Obj. 4: Further, the good are more closely united to G.o.d than the wicked. But the good do not all work miracles. Much less therefore do the wicked.
_On the contrary,_ The Apostle says (1 Cor. 13:2): "If I should have all faith, so that I could remove mountains, and have not charity, I am nothing." Now whosoever has not charity is wicked, because "this gift alone of the Holy Ghost distinguishes the children of the kingdom from the children of perdition," as Augustine says (De Trin.
xv, 18). Therefore it would seem that even the wicked can work miracles.
_I answer that,_ Some miracles are not true but imaginary deeds, because they delude man by the appearance of that which is not; while others are true deeds, yet they have not the character of a true miracle, because they are done by the power of some natural cause.
Both of these can be done by the demons, as stated above (A. 1, ad 2).
True miracles cannot be wrought save by the power of G.o.d, because G.o.d works them for man"s benefit, and this in two ways: in one way for the confirmation of truth declared, in another way in proof of a person"s holiness, which G.o.d desires to propose as an example of virtue. In the first way miracles can be wrought by any one who preaches the true faith and calls upon Christ"s name, as even the wicked do sometimes. In this way even the wicked can work miracles.
Hence Jerome commenting on Matt. 7:22, "Have not we prophesied in Thy name?" says: "Sometimes prophesying, the working of miracles, and the casting out of demons are accorded not to the merit of those who do these things, but to the invoking of Christ"s name, that men may honor G.o.d, by invoking Whom such great miracles are wrought."
In the second way miracles are not wrought except by the saints, since it is in proof of their holiness that miracles are wrought during their lifetime or after death, either by themselves or by others. For we read (Acts 19:11, 12) that "G.o.d wrought by the hand of Paul ... miracles" and "even there were brought from his body to the sick, handkerchiefs ... and the diseases departed from them."
In this way indeed there is nothing to prevent a sinner from working miracles by invoking a saint; but the miracle is ascribed not to him, but to the one in proof of whose holiness such things are done.
Reply Obj. 1: As stated above (Q. 83, A. 16) when we were treating of prayer, the prayer of impetration relies not on merit but on G.o.d"s mercy, which extends even to the wicked, wherefore the prayers even of sinners are sometimes granted by G.o.d. Hence Augustine says (Tract.
xliv in Joan.) that "the blind man spoke these words before he was anointed," that is, before he was perfectly enlightened; "since G.o.d does hear sinners." When it is said that the prayer of one who hears not the law is an abomination, this must be understood so far as the sinner"s merit is concerned; yet it is sometimes granted, either for the spiritual welfare of the one who prays--as the publican was heard (Luke 18:14)--or for the good of others and for G.o.d"s glory.
Reply Obj. 2: Faith without works is said to be dead, as regards the believer, who lives not, by faith, with the life of grace. But nothing hinders a living thing from working through a dead instrument, as a man through a stick. It is thus that G.o.d works while employing instrumentally the faith of a sinner.
Reply Obj. 3: Miracles are always true witnesses to the purpose for which they are wrought. Hence wicked men who teach a false doctrine never work true miracles in confirmation of their teaching, although sometimes they may do so in praise of Christ"s name which they invoke, and by the power of the sacraments which they administer. If they teach a true doctrine, sometimes they work true miracles as confirming their teaching, but not as an attestation of holiness.
Hence Augustine says (QQ. lx.x.xiii, qu. 79): "Magicians work miracles in one way, good Christians in another, wicked Christians in another.
Magicians by private compact with the demons, good Christians by their manifest righteousness, evil Christians by the outward signs of righteousness."
Reply Obj. 4: As Augustine says (QQ. lx.x.xiii, qu. 79), "the reason why these are not granted to all holy men is lest by a most baneful error the weak be deceived into thinking such deeds to imply greater gifts than the deeds of righteousness whereby eternal life is obtained."
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QUESTION 179
OF THE DIVISION OF LIFE INTO ACTIVE AND CONTEMPLATIVE (In Two Articles)
We must next consider active and contemplative life. This consideration will be fourfold: (1) Of the division of life into active and contemplative; (2) Of the contemplative life; (3) Of the active life; (4) Of the comparison between the active and the contemplative life.
Under the first head there are two points of inquiry:
(1) Whether life is fittingly divided into active and contemplative?
(2) Whether this is an adequate division?
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FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 179, Art. 1]
Whether Life Is Fittingly Divided into Active and Contemplative?
Objection 1: It would seem that life is not fittingly divided into active and contemplative. For the soul is the principle of life by its essence: since the Philosopher says (De Anima ii, 4) that "in living things to live is to be." Now the soul is the principle of action and contemplation by its powers. Therefore it would seem that life is not fittingly divided into active and contemplative.
Obj. 2: Further, the division of that which comes afterwards is unfittingly applied to that which comes first. Now active and contemplative, or "speculative" and "practical," are differences of the intellect (De Anima iii, 10); while "to live" comes before "to understand," since "to live" comes first to living things through the vegetative soul, as the Philosopher states (De Anima ii, 4).
Therefore life is unfittingly divided into active and contemplative.
Obj. 3: Further, the word "life" implies movement, according to Dionysius (Div. Nom. vi): whereas contemplation consists rather in rest, according to Wis. 8:16: "When I enter into my house, I shall repose myself with her." Therefore it would seem that life is unfittingly divided into active and contemplative.
_On the contrary,_ Gregory says (Hom. xiv super Ezech.): "There is a twofold life wherein Almighty G.o.d instructs us by His holy word, the active life and the contemplative."
_I answer that,_ Properly speaking, those things are said to live whose movement or operation is from within themselves. Now that which is proper to a thing and to which it is most inclined is that which is most becoming to it from itself; wherefore every living thing gives proof of its life by that operation which is most proper to it, and to which it is most inclined. Thus the life of plants is said to consist in nourishment and generation; the life of animals in sensation and movement; and the life of men in their understanding and acting according to reason. Wherefore also in men the life of every man would seem to be that wherein he delights most, and on which he is most intent; thus especially does he wish "to a.s.sociate with his friends" (Ethic. ix, 12).
Accordingly since certain men are especially intent on the contemplation of truth, while others are especially intent on external actions, it follows that man"s life is fittingly divided into active and contemplative.
Reply Obj. 1: Each thing"s proper form that makes it actually _to be_ is properly that thing"s principle of operation. Hence _to live_ is, in living things, _to be,_ because living things through having _being_ from their form, act in such and such a way.
Reply Obj. 2: Life in general is not divided into active and contemplative, but the life of man, who derives his species from having an intellect, wherefore the same division applies to intellect and human life.
Reply Obj. 3: It is true that contemplation enjoys rest from external movements. Nevertheless to contemplate is itself a movement of the intellect, in so far as every operation is described as a movement; in which sense the Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 7) that sensation and understanding are movements of a kind, in so far as movement is defined "the act of a perfect thing." In this way Dionysius (Div.
Nom. iv) ascribes three movements to the soul in contemplation, namely, "straight," "circular," and "oblique" [*Cf. Q. 180, A. 6].
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SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 179, Art. 2]
Whether Life Is Adequately Divided into Active and Contemplative?
Objection 1: It would seem that life is not adequately divided into active and contemplative. For the Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 5) that there are three most prominent kinds of life, the life of "pleasure,"
the "civil" which would seem to be the same as the active, and the "contemplative" life. Therefore the division of life into active and contemplative would seem to be inadequate.
Obj. 2: Further, Augustine (De Civ. Dei xix, 1, 2, 3, 19) mentions three kinds of life, namely the life of "leisure" which pertains to the contemplative, the "busy" life which pertains to the active, and a third "composed of both." Therefore it would seem that life is inadequately divided into active and contemplative.
Obj. 3: Further, man"s life is diversified according to the divers actions in which men are occupied. Now there are more than two occupations of human actions. Therefore it would seem that life should be divided into more kinds than the active and the contemplative.
_On the contrary,_ These two lives are signified by the two wives of Jacob; the active by Lia, and the contemplative by Rachel: and by the two hostesses of our Lord; the contemplative life by Mary, and the active life by Martha, as Gregory declares (Moral. vi, 37 [*Hom. xiv in Ezech.]). Now this signification would not be fitting if there were more than two lives. Therefore life is adequately divided into active and contemplative.
_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1, ad 2), this division applies to the human life as derived from the intellect. Now the intellect is divided into active and contemplative, since the end of intellective knowledge is either the knowledge itself of truth, which pertains to the contemplative intellect, or some external action, which pertains to the practical or active intellect. Therefore life too is adequately divided into active and contemplative.
Reply Obj. 1: The life of pleasure places its end in pleasures of the body, which are common to us and dumb animals; wherefore as the Philosopher says (Ethic. _Ethic._ i, 5), it is the life "of a beast."
Hence it is not included in this division of the life of a man into active and contemplative.
Reply Obj. 2: A mean is a combination of extremes, wherefore it is virtually contained in them, as tepid in hot and cold, and pale in white and black. In like manner active and contemplative comprise that which is composed of both. Nevertheless as in every mixture one of the simples predominates, so too in the mean state of life sometimes the contemplative, sometimes the active element, abounds.
Reply Obj. 3: All the occupations of human actions, if directed to the requirements of the present life in accord with right reason, belong to the active life which provides for the necessities of the present life by means of well-ordered activity. If, on the other hand, they minister to any concupiscence whatever, they belong to the life of pleasure, which is not comprised under the active life.
Those human occupations that are directed to the consideration of truth belong to the contemplative life.
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QUESTION 180
OF THE CONTEMPLATIVE LIFE (In Eight Articles)
We must now consider the contemplative life, under which head there are eight points of inquiry:
(1) Whether the contemplative life pertains to the intellect only, or also to the affections?
(2) Whether the moral virtues pertain to the contemplative life?
(3) Whether the contemplative life consists in one action or in several?