THIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 4, Art. 3]
Whether Any Creature Can Be Like G.o.d?
Objection 1: It seems that no creature can be like G.o.d. For it is written (Ps. 85:8): "There is none among the G.o.ds like unto Thee, O Lord." But of all creatures the most excellent are those which are called by partic.i.p.ation G.o.ds. Therefore still less can other creatures be said to be like G.o.d.
Obj. 2: Further, likeness implies comparison. But there can be no comparison between things in a different genus. Therefore neither can there be any likeness. Thus we do not say that sweetness is like whiteness. But no creature is in the same genus as G.o.d: since G.o.d is no genus, as shown above (Q. 3, A. 5). Therefore no creature is like G.o.d.
Obj. 3: Further, we speak of those things as like which agree in form. But nothing can agree with G.o.d in form; for, save in G.o.d alone, essence and existence differ. Therefore no creature can be like to G.o.d.
Obj. 4: Further, among like things there is mutual likeness; for like is like to like. If therefore any creature is like G.o.d, G.o.d will be like some creature, which is against what is said by Isaias: "To whom have you likened G.o.d?" (Isa. 40:18).
_On the contrary,_ It is written: "Let us make man to our image and likeness" (Gen. 1:26), and: "When He shall appear we shall be like to Him" (1 John 3:2).
_I answer that,_ Since likeness is based upon agreement or communication in form, it varies according to the many modes of communication in form. Some things are said to be like, which communicate in the same form according to the same formality, and according to the same mode; and these are said to be not merely like, but equal in their likeness; as two things equally white are said to be alike in whiteness; and this is the most perfect likeness. In another way, we speak of things as alike which communicate in form according to the same formality, though not according to the same measure, but according to more or less, as something less white is said to be like another thing more white; and this is imperfect likeness. In a third way some things are said to be alike which communicate in the same form, but not according to the same formality; as we see in non-univocal agents. For since every agent reproduces itself so far as it is an agent, and everything acts according to the manner of its form, the effect must in some way resemble the form of the agent. If therefore the agent is contained in the same species as its effect, there will be a likeness in form between that which makes and that which is made, according to the same formality of the species; as man reproduces man. If, however, the agent and its effect are not contained in the same species, there will be a likeness, but not according to the formality of the same species; as things generated by the sun"s heat may be in some sort spoken of as like the sun, not as though they received the form of the sun in its specific likeness, but in its generic likeness. Therefore if there is an agent not contained in any genus, its effect will still more distantly reproduce the form of the agent, not, that is, so as to partic.i.p.ate in the likeness of the agent"s form according to the same specific or generic formality, but only according to some sort of a.n.a.logy; as existence is common to all. In this way all created things, so far as they are beings, are like G.o.d as the first and universal principle of all being.
Reply Obj. 1: As Dionysius says (Div. Nom. ix), when Holy Writ declares that nothing is like G.o.d, it does not mean to deny all likeness to Him. For, "the same things can be like and unlike to G.o.d: like, according as they imitate Him, as far as He, Who is not perfectly imitable, can be imitated; unlike according as they fall short of their cause," not merely in intensity and remission, as that which is less white falls short of that which is more white; but because they are not in agreement, specifically or generically.
Reply Obj. 2: G.o.d is not related to creatures as though belonging to a different genus, but as transcending every genus, and as the principle of all genera.
Reply Obj. 3: Likeness of creatures to G.o.d is not affirmed on account of agreement in form according to the formality of the same genus or species, but solely according to a.n.a.logy, inasmuch as G.o.d is essential being, whereas other things are beings by partic.i.p.ation.
Reply Obj. 4: Although it may be admitted that creatures are in some sort like G.o.d, it must nowise be admitted that G.o.d is like creatures; because, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. ix): "A mutual likeness may be found between things of the same order, but not between a cause and that which is caused." For, we say that a statue is like a man, but not conversely; so also a creature can be spoken of as in some sort like G.o.d; but not that G.o.d is like a creature.
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QUESTION 5
OF GOODNESS IN GENERAL (In Six Articles)
We next consider goodness: First, goodness in general. Secondly, the goodness of G.o.d.
Under the first head there are six points of inquiry:
(1) Whether goodness and being are the same really?
(2) Granted that they differ only in idea, which is prior in thought?
(3) Granted that being is prior, whether every being is good?
(4) To what cause should goodness be reduced?
(5) Whether goodness consists in mode, species, and order?
(6) Whether goodness is divided into the virtuous, the useful, and the pleasant?
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FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 5, Art. 1]
Whether Goodness Differs Really from Being?
Objection 1: It seems that goodness differs really from being. For Boethius says (De Hebdom.): "I perceive that in nature the fact that things are good is one thing: that they are is another." Therefore goodness and being really differ.
Obj. 2: Further, nothing can be its own form. "But that is called good which has the form of being," according to the commentary on _De Causis._ Therefore goodness differs really from being.
Obj. 3: Further, goodness can be more or less. But being cannot be more or less. Therefore goodness differs really from being.
_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 42) that, "inasmuch as we exist we are good."
_I answer that,_ Goodness and being are really the same, and differ only in idea; which is clear from the following argument. The essence of goodness consists in this, that it is in some way desirable. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. i): "Goodness is what all desire." Now it is clear that a thing is desirable only in so far as it is perfect; for all desire their own perfection. But everything is perfect so far as it is actual. Therefore it is clear that a thing is perfect so far as it exists; for it is existence that makes all things actual, as is clear from the foregoing (Q. 3, A. 4; Q. 4, A. 1). Hence it is clear that goodness and being are the same really. But goodness presents the aspect of desirableness, which being does not present.
