QUESTION 143
OF THE PARTS OF TEMPERANCE, IN GENERAL
We must now consider the parts of temperance: we shall consider these same parts (1) in general; (2) each of them in particular.
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ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 143, Art.]
Whether the Parts of Temperance Are Rightly a.s.signed?
Objection 1: It would seem that Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii, 54) unbecomingly a.s.signs the parts of temperance, when he a.s.serts them to be "continence, mildness, and modesty." For continence is reckoned to be distinct from virtue (Ethic. vii, 1): whereas temperance is comprised under virtue. Therefore continence is not a part of temperance.
Obj. 2: Further, mildness seemingly softens hatred or anger. But temperance is not about these things, but about pleasures of touch, as stated above (Q. 141, A. 4). Therefore mildness is not a part of temperance.
Obj. 3: Further, modesty concerns external action, wherefore the Apostle says (Phil. 4:5): "Let your modesty be known to all men." Now external actions are the matter of justice, as stated above (Q. 58, A. 8). Therefore modesty is a part of justice rather than of temperance.
Obj. 4: Further, Macrobius (In Somn. Scip. i, 8) reckons many more parts of temperance: for he says that "temperance results in modesty, shamefacedness, abstinence, chast.i.ty, honesty, moderation, lowliness, sobriety, purity." Andronicus also says [*De Affectibus] that "the companions of temperance are gravity, continence, humility, simplicity, refinement, method, contentment." [*_Per-se-sufficientiam_ which could be rendered "self-sufficiency," but for the fact that this is taken in a bad sense. See Q. 169, A. 1.] Therefore it seems that Tully insufficiently reckoned the parts of temperance.
_I answer that,_ As stated above (QQ. 48, 128), a cardinal virtue may have three kinds of parts, namely integral, subjective, and potential. The integral parts of a virtue are the conditions the concurrence of which are necessary for virtue: and in this respect there are two integral parts of temperance, _shamefacedness,_ whereby one recoils from the disgrace that is contrary to temperance, and _honesty,_ whereby one loves the beauty of temperance. For, as stated above (Q. 141, A. 2, ad 3), temperance more than any other virtue lays claim to a certain comeliness, and the vices of intemperance excel others in disgrace.
The subjective parts of a virtue are its species: and the species of a virtue have to be differentiated according to the difference of matter or object. Now temperance is about pleasures of touch, which are of two kinds. For some are directed to nourishment: and in these as regards meat, there is _abstinence,_ and as regards drink properly there is _sobriety._ Other pleasures are directed to the power of procreation, and in these as regards the princ.i.p.al pleasure of the act itself of procreation, there is _chast.i.ty,_ and as to the pleasures incidental to the act, resulting, for instance, from kissing, touching, or fondling, we have _purity._
The potential parts of a princ.i.p.al virtue are called secondary virtues: for while the princ.i.p.al virtue observes the mode in some princ.i.p.al matter, these observe the mode in some other matter wherein moderation is not so difficult. Now it belongs to temperance to moderate pleasures of touch, which are most difficult to moderate.
Wherefore any virtue that is effective of moderation in some matter or other, and restrains the appet.i.te in its impulse towards something, may be reckoned a part of temperance, as a virtue annexed thereto.
This happens in three ways: first, in the inward movements of the soul; secondly, in the outward movements and actions of the body; thirdly, in outward things. Now besides the movement of concupiscence, which temperance moderates and restrains, we find in the soul three movements towards a particular object. In the first place there is the movement of the will when stirred by the impulse of pa.s.sion: and this movement is restrained by _continence,_ the effect of which is that, although a man suffer immoderate concupiscences, his will does not succ.u.mb to them. Another inward movement towards something is the movement of hope, and of the resultant daring, and this is moderated or restrained by _humility._ The third movement is that of anger, which tends towards revenge, and this is restrained by _meekness_ or _mildness._
With regard to bodily movements and actions, moderation and restraint is the effect of _modesty,_ which, according to Andronicus, has three parts. The first of these enables one to discern what to do and what not to do, and to observe the right order, and to persevere in what we do: this he a.s.signs to _method._ The second is that a man observe decorum in what he does, and this he ascribes to _refinement._ The third has to do with the conversation or any other intercourse between a man and his friends, and this is called _gravity._
With regard to external things, a twofold moderation has to be observed. First, we must not desire too many, and to this Macrobius a.s.signs _lowliness,_ and Andronicus _contentment_; secondly, we must not be too nice in our requirements, and to this Macrobius ascribes _moderation,_ Andronicus _simplicity._
Reply Obj. 1: It is true that continence differs from virtue, just as imperfect differs from perfect, as we shall state further on (Q. 165, A. 1); and in this sense it is condivided with virtue. Yet it has something in common with temperance both as to matter, since it is about pleasures of touch, and as to mode, since it is a kind of restraint. Hence it is suitably a.s.signed as a part of temperance.
Reply Obj. 2: Mildness or meekness is reckoned a part of temperance not because of a likeness of matter, but because they agree as to the mode of restraint and moderation as stated above.
Reply Obj. 3: In the matter of external action justice considers what is due to another. Modesty does not consider this, but only a certain moderation. Hence it is reckoned a part not of justice but of temperance.
Reply Obj. 4: Under modesty Tully includes whatever pertains to the moderation of bodily movements and external things, as well as the moderation of hope which we reckoned as pertaining to humility.
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QUESTION 144
OF SHAMEFACEDNESS (In Four Articles)
We must now consider the parts of temperance in particular: and in the first place the integral parts, which are shamefacedness and honesty. With regard to shamefacedness there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether shamefacedness is a virtue?
(2) What is its object?
(3) Who are the cause of a man being ashamed?
(4) What kind of people are ashamed?
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FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 144, Art. 1]
Whether Shamefacedness Is a Virtue?
Objection 1: It seems that shamefacedness is a virtue. For it is proper to a virtue "to observe the mean as fixed by reason": this is clear from the definition of virtue given in _Ethic._ ii, 6. Now shamefacedness observes the mean in this way, as the Philosopher observes (Ethic. ii, 7). Therefore shamefacedness is a virtue.
Obj. 2: Further, whatever is praiseworthy is either a virtue or something connected with virtue. Now shamefacedness is praiseworthy.
But it is not part of a virtue. For it is not a part of prudence, since it is not in the reason but in the appet.i.te; nor is it a part of justice. Since shamefacedness implies a certain pa.s.sion, whereas justice is not about the pa.s.sions; nor again is it a part of fort.i.tude, because it belongs to fort.i.tude to be persistent and aggressive, while it belongs to shamefacedness to recoil from something; nor lastly is it a part of temperance, since the latter is about desires, whereas shamefacedness is a kind of fear according as the Philosopher states (Ethic. iv, 9) and Damascene (De Fide Orth.
ii, 15). Hence it follows that shamefacedness is a virtue.
Obj. 3: Further, the honest and the virtuous are convertible according to Tully (De Offic. i, 27). Now shamefacedness is a part of honesty: for Ambrose says (De Offic. i, 43) that "shamefacedness is the companion and familiar of the restful mind, averse to wantonness, a stranger to any kind of excess, the friend of sobriety and the support of what is honest, a seeker after the beautiful." Therefore shamefacedness is a virtue.
Obj. 4: Further, every vice is opposed to a virtue. Now certain vices are opposed to shamefacedness, namely shamelessness and inordinate prudery. Therefore shamefacedness is a virtue.
Obj. 5: Further, "like acts beget like habits," according to _Ethic._ ii, 1. Now shamefacedness implies a praiseworthy act; wherefore from many such acts a habit results. But a habit of praiseworthy deeds is a virtue, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. i, 12). Therefore shamefacedness is a virtue.
_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 7; iv, 9) that shamefacedness is not a virtue.
_I answer that,_ Virtue is taken in two ways, in a strict sense and in a broad sense. Taken strictly virtue is a perfection, as stated in _Phys._ vii, 17, 18. Wherefore anything that is inconsistent with perfection, though it be good, falls short of the notion of virtue.
Now shamefacedness is inconsistent with perfection, because it is the fear of something base, namely of that which is disgraceful. Hence Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 15) that "shamefacedness is fear of a base action." Now just as hope is about a possible and difficult good, so is fear about a possible and arduous evil, as stated above (I-II, Q. 40, A. 1; Q. 41, A. 2; Q. 42, A. 3), when we were treating of the pa.s.sions. But one who is perfect as to a virtuous habit, does not apprehend that which would be disgraceful and base to do, as being possible and arduous, that is to say difficult for him to avoid; nor does he actually do anything base, so as to be in fear of disgrace. Therefore shamefacedness, properly speaking, is not a virtue, since it falls short of the perfection of virtue.
Taken, however, in a broad sense virtue denotes whatever is good and praiseworthy in human acts or pa.s.sions; and in this way shamefacedness is sometimes called a virtue, since it is a praiseworthy pa.s.sion.
Reply Obj. 1: Observing the mean is not sufficient for the notion of virtue, although it is one of the conditions included in virtue"s definition: but it is requisite, in addition to this, that it be "an elective habit," that is to say, operating from choice. Now shamefacedness denotes, not a habit but a pa.s.sion, nor does its movement result from choice, but from an impulse of pa.s.sion. Hence it falls short of the notion of virtue.
Reply Obj. 2: As stated above, shamefacedness is fear of baseness and disgrace. Now it has been stated (Q. 142, A. 4) that the vice of intemperance is most base and disgraceful. Wherefore shamefacedness pertains more to temperance than to any other virtue, by reason of its motive cause, which is a base action though not according to the species of the pa.s.sion, namely fear. Nevertheless in so far as the vices opposed to other virtues are base and disgraceful, shamefacedness may also pertain to other virtues.
Reply Obj. 3: Shamefacedness fosters honesty, by removing that which is contrary thereto, but not so as to attain to the perfection of honesty.
Reply Obj. 4: Every defect causes a vice, but not every good is sufficient for the notion of virtue. Consequently it does not follow that whatever is directly opposed to vice is a virtue, although every vice is opposed to a virtue, as regards its origin. Hence shamelessness, in so far as it results from excessive love of disgraceful things, is opposed to temperance.
Reply Obj. 5: Being frequently ashamed causes the habit of an acquired virtue whereby one avoids disgraceful things which are the object of shamefacedness, without continuing to be ashamed in their regard: although as a consequence of this acquired virtue, a man would be more ashamed, if confronted with the matter of shamefacedness.
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SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 144, Art. 2]
Whether Shamefacedness Is About a Disgraceful Action?
Objection 1: It would seem that shamefacedness is not about a disgraceful action. For the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 9) that "shamefacedness is fear of disgrace." Now sometimes those who do nothing wrong suffer ignominy, according to Ps. 67:8, "For thy sake I have borne reproach, shame hath covered my face." Therefore shamefacedness is not properly about a disgraceful action.
Obj. 2: Further, nothing apparently is disgraceful but what is sinful. Yet man is ashamed of things that are not sins, for instance when he performs a menial occupation. Therefore it seems that shamefacedness is not properly about a disgraceful action.
Obj. 3: Further, virtuous deeds are not disgraceful but most beautiful according to _Ethic._ i, 8. Yet sometimes people are ashamed to do virtuous deeds, according to Luke 9:26, "He that shall be ashamed of Me and My words, of him the Son of man shall be ashamed," etc. Therefore shamefacedness is not about a disgraceful action.