Obj. 2: Further, "every magnificent man is liberal" (Ethic. iv, 2).
But liberality is about gifts rather than about expenditure.
Therefore magnificence also is not chiefly about expenditure, but about gifts.
Obj. 3: Further, it belongs to magnificence to produce an external work. But not even great expenditure is always the means of producing an external work, for instance when one spends much in sending presents. Therefore expenditure is not the proper matter of magnificence.
Obj. 4: Further, only the rich are capable of great expenditure. But the poor are able to possess all the virtues, since "the virtues do not necessarily require external fortune, but are sufficient for themselves," as Seneca says (De Ira i: De vita beata xvi). Therefore magnificence is not about great expenditure.
_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 2) that "magnificence does not extend, like liberality, to all transactions in money, but only to expensive ones, wherein it exceeds liberality in scale." Therefore it is only about great expenditure.
_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 2), it belongs to magnificence to intend doing some great work. Now for the doing of a great work, proportionate expenditure is necessary, for great works cannot be produced without great expenditure. Hence it belongs to magnificence to spend much in order that some great work may be accomplished in becoming manner. Wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 2) that "a magnificent man will produce a more magnificent work with equal,"
i.e. proportionate, "expenditure." Now expenditure is the outlay of a sum of money; and a man may be hindered from making that outlay if he love money too much. Hence the matter of magnificence may be said to be both this expenditure itself, which the magnificent man uses to produce a great work, and also the very money which he employs in going to great expense, and as well as the love of money, which love the magnificent man moderates, lest he be hindered from spending much.
Reply Obj. 1: As stated above (Q. 129, A. 2), those virtues that are about external things experience a certain difficulty arising from the genus itself of the thing about which the virtue is concerned, and another difficulty besides arising from the greatness of that same thing. Hence the need for two virtues, concerned about money and its use; namely, liberality, which regards the use of money in general, and magnificence, which regards that which is great in the use of money.
Reply Obj. 2: The use of money regards the liberal man in one way and the magnificent man in another. For it regards the liberal man, inasmuch as it proceeds from an ordinate affection in respect of money; wherefore all due use of money (such as gifts and expenditure), the obstacles to which are removed by a moderate love of money, belongs to liberality. But the use of money regards the magnificent man in relation to some great work which has to be produced, and this use is impossible without expenditure or outlay.
Reply Obj. 3: The magnificent man also makes gifts of presents, as stated in _Ethic._ iv, 2, but not under the aspect of gift, but rather under the aspect of expenditure directed to the production of some work, for instance in order to honor someone, or in order to do something which will reflect honor on the whole state: as when he brings to effect what the whole state is striving for.
Reply Obj. 4: The chief act of virtue is the inward choice, and a virtue may have this without outward fortune: so that even a poor man may be magnificent. But goods of fortune are requisite as instruments to the external acts of virtue: and in this way a poor man cannot accomplish the outward act of magnificence in things that are great simply. Perhaps, however, he may be able to do so in things that are great by comparison to some particular work; which, though little in itself, can nevertheless be done magnificently in proportion to its genus: for little and great are relative terms, as the Philosopher says (De Praedic. Cap. Ad aliquid.).
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FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 134, Art. 4]
Whether Magnificence Is a Part of Fort.i.tude?
Objection 1: It seems that magnificence is not a part of fort.i.tude.
For magnificence agrees in matter with liberality, as stated above (A. 3). But liberality is a part, not of fort.i.tude, but of justice.
Therefore magnificence is not a part of fort.i.tude.
Obj. 2: Further, fort.i.tude is about fear and darings. But magnificence seems to have nothing to do with fear, but only with expenditure, which is a kind of action. Therefore magnificence seems to pertain to justice, which is about actions, rather than to fort.i.tude.
Obj. 3: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 2) that "the magnificent man is like the man of science." Now science has more in common with prudence than with fort.i.tude. Therefore magnificence should not be reckoned a part of fort.i.tude.
_On the contrary,_ Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii) and Macrobius (De Somn. Scip. i) and Andronicus reckon magnificence to be a part of fort.i.tude.
_I answer that,_ Magnificence, in so far as it is a special virtue, cannot be reckoned a subjective part of fort.i.tude, since it does not agree with this virtue in the point of matter: but it is reckoned a part thereof, as being annexed to it as secondary to princ.i.p.al virtue.
In order for a virtue to be annexed to a princ.i.p.al virtue, two things are necessary, as stated above (Q. 80). The one is that the secondary virtue agree with the princ.i.p.al, and the other is that in some respect it be exceeded thereby. Now magnificence agrees with fort.i.tude in the point that as fort.i.tude tends to something arduous and difficult, so also does magnificence: wherefore seemingly it is seated, like fort.i.tude, in the irascible. Yet magnificence falls short of fort.i.tude, in that the arduous thing to which fort.i.tude tends derives its difficulty from a danger that threatens the person, whereas the arduous thing to which magnificence tends, derives its difficulty from the dispossession of one"s property, which is of much less account than danger to one"s person. Wherefore magnificence is accounted a part of fort.i.tude.
Reply Obj. 1: Justice regards operations in themselves, as viewed under the aspect of something due: but liberality and magnificence regard sumptuary operations as related to the pa.s.sions of the soul, albeit in different ways. For liberality regards expenditure in reference to the love and desire of money, which are pa.s.sions of the concupiscible faculty, and do not hinder the liberal man from giving and spending: so that this virtue is in the concupiscible. On the other hand, magnificence regards expenditure in reference to hope, by attaining to the difficulty, not simply, as magnanimity does, but in a determinate matter, namely expenditure: wherefore magnificence, like magnanimity, is apparently in the irascible part.
Reply Obj. 2: Although magnificence does not agree with fort.i.tude in matter, it agrees with it as the condition of its matter: since it tends to something difficult in the matter of expenditure, even as fort.i.tude tends to something difficult in the matter of fear.
Reply Obj. 3: Magnificence directs the use of art to something great, as stated above and in the preceding Article. Now art is in the reason. Wherefore it belongs to the magnificent man to use his reason by observing proportion of expenditure to the work he has in hand.
This is especially necessary on account of the greatness of both those things, since if he did not take careful thought, he would incur the risk of a great loss.
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QUESTION 135
OF MEANNESS*
(In Two Articles) [*"Parvificentia," or doing mean things, just as "magnificentia" is doing great things.]
We must now consider the vices opposed to magnificence: under which head there are two points of inquiry:
(1) Whether meanness is a vice?
(2) Of the vice opposed to it.
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FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 135, Art. 1]
Whether Meanness Is a Vice?
Objection 1: It seems that meanness is not a vice. For just as vice moderates great things, so does it moderate little things: wherefore both the liberal and the magnificent do little things. But magnificence is a virtue. Therefore likewise meanness is a virtue rather than a vice.
Obj. 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 2) that "careful reckoning is mean." But careful reckoning is apparently praiseworthy, since man"s good is to be in accordance with reason, as Dionysius states (Div. Nom. iv, 4). Therefore meanness is not a vice.
Obj. 3: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 2) that "a mean man is loth to spend money." But this belongs to covetousness or illiberality. Therefore meanness is not a distinct vice from the others.
_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher (Ethic. ii) accounts meanness a special vice opposed to magnificence.
_I answer that,_ As stated above (I-II, Q. 1, A. 3; Q. 18, A. 6), moral acts take their species from their end, wherefore in many cases they are denominated from that end. Accordingly a man is said to be mean (_parvificus_) because he intends to do something little (_parvum_). Now according to the Philosopher (De Praedic. Cap. Ad aliquid.) great and little are relative terms: and when we say that a mean man intends to do something little, this must be understood in relation to the kind of work he does. This may be little or great in two ways: in one way as regards the work itself to be done, in another as regards the expense. Accordingly the magnificent man intends princ.i.p.ally the greatness of his work, and secondarily he intends the greatness of the expense, which he does not shirk, so that he may produce a great work. Wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 4) that "the magnificent man with equal expenditure will produce a more magnificent result." On the other hand, the mean man intends princ.i.p.ally to spend little, wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 2) that "he seeks how he may spend least." As a result of this he intends to produce a little work, that is, he does not shrink from producing a little work, so long as he spends little. Wherefore the Philosopher says that "the mean man after going to great expense forfeits the good" of the magnificent work, "for the trifle" that he is unwilling to spend. Therefore it is evident that the mean man fails to observe the proportion that reason demands between expenditure and work. Now the essence of vice is that it consists in failing to do what is in accordance with reason. Hence it is manifest that meanness is a vice.
Reply Obj. 1: Virtue moderates little things, according to the rule of reason: from which rule the mean man declines, as stated in the Article. For he is called mean, not for moderating little things, but for declining from the rule of reason in moderating great or little things: hence meanness is a vice.
Reply Obj. 2: As the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5), "fear makes us take counsel": wherefore a mean man is careful in his reckonings, because he has an inordinate fear of spending his goods, even in things of the least account. Hence this is not praiseworthy, but sinful and reprehensible, because then a man does not regulate his affections according to reason, but, on the contrary, makes use of his reason in pursuance of his inordinate affections.
Reply Obj. 3: Just as the magnificent man has this in common with the liberal man, that he spends his money readily and with pleasure, so too the mean man in common with the illiberal or covetous man is loth and slow to spend. Yet they differ in this, that illiberality regards ordinary expenditure, while meanness regards great expenditure, which is a more difficult accomplishment: wherefore meanness is less sinful than illiberality. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 2) that "although meanness and its contrary vice are sinful, they do not bring shame on a man, since neither do they harm one"s neighbor, nor are they very disgraceful."
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SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 135, Art. 2]
Whether There Is a Vice Opposed to Meanness?
Objection 1: It seems that there is no vice opposed to meanness. For great is opposed to little. Now, magnificence is not a vice, but a virtue. Therefore no vice is opposed to meanness.
Obj. 2: Further, since meanness is a vice by deficiency, as stated above (A. 1), it seems that if any vice is opposed to meanness, it would merely consist in excessive spending. But those who spend much, where they ought to spend little, spend little where they ought to spend much, according to _Ethic._ iv, 2, and thus they have something of meanness. Therefore there is not a vice opposed to meanness.
Obj. 3: Further, moral acts take their species from their end, as stated above (A. 1). Now those who spend excessively, do so in order to make a show of their wealth, as stated in _Ethic._ iv, 2. But this belongs to vainglory, which is opposed to magnanimity, as stated above (Q. 131, A. 2). Therefore no vice is opposed to meanness.
_On the contrary,_ stands the authority of the Philosopher who (Ethic. ii, 8; iv, 2) places magnificence as a mean between two opposite vices.
_I answer that,_ Great is opposed to little. Also little and great are relative terms, as stated above (A. 1). Now just as expenditure may be little in comparison with the work, so may it be great in comparison with the work in that it exceeds the proportion which reason requires to exist between expenditure and work. Hence it is manifest that the vice of meanness, whereby a man intends to spend less than his work is worth, and thus fails to observe due proportion between his expenditure and his work, has a vice opposed to it, whereby a man exceeds this same proportion, by spending more than is proportionate to his work. This vice is called in Greek _banausia_, so called from the Greek _baunos_, because, like the fire in the furnace, it consumes everything. It is also called _apyrokalia_, i.e.
lacking good fire, since like fire it consumes all, but not for a good purpose. Hence in Latin it may be called _consumptio_ (waste).
Reply Obj. 1: Magnificence is so called from the great work done, but not from the expenditure being in excess of the work: for this belongs to the vice which is opposed to meanness.
Reply Obj. 2: To the one same vice there is opposed the virtue which observes the mean, and a contrary vice. Accordingly, then, the vice of waste is opposed to meanness in that it exceeds in expenditure the value of the work, by spending much where it behooved to spend little. But it is opposed to magnificence on the part of the great work, which the magnificent man intends princ.i.p.ally, in so far as when it behooves to spend much, it spends little or nothing.