Reply Obj. 1: Although goodness and being are the same really, nevertheless since they differ in thought, they are not predicated of a thing absolutely in the same way. Since being properly signifies that something actually is, and actuality properly correlates to potentiality; a thing is, in consequence, said simply to have being, accordingly as it is primarily distinguished from that which is only in potentiality; and this is precisely each thing"s substantial being.
Hence by its substantial being, everything is said to have being simply; but by any further actuality it is said to have being relatively. Thus to be white implies relative being, for to be white does not take a thing out of simply potential being; because only a thing that actually has being can receive this mode of being. But goodness signifies perfection which is desirable; and consequently of ultimate perfection. Hence that which has ultimate perfection is said to be simply good; but that which has not the ultimate perfection it ought to have (although, in so far as it is at all actual, it has some perfection), is not said to be perfect simply nor good simply, but only relatively. In this way, therefore, viewed in its primal (i.e.
substantial) being a thing is said to be simply, and to be good relatively (i.e. in so far as it has being) but viewed in its complete actuality, a thing is said to be relatively, and to be good simply.
Hence the saying of Boethius (De Hebdom.), "I perceive that in nature the fact that things are good is one thing; that they are is another,"
is to be referred to a thing"s goodness simply, and having being simply. Because, regarded in its primal actuality, a thing simply exists; and regarded in its complete actuality, it is good simply--in such sort that even in its primal actuality, it is in some sort good, and even in its complete actuality, it in some sort has being.
Reply Obj. 2: Goodness is a form so far as absolute goodness signifies complete actuality.
Reply Obj. 3: Again, goodness is spoken of as more or less according to a thing"s superadded actuality, for example, as to knowledge or virtue.
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SECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 5, Art. 2]
Whether Goodness Is Prior in Idea to Being?
Objection 1: It seems that goodness is prior in idea to being. For names are arranged according to the arrangement of the things signified by the names. But Dionysius (Div. Nom. iii) a.s.signed the first place, amongst the other names of G.o.d, to His goodness rather than to His being. Therefore in idea goodness is prior to being.
Obj. 2: Further, that which is the more extensive is prior in idea. But goodness is more extensive than being, because, as Dionysius notes (Div. Nom. v), "goodness extends to things both existing and non-existing; whereas existence extends to existing things alone."
Therefore goodness is in idea prior to being.
Obj. 3: Further, what is the more universal is prior in idea. But goodness seems to be more universal than being, since goodness has the aspect of desirable; whereas to some non-existence is desirable; for it is said of Judas: "It were better for him, if that man had not been born" (Matt. 26:24). Therefore in idea goodness is prior to being.
Obj. 4: Further, not only is existence desirable, but life, knowledge, and many other things besides. Thus it seems that existence is a particular appetible, and goodness a universal appetible.
Therefore, absolutely, goodness is prior in idea to being.
_On the contrary,_ It is said by Aristotle (De Causis) that "the first of created things is being."
_I answer that,_ In idea being is prior to goodness. For the meaning signified by the name of a thing is that which the mind conceives of the thing and intends by the word that stands for it. Therefore, that is prior in idea, which is first conceived by the intellect. Now the first thing conceived by the intellect is being; because everything is knowable only inasmuch as it is in actuality. Hence, being is the proper object of the intellect, and is primarily intelligible; as sound is that which is primarily audible. Therefore in idea being is prior to goodness.
Reply Obj. 1: Dionysius discusses the Divine Names (Div. Nom.
i, iii) as implying some causal relation in G.o.d; for we name G.o.d, as he says, from creatures, as a cause from its effects. But goodness, since it has the aspect of desirable, implies the idea of a final cause, the causality of which is first among causes, since an agent does not act except for some end; and by an agent matter is moved to its form. Hence the end is called the cause of causes. Thus goodness, as a cause, is prior to being, as is the end to the form. Therefore among the names signifying the divine causality, goodness precedes being. Again, according to the Platonists, who, through not distinguishing primary matter from privation, said that matter was non-being, goodness is more extensively partic.i.p.ated than being; for primary matter partic.i.p.ates in goodness as tending to it, for all seek their like; but it does not partic.i.p.ate in being, since it is presumed to be non-being. Therefore Dionysius says that "goodness extends to non-existence" (Div. Nom. v).
Reply Obj. 2: The same solution is applied to this objection.
Or it may be said that goodness extends to existing and non-existing things, not so far as it can be predicated of them, but so far as it can cause them--if, indeed, by non-existence we understand not simply those things which do not exist, but those which are potential, and not actual. For goodness has the aspect of the end, in which not only actual things find their completion, but also towards which tend even those things which are not actual, but merely potential. Now being implies the habitude of a formal cause only, either inherent or exemplar; and its causality does not extend save to those things which are actual.
Reply Obj. 3: Non-being is desirable, not of itself, but only relatively--i.e. inasmuch as the removal of an evil, which can only be removed by non-being, is desirable. Now the removal of an evil cannot be desirable, except so far as this evil deprives a thing of some being. Therefore being is desirable of itself; and non-being only relatively, inasmuch as one seeks some mode of being of which one cannot bear to be deprived; thus even non-being can be spoken of as relatively good.
Reply Obj. 4: Life, wisdom, and the like, are desirable only so far as they are actual. Hence, in each one of them some sort of being is desired. And thus nothing can be desired except being; and consequently nothing is good except being.
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