Moreover, as again Augustine says (Super Gen. contra Manich. ii, 17, 18), "his, that is, the devil"s, punishment mentioned here is that for which we must be on our guard against him, not that which is reserved till the last judgment. For when it was said to him: "Thou art cursed among all cattle and beasts of the earth," the cattle are set above him, not in power, but in the preservation of their nature, since the cattle lost no heavenly bliss, seeing that they never had it, but they continue to live in the nature which they received." It is also said to him: ""Upon thy breast and belly shalt thou creep,""
according to another version [*The Septuagint] "Here the breast signifies pride, because it is there that the impulse of the soul dominates, while the belly denotes carnal desire, because this part of the body is softest to the touch: and on these he creeps to those whom he wishes to deceive." The words, ""Earth shalt thou eat all the days of thy life" may be understood in two ways. Either "Those shall belong to thee, whom thou shalt deceive by earthly l.u.s.t," namely sinners who are signified under the name of earth, or a third kind of temptation, namely curiosity, is signified by these words: for to eat earth is to look into things deep and dark." The putting of enmities between him and the woman "means that we cannot be tempted by the devil, except through that part of the soul which bears or reflects the likeness of a woman. The seed of the devil is the temptation to evil, the seed of the woman is the fruit of good works, whereby the temptation to evil is resisted. Wherefore the serpent lies in wait for the woman"s heel, that if at any time she fall away towards what is unlawful, pleasure may seize hold of her: and she watches his head that she may shut him out at the very outset of the evil temptation."
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QUESTION 166
OF STUDIOUSNESS (In Two Articles)
We must next consider studiousness and its opposite, curiosity.
Concerning studiousness there are two points of inquiry:
(1) What is the matter of studiousness?
(2) Whether it is a part of temperance?
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FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 166, Art. 1]
Whether the Proper Matter of Studiousness Is Knowledge?
Objection 1: It would seem that knowledge is not the proper matter of studiousness. For a person is said to be studious because he applies study to certain things. Now a man ought to apply study to every matter, in order to do aright what has to be done. Therefore seemingly knowledge is not the special matter of studiousness.
Obj. 2: Further, studiousness is opposed to curiosity. Now curiosity, which is derived from _cura_ (care), may also refer to elegance of apparel and other such things, which regard the body; wherefore the Apostle says (Rom. 13:14): "Make not provision (_curam_) for the flesh in its concupiscences."
Obj. 3: Further it is written (Jer. 6:13): "From the least of them even to the greatest, all study [Douay: "are given to"]
covetousness." Now covetousness is not properly about knowledge, but rather about the possession of wealth, as stated above (Q. 118, A.
2). Therefore studiousness, which is derived from "study," is not properly about knowledge.
_On the contrary,_ It is written (Prov. 27:11): "Study wisdom, my son, and make my heart joyful, that thou mayest give an answer to him that reproacheth." Now study, which is commended as a virtue, is the same as that to which the Law urges. Therefore studiousness is properly about _knowledge._
_I answer that,_ Properly speaking, study denotes keen application of the mind to something. Now the mind is not applied to a thing except by knowing that thing. Wherefore the mind"s application to knowledge precedes its application to those things to which man is directed by his knowledge. Hence study regards knowledge in the first place, and as a result it regards any other things the working of which requires to be directed by knowledge. Now the virtues lay claim to that matter about which they are first and foremost; thus fort.i.tude is concerned about dangers of death, and temperance about pleasures of touch.
Therefore studiousness is properly ascribed to knowledge.
Reply Obj. 1: Nothing can be done aright as regards other matters, except in so far as is previously directed by the knowing reason.
Hence studiousness, to whatever matter it be applied, has a prior regard for knowledge.
Reply Obj. 2: Man"s mind is drawn, on account of his affections, towards the things for which he has an affection, according to Matt.
6:21, "Where thy treasure is, there is thy heart also." And since man has special affection for those things which foster the flesh, it follows that man"s thoughts are concerned about things that foster his flesh, so that man seeks to know how he may best sustain his body. Accordingly curiosity is accounted to be about things pertaining to the body by reason of things pertaining to knowledge.
Reply Obj. 3: Covetousness craves the acquisition of gain, and for this it is very necessary to be skilled in earthly things.
Accordingly studiousness is ascribed to things pertaining to covetousness.
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SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 166, Art. 2]
Whether Studiousness Is a Part of Temperance?
Objection 1: It would seem that studiousness is not a part of temperance. For a man is said to be studious by reason of his studiousness. Now all virtuous persons without exception are called studious according to the Philosopher, who frequently employs the term "studious" (_spoudaios_) in this sense (Ethic. ix, 4, 8, 9).
[*In the same sense Aristotle says in _Ethic._ iii, 2, that "every vicious person is ignorant of what he ought to do."] Therefore studiousness is a general virtue, and not a part of temperance.
Obj. 2: Further, studiousness, as stated (A. 1), pertains to knowledge. But knowledge has no connection with the moral virtues which are in the appet.i.tive part of the soul, and pertains rather to the intellectual virtues which are in the cognitive part: wherefore solicitude is an act of prudence as stated above (Q. 47, A. 9).
Therefore studiousness is not a part of temperance.
Obj. 3: Further, a virtue that is ascribed as part of a princ.i.p.al virtue resembles the latter as to mode. Now studiousness does not resemble temperance as to mode, because temperance takes its name from being a kind of restraint, wherefore it is more opposed to the vice that is in excess: whereas studiousness is denominated from being the application of the mind to something, so that it would seem to be opposed to the vice that is in default, namely, neglect of study, rather than to the vice which is in excess, namely curiosity.
wherefore, on account of its resemblance to the latter, Isidore says (Etym. x) that "a studious man is one who is curious to study."
Therefore studiousness is not a part of temperance.
_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Morib. Eccl. 21): "We are forbidden to be curious: and this is a great gift that temperance bestows." Now curiosity is prevented by moderate studiousness.
Therefore studiousness is a part of temperance.
_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 141, AA. 3, 4, 5), it belongs to temperance to moderate the movement of the appet.i.te, lest it tend excessively to that which is desired naturally. Now just as in respect of his corporeal nature man naturally desires the pleasures of food and s.e.x, so, in respect of his soul, he naturally desires to know something; thus the Philosopher observes at the beginning of his _Metaphysics_ (i, 1): "All men have a natural desire for knowledge."
The moderation of this desire pertains to the virtue of studiousness; wherefore it follows that studiousness is a potential part of temperance, as a subordinate virtue annexed to a princ.i.p.al virtue.
Moreover, it is comprised under modesty for the reason given above (Q. 160, A. 2).
Reply Obj. 1: Prudence is the complement of all the moral virtues, as stated in _Ethic._ vi, 13. Consequently, in so far as the knowledge of prudence pertains to all the virtues, the term "studiousness,"
which properly regards knowledge, is applied to all the virtues.
Reply Obj. 2: The act of a cognitive power is commanded by the appet.i.tive power, which moves all the powers, as stated above (I-II, Q. 9, A. 1). Wherefore knowledge regards a twofold good. One is connected with the act of knowledge itself; and this good pertains to the intellectual virtues, and consists in man having a true estimate about each thing. The other good pertains to the act of the appet.i.tive power, and consists in man"s appet.i.te being directed aright in applying the cognitive power in this or that way to this or that thing. And this belongs to the virtue of seriousness. Wherefore it is reckoned among the moral virtues.
Reply Obj. 3: As the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 93) in order to be virtuous we must avoid those things to which we are most naturally inclined. Hence it is that, since nature inclines us chiefly to fear dangers of death, and to seek pleasures of the flesh, fort.i.tude is chiefly commended for a certain steadfast perseverance against such dangers, and temperance for a certain restraint from pleasures of the flesh. But as regards knowledge, man has contrary inclinations. For on the part of the soul, he is inclined to desire knowledge of things; and so it behooves him to exercise a praiseworthy restraint on this desire, lest he seek knowledge immoderately: whereas on the part of his bodily nature, man is inclined to avoid the trouble of seeking knowledge. Accordingly, as regards the first inclination studiousness is a kind of restraint, and it is in this sense that it is reckoned a part of temperance. But as to the second inclination, this virtue derives its praise from a certain keenness of interest in seeking knowledge of things; and from this it takes its name. The former is more essential to this virtue than the latter: since the desire to know directly regards knowledge, to which studiousness is directed, whereas the trouble of learning is an obstacle to knowledge, wherefore it is regarded by this virtue indirectly, as by that which removes an obstacle.
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QUESTION 167
OF CURIOSITY (In Two Articles)
We must next consider curiosity, under which head there are two points of inquiry:
(1) Whether the vice of curiosity can regard intellective knowledge?
(2) Whether it is about sensitive knowledge?
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FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 167, Art. 1]
Whether Curiosity Can Be About Intellective Knowledge?
Objection 1: It would seem that curiosity cannot be about intellective knowledge. Because, according to the Philosopher (Ethic.
ii, 6), there can be no mean and extremes in things which are essentially good. Now intellective knowledge is essentially good: because man"s perfection would seem to consist in his intellect being reduced from potentiality to act, and this is done by the knowledge of truth. For Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that "the good of the human soul is to be in accordance with reason," whose perfection consists in knowing the truth. Therefore the vice of curiosity cannot be about intellective knowledge.
Obj. 2: Further, that which makes man like to G.o.d, and which he receives from G.o.d, cannot be an evil. Now all abundance of knowledge is from G.o.d, according to Ecclus. 1:1, "All wisdom is from the Lord G.o.d," and Wis. 7:17, "He hath given me the true knowledge of things that are, to know the disposition of the whole world, and the virtues of the elements," etc. Again, by knowing the truth man is likened to G.o.d, since "all things are naked and open to His eyes" (Heb. 4:13), and "the Lord is a G.o.d of all knowledge" (1 Kings 2:3). Therefore however abundant knowledge of truth may be, it is not evil but good.
Now the desire of good is not sinful. Therefore the vice of curiosity cannot be about the intellective knowledge of truth.
Obj. 3: Further, if the vice of curiosity can be about any kind of intellective knowledge, it would be chiefly about the philosophical sciences. But, seemingly, there is no sin in being intent on them: for Jerome says (Super Daniel 1:8): "Those who refused to partake of the king"s meat and wine, lest they should be defiled, if they had considered the wisdom and teaching of the Babylonians to be sinful, would never have consented to learn that which was unlawful": and Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. ii, 40) that "if the philosophers made any true statements, we must claim them for our own use, as from unjust possessors." Therefore curiosity about intellective knowledge cannot be sinful.
_On the contrary,_ Jerome [*Comment. in Ep. ad Ephes. iv, 17] says: "Is it not evident that a man who day and night wrestles with the dialectic art, the student of natural science whose gaze pierces the heavens, walks in vanity of understanding and darkness of mind?" Now vanity of understanding and darkness of mind are sinful. Therefore curiosity about intellective sciences may be sinful.
_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 166, A. 2, ad 2) studiousness is directly, not about knowledge itself, but about the desire and study in the pursuit of knowledge. Now we must judge differently of the knowledge itself of truth, and of the desire and study in the pursuit of the knowledge of truth. For the knowledge of truth, strictly speaking, is good, but it may be evil accidentally, by reason of some result, either because one takes pride in knowing the truth, according to 1 Cor. 8:1, "Knowledge puffeth up," or because one uses the knowledge of truth in order to sin.