 35, A. 4; I-II, Q.
84, AA. 3, 4), the vices which by their very nature are such as to be directed to the end of a certain capital vice, are called its daughters. Now the end of vainglory is the manifestation of one"s own excellence, as stated above (AA. 1, 4): and to this end a man may tend in two ways. In one way directly, either by words, and this is boasting, or by deeds, and then if they be true and call for astonishment, it is love of novelties which men are wont to wonder at most; but if they be false, it is hypocrisy. In another way a man strives to make known his excellence by showing that he is not inferior to another, and this in four ways. First, as regards the intellect, and thus we have _obstinacy,_ by which a man is too much attached to his own opinion, being unwilling to believe one that is better. Secondly, as regards the will, and then we have _discord,_ whereby a man is unwilling to give up his own will, and agree with others. Thirdly, as regards _speech,_ and then we have _contention,_ whereby a man quarrels noisily with another. Fourthly as regards deeds, and this is _disobedience,_ whereby a man refuses to carry out the command of his superiors.
Reply Obj. 1: As stated above (Q. 112, A. 1, ad 2), boasting is reckoned a kind of pride, as regards its interior cause, which is arrogance: but outward boasting, according to _Ethic._ iv, is directed sometimes to gain, but more often to glory and honor, and thus it is the result of vainglory.
Reply Obj. 2: Anger is not the cause of discord and contention, except in conjunction with vainglory, in that a man thinks it a glorious thing for him not to yield to the will and words of others.
Reply Obj. 3: Vainglory is reproved in connection with almsdeeds on account of the lack of charity apparent in one who prefers vainglory to the good of his neighbor, seeing that he does the latter for the sake of the former. But a man is not reproved for presuming to give alms as though this were something novel.
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QUESTION 133
OF PUSILLANIMITY (In Two Articles)
We must now consider pusillanimity. Under this head there are two points of inquiry:
(1) Whether pusillanimity is a sin?
(2) To what virtue is it opposed?
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FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 133, Art. 1]
Whether Pusillanimity Is a Sin?
Objection 1: It seems that pusillanimity is not a sin. For every sin makes a man evil, just as every virtue makes a man good. But a fainthearted man is not evil, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 3).
Therefore pusillanimity is not a sin.
Obj. 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 3) that "a fainthearted man is especially one who is worthy of great goods, yet does not deem himself worthy of them." Now no one is worthy of great goods except the virtuous, since as the Philosopher again says (Ethic. iv, 3), "none but the virtuous are truly worthy of honor."
Therefore the fainthearted are virtuous: and consequently pusillanimity is not a sin.
Obj. 3: Further, "Pride is the beginning of all sin" (Ecclus. 10:15).
But pusillanimity does not proceed from pride, since the proud man sets himself above what he is, while the fainthearted man withdraws from the things he is worthy of. Therefore pusillanimity is not a sin.
Obj. 4: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 3) that "he who deems himself less worthy than he is, is said to be fainthearted."
Now sometimes holy men deem themselves less worthy than they are; for instance, Moses and Jeremias, who were worthy of the office G.o.d chose them for, which they both humbly declined (Ex. 3:11; Jer. 1:6).
Therefore pusillanimity is not a sin.
_On the contrary,_ Nothing in human conduct is to be avoided save sin. Now pusillanimity is to be avoided: for it is written (Col.
3:21): "Fathers, provoke not your children to indignation, lest they be discouraged." Therefore pusillanimity is a sin.
_I answer that,_ Whatever is contrary to a natural inclination is a sin, because it is contrary to a law of nature. Now everything has a natural inclination to accomplish an action that is commensurate with its power: as is evident in all natural things, whether animate or inanimate. Now just as presumption makes a man exceed what is proportionate to his power, by striving to do more than he can, so pusillanimity makes a man fall short of what is proportionate to his power, by refusing to tend to that which is commensurate thereto.
Wherefore as presumption is a sin, so is pusillanimity. Hence it is that the servant who buried in the earth the money he had received from his master, and did not trade with it through fainthearted fear, was punished by his master (Matt. 25; Luke 19).
Reply Obj. 1: The Philosopher calls those evil who injure their neighbor: and accordingly the fainthearted is said not to be evil, because he injures no one, save accidentally, by omitting to do what might be profitable to others. For Gregory says (Pastoral. i) that if "they who demur to do good to their neighbor in preaching be judged strictly, without doubt their guilt is proportionate to the good they might have done had they been less retiring."
Reply Obj. 2: Nothing hinders a person who has a virtuous habit from sinning venially and without losing the habit, or mortally and with loss of the habit of gratuitous virtue. Hence it is possible for a man, by reason of the virtue which he has, to be worthy of doing certain great things that are worthy of great honor, and yet through not trying to make use of his virtue, he sins sometimes venially, sometimes mortally.
Again it may be replied that the fainthearted is worthy of great things in proportion to his ability for virtue, ability which he derives either from a good natural disposition, or from science, or from external fortune, and if he fails to use those things for virtue, he becomes guilty of pusillanimity.
Reply Obj. 3: Even pusillanimity may in some way be the result of pride: when, to wit, a man clings too much to his own opinion, whereby he thinks himself incompetent for those things for which he is competent. Hence it is written (Prov. 26:16): "The sluggard is wiser in his own conceit than seven men that speak sentences." For nothing hinders him from depreciating himself in some things, and having a high opinion of himself in others. Wherefore Gregory says (Pastoral. i) of Moses that "perchance he would have been proud, had he undertaken the leadership of a numerous people without misgiving: and again he would have been proud, had he refused to obey the command of his Creator."
Reply Obj. 4: Moses and Jeremias were worthy of the office to which they were appointed by G.o.d, but their worthiness was of Divine grace: yet they, considering the insufficiency of their own weakness, demurred; though not obstinately lest they should fall into pride.
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SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 133, Art. 2]
Whether Pusillanimity Is Opposed to Magnanimity?
Objection 1: It seems that pusillanimity is not opposed to magnanimity. For the Philosopher says (Ethic., 3) that "the fainthearted man knows not himself: for he would desire the good things, of which he is worthy, if he knew himself." Now ignorance of self seems opposed to prudence. Therefore pusillanimity is opposed to prudence.
Obj. 2: Further our Lord calls the servant wicked and slothful who through pusillanimity refused to make use of the money. Moreover the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 3) that the fainthearted seem to be slothful. Now sloth is opposed to solicitude, which is an act of prudence, as stated above (Q. 47, A. 9). Therefore pusillanimity is not opposed to magnanimity